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Communism was not the crazy fantasy of a few fanatics, nor the result of human stupidity and baseness; it was a real, very real part of the history of the twentieth century, and we cannot understand this history of ours without understanding communism. We cannot get rid of this specter by saying it was just “human stupidity,” or “human corruptibility.” The specter is stronger than the spells we cast on it. It might come back to life.

Leszek Kolakowski, Introduction to My Correct Views on Everything













1 The Darkness of Disinheritance

I began these volumes with the Enlightenment and the emancipatory, but problematic, connection between reason and freedom, raising the issue of its disconnection in modern social forms and what needs to be done socially and institutionally for its reconnection. I return in this concluding volume to make some final observations on Enlightenment rationality. I hope to have demonstrated in these two volumes on Marx that there is no automatic, uni-linear connection between reason and freedom in history and that, as Marx is concerned to emphasise, mediation matters. There is ‘Reason’ as an extraneous force unfolding its design in history. The character assumed by reason and rationality very much depends upon the social forms through which these things are expressed by creative agents in history. I have made a very strong case for Marx’s socialism as the free and rational society that is premised upon forms of social self-mediation facilitating human flourishing, mediating the exchange between humanity and nature rationally. Such mediation restores the connection between reason and freedom that has been broken up by capital’s alien forms, realizing a reason that has its normative-developmental component firmly in place with respect to human flourishing.

I have cited – in agreement – Scott Meikle’s view that Marx’s Capital is the greatest book of human self-understanding in history. (Meikle 1985). And I have made a strong case for reclaiming growth as the actualization of healthy human potentials to bring about a society in which human social power is exercised creatively. Marx gives us a society of self-knowledge, a vision of a realized humanity in a realized society in conscious control of its means of life. I find the view cogent and compelling, and have developed it at length.

In this final Part, I wish to make some disquieting observations with respect to this vision of a future society of knowledge and power, focusing attention particularly on its ethical and philosophical grounding. In setting Marx’s thought within its essentialist framework, I have sought to render power as something healthy, something defined in terms of a natural growth, emphasizing the realization of healthy potentials and their creative exercise in the community of others as a dimension of flourishing. Power in this ‘rational’ conception is not something external, an outside force, something potentially evil and repressive that needs to be staked down and hemmed in with constraints, laws, and regulations but something internal and intimate that works within human subjectivity. This view clearly repudiates the liberal ontology that sees nothing but discrete individuals with natural liberty and private interests, a self-possession that restricts common purpose to the securing and protecting of individual rights as claims against others. In the liberal view, power is extraneous, something potentially repressive of individual freedom that needs to be severely delimited. I take the liberal view to be socially, politically and morally illiterate, blocking individuals from the public life they need in order to individuate themselves as social beings. The origin of the word politics is polites, denoting those interested in public affairs. Human beings are social beings requiring that politics as creative self-realisation through public life. The antonym of polites is idiotes, those interested only in private affairs. The liberal view, premised on discrete individuals, sees government not in terms of any common purpose enhancing individual liberty but as a mutual insurance pact securing and protecting private self-interest, and nothing more. That view comes with a pronounced sense of power as a dangerous and corrupting force that needs to be strictly delimited. Of course, it is the liberal ontology, in falsely separating individuality and sociality in the first place, starting with individuals as self-interested beings as prior to and privileged before society that is the source of the corruption and danger in the first place. Liberalism makes a virtue of an insurance and a protection vis an extraneous and abstract collective power that is the inevitable product of the liberal ontology. Marx’s view of power comes from other sources entirely. Far from being a ‘totalitarian’ whose thickly-textured communitarianism is inimical to individual liberty, Marx is a thorough and consistent critic of liberalism and the way it leaves ‘free’ individuals subordinated to the external constraint of their own alien collective power. Marx shows the way to practically reappropriate that power and reorganise and exercise it as a conscious social power. It is that healthy and creative sense of power that I emphasise in Marx, making a strong case for socialism as the truly human society of truly human individuals. I stand by that view, but am concerned about a missing dimension, a certain spiritual deficiency. In this final volume, then, I wish to examine the possibilities for this conception to tip over into something much less healthy.

There has been a lot of heavy reading to get to this point, and the few who are likely to have made it this far will be incorrigible enthusiasts like myself who stand most in need of what I now about to say. Anyone who has read this far will most likely agree with my view that Marx offers us the critical resources to take us to socialism as the realized human society of realized human beings. As an emancipatory vision of a future alternative society, it is infinitely superior to everything else on offer (which is a modest enough claim given the competition, which, one after the other, turn out to be institutionally and structurally deficient). All friends together at this late stage, let us all agree with the words of Charles Taylor that ‘the line from Hegel to Marx remains in many ways the most clear and intellectually structured theory of liberation in the modern world.’ (Charles Taylor, 'Feuerbach and the Roots of Materialism', Political Studies (Oxford University Press), vol. xxvi, September 1978, p. 421). So long as we understand that that line leads much further back than Hegel, mind. I have a soft spot for Rousseau, who was the greatest, most critical, most challenging, most fertile, and most awkward Enlightenment thinker of them all. And so long as Rousseau is properly understood as a Platonist contesting the conventionalism and sophism of the moderns. (Williams 2007; Critchley 2017 Rousseau, Natural Law and Rational Freedom http://pcritchley2.wixsite.com/beingandplace/single-post/2017/05/16/Rousseau-Natural-Law-and-Rational-Freedom). And so long as it is understood that that line of liberation is an immanent line of development, that history has a purpose, that human beings are teleological beings, and that a good dose of Aristotelian essentialism goes a long way indeed. 

Pretty much all of these claims have been repudiated by the liveliest minds of the age – natural essences are out, teleology too. Except that the idea of purpose doesn’t go away because the brave soldiers of positivism dare not mention its name, so is smuggled back in, under the name of teleonomy. Teleology is out, most of all, because it is closely associated with religion, notions of intelligent design and the idea of an extraneous force introducing purpose from the outside. I have distinguished teleology in Marx from this understanding. Marx himself was nervous of teleology, downright hostile, frankly, celebrating Darwin for putting the final nail in the coffin of teleology, despite the fact that Marx is demonstrably a teleological thinker. If Marx’s essentialist metaphysics have been ignored, and Marx himself frequently misunderstood as a consequence, then Marx himself bears some of the blame: those courageous thinkers of the post-Enlightenment, using their own reason to deny their metaphysics at every turn, calling it ‘science’ instead! Marx, indeed, insisted on the scientific nature of his normative emancipatory project. And critics score an easy point by stating that it isn’t science at all. And it isn’t, not in the sense they understand science. Marx’s ‘one science’ is an integral human knowledge as a self-knowledge, knowledge and power as intimate forces in a human affirmation and appropriation of sensuous existence. Such is Marx’s atheism, not a rationalist negation of a non-existent being but a positive sensuous affirmation of life and its healthy and creative potentials and powers. And that cannot put point to a purposive materialism. 

Contemporary evolutionary theorists make a distinction between teleonomy as evolved, internal purposiveness and teleology as external purpose. If you can’t do without ‘purpose,’ just say so. I shall leave the scientists to frighten each other with mere mentions of the ‘t’ word. 

Marx and the Giraffe, G.A. Cohen 1980 reply by Peter Singer 

Erich Heller puts it well in The Disinherited Mind:





Neither particularly brave nor foolhardy, merely having the courage to use my own understanding, I enter the region of metaphysics. I have throughout made a strong argument in favour of Marx’s essentialist metaphysics, knowing fine well that Marx did not present his views that way. In hindsight, Marx appears to be involved in a rear-guard action without him quite realizing it, applying essentialist categories critically to the capital economy just as the political economists were extinguishing them in an explicit programme of metaphysical sterilisation. I don’t care that Marx was obsessed with the scientific status of his work, wanting precision and clarity in analysis with respect to his conceptual scheme. That ambition is perfectly realized by an essentialist metaphysics, much as Marx seemed to object to critics referring to the metaphysical character of his Capital. The scheme of that work is infused with essentialist categories and only makes sense in those terms – law, form, substance, inner connections, relations, potential, necessity, development. It’s metaphysics, and all the better for it. Metaphysics is about clarity and precision, and it is a modernist prejudice that says it is an obscurantism or mere flux. (Passmore 1968: 47).

Words ought to be a little wild, for they are the assaults of thoughts on the unthinking.
John Maynard Keynes

So let’s get wild, I have some disquieting thoughts to share, recognising that in sharing them, I would seem to be withdrawing the claims made in the previous two volumes on Marx. A year before the final triumph of Solidarity in 1989, Polish philosopher Leszek Kolakowski reassured those philosophers among us who sometimes think they may be barking up the wrong tree:





I suspect this all the time, and my barking over the years has been sufficient to keep the entire Black Forest awake. I loved my time there, and would have loved to have questioned Martin Heidegger on what he meant by claiming that only a god can still save us.

On the question of the existence or otherwise of God, Marx asks the questions that can only be answered the one way:

Who begot the first man, and nature in general? I can only answer: Your question is itself a product of abstraction. Ask yourself how you arrived at that question. Ask yourself whether your question does not arise from a standpoint to which I cannot reply because it is a perverse one. Ask yourself whether that progression exists as such for rational thought. If you ask about the creation of nature and of man, then you are abstracting from nature and from man. You assume them as non-existent and want me to prove to you that they exist. My answer is: Give up your abstraction and you will then give up your question. But if you want to hold on to your abstraction, then do so consistently, and if you assume the non-existence of man and nature, then assume also your own non-existence, for you are also nature and man. Do not think and do not ask me questions, for as soon as you think and ask questions, your abstraction from the existence of nature and man has no meaning. Or are you such an egoist that you assume everything as non-existent and still want to exist yourself?

Marx EW EPM 1975: 357-358

Argument over, there is no debate. The correct position in the theism versus atheism debate is apatheism. It’s a fuss over nothing, of interest only to those who think that it is healthy to disinfect human life from the extraordinary claims that human beings make. I’m less than sure that this view of reason as a cleansing tool is true to the nature of human beings as meaning-seeking, story-telling creatures, and I am entirely sure that, as A.N. Whitehead put it, ‘if men cannot live on bread alone, still less can they do so on disinfectants.’ (Whitehead 1972: ch 4). The point that if we employ reason to clear away the errors, prejudices, and false ideologies and institutions standing in the way of a natural growth then we restore health to the world. It’s just that there is no pristine nature cluttered up with human inventions, and that culture is something that comes naturally to human beings, becoming in turn part of their nature. Let’s just say that if we fail to distinguish infection from the rough, raw and often ambiguous way that is the only way that human beings, in all their flaws and imperfections, find it possible to sing and dance, then instead of a politics of creative self-realisation, a natural and healthy growth, we end up suffocating ourselves in a world of endless sanitation and sterilisation. 

There is no God. And there never has been. But we know this, don’t we? Don’t we? Do those that claim this know the full implications, though? Kant, seeking to preserve the core of religious ethics and present it on a rationally defensible basis, set out the challenge long before either Marx or Nietzsche:

This problem is both the most difficult and the last to be solved by the human race. The difficulty (which the very idea of this problem clearly presents) is this: if he lives among others of his own species, man is an animal who needs a master. For he certainly abuses his freedom in relation to others of his own kind. And even although, as a rational creature, he desires a law to impose limits on the freedom of all, he is still misled by his self-seeking animal inclinations into exempting himself from the law where he can. He thus requires a master to break his self-will and force him to obey a universally valid will under which everyone can be free. But where is he to find such a master? Nowhere else but in the human species. But this master will also be an animal who needs a master. Thus while man may try as he will, it is hard to see how he can obtain for public justice a supreme authority which would itself be just, whether he seeks this authority in a single person or in a group of many persons selected for this purpose. For each one of them will always misuse his freedom if he does not have anyone above him to apply force to him as the laws should require it. Yet the highest authority has to be just in itself and yet also a man. This is therefore the most difficult of all tasks, and a perfect solution is impossible. Nothing straight can be constructed from such warped wood as that which man is made of. Nature only requires of us that we should approximate to this idea. A further reason why this task must be the last to be accomplished is that man needs for it a correct conception of the nature of a possible constitution, great experience tested in many affairs of the world, and above all else a good will prepared to accept the findings of this experience. But three factors such as these will not easily be found in conjunction, and if they are, it will happen only at a late stage and after many unsuccessful attempts.

Kant, Sixth Proposition UH in Reiss ed 1996: 46

That’s the solution Marx aims at, but …. out of the crooked timber of humanity, nothing entirely straight can ever be made. Nietzsche thought this rationalist and humanist line connecting Kant to Marx to be delusional, as religious in its humanism as the Christian morality it sought to overthrow. Men and women as gods? That would be merely to replace the idolatry of religion with the idolatry of humanism. Are you up to the responsibility? It’s an onerous burden. Nietzsche thought only a few capable of living up to such power. Marx was a democrat in this respect. But on what was Marx’s democratic commitment based? Not nature, would say Nietzsche. Give up the moral burden, accept contingency, use power if you have it, and live beyond good and evil. Can it be done? Nietzsche went mad.

The passages from Marx and Kant are appropriate to a human appropriation and organisation of the world, a determination on the part of human beings to live in accordance with their own natural reason. That appropriation that, understood properly, is also a naturalization of humanity since, as Marx emphasizes, human beings are natural beings. As I demonstrated at length in Social Restitution and Metabolic Restoration, Marx seeks a mediation between humanity and nature that is a positive, creative and healthy expression of the human essence. Given such a positive affirmation, Marx argues, there is no longer a need to go indirectly to this ideal via God and religion. Nor is there a need to state atheism as the negation of this God. God is an ideal image of human beings that, through the establishment of a healthy metabolic interaction between humanity and nature, we can realize within our own social being. Does Marx, then, believe that human beings have the potential to be as gods? Is this not to replace the idolatry of religion with the idolatry of humanism? Nietzsche would say so, and denounce it as a religious morality lacking in the substance that only God can give it, a God which, in Nietzsche’s view, is dead.

My disquieting observation is that, after presenting the case for Marx’s socialism as a social self-mediation establishing a healthy metabolic interaction between humanity and nature, the principal challenge to Marx and Marxism comes not from capitalism or from the economics profession or from philosophy. The view that every attempt to establish socialism has ended in failure is trotted out pretty much every time socialism is mentioned as a possible alternative to the capital system. It’s a good idea in theory, says the old sage, but like all such dreams for a better world, it can’t work in practice. That’s kindly criticism, along the lines that the communists mean well and have their hearts in the right place but need to learn by hard experience. There’s not a few political philosophers and economists who say Marx’s socialism doesn’t work in theory, either; N Scott Arnold wrote an entire book arguing precisely this (1991). I think these claims can be rebutted, and have given a vigorous presentation of the key themes in Marx to that effect. I have emphasized the extent to which Marx does not present socialism in terms of an abstract ideal, shaping reality in accordance with a priori principles of rationality. Instead, I have underscored the extent to which Marx located the socialist future in the emergent forms of the capital economy itself. Marx, in Hegelian manner, locates the ‘ought-to-be’ within the ‘is’ and enjoins human beings to realize what in large part exists already as potential. That’s an important point to establish against critics who see socialism as utopian, and against socialists themselves who see their tasks in terms of ‘building’ an entirely new social order. Marx makes it clear that the creative agents bringing about the socialist future need to act more in the manner of midwives rather than builders. I stressed in the main text how often Marx employed organic metaphors when describing how socialism emerged from the womb of capitalist society, being ‘stamped’ ‘in every respect, economically, morally, intellectually,’ ‘with the birth-marks of the old society from whose womb it has emerged.’ (Marx CGP 1974: 347). Socialism is possible precisely because it already exists as immanent potential. 

I have also dealt with liberal objections to Marx. I examined the liberal criticism that Marx imposes an abstract and artificial collectivism on individuals, destroying individual liberty and instituting a totalitarian society. I have shown this to be wrong, and have shown the origins of such criticism as lying in a liberal ontology that is false with respect to the nature of human beings and to the nature of human society. I show how Marx turns that criticism right back at liberals, who expatiate at length on the evils of poverty, inequality, and such like, only to propose tinkering little interventions and piecemeal reforms which do nothing to remove their causes and everything to maintain the system that generates them. Marx shows how the capital system that liberals protect and rationalize itself entails an external systemic constraint upon ostensibly ‘free’ individuals. I am confident that Marx can meet criticisms from the direction of liberalism. Likewise with a large part of ‘green’ criticism, which is not surprising to the extent that green philosophy is a species of liberalism, sharing the same fallacies of the liberal ontology. Marx identified the way that the bourgeois viewpoint either presumes history has come to an end with the competitive ‘freedom’ of capitalist relations or expresses a romantic yearning for a return to nature, an antithetical way of thinking that will characterize the bourgeois mind to its ‘blessed end,’ Marx says in the Grundrisse. (Marx 1973: 163). I could cite various greens who think Marx and socialism part of the Promethean expansionism that is eating up the planet, no different from capitalism as a species of ‘industrialism,’ and claiming that Marx has nothing to say on the environment. I consider that view to be plain wrong, ignorant, self-defeating, and an expression of the decadence and hopeless romanticism of liberals who, when forced to see, in plain consciousness, the bankruptcy – and historicity - of the capital system, rather than embrace the socialist alternative to put an end to prevailing social relations, seek instead to return to some long lost never world or, more likely, passively lament its irrevocable loss, which has the not inconvenient consequence of preserving the very alterable status quo intact. To refer generally to ‘industrialism’ or ‘productivism’ is to say precisely nothing with respect to the mediating forms of labour and production between humanity and nature. This focus on precise forms is essential if we are to ever achieve a healthy metabolic interaction and manage the human interchange with nature in a ‘rational way.’ This is what Marx gives us. Marx shows what is required if an effective ecologism is ever going to transcend the bourgeois liberal mind-set and succeed in uprooting the capital system – which is precisely what is required, the claims of environmental reformists notwithstanding.

So before I go any further, let me just make clear what my criticisms of Marx do not involve: they do not involve complacent liberal and social democratic thinking, lazy generalizations and sweeping denunciations of systematic thought:





Criticisms like this have a superficial plausibility, and certainly appeal to the liberal mind. But in point of historical fact there has been no system of rule more ‘all-embracing’ than the capital system. It has no ‘all-embracing system of thought’ behind it. It has methodological individualism, atomism, accidentalism, empiricism and utilitarianism. It does, however, have plenty of liberal thinkers and political economists who were and are more than prepared to raise historically and socially specific products and relations to the status of a natural order based on eternal principles. In other words, a bogus metaphysics. Anyone who thinks incrementalism in thought and practice will suffice to release the world from the vice-like grip of capital is living in cloud-cuckoo land. I’ve no interest in offering succour to those who lack the nerve for substantive, serious thinking, and think some piecemeal pragmatism will suffice to get us out of the predicament we are in. Thought, as well as practice, needs to scale up, otherwise we will remain subject to the all-embracing systemic force of a capitalist economy driving society and the planet itself beyond all limits.

I could go on, but won’t. I’ve shown at length how Marx can deal with criticisms from these quarters. And the real challenge to Marx and Marxism comes not from these sources, but from religion, from a genuinely religious understanding of life and its meaning – from the truth of religious experience. And the real threat to Marx comes from within, in his loss of the religious roots of his redemptive project for humanity; more than that, there is a real danger in Marx’s inversion of religious truth: Marx’s invitation to human beings to become as gods is an invitation to delusion and (self-)destruction. Does Marx issue such an invitation? Some would say not, and that a positive human affirmation and sensuous appropriation is not seeing men and women as gods, only as human beings, truly human, to be sure, but human all the same. That would be my interpretation, in keeping with Kant’s attempt to secure a free society based upon a rational, self-legislated authority. But Kant’s ethics themselves are clear rationalizations of the religious ethic he was brought up in, his ethic of ends being a clear attempt to put the Christian ethic on the basis of human reason alone, without the need for revelation or grace of God. A century later, and Nietzsche excoriates such thinking as empty, a religious morality that has no grounding because it has no God. Rational humanism is as idolatrous as the religion it seeks to replace. 

So we move forwards, then, to a genuine secularisation beyond God, good and evil? Michel Onfray accuses Kant of wimping out on the issue, failing to live up to his own rational project by retaining space for faith against the claims of knowledge. But maybe Kant knew something that the secularisers have missed. Kant saw the possibilities of the irrational use of reason, pushing reason beyond its limits to produce its opposite. Bernard Yack defines a ‘Left Kantianism’ as a revolutionary morality that preaches liberation from all contexts or situations (Yack 1986: 89/133). This hugely overstates Kant’s actual position as a lawful freedom which attempts to realise individual freedom within a social, institutional and relational context, not against it. Yack’s words describe a libertarian freedom, in the manner of Fichte, who identifies any such lawful framework as a constraint upon the individual, asserting the freedom of the individual against a lawful, institutional context. The individual is free because s/he is self-sufficient, 'conscious of his self-sufficiency and independence outside of everything’ (Fichte 1982:15). Kant criticises such thinking as a lawless use of reason which invites unreason, an individualist and, ultimately, an elitist conception, pointing forwards to Max Stirner and, later, to Nietzsche’s own conception. In contrast, in laying down a universal standard of conduct for all, Kant's morality possesses a democratic thrust (Smith 1991: 30/1), Marx’s too. But is that thrust sustainable? What if Nietzsche is right, and this natural light of reason is a chimera, and the human appropriation of the sensuous world is merely a matter of amoral power? For it to be anything more implies a moral standard that is more than nature, which to Nietzsche implies a God that is no more.

We come now to the controversial points. Is original sin real or merely a libel upon the human race justifying an authoritarian politics to maintain the civil peace? Marx’s naturalism as a humanism, and humanism as a naturalism, is premised upon human powers and their creative development through history, his essentialism is premised on healthy potentials being actualized in socialism as the truly human society. It’s a compelling view, and I find it cogent in its own terms. And, of course, it is bound to commend itself to the rationalists among us, for its flattering portrayal of human nature. Here is a view in which power is healthy, entailing a natural growth, not something potentially harmful and destructive, something to be afraid of, and staked down with rules, codes and laws. There is none of the worry that comes with original sin here. ‘Love needs no law,’ wrote Martin Luther (Babylonish Captivity). But Luther was unwavering in his belief in God, in his insistence in the complete surrender of the human will to God, and in his belief that it is only such a greater Love that can bind us all as one. That is not open to Marx, nor to anyone who thinks nature is all that there is. For unity, reason and freedom, that view is entirely dependent upon nature. Some think nature benign, and are happy to claim that ‘Mother Nature’ the boss. If that is true, why do people feel the need to say so? Others see nature as pitiless, red in tooth and claw, and completely indifferent to human affairs, and say that Mother Nature is boss, without our say so, and not in ways we are likely to find agreeable. The problem is that Marx’s view of nature may well not be your view, nor the view of the biologists. It certainly wasn’t Nietzsche’s view. It depends on mediation, of course, and such mediation is moral as well as institutional. If culturalists complain that any God we propose to exist is ‘made up,’ the response back is, isn’t everything in a contingent world? Artificiality cannot be an objection in an artificial world. It merely begs the question as to why human beings feel the need to reinvent God and the sacred, no sooner have they discarded such things in favour of nature.

I will continue to argue for a developmental conception that is premised on a healthy growth and which points to the realization of healthy potentials and exercise of power, set within the context of the free and full development of each and all within which Marx set it. The controversy lies in whether such a rational humanism is sustainable in itself, or whether it requires a morality that is in some way autonomous of nature; that, in recognizing weakness and vulnerability rather than makes a fetish of power and strength, is much more humane, more true to the human condition; that recognizes the frailty of human beings and the fragility of the good; that, in short, keeps us this side of sanity in face of the invitation to live as Nietzschean Supermen.

In Ethics, Essentialism and Immanence, I argued that Marx does not merely abolish religion, the state, ethics and philosophy, but realizes the truths that each contains within but can express only abstractly and idealistically. He argues that natural science shed its idealistic character for the same reason. I made this point in particular about religion, given the extent to which Marx is frequently misunderstood to be a rationalist merely concerned to extirpate religion as an illusion. Marx was actually arguing against precisely that view as presented by his atheist colleagues. Marx’s ‘abolition’ is nuanced, and focuses on the social transformation of the inverted conditions that generate the need to seek solace in illusions. Marx openly acknowledges religion as an expression of human suffering. The key point I wish to develop here is that the moral, psychic and experiential truths of religion cannot be appropriated, still less dissolved, in the way that Marx thinks – they are truths that are lived in the heart of the human condition, not ideal powers. And they are personal truths in face of primordial being the first instance, not social. Truths of our ancient days, of our origin and end, outside of logic. 





Marx has modelled his critique on Feuerbach, for whom God is an ideal expression of the perfectly realized human being. Marx’s end is that perfect realization in the truly human society of truly human beings. He shows that some such thing is possible in terms of the realization of essential power and potential. The religious ideal, however, is not about power in this sense – it is about its very opposite, about transcending the weakness and corruptibility of the flesh. One of the most penetrating and knowledgeable critics of Marx and Marxism was Polish philosopher Leszek Kolakowski. I don’t remotely accept his conclusion that Stalinism is the inevitable outcome of Marx’s thought, but I do see how the rationalist humanism he finds in Marxism could degenerate into a collective fantasy in practice. The interesting thing about Kolakowski is that he was once a Marxist revolutionary who, in repudiating his communist past, turned not to liberalism, but to a traditional conservatism, showing a profound understanding of religion and the ties human beings establish at the community level, demonstrating at the same time a deep scepticism of the materialist implications of capitalism as well as of secularist, relativist and rationalist pieties of the Enlightenment. Kolakowski points to the permanence of the religious and the grounding of a meaningful human life in bedrock religious truth:





Marx seems to have in mind the image of God the Creator, a power which properly belongs to human beings as the self-creating authors of their own world. It’s a power to be jealous of, certainly, and a power worth having, if the rational society is to be achieved, and human beings to live in accordance with the natural light of their common reason. But there’s much more to religion than that, and certainly much more to religion than an omnipotent God. Buckley writes of religion as possessing the principles and experiences within itself to disclose the existence of God, pointing to

the cogency in the phenomenology of religious experience, the witness of the personal histories of holiness and religious commitment, the sense of claim by the absolute already present in the demands of truth or goodness or beauty, the intuitive sense of the givenness of God, an awareness of the infinite horizon opening up before inquiry and longing, an awakening jolted into a more perceptive consciousness by limit-experiences, the long history of religious institutions and practice, or the life and meaning of Jesus of Nazareth.

To look outside of these things in order to establish that there is a ‘friend behind the phenomena’ is to be involved in a fruitless search for foundations. Buckley’s point is that this search is utterly futile, involving religion in the limitations of philosophical reason, noting the extent to which philosophy undercuts its own foundations. Those who, from a rationalist perspective, accuse religion of lacking in grounds need to understand that such critical reason is a double-edged sword, and applies to all such grounds. Religion has its grounds within itself, and it is ‘ultimately counterproductive to look outside of the religion to another discipline or science or art. Inference cannot substitute for experience, and the most compelling witness to a personal God must itself be personal. To attempt something else either as foundation or as substitute, as did the Newtonian Settlement, is to move into a progress of internal contradiction of which the ultimate resolution is atheism.’ (Buckley 1988: 99). The implication of Buckley’s view is this, a moral language that is shorn of the religious experience it presupposes not only loses the only foundation it can have, God, but also any foundation – such foundations do not exist. ‘The origin of atheism in the intellectual culture of the West lies thus with the self-alienation of religion itself.’ (Buckley 1987: 363). I shall come in time to address the implications with respect to a Nietzschean amoralism. Power as its own end and justification is, of course, objectionable, but objections imply a moral compass that is lost, Nietzsche claims, approvingly, with the ‘death of God.’

Putting the point provocatively, if Nietzsche is right, then Marx needs the reality of God and religion in order to sustain his moral claims. In having his transcendent cake and eating it too, in abolishing God in favour of a positive human self-affirmation, Marx loses the moral standards by which to evaluate natural development. He has lost the sense of alienation as an individual self-alienation that requires personal responsibility and individual moral effort to overcome, not merely a socio-structural transformation. It is that loss, the loss of something that is core in the religious sensibility, that contains the potential for Marxist emancipation to tip over into something else entirely. This lengthy passage from Robert Tucker details the way in which Marx came to profoundly misread religion:

Hegel had presented history as a process of the self-alienation and self-realization of God in the person of mankind. Feuerbach construed this as a mystified revelation of the universally self-estranged condition of man himself in the life of religion, and Marx, following Feuerbach's example, drew the same conclusion in a different way. Positing that 'Hegel has the point of view of modern political economy', he construed the Hegelian philosophy of history as a revelation of the self-estranged condition of mankind in the economic life. Both Feuerbach and Marx Hegelianized humanity. That is, they took Hegel's category of alienation to be universally operative in the collective life of man. The one located the neurotic process in religion, which he saw as a phenomenon of human self-worship. The other located it in economics, which he saw as a practical religion of money-worship. As a consequence, the one found self-alienation to be the essence of Christianity, and the other found it to be the essence of capitalism. 
They were both mistaken. Not only did they respectively misread Christianity and capitalism; they failed to grasp the essence of self-alienation. In its intrinsic nature, this is neither a fact of religion nor a fact "of political economy. It may find expression in the economic life or in religion, just as it may also find expression in politics, war and every other human pursuit. Thus, a given alienated individual may develop a compulsive urge towards absolute enrichment, and for him the economic life will indeed be a practical religion of money-worship and a sphere of 'alienated labour'. But his alienation only becomes in a derivative way an economic fact. Inherently or in itself it is a fact of the life of the self, i.e. a spiritual or, as we say today, psychological fact. It is a sickness of the self growing out of and reflecting a man's confusion of humanity in his own person with deity, his quest to actualize himself as a supra-human absolute being. Alienation is the counterpart of egoism in this sense. It is not, therefore, a general condition of humanity. Man is not born alienated, although he is born with a potentiality of becoming an alienated individual. No matter how many individual men may belong to this category, it is always an individual matter. Marx originally had within his grasp, or at any rate within easy reach, the truth that alienation is essentially a fact of the life of the individual human self. This is shown by his very first statement about it, the statement of 1843 that man is alienated from himself when he produces under the compulsion of 'egoistic need.’ But he failed to trace this egoism to its real source within the personality of the alienated individual himself. It became for him a kind of disembodied inhuman force ruling over everything. First he universalized it, making out both the egoistic need and the resulting alienation to be a species phenomenon, and then he split the species and made one section's alienation the consequence of the other's egoistic need. He was never clear about the source of this egoistic need, but suggested in Capital that money is the cause of the greed for money and that competition is responsible for the maniacal, specifically capitalist form of it, the 'werewolf hunger for surplus value'. And he never seems to have asked himself what would prevent the inhuman force from rising again to estrange man from himself on the yonder side of history. These were so many different manifestations of Marx's failure to grasp clearly the phenomenon with which he was working.
Not having located the 'egoistic need' within the personality of the alienated individual person, he also failed to understand that it is only there, and by the individual's own moral effort, that the egoism can be undone and the revolutionary 'change of self achieved. If the starting point is the moral rebellion against alienated living and the force that condemns him to this servitude (as Marx indicates in his image of the proletariat as dehumanized man no longer willing to be dehumanized), the ensuing revolutionary movement of emancipation is its direct moral continuation. It is essentially a work of self-clarification and self-changing. Its tools are the power of understanding, the urge to be free, and the willingness to be merely human.  Its dialectic is a Socratic dialectic of 'Know thyself. The 'revolution' or real change of self that emerges in and through this movement of emancipation is, likewise, a moral revolution. The change of 'circumstances' with which it coincides is a change of the self's character, meaning the habitual circumstances within the self that have been shaped by alienated living and stand in the way of its freedom, the inner autocracy or coercive system. Such a revolution within the self cannot occur or start in a violent catastrophic episode. It is the outcome of a gradual process, and is this process taken as a whole. Alternatively, it is the merely theoretical point of culmination of the whole slow growth of inward freedom and repossession of the productive powers of the self which takes place in the movement and by the labour of self-liberation.

Tucker 1964 ch 16 240-242

Marx offers a superb critical analysis of alienation as a structural and institutional phenomenon, tracing its social origins and showing what needs to be done to uproot it socially. But in the process, he lost sight of its personal dimension with respect to individual self-alienation, and with that he lost sight of the need of individual moral effort in a transformation that reclaimed personal responsibility. That leaves his proposals for social transformation strong on the collective or supra-individual aspects of alienation but potentially lacking in the personal dimension. If the capital system, as Max Weber argues, proceeds ‘without regard to persons,’ its overcoming requires a repersonalisation. And that implies a central role for personal moral effort in its overcoming. Marx does emphasise the role of individuals in overcoming alienation. He comes close to combining the social and the personal, but his misreading of religion exposes a lacunae in his emancipatory project. Very early on, Marx understood what Kierkegaard came to see so clearly, that alienation is essentially a fact of the life of the individual human self. 

And the relation to himself a man cannot get rid of, any more than he can get rid of himself, which moreover is one and the same thing, since the self is the relationship to oneself. (Soren Kierkegaard). 

Marx saw this as early as 1843, when he argued that man is alienated from himself in producing under the compulsion of ‘egoistic need.’ But rather than trace this egoism to its real source within the personality of the alienated individual, he socialized it and rendered it a disembodied inhuman universal force ruling over everything. Such is the capital system. Abolish the capital system and reappropriate alienated social power, and alienation would be supplanted by freedom. Such is Marx’s argument. The problem is that it is modelled on a mistaken Feuerbachian view of religion, conceived as a mystified revelation of the universally self-estranged condition of human beings. The misreading here has the potential to turn the emancipatory commitment into its opposite in practice. Conceiving self-alienation to be the essence of God and religion, Marx extended the view to define self-alienation to be the essence of the capital system. The problem is that this is a misreading of the nature of God and religion and, when allied to practical critique, can come to backfire spectacularly. Self-alienation is not intrinsically a fact of religion, although it can be expressed in religious forms, just as it can find expression in political institutions, economic arrangements, and all other human activities. Marx is almost there, hence I have been at pains to distinguish the principle of the state from the institution of the state in Marx’s critique, the core principles of ethics from their particular forms of expression, to rebut the criticism that Marx’s ethical critique does not, as critics allege, imply the end of the political and of the economy. But critics have identified a dangerous lacunae in Marx here. Where Marx is vulnerable is in the way that he socializes the question of theodicy, something which served to take him away from his original insight of 1843 that self-alienation remains a problem of the self, something which requires God in order to draw the individual beyond egoistic need.

The principles and experiences of religion are not ideal, alienated expressions of human power, and are therefore not available as things to be reclaimed by human beings, making them more god-like in the process. Marx doesn’t quite argue that, arguing instead for the realised society of realized individuals. But even this self-realisation as healthy and natural is curiously and worryingly silent on weakness and vulnerability. You can see the temptation to tip-over into a god-like assertion of power. But religion is not about power in this sense but refers to a lived experience, a phenomenology of interpersonal relations. The humility encouraged by this religious experience points in the direction of the natural anarchy that Tolkien expressed in the letter to his son Christopher, when he wrote: 

the most improper job of any man, even saints (who at any rate were at least unwilling to take it on), is bossing other men. Not one in a million is fit for it, and least of all those who seek the opportunity… The mediævals were only too right in taking nolo episcopari [I do not want to be bishop] as the best reason a man could give to others for making him a bishop.

J.R.R. Tolkien, Letter to his son Christopher, Letters of J.R.R. Tolkien, ed. Humphrey Carpenter.

I do not want to be god. Marx’s free and full development of each and all in unison, too, indicates a natural anarchy. But the constant emphasis on power and its exercise that comes with it – even if we understand it properly in Marx’s terms as a healthy growth in conditions of mutuality – lacks a certain … humility; it lacks an understanding of human frailty and weakness. And in the hands of a Nietzsche, it positively loathes those things.

The paradox of power in an institutional sense is that those who seek and desire power over others are the ones least qualified to hold it. Those most reluctant to seek and exercise power are emotionally the most qualified, but rule themselves out or are overlooked. Sam’s humility makes him reluctant to put himself forward, and thus he is able to resist the temptation to claim the Ring: 

In that hour of trial it was the love of his master that helped most to hold him firm; but also deep down in him lived still unconquered his plain hobbit-sense: he knew in the core of his heart that he was not large enough to bear such a burden, even if such visions were not a mere cheat to betray him. The one small garden of a free gardener was all his need and due, not a garden swollen to a realm; his own hands to use, not the hands of others to command.

J. R. R. Tolkien. The Lord of the Rings.

Those who claimed the Ring did so out of greed (Gollum and Déagol) or out of a desire for power (Sauron and Isildur). They lacked the humility that alone could make their intent virtuous. And that humility stems from the love that held Sam firm. In the end, though, not even Sam is the main hero – the real hero is unseen, unstated, unnamed, working the invisible magic of divine providence: God, the true Lord and the true power. True power lies in humility.

I think Marx can deal with the institutional question of power as something that some exercise over others. He looks to create a society in which the imbalances of power that allow some to predate on others, and forces others to succumb to the pressure of the powerful, do not exist. I agree very much with Marx on this. It’s just that the emphasis on the realized society of realized individuals may – in going beyond its boundaries - come to overrate the extent of human power and reason, succumbing to a fatal temptation to become as gods whilst pursuing self-realization, thus bringing about not a society of universal peace and joy, but the very opposite, a war between human beings possessed with an overweening sense of their own importance and an unbending conviction of the fundamental rightness of their own subjective desires. In reclaiming the ancient sense of politics as a creative self-realization, there is a need to establish the boundaries of that ‘self.’ There is a deficiency in this vision, not in power but in humility, so that the concern with self-realization, unbounded by anything greater than the ego, can tip over into a men as gods delusion – humanism as idolatry. The conception of men as gods lacks the humility that alone could make human actions virtuous. Marx’s ‘self’ is, of course, not unbounded, but proceeds as a natural development common to each and all. But there is a lack of humility that could easily turn something healthy in unhealthy directions. 

Here is Georges Bernanos writing of Hitler and Stalin:





A reactionary lament about the consequences of Enlightenment rationalism? The weakening of the religious instinct of which Bernanos writes points to the loss of religious principles and experiences adumbrated above by Buckley. Lose those, and all that there is is an unbounded ego, and all the assertions in the world about natural boundaries cannot serve to restrain such an ego. We know this from the ways in which planetary boundaries are currently being transgressed, notwithstanding repeated warnings from scientific quarters. Mother Nature might well be boss, as many environmentalists claim, but that has as much affective power as the statement that one day we will all die. The adjustment of common moral reason, and the practices and communities through which that reason is expressed, is key to establishing natural facts as existentially meaningful.

After a century of world war, destruction of civilisation, nuclear and chemical weapons, I’d listen to Bernanos’ warning – because destruction and death on the scale wreaked by the twentieth century is not accidental, but is an expression of certain states of mind within specific social and institutional arrangements. The part that interests me in all of this is the warning that once human beings come to see their world as they see their gods, as their own self-creations, then not only have we had our transcendent cake, we have eaten it too, and eaten it for good. Once we reach this stage, there is no power outside of ourselves to check egos inflating to infinity.

How much reality can people cope with? How real do you want it? You want delight? There’s a crack in everything, that’s how the light gets in.
You want it darker?

"You Want It Darker" by Leonard Cohen

If you are the dealer, I'm out of the game
If you are the healer, it means I'm broken and lame
If thine is the glory then mine must be the shame
You want it darker
We kill the flame

Magnified, sanctified, be thy holy name
Vilified, crucified, in the human frame
A million candles burning for the help that never came
You want it darker

Hineni, hineni
I'm ready, my lord

There's a lover in the story
But the story's still the same
There's a lullaby for suffering
And a paradox to blame
But it's written in the scriptures
And it's not some idle claim
You want it darker
We kill the flame

They're lining up the prisoners
And the guards are taking aim
I struggled with some demons
They were middle class and tame
I didn't know I had permission to murder and to maim
You want it darker

Hineni, hineni
I'm ready, my lord

Magnified, sanctified, be thy holy name
Vilified, crucified, in the human frame
A million candles burning for the love that never came
You want it darker
We kill the flame

If you are the dealer, let me out of the game
If you are the healer, I'm broken and lame
If thine is the glory, mine must be the shame















There is no significant example in history, before our time, of a society successfully maintaining moral life without the aid of religion.

Will and Ariel Durant 1996: 51

Will Durant in The Story of Civilisation understood the decline of a civilization to be the culmination of the split between religion and secular intellectualism, issuing in a conflict that over time undermines the precarious institutions of convention and morality. This happens as the institutions and laws that make society work weaken as a result of losing their foundations in a God-given morality. The secular philosophy which replaces this morality can be nothing more than a self-legislating reason grounded in nothing but itself. That fulfils the demand that human beings live in accordance with their own natural reason, and I would argue that in the line connecting Kant to Marx, that this reason is intersubjective, generating an experience that has an objectivity of its own, that is self-critical and self-reflective, ensuring that we do indeed live by moral standards. That envisages the rational society as a Kantian society of self-legislators living in accordance with the laws they set themselves, subject always to scrutiny, criticism and alteration. But Kant’s ethic of ends remains very much a rationalization of the religious ethic, establishing the Golden Rule on rational grounds. Is it sustainable without God and religion, its true foundation, or is a self-legislating reason enough?

Durant is worth quoting at length on this:

Hence a certain tension between religion and society marks the higher stages of every civilization. Religion begins by offering magical aid to harassed and bewildered men; it culminates by giving to a people that unity of morals and belief which seems so favorable to statesmanship and art; it ends by fighting suicidally in the lost cause of the past.
For as knowledge grows or alters continually, it clashes with mythology and theology, which change with geological leisureliness. Priestly control of arts and letters is then felt as a galling shackle or hateful barrier, and intellectual history takes on the character of a "conflict between science and religion."
Institutions which were at first in the hands of the clergy, like law and punishment, education and morals, marriage and divorce, tend to escape from ecclesiastical control, and become secular, perhaps profane. The intellectual classes abandon the ancient theology and-after some hesitation-the moral code allied with it; literature and philosophy become anticlerical. The movement of liberation rises to an exuberant worship of reason, and falls to a paralyzing disillusionment with every dogma and every idea.
Conduct, deprived of its religious supports, deteriorates into Epicurean chaos; and life itself, shorn of consoling faith, becomes a burden alike to conscious poverty and to weary wealth. In the end a society and its religion tend to fall together, like body and soul, in a harmonious death. Meanwhile among the oppressed another myth arises, gives new form to human hope, new courage to human effort, and after centuries of chaos builds another civilization.

Durant 2006 V.1. 71.

There being no God, we are charged with the responsibility to live self-consciously by our own efforts from hereon in. Except that there is no ‘we,’ and even if there were, that would still beg the question as to what standards we come to live in accordance with in that society of free creation. The intersubjectivity of citizen legislators would be a Kantian response, generating a moral objectivity through experience that sets standards by which to evaluate behaviours, choices and decisions. That’s the rational society of realized human beings, and fits Marx’s demand for a true state in which human beings live in accordance with their own natural reason. For those who think that morality implies a degree of autonomy from natural processes and imperatives – for reasons lying in the amoralism of nature – then the loss of a religious grounding makes this not merely a hopeless task but one that will rebound on its architects. Marx, Nietzsche and Max Weber would say we have no option but to make it work, whether as communists, aristocratic anarchists and egoists or existentialists. We are on our own. That’s how life is for gods, if gods we need to be. In such a condition, it is easier to discard standards of good and evil entirely, lose morality as a rationalization, and live in accordance with natural power. What are the chances of the society of co-legislators and co-operators taking shape on this basis?

Marx, of course, presumes the existence of a unified humanity as a condition of a unified science, the two being achieved in one and the same process. Marx does supply a ‘we,’ and the standards he proposes are internal in the sense of the free and full development of all humanity. That immanent humanist naturalism stands as Marx’s case for human freedom and happiness in the rational society.

But what of the transcendent? And what of human beings who fall short of the full realization of their potentials (which is all of us). 

Pascal argues that ‘man wishes to be happy and only exists to be happy and cannot wish not to be happy.’ (Blaise Pascal, Penseés, section n, no. 169 ‘Man has no reason to philosophise except with a view to happiness,’ said St Augustine (Nulla est homini causa philosophandi, nisi ut beatus sit). Kant spoke for the modern philosophers in noting that ‘he never can say definitely and consistently what it is that he really wishes’ and that he cannot ‘determine with certainty what would make him truly happy; because to do so he would need to be omniscient.’ (Kant quoted in Great Books of the Western World. The Great Ideas (Chicago, 1953), vol. i, ch. 33). Traditional wisdom, writes E.F. Schumacher, gives a simple answer to the question: ‘Man’s happiness is to move higher, to develop his highest faculties, to gain knowledge of the higher and highest things and, if possible, to 'see God'. If he moves lower, develops only his lower faculties, which he shares with the animals, then he makes himself deeply unhappy, even to the point of despair.’ (Schumacher 1977: 22). St Thomas Aquinas writes here:

No man tends to do a thing by his desire and endeavour unless it be previously known to him. Wherefore since man is directed by divine providence to a higher good than human frailty can attain in the present life ... it was necessary for his mind to be bidden to something higher than those things to which our reason can reach in the present life, so that he might learn to aspire, and by his endeavours to tend to something surpassing the whole state of the present life ... It was with this motive that the philosophers, in order to wean men from sensible pleasures to virtue, took care to show that there are other goods of greater account than those which appeal to the senses, the taste of which things affords much greater delight to those who devote themselves to active or contemplative virtues.

St Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles, vol. 1 (London 1924-8).

Schumacher describes these teachings as the traditional wisdom of all peoples in all parts of the world. They have, however, become virtually incomprehensible to those living in the modern age. The moderns have retained the desire to rise above the present world, but seek the sense of the transcendent in terms of moving around at ever increasing speed, by travelling to the moon and into space as well as expanding economic activity to infinity on a planet of finite resources. St Thomas Aquinas is concerned that this desire be bounded by true ends, lest it consume the world in an endless nihilism:

There is a desire in man, common to him and other animals, namely the desire for the enjoyment of pleasure: and this men pursue especially by leading a voluptuous life, and through lack of moderation become intemperate and incontinent. Now in that vision [the divine vision] there is the most perfect pleasure, all the more perfect than sensuous pleasure as the intellect is above the senses; as the good in which we shall delight surpasses all sensible good, is more penetrating, and more continuously delightful; and as that pleasure is freer from all alloy of sorrow or trouble of anxiety ... 
In this life there is nothing so like this ultimate and perfect happiness as the life of those who contemplate the truth, as far as possible here below. Hence the philosophers who were unable to obtain full knowledge of that final beatitude, placed man's ultimate happiness in that contemplation which is possible during this life. For this reason too, Holy Writ commends the contemplative rather than other forms of life, when our Lord said (Luke X.42): Mary hath chosen the better part, namely the contemplation of truth, which shall not be taken from her. For contemplation of truth begins in this life, but will be consummated in the life to come: while the active and civic life does not transcend the limits of this life.

St Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles, vol. 3 (London 1924-8).

Schumacher comments that ‘most modern readers will be reluctant to believe that perfect happiness is attainable by methods of which their modern world knows nothing.’ He leaves aside the question of belief or disbelief to emphasize that ‘without the qualitative concepts of “higher” and “lower” it is impossible to even think of guidelines for living that lead beyond individual or collective utilitarianism and selfishness. (Schumacher 1977: 23). A society of co-legislating, co-determining co-operators still needs standards that transcend time and place in order to set the sights of its members higher than a collective, sectional or individualistic egoism.

Rebecca Goldstein writes of ‘the sad sight of human life untouched by transcendence.’ The condition, however, could be much worse than sad: it could become fatal.

Hence my question as to what would happen once human beings become free self-creators in a world of their own making. It’s a liberating vision, but it may well be delusional and self-destructive. Nietzsche writes of ‘this laboriously won self-contempt of man.’ (Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals). Nietzsche loathed democracy, this ‘counting of noses’ as he called it; but he loathed Christianity much more, for the reason that he considered it, and the Judaism which gave birth to it, to be the founder and root of democracy and equality in the first place. Those who think they can advance emancipation in conscious opposition to religion are playing with fire, cutting the democratic and egalitarian ground from under their own feet. Why do we hear more about servitude and less about salvation, I heard a friend ask, without giving examples I could examine. I’d say we hear plenty about emancipation and next to nothing about salvation, sacrifice and servitude. And I know this to be an old theme, because it was a point that my history teacher Brother Victor raised in class back in 1981-1982. If you are serious about emancipation as a salvation, you need to get serious about sacrifice and service to others. Unless you really do define emancipation in terms of an unbounded power, the ego alone, free of all context and constraint. And that’s not a freedom, it is a delusion, and a destructive one at that. 

It was Christianity that insisted on the equality of all souls, affirming the moral and ontological ultimacy of each individual. But maybe, in its defective realization, indicating the impossibility of its full realization, this ‘eternal principle’ too is coming to an end: ‘Man is an invention of recent date. And one perhaps nearing its end.’ (Michel Foucault). In which case, Marx’s hopes for socialism are destined to be self-defeating. Marx’s words are a potent brew that well prove to be too strong for most, frail and imperfect and often unreasoning as we are. We will get democracy when the individuals composing the demos are capable of leading themselves by the nous rather than allowing others to lead them by the nose, or than leading themselves by their own noses, chaining themselves to empirical necessity by a desire unordered to its true end. To defend Marx, he sought to draw human beings out beyond their own egos, taking the standpoint of a socialized humanity. And he did try to turn us into logicians as well as actors – not merely creative agents engaged in practice but agents who would have some kind of idea what we are doing and where we were going. But why did he feel the need to get the metaphysical ordering right? Because, behind all science, that is what he was doing. If natural growth as an end in itself is all we need, why did Marx worry his categories to death in his critiques? Remove the obstacles and just let life grow; that seems a healthy enough injunction. But, of course, that’s precisely the kind of romantic delusion that Marx despised and cautioned against, a society of unmediated spontaneity that will deliver us to necessity in no time. Marx took pains to do more, and in this he was wise. But was he wise enough, or did he too, in common with the moderns, ignore the traditional wisdom?

In The Price of Leadership, Middleton Murry writes:





Whilst I think Marx’s case for socialism can respond to such charges, I do think that Murry’s case – resting on a humility, a power tempered by love – is infinitely sager and saner than a dream of ‘men as gods.’ 

Men as gods? Self-made man as master of nowhere. It looks like human beings, in building a big powerful machine, persuaded themselves that they were gods in control of nature. So busy were they, as practical men of action, they didn’t bother to write an instruction manual, just pushed the buttons and pulled the levers and sped away on a destinationless voyage. They don’t know where they are going. Some cite a wealth of facts and figures which prove that progress is a reality. Others suspect civilization is going over the cliff, and the biosphere over the edge, beyond recall. And at this late stage, a few here and there swallow their pride and ask if anyone has the foggiest idea as to how this machine works. Like anyone knows. ‘What is your strategy?’ I’ve had people screaming at me. Get in tune is my reply. If you think a strategy is going to save us, you are still thinking in terms of the machine world. It’s not religion that has brought us to this, but disenchantment as a dis-godding. A few comments on Leonard Cohen’s The Future are in order here:

Things are going to slide, slide in all directions
Won't be nothing
Nothing you can measure anymore
The blizzard, the blizzard of the world
Has crossed the threshold
And it has overturned
The order of the soul

Here, Leonard Cohen drops the irony and biting sarcasm of some of the lines in this song to get as honest-to-God as it is possible to get with words. How real does it get? How real do people want it? How much reality can people handle? 

Things sliding is an easy enough idea to understand, if discomforting, suggesting we live on unfirm ground, with things we desire or need becoming out of reach. The notion of things sliding in all directions, however, is qualitatively different, indicating the extent to which our experience is one of chaos and confusion, without possibility of connection and communication. It is a condition that expresses the inescapability of loneliness. We no longer share a world in common, and the world we do live in is not our home. The scientific-political attempt to build a Heaven on Earth has overturned the one and true order, the order of the soul, and in victory the masters of the universe see that they are merely the masters of nowhere. The fight is over, things aren’t going to get any better.

Your servant here, he has been told 
to say it clear, to say it cold: 
It's over, it ain't going 
any further 
And now the wheels of heaven stop 
you feel the devil's riding crop 
Get ready for the future: 
it is murder

The only true thing left standing is Love. 

I've seen the nations rise and fall 
I've heard their stories, heard them all 
but love's the only engine of survival

There are people who disagree. They say Love does nothing to prevent evil and remedy ills, and demand strategy, politics, action, organisation, guns, bombs … Their mindsets have been shaped by the very machine world they claim to be against. To think that the world is whatever we want it to be, and whatever is in our power to make it be, is not to escape or overcome the blizzard of the world, it is the blizzard of the world that has crossed the threshold.

Cohen’s use of negation in saying ‘there won’t be nothing you can measure anymore’ is strong on the irony of man the measurer discovering to his horror that he is not the measure of all things. By raising measurement in relation to the order of the soul, Cohen is raising issues about the nature, claims and limits of rationality. Cohen strongly suggests that there are things that are beyond measure, and that attempts to measure them will backfire on us. The implication is that human beings have created the catastrophe that now confronts them by equating being with the quality of being measureable, calculable, quantifiable, manipulable, tradeable, controllable. And here, Cohen resurrects the corpses of the 20th century, the age of death, when mass politics and total war joined to make annihilation and exterminism the height of political rationality. Human beings, like all things possessing intrinsic worth, are beyond measure. That’s the anarchic surplus that evades reason, the core of our being, the soul of all living things. Instead of seeing the immeasurable as the most worthy of all that there is, such things are discounted as unworthy. With that comes disregard for all things that are not measurable. We have no need of measurement to know that people are real, we have no need of measurement to know the planet is real, and we have no need of measurement to know God is real. Such things stand in no need of proof. In seeing freedom as the projection of truth and meaning upon an objectively valueless world, we have come to locate value in the valuer and not in the valued, which means that human beings merely measure things for our instrumental use, and do likewise with other human beings. Such individuals, men as gods, use others as means to personal ends, with the result that all become subject to external fate. Or, as Marx put the same idea, the ‘private individual regards other men as means, debases himself to a means and becomes a plaything of alien powers.’ (Marx EW OJQ 1975: 221). But Marx is one of the measurers in this context, overturning the order of the soul, and seeing human beings as revolving around their own sun. I believe that renders his position incoherent, and very much subject to the warning issued by Leonard Cohen here. In the past, the soul was bound up with politics conceived in the broad sense of the good life. The belief in God supported a whole metaphysical infrastructure that gave meaning to demands for freedom, justice, equality, notions of good and evil. With the death of God, that overarching ethical framework dissolved too. A liberation? Human beings as gods revolving around their own sun? Self-made man the measurer of all things … the subject of Leonard Cohen’s The Future. We need to call back the soul.

When they said REPENT REPENT 
I wonder what they meant 
When they said REPENT REPENT 
I wonder what they meant 
When they said REPENT REPENT 
I wonder what they meant

I think we had better understand what that word means.

The view that the real challenge to Marx comes from the truth and reality of religion may well encourage Marxists greatly, on the understanding that if religion has stood for anything, then it is falsehood, illusion and unreality. I think that understanding is mistaken, profoundly so, and dangerously so, blinding people with the best of intentions to the dangers of bringing about the very opposite of what they intend. I don’t think that Marx demands that human beings become as gods, only realized human beings, a self-realization that proceeds in unity, each as one with all. I’m just concerned to bound that view within a sense of the transcendent, something that draws being out and expands it in relation to something greater than the self.





I will say with Plato, though, that a tempered freedom does exist, and that human beings could come to be sufficiently rational in living in accordance with the reality of this vision of a well-tempered free will. (I write extensively on this in the forthcoming book Dante’s Sweet Symphony of Paradise).

Revise Marx, along essentialist Aristotelian lines tempered by a dose of Thomism, as arguing for a healthy development and natural growth that is extended to each and all, incorporating the spiritual dimension as very much part of the real life of real human beings as meaning seeking creatures, and I’ll be happy to argue for Marx. But it will be a naturalist immanence tempered by the transcendent, that desire for something ‘higher’ that E.F. Schumacher wrote of, that prevents desire from closing in on the ego. But, maybe, this is a forlorn hope, and that the secret that we are on our own is out, leaving us to work out the implications as best we can, existentialists one and all in a meaningless universe going nowhere. It’s all invention to no end:

Friedrich Nietzsche said that philosophy invents modes of existence or possibilities of life. That’s why a few fundamental anecdotes are enough to convey a portrait of philosophy... Some will argue that most philosophers’ lives are bourgeois, but what about Kant's stocking-suspenders as a fitting anecdote for Reason? And Spinoza's liking of battles between spiders as a pure reproduction of the relationships between modes in the system of Ethics as higher ethology? These anecdotes do not refer simply to social nor psychological types of a philosopher (Empedocles the Prince, or Diogenes the slave) but instead show the conceptual personae who inhabit them. Possibilities of life, or modes of existence, can only be invented on a plane of immanence that develops the power of conceptual personae. 

Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari.

In the final words of his final book, Love, Freedom and Society (1957), Middleton Murry says this of Jesus: ‘we know he lives now in the hearts of individual and mortal men, and only there.’ No heaven, no resurrection, no redemption, no salvation, no transcendent realm, it seems. A naturalist realization conceived along the humanist lines of Aristotle and Marx could make sense of such a Jesus, as a figure whose service to and sacrifice for others set a very humane, if incredibly high, example to us all. Such a Jesus existed as the very embodiment of the love ‘that seeketh not its own.’ But such a love was the incarnation of something more than self-created, self-chosen values and subjective truths projected upon an objectively valueless world. ‘For God so loved the world that he gave his one and only Son, that whoever believes in him shall not perish but have eternal life.’ 

Georges Bernanos, whom I quoted above, expressed his belief in the reality of this eternal life, and he was clear that it is such a belief that can alone temper power with love. Remove this, and we are in the world of self-made man and his undoing, a world of self-important beings righteously collectivising their separate narcissisms in an attempt to bring about a better world, an experiment that ends in a condition of universal hatred.

'Beauty', Goethe writes, 'is the manifestation of secret laws of Nature which, were it not for their being revealed through beauty, would have remained unknown for ever.' All searches, discoveries, and inventions would, Goethe feared, ultimately spend themselves in the vain and desperate fidgetings of the good intention to make Hell a better place to live in. (Heller 1952). The very activities and achievements involved in thrusting these things on the world serves only to progressively alienate the world from the truth that resides in the imagination and in precise vision rather than in the abstract formulae of the fittingness, beauty, and significance of things. That’s the contemplative vision of which St Thomas Aquinas spoke earlier in terms of an ultimate happiness that rises above the intemperate and incontinent life of the senses, leading to a delight that ‘surpasses all sensible good.’

Max Weber at the end of The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism describes capitalist modernity as a ‘mechanised petrification embellished by a convulsive self-importance.’ (Weber 1985: 181-82). The age of emancipation as egoistic self-assertion turns out in practice to involve the maximum of subordination and servitude:





As we keep asking of progress from our backseat in the capitalist juggernaut, ‘are we there yet?’ This is the kind of progress in which things seem to get worse as they get better, a world in which, as Marx puts it, ‘everything seems pregnant with its contrary.’

Machinery, gifted with the wonderful power of shortening and fructifying human labour, we behold starving-and overworking it. The new-fangled sources of wealth, by some strange weird spell, are turned into sources of want. The victories of art seem bought by the loss of character. At the same pace that mankind masters nature, man seems to become enslaved to other men or to his own infamy. Even the pure light of science seems unable to shine but on the dark background of ignorance. All our invention and progress seem to result in endowing material forces with intellectual life, and in stultifying human life into a material force. This antagonism between modern industry and science on the one hand, modern misery and dissolution on the other hand; this antagonism between the productive powers and the social relations of our epoch is a fact, palpable, overwhelming, and not to be controverted. 

Marx AB SE 1973: 289-90

Marx explains this dialectic of enlightenment by taking us to its roots in the alienated system of production, and he has shown us the way out of it: ‘We know that to work well the new-fangled forces of society, they only want to be mastered by new-fangled men - and such are the working men.’ But is the free human self-creation he affirms bounded by something greater than ‘purely human values’, however much these values are expressed in an association that joins each with all others? Are such self-created values sufficient? Here we forced to address Plato’s old question of whether democracy is capable of supplying itself with limits from within. Plato thought not. If Plato is right, then how else is recognition of the necessity of limits possible? Or are the floodgates now opened to a self-realization that is bounded by nothing outside of human desire? Marx, I have shown, does recognise the ‘the eternal natural condition’ for life on earth (Karl Marx, Capital, vol. 1 (London: Penguin, 1976), 637–38), and to that extent his free association does recognize – and enable a recognition of – natural limits. Marx’s emphasis upon the self-mediated creation of the human species in history is not, therefore, unbounded. But if Nature continues to exist for Marx, then God does not. Human beings are not just the meaning-seeking creatures in this heady vision, they are the meaning-making creatures. God exists only as a human invention.

I’m not so sure God does disappear in Marx. Marx may well have thought he had removed God, but the theological assumptions attendant upon the belief in God are much less easy to extirpate than is God, not least when you are concerned with ethics and the moral condition of humanity. Critics have referred to Marx’s ‘hidden God,’ which, apparently, is a very ‘bad thing’ to be extirpated. (Connolly 1989). 

It is in this context that Connolly refers to the 'docility' achieved through the category of citizenship. Since it is impossible to maintain the command theory of political obligation without a Commander-in-Chief, democracy comes to acquire a better name as secularisation advances for the way that it replaces faith in a common God with a common faith in the civilizing power of citizenship (Connolly 1989: 39/40). In Connolly's Foucaultian critique, Rousseau, Hegel and Marx are advocates of self-realisation who become 'unwitting allies of technocratic agencies of social control' (Connolly 1989: 14). ‘Because each theory denies that otherness will persist once the state or the community is actualized, because each seeks to draw all otherness into the sphere of a realised state or community where it can fulfil its essence, each theory is unintentionally repressive in its implications’ (Connolly 1988:130). Which is a celebration of difference, margins and minorities that denies community, morality, authority, the normative as necessarily repressive. That view is subject to the criticisms of liberalism, postmodernism and abstraction I have made throughout. At this stage I am more concerned with the connection between God and an affirmation of a commonality in politics and social organisation that a libertarian critique sees as necessarily repressive of difference, otherness and individuality. I have rebutted those claims elsewhere. Here, I am interested in noting the extent to which critics see a connection between a commonality in ethics and politics and God and religion. The implication is that the two go together. Libertarians demand consistency here, extirpating not only God but the commitment to common standards, unity and equality that are considered remnants of a moribund religious view, taking a repressive form in organised political life. 

I see it differently; I see it as an ineradicable normative dimension without which Marx’s emancipatory vision not only makes no sense, could misfire spectacularly. Consistency cuts both ways. A structureless, meaningless world of pure contingency, a life permanently lived on the margins, is incapable of embodying and institutionalising power, let alone expressing it any communal sense. It denies social mediation to human beings, with the result that individuals are permanently subject to an external force. Further, a self-realization without limits can fly to infinity, eating up the world and humanity in the process. A rational restraint, self-given and absorbed into mediated forms, is a condition of an authentic self-realization. However repressive some such notion may be to those who, in abstracting out and separating the things that belong together, see each, any and every form of law, authority, community and morality as inimical to individual freedom, that notion is a condition of human survival, let alone freedom and happiness.

To state the point clearly: Marx’s emancipatory commitment presupposes truths and values which are religious in origin and nature. Lose touch with dimension, and the whole emancipatory project becomes unmoored, incoherent, delusional and downright hazardous. 

And here we return to Marx’s ambivalent status as an Enlightenment thinker. He believes in reason, certainly. But he is a critical thinker, seeing progress as dialectical rather than as uni-linear. Marx cannot be accused of being unaware of the downside of Enlightenment, and he is a sharp critic of eighteenth century materialism. It would be wrong to claim that the Encyclopaedists and rationalists of the Enlightenment were themselves naïve proponents of a simple connection between reason, freedom and progress. But there is a complacency in that tradition which has served to blind us to certain truths and realities that go much deeper than that which can be defined, conceptualized, and counted. Man may be the measurer of all things, but he is not the measure of all things. Marx was not blind, but critical. The extent to which Marx was well aware of the downside of the Enlightenment, particularly in its liberal and capitalist and free trade incarnation, can be gleaned from the fact he is anathema to Steven Pinker’s conception of the Enlightenment. The Enlightenment which Pinker is urging us all to defend is in key respects the liberal Enlightenment that Marx sought to challenge and overturn – the liberalism that sold the rational soul of the Enlightenment to capital to be flogged at any price and any cost on the global market.

Many now repudiate anthropocentrism. Beneath the very vocal nature of the declarations here, the nature of this repudiation and the depths to which it goes can very much be doubted. The fact that it is frequently blamed upon religion suggests that the humanism of the Enlightenment has become a self-satisfied, self-blinding vision. No religious vision based upon God can be anthropocentric. The anthropocentrism that is so destructive with respect to the planet and so self-destructive with respect to the human species comes from another source entirely, from the practical demonstration of the reality of human knowledge and power through the advance of industry, technology, and a natural science that, paradoxically, in revealing how relatively insignificant human beings are in the universal scale of things, has served somehow to reinforce an arrogant self-assertion. Marx saw the potential for human liberation here. And he did, to be fair, make the necessary qualifications with respect to the balance of technical and moral capacities. Many others are not so circumspect. And, it seems, what we do with this power is all a matter of our own choices.

Philosopher Ronnie de Sousa, author of Why Think? Evolution and the Rational Mind (2007), argues that we are ‘natural-born existentialists.’ He claims that evolutionary biology makes existentialists of us all. This is hardly news. We have been here since Nietzsche declared ‘God is dead.’ (Actually, if true, we have been here since ever, it just means that people are free to choose to believe in a transcendent God as creator of all things and that people, throughout history, have in their practical wisdom done so, and very happily indeed for the most part.) (Ronnie de Sousa https://aeon.co/essays/how-evolutionary-biology-makes-everyone-an-existentialist).

In Part 3, I examined the way that Marx addressed the relation between law and morality with respect to the intractable nature of resolving the eternal question of ‘what is fair’ within capitalist relations. Whilst Marx denounces the capital relation as exploitative and alienative, he doesn’t set his argument out in terms of fairness. There is nothing unfair about the arrangement between capitalists and proletarians within the capital system itself. From the ‘legal standpoint,’ commodity exchange refers to no more than ‘the worker’s power to dispose freely of his own capacities, and the money owner or commodity owner’s power to dispose freely of the values that belong to him.’ No one is cheated, there is no unfairness. Of course, Marx here is concerned to draw attention to is the inherent bias of the system, something that no moral standpoint outside of that system is able to correct, not even an omnipotent God (although the point remains that God exists as the transcendent source, standard and hope that enjoins us to correct injustice in the structures, relations and institutions of the world, confident in the knowledge that justice does indeed exist).

The argument concerning fairness made me think of a favourite television play of mine from the 1970s, Another Sunday and Sweet F.A., a play about a football match in which the referee tries to ensure fairness in a world that is substantively unfair. Writer Jack Rosenthal explained that the referee Mr Armistead saw ‘life as an Immorality Play. Right never triumphs over wrong. Good never vanquishes evil. No one knows the meaning of “fairness,” which is why he's a Sunday morning referee - hoping that in his own small way, in a foreign field that's forever Manchester, he and his whistle might change the world.’ All the referee has is the law, and he knows that the law is not always fair in substantively unfair conditions. The players know it, and grumble about it. The referee knows it, and knows that all he can do is apply the laws. Because if he didn’t, sheer brute strength would prevail, and questions of fairness and unfairness would be settled by naked power. Why, a consistent naturalist could argue, shouldn’t it? Why worry about moral standards at all?
Here are some lines of dialogue to contemplate:

Mr. Armistead: Now may the best team win.
Albion Captain: Why?

The game gets underway, and it remains scoreless despite the fact that one side is clearly better than the other, and has had a hatful of chances to score:

Player: We should have a cricket score here.
Mr. Armistead: that’s life isn’t it lad?

Player: can’t you give us one?
Mr. Armistead: that’s wishful thinking

The referee ponders the injustices of the game:

Mr. Armistead: Vicious circle. So where do you start? Tell them to play to the game, play to the rules. Half of them have probably been on the dole eighteen months. Of course they should have a cricket score. But that is life. I wasn’t wrong. Not that it ever sinks in. And all you can do is tell them to be fair. They’ve never won a football match yet, mind you. They’ve never won anything. They might not know Mephistopheles, but they know that all right. 
Yes lads, I know that being fair isn’t fair any day of the week. That’s why we turn out on Sundays, hoping this time it will be. It never is, but we hope. The beauty of football we used to call it. 

The team finally scores to take the lead, only to have the goal disallowed. The goalscorer shoots the referee an evil look:

Mr. Armistead: What’s that for?
Player: You could have allowed it.

Mr. Armistead: An offside goal. Is that how you want to win?
Player: It’s right, that’s all, and we don’t when it’s wrong.

Mr. Armistead: Yes, it is. 
Player: There’s no flaming justice.

Mr. Armistead: The other side has got a free kick. That’s justice. 
Player: You know what I mean.

Mr. Armistead: Yes, I do.

The referee shares his story about how he was wanted for trials, but had his opportunity ended by the war. His own dream that he could have been another Dixie Dean is scorned by one of the players. The referee, upset, runs up the park to get on the end of a cross to score a goal with his head at the far corner. The goal can’t stand, surely? The referee says it is perfectly legal, getting out his rulebook to say so. Game over, 1-0, the winner scored by the referee, who denies participating in the game, claiming he was merely keeping up with play as per his duties, the ball accidentally hitting his head and flying into the goal. A plain lie that he covers with the rule book. The better team, then, wins.

Sam the Coach: Excuse me Mr Armistead, I’m not complaining, but it wasn’t fair our goal, was it?
Mr. Armistead: Absolutely legal, law 9 paragraph B

Sam the Coach: I see. 
Mr. Armistead: Good morning

Sam the Coach: I still think it was unfair, really.
Mr. Armistead: Only in the eyes of God, lad. And he’s needed new glasses for nearly two thousand years.

So who, in the wide world outside of Manchester, is our referee? And how might such a referee change the world? And what is fair? 
Miguel de Cervantes made the comparison between love and war in Don Quixote (1604) writing ‘Love and war are all one . . . It is lawful to use sleights and stratagems to . . . attain the wished end.’ That’s life, isn’t it? All’s fair in love and war and football. And that’s the need for a referee applying the laws, even though justice in an unjust world is often very unfair indeed. Really, fairness and justice exist only in the eyes of God.

The Death of God
Nietzsche says there is no God. He says much more than this, though, arguing that where there is no God there is no morality. It’s not even clear if Nietzsche sees the need for a referee or a rulebook. Remove God, and everything changes:

God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him. How shall we comfort ourselves, the murderers of all murderers? What was holiest and mightiest of all that the world has yet owned has bled to death under our knives: who will wipe this blood off us? What water is there for us to clean ourselves? What festivals of atonement, what sacred games shall we have to invent? Is not the greatness of this deed too great for us? Must we ourselves not become gods simply to appear worthy of it?

Nietzsche, The Gay Science, Section 125, tr. Walter Kaufmann (​https:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​Walter_Kaufmann_(philosopher)" \o "Walter Kaufmann (philosopher)​)

That’s an awful lot of awkward questions to contemplate. Becoming as gods is not quite the same as living life as a realized human being in association with other realized human beings. Marx’s aim is the latter rather than the former. In his provocative way, Nietzsche seems to be saying that once we put an end to God, we are charged with the responsibility of becoming as gods, if we are concerned to hold onto our moral concerns and conceits. Nietzsche, of course, encourages us to abandon them and embrace a power beyond good and evil. Living with a burdensome moral responsibility would seem to be the condition of socialism as Marx defines it, insofar as we eschew Nietzsche’s aristocratic anarchism for the association of each and all in a society of social self-mediation. 

Marx saw the challenge before it was issued, and set about showing us what is required if human beings are to meet it. ‘Man ought not to know more of a thing than he can creatively live up to,’ wrote Nietzsche with respect to the sterility of philological studies. His point can be generalized in terms of knowledge and power. Human beings ought have only such power that they can creatively live up to. On this, Marx is an optimist. And to pessimists, Marx would have pointed to the alternative – the destructive consequences for humanity and for the world of human social powers continuing in their alienated form. ‘Not the gods, not nature, but only man himself can be this alien power over men.’ (Marx EW EPM 1975: 331). Unless we wish to remain complicit in this self-alienation, with all the destructive consequences that follow from it, then human beings have no option but to reclaim their powers from the new idols of state, bureaucracy, capital, commodities and creatively live up to them. We don’t have to see it in terms of becoming as gods, but in the absence of God, it could mean much the same thing to the extent that we retain a moral language. And maybe that’s what Marx, Nietzsche and Weber are saying – we have no choice but to choose how we are to live, if we are to live at all. As Marx warned, ‘individuals are now ruled by abstractions, whereas earlier they depended on one another.’ (Marx Gr 1973: 164-165). Marx’s great critic Max Weber drew attention to modern organisational forms which proceed ‘without regard to persons.’ (Gerth and Mills ed. 1970: 215; Sayer 1991: ch4).





There are no men as gods in Weber’s view, no realized human beings either, only individuals with an inflated sense of their own self-importance, given their existence as egoistic atoms living under the control of capital’s ‘irresistible force.’ (Weber 1985: 181-82). Weber here describes the impersonality of the alien power that Marx sought to uproot. Marx sought the practical restitution of this alien power to the social body and its conscious exercise as social power through the agency of the associated producers. Weber entertains no such ambitions. Weber described the Communist Manifesto as a ‘pathetic prophecy,’ claiming that notions of associated producers are institutionally vague and say nothing about how future communist society will be governed, examining the untranscendability of the bureaucratic form to predict that the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ would take practical form as the ‘dictatorship of the officials’ over the proletariat. (Lassman and Speirs 1994: 292 295/6; (R S 1994:70 292; Bottomore 1985:26). Weber M 1994 Weber: Political Writings, Lassman, P and Speirs, R ed (Cambridge University Press) If that is true – and Weber wrote before the example of the Soviet Union seemingly came to prove him right - then Marx’s ‘prophecy’ is not merely ‘pathetic,’ it is dangerous too – seducing us into the attempt to create Heaven on Earth only to unleash its very opposite. Whilst I have shown that Weber’s views on Marx’s socialism were mistaken, I have emphasized that his warnings on state socialism remain apposite, making criticisms that Marx himself would have made, not least because those warnings are prone to be missed, and that those bent on creating the new society are prone to be wishful thinkers rather than logicians and metaphysicians, none of which augurs well for the future. 

Weber also acknowledged the Manifesto as ‘a scholarly work of the highest order.’ (MWG, I/i 5, p. 616; Max Weber, 'Socialism', in Eldridge, p. 205.) Eduard Baumgarten reported that, in the last years of his life, Weber told one of his students:





I’d say the same of Max Weber. If neither Marx nor Nietzsche are easily side-stepped, then neither is Weber, who drew on both. We live under the shadows of Marx, Nietzsche and Weber, and even more under the capitalist modernity these figures analysed in different ways. The questions they asked remain the pertinent ones, and they remain unanswered. So long as this is the world we live in, then the ideas of these three will be the key ideas. It is easy enough to call for new ideas. So many attempts to go beyond Marx, Sartre noted in Search for a Method, end up in a position before Marx. For Sartre, the purpose of marxism is completed only with the realisation of philosophy’s emancipatory goal (Sartre 1968: 34). That may involve a long wait on our part.

Max Weber warned long ago about the age of existentialism that is upon us, describing it as an age in which every advance in natural science serves only to reveal the objective meaninglessness of the world. ‘Where there is nothing,’ he warned with respect to natural science’s revelation that we live in an objectively valueless world, ‘not only the Kaiser but the proletarian has lost his rights.’ Weber warned of life in this disenchanted, godless world: ‘Not summer's bloom lies ahead of us, but rather a polar night of icy darkness and hardness, no matter which group may triumph externally now.’ (Weber Politics as a Vocation 1970: 128). Far from human beings creatively living up to their power as gods, Weber saw self-important little narcissists and egoists crushed under the ‘irresistible force’ of the capital economy: 





Oddly, every new scientific revelation of human impotence and unimportance in the wider scale of things has had the paradoxical effect of reinforcing anthropocentric self-satisfaction. The paradox is easily explained. The repudiations of anthropocentrism are fake, to the extent that they remain within a science vs religion narrative that has Enlightenment materialism and nineteenth century scientism written through it from first page to last. God and religion remain the targets, Nature is sanctified as the new God, and natural science is its untouchable religion. This has nothing to do with science, of course, which itself contains an inherent humility with respect to truth claims and reality-checks. It’s all to do with the missing mediation that integrates all the human faculties. And it has everything to do with the impossibilities of naturalism – the ineradicable nature of morality, meaning that even though God is dead, the theological assumptions attendant upon a belief in God hang around and come to be re-attached to other things. 

Monbiot is an example of one of those who thinks they can discard God and yet retain a Christian ethic – or any kind of ethic.

It is worth noting some comments that George Monbiot writes in his article, God versus Greens (Published in the Guardian 25th May 2000). That title should really be rewritten as Greens versus God, because God enjoins each and every one of us to practice a Creation care.

Monbiot charges that ‘environmentalists are foolishly following Prince Charles over the spiritual abyss.’ In his article, Monbiot proceeds to set religion and spiritual transformation in antithetical relation to science, so that anyone who agrees with the importance of one will necessarily be involved in a rejection of the other. The approach is insidious and I have no time to waste on unravelling its logical flaws. Monbiot refers to Prince Charles’ praise of Socrates’s definition of wisdom – ‘knowing that you don’t know’ – describing this in parentheses as ‘a pretty good description of the scientific model.’ It may be, but Socrates, in bringing truth down to earth, was explicitly emphasising the importance of moral truth to human beings, something more than the natural facts which had hitherto been the dominant concern of the natural philosophers of ancient Greece. I don’t care that Greens, liberals and republicans have a problem with monarchy or religion, or that middle class radicals want to continue to fight an outmoded war of science and reason vs religion and superstition, taking on feudal institutions in a stance of phoney ineffective radicalism. But the idea that a concern with the despiritualisation of the world as a result of capitalist disenchantment is beside the point is evidence of a curiously blinkered vision, remaining squarely within the liberal Enlightenment that blinds. Blake saw it clearly from the first, and I’d recommend the work of Joel Kovel who, responding to Blake, saw the centrality of the spiritual transformation to an enduring social transformation. 
Prince Charles writes of an ‘an instinctive, heart-felt awareness’ is ‘the most reliable guide’ to whether or not we are doing the right thing. In other words, Monbiot says, ‘we already know .. all that we need to.’ That isn’t what Prince Charles says, and the way that Monbiot twists perfectly reasonable, and actually very insightful, points does not do either him or the Green movement, insofar as they think Monbiot right, credit. As I write on the merits of virtue theory, a practical morality works with the grain of what people do and how they reason in their everyday lives, something that is far more effective than employing a morality that is about deontological rules and commands and utilitarian calculations. There is an implicit philosophy which gives individuals direction in their problem solving. That doesn’t mean ‘we already know all that we need to’ at all. Knowledge is absorbed into those practices. The ‘chaotic thinking’ Monbiot finds in Prince Charles actually points to his own inability to integrate forms of learning, knowledge and understanding. He criticises Sir Jonathon Porritt for insisting that ‘every one of the world’s major religions’ contains ‘an environmental ethic.’ In response, Monbiot sneers: ‘Maybe his copy of the Bible differs from mine. The one I’ve read keeps insisting that God granted Man dominion over Nature.’ It would be interesting to know what Monbiot understands by ‘dominion’ here. There is a clear environmental ethic in the Bible. It may not be Monbiot’s, but his may well be wrong. And that brings me to a very interesting passage. Monbiot cites Dr Mae-Wan Ho, who argues that ‘the prince is more in touch with the common people than our elected government.’ ‘This may be true,’ says Monbiot, ‘but it doesn’t mean he’s right.’ 

Which reminds me of a comment from Stephen Fry: ‘One of the greatest human failings is to prefer to be right rather than effective.’ It’s an old bugbear of mine that a certain dominant strain of environmentalism is more concerned with being right than being popular which, in a democracy, is a lamentable political failure. It should, by now, be abundantly clear that environmentalism, despite claiming a wealth of scientific knowledge and technological know-how on its side, is politically sleight, punching above its political weight in terms of numbers, certainly, but well below its true weight. Rather than address, still less engage and solicit the participation of, individuals as citizens, there is a tendency among certain environmentalists to dictate truths to governments and the governed. I have made the point continually over the years that the failure to bridge the gap between theoretical reason and practical reason will effectively undermine attempts at environmental reformation, blocking the environmental transformation of ‘the political’ which is the condition of effectiveness in resolving the environmental crisis. The contempt for people is staggering. In meeting with people of all political persuasions and all classes, the consistent complaint has been that environmentalists talk past and talk down to people, lecture and harangue, issue commands and orders not backed by any democratic legitimacy. I’ve heard the complaint, expressed differently, among working class communities with practical socio-economic concerns in the ‘here and now’ that they see unaddressed for environmental concerns for a future that does not, as yet, exist, and among conservative communities, who resent attempts to hijack the political process through the political use of science as an authoritative source of command. That is a denial of liberty, citizenship and democracy, the right of the people to obligate themselves only by such laws that they have had a hand in making through due process. Noted is the emphatic assertion that one’s side is right because it is based on science. An assertion of a truth that trumps all things, including the voices of the people. 

That leaves the environmental movement building knowledge in order to shape policy and policy-frameworks within already constituted power and systems. 

I’m alert to the hints of dictatorship in the way that the environmental cause is sometimes stated. 

And I’m interested in the identification of a religious and spiritual concern as somehow against reason. I doubt Monbiot has much time for Catholicism’s long standing commitment to both reason and faith, and I’m not sure he is aware that fideism is considered a heresy in this tradition. Reason as far as reason will go, says Aquinas. 

‘Environmentalists are in danger of allowing their critics to define them: as backward-looking and anti-intellectual.’ I’d like to know why Monbiot considers religion and the spiritual dimension as necessarily ‘anti-intellectual.’ Would he apply those terms to Dr Robert Winston, one of the world’s leading fertility experts and a practicing Jew? And I am neither backward-looking nor anti-intellectual. 

‘Science teaches us humility…’ Monbiot says, before arguing that ‘only through the demolition of creation myths can an ecological worldview be sustained,’ which amounts to a concern to see his environmental ethic prevail over all others.

I agree that ‘the problem arises not from science itself, but from the political and economic context in which it operates,’ but who is being anti-science. ‘Whether science is used for or against us depends upon who controls the purse strings,’ says Monbiot, a view that fits very comfortably within a Marxist understanding of the way technology, science, production etc are set within specific social relations of production. Except that Monbiot has rejected Marx and Marxism too.

Monbiot then spells out what human humbling at the hands of science entails: ‘While human life, resulting from a series of evolutionary accidents, is arguably meaningless, individual human lives are not. Those accidents have bequeathed an extraordinary degree of consciousness, which in turn has granted us an enhanced capacity for both sympathy and suffering. Using the one to relieve the other invests our lives with a purpose which surely requires no celestial justification. Nor do we need God to tell us to protect other species and beautiful landscapes: we can do so simply because we love them.’ Doesn’t that love depend on what good nature is for us? Doesn’t human valuation depend on the purse strings? Monbiot has just pointed out the entire rationale for God, only to conclude precisely the opposite. The ‘chaotic thinking’ here is Monbiot’s. I wouldn’t expect anything of substance to come from Monbiot’s views. He plainly attacks anthropocentrism, hence his dismissive comment on God granting dominion to human beings. But that dominion does not entail anthropocentrism at all – it is God that encompasses all things in their interrelation that is at the centre of religion as a theocentric vision. Monbiot tells us that the world is objectively meaningless, which is consistent with the natural science that says the world is objectively valueless, and then tells us that human life is not likewise meaningless and valueless, because we have reason and consciousness and can think. Ironically, here, working backwards, he starts to put back together the theocentric view of the universe he is most concerned to destroy. The problem is, working from the wrong direction, inverting the true relation, he has left us halfway, with the very anthropocentrism he claims to oppose. Hardly humble, just another variant of the men as gods thesis. The only things important in this world are thinking, conscious human beings. The world is objectively valueless, and we must save it! Why? For our own good. Monbiot claims Prince Charles ‘has dug a hole, into which many of our most prominent environmentalists have felt obliged to fall. They can hardly complain if those who wish to profit from destruction characterise them as the enemies of reason.’ There is no opposition between religion and science, and reason is so much more than scientific reason. The only hole here is the one dug by Monbiot and militant atheist environmentalists who think like him. The problem with being right rather than effective is not merely that it leads to an ineffective politics that falls far short of the social transformation that is needed and is within reach. And it is far from clear that the likes of Monbiot are right. Environmentalism is too precious a cause to be made a plaything of a bigoted and narrow politics destined to remain on the margins, the voice of the self-righteous. 

The solution seems easy enough: a thoroughgoing secularisation that extirpates the theological assumptions too, along with all the religious yearnings and cravings that go with them – Nietzsche’s world beyond good and evil. Things are not so easy:





When we have found all the mysteries and lost all the meaning, we will be alone, on an empty shore.

Stoppard 1993 Act 2 scene 7

How do we deal with the natural limits of our lives? We may merely have to accept contingency, and abandon all illusions that we are so much more important than we actually are, as Jacques Monod argues in Chance and Necessity:





It’s the way of science, it seems. As neuroscientist Hannah Critchlow says: ‘consciousness is a really funny word. It’s almost as if humans have developed this word to make ourselves seem more important than we are.’ And how important is that? The less important such scientists say we are, the more self-important certain human beings seem to become, taking delight in knocking down the illusions that human beings have developed in order to find meaning in a meaningless world. There’s a lot of evidence to show that free will is ‘largely an illusion,’ says Critchlow. How much of an illusion? Even a little free will leaves us with enough of a degree of moral autonomy to allow us to transcend purely naturalist accounts of human behaviour. And that autonomy can go an awful long way in making human life much more than a response to biological imperatives. ‘There’s a huge amount that seems to be hardwired into us and predetermined. You are born with a particular brain and that shapes your perception, shapes what you are hardwired to find rewarding. You are brought up in a particular environment and that reinforces what you are born with.’ (Critchlow 2018).

What does that mean for decision-making? ‘If your perception of the world is based on prior experiences and hardwiring, then that shapes your reality, which goes on to affect your decision-making. A large amount of your decision-making taps into your reward system in your brain. Although there is scope to change certain behaviours, you have to make a real conscious effort in order to break habits and change how your reward system affects your motivation. I think neuroscience can be very empowering in that, in making me go for a jog rather than reach for a bottle of shiraz.’

Surely the danger in being a neuroscientist is that you can start to view people as simply a bunch of chemical and electrical reactions. ‘I haven’t got to that point, yet,’ says Critchlow. ‘I hope I never do.’ I wonder what she fears, here. If we are nothing but a pack of neurons, then not just religion but all the arguments and struggles over ideals and values is just an illusion. Isn’t that what neuroscience is basically saying we are? ‘Yeah,’ says Critchlow, ‘but it’s an awe-inspiring, highly sophisticated, highly dynamic system that is incredible and beautiful in its intricacy…’ And so, too, is human history, society and politics, the very things by which human beings shape the environment that in turn shapes them. If the environment shapes us, as Critchlow states, then we shape that environment – it’s a two-way process and one that is ever-developing. As for humility, I just see a disinfectant that delights in eliminating moral and cultural constraints upon our technical and economic powers, without replacing them with anything that can hold those powers in check in the same way.

Shortly after Monod published Chance and Necessity, Leszek Kolakowski, repentant ex-Marxist philosopher, wrote an essay titled The Revenge of the Sacred in Secular Culture:





Whereas Camus took the pointless labour of Sisyphus to point to irreligion as the condition for the acceptance life’s defeat, Kolakowski does something much more profound in taking religion to be the acceptance itself. He holds that to even recognize, before coming to accept, our inadequacy in face of the human condition as inevitable defeat, requires that we accept the reality of the other, contrasting, condition, the ‘order of the sacred’ in which all our deficiencies are made good.

We return also to John Finnis’ point that the fact that desire or inclination expresses, or is part of, a deep structure shaping the human mind, a structure that is ineradicable, and common to all humans (and maybe all animals) does not provide a sufficient basis for inferring that the object of that desire is really desirable in the sense of being objectively good. (Finnis 1980: 65).

There is no scientific workaround that allows us to avoid politics and ethics and the key questions of human agency in making history, and a scientific explanation that reduces these things explains precisely nothing beyond what Marx emphasizes with respect to human life as a mediated life of thoughts, actions, relations and environments – environments that we shape as we shape them.

Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living.

Karl Marx The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. 1852

It is upon this ‘making history’ – and the shaping and reshaping of environments - that our focus should fall.

And I need some genuine humility. I need a greater recognition for the need for mercy and forgiveness than I find in the emphasis on power and flourishing. The emphasis on the realization of healthy potentialities, fulfilment, flourishing as the exercise of powers, needs to be tempered by a sense of human frailty and weakness and failure. There is a need to recognize that we will not realize all of our goals, and not to the full, that we will fall short, and not be scorned in our failure. A recognition of that truth comes with a check against the commitment to the healthy flourishing of each and all tipping over into an assertive arrogance that is contemptuous and intolerant of failure and of those who fail as ‘the weak and the botched’ (Nietzsche Antichrist). Far from being a society at peace with itself, a society in which each and all are expected to be Nietzschean Superman may well prove to be the most anxious, neurotic, unhappy, and cruel of all societies. Instead of the collective self-realization that Marx envisaged, there is a clear danger of a society of collective narcissisms, petty egos inflated out of all importance in their separation, generating new rivalries in separation to issue in a collective self-hatred. 

Of course, the criticism cuts both ways, and Nietzsche could no doubt respond by excoriating visions of the self-realisation of each and all as entailing no more than the mass mediocrity of the ‘last man.’ By the ‘last man’ or the ‘last race’ (Letzter Mensch), Nietzsche describes the antithesis of his superior being, the Übermensch (​https:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​%C3%9Cbermensch" \o "Übermensch​) or Overman or Superman. (Thus Spoke Zarathustra). The last men are tired and unadventurous, seeking no more from life than comfort and security. The first appearance of the last man is in ‘Zarathustra's Prologue.’ Nietzsche condemns modern society for having the last man as its goal, Zarathustra hoping to so appal people with a goal so disgusting as to provoke them into pursuing the goal of the Übermensch in revolt. (Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Prologue, §5). Instead of choosing to become Übermensch, the people take Zarathustra literally and instead choose the ‘disgusting’ goal of becoming the last men. The lives of the last men or race are comfortable and pacifist, without distinctions between rulers and ruled, strong and weak, supreme and mediocre. Social conflict and challenges are at a minimum, individuals live in equality, satisfied with a ‘superficial’ harmony, individuality and creativity are no more. Nietzsche warned that such a society would become too decadent to support the growth of a flourishing and healthy human life, only apathetic persons incapable of dreaming and taking risks, merely earning a living and staying safe and secure. 

What to say? Nietzsche’s reactionary lament for the society of the masses to come is itself a form of decadence, expressing a nostalgia for a time when only the few could indulge fantasies of supremacy, buttressed by the wealth and security bought by class privilege. For all the forceful language, Nietzsche's ‘will to power’ reads like a fanciful paean to bourgeois competition, which liberalism sees as the mainspring of human action. Which is not much of a freedom, merely a mutual self-cancellation. Marx refers to the personal independence as a result of competition as the ‘illusion’ of freedom: ‘an independence which is at bottom merely an illusion, and is more correctly called indifference’. Individuals being ‘free’ merely ‘to collide with one another’ (Marx Gr 1973:163). Here is the real ‘last man’ or ‘last race,’ in the liberal idea that with capitalist free markets, free trade and free competition history has ended. 

Marx thus criticises the 'absurdity’ of liberal thinkers who regard competition 'as the absolute mode of existence of free individuality’ when it is not individuals who are set free by competition but capital. (Gr 1973:649/51). Here is the mediocrity and levelling of the ‘last man,’ the ‘last race’ is the age of the bourgeois. Hence 'the insipidity of the view that free competition is the ultimate development of human freedom; and that the negation of free competition = the negation of individual freedom. (Gr 1973: 652). Marx continues:

It is nothing more than free development on a limited basis - the basis of the rule of capital. This kind of individual freedom is therefore at the same time the most complete suspension of all individual freedom, and the most complete subjugation of individuality under social conditions which assume the form of objective powers, even of overpowering objects - of things independent of the relations among individuals themselves. The analysis of what free competition really is, is the only rational reply to the middle-class prophets who laud it to the skies or to the socialists who damn it to hell. The statement that, within free competition, the individuals, in following purely their private interest, realize the communal or rather the general interest means nothing other than that they collide with one another under the conditions of capitalist production, and hence that the impact between them is itself nothing more than the recreation of the conditions under which this interaction takes place. By the way, when the illusion about competition as the so-called absolute form of free individuality vanishes, this is evidence that the conditions of competition, i.e. of production founded on capital, are already felt and thought of as barriers, and hence already are such, and more and more become such. The assertion that free competition = the ultimate form of the development of the forces of production and hence of human freedom means nothing other than that middle-class rule is the culmination of world history - certainly an agreeable thought for the parvenus of the day before yesterday.

Marx Gr 1973: 652

For Nietzsche, the ‘last man’ is one response to the problem of nihilism arising from the death of God. He is clear, however, that the way forward is uncertain. It is too soon to understand the full implications of the death of God: ‘The event itself is far too great, too distant, too remote from the multitude's capacity for comprehension even for the tidings of it to be thought of as having arrived as yet.’ (Gay Science, §343). 

Is the choice before one of being a mass of bourgeois mediocrities or an elite of aristocratic Overmen? There is no good reason to rule out Marx’s free and full development of each and all, and opt for a self-realization conceived in terms of the realization of the healthy potentials possessed by each and all, in full recognition of the fragility of the flesh. The flesh is not all-powerful, it is frail and corruptible. To argue as though it is is an invitation into fantasies that are debilitating at the individual level and dangerous at the collective level. That’s not how Marx’s conceived the commitment to universal flourishing through the realization of healthy potentialities, of course. The only note of scepticism here is that this view does come with an attitude to human power that is prone to overlook the ineradicable fragilities of human life. Religion comes with a recognition of human weakness, and will respond with mercy and forgiveness, and offer the possibility of redemption. Does a humanist ethic give us the same? Or does it not pass over too easily into arrogance and conceit, demonstrating a disdainful attitude toward ‘the weak and the botched’ who, through weakness of will, fail to creatively live up to their potentialities or, worse, fail to conform to an abstract standard of the ideal drawn from what the Supermen among us establish as the new norm? This is not Marx’s flourishing in association with others, but society as a hygiene, eliminating the weak, holding failure in contempt. The irony is that there would be no place for someone as sensitive a nature as Nietzsche in such an austere fitness regime. And Marx, too, was something of an oddball, bookworming his way through life, sponging off others as he went. What is the criterion of healthy and successful living? And who applies it? Nature? Survival of the fittest?

Marx seems to have had in mind the image of God the Creator being supplanted by a vision of human beings as the self-creators of their history. It is with such an argument that Marx sought to live up to the challenge Nietzsche later issued of human beings, in a world without God, having to become as gods and assume responsibility for their actions. It is a superior vision to that of the Nietzschean Supermen. But the vision of power upon which it is based needs tempering with a humble recognition of weakness and vulnerability. The strong Aristotelian vision that Marx gives us is silent on this.

And as for power, so with knowledge. It would appear to be a clear truth that knowledge is really a good, an aspect of authentic human flourishing, and that the principle which expresses its value formulates a real (intelligent) reason for action. The good of knowledge is self-evident, an obvious truth. Whilst it cannot be demonstrated, it stands in no need of such demonstration. ‘It seems clear that such indeed is the case,’ John Finnis writes, ‘and that there are no sufficient reasons for doubting it to be so.’ A commitment to truth-seeking, then, is sufficient, and knowledge will set us free. Here, in affirming a direct connection between reason and freedom, we would seem to have confirmation of the Enlightenment model, a line in which knowledge (as power) takes us to the free society. Finnis proceeds to criticize the view. We cannot validly infer the value of knowledge from the fact (if fact it be) that ‘all men desire to know.’ The universality of a desire is not a sufficient basis for inferring that the object of that desire is really desirable in the sense of being objectively good. Nor is such a basis afforded by the fact that the desire or inclination manifests, or is part of, a deep structure shaping the human mind, or by the fact that the desire, or the structure, is ineradicable, or by the fact that in whole or part the desire is (or is not) common to all animals, or by the fact that it is (or is not) peculiar to human beings. (Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights 1980: 65).

We come here to the question of foundations. Finnis asks whether there is a ‘principle of sufficient reason.’ Leibniz had identified such a principle, and formulated it thus: ‘No fact can be real or existent, no statement true, unless there be a sufficient reason why it is so and not otherwise, although these reasons usually cannot be known to us.’ (Leibniz, Monadology [1714], sec. 32) However, Finnis argues, this principle should not be conceded. ‘No reason can be given or need be sought to explain why two identical individuals (e.g. two pins or two atoms) are distinct and different. No reason can or need be given for a choice that was really freely made as between eligible alternatives. And no reason can or need be given why it is this world-order rather than some other possible world-order that exists. (Leibniz held that this world-order exists because God chose it, but his principle of sufficient reason compelled Leibniz to offer a reason for this choice. The reason offered had to be that this is the best of all possible worlds. But we must reject the very notion of a best possible world as 'merely incoherent, like the idea of a biggest natural number.’ For goodness, Finnis argues, has irreducibly distinct and incommensurable aspects. So, in the absence of any universal, necessary principle such as that of ‘sufficient reason,’ the question remains: ‘Must we answer the question why the whole state of affairs causing the first-mentioned state of affairs to exist itself exists?’ (Finnis 1980: 385-86). 

Finnis argues that the question cannot be answered, and, indeed, need not be answered. Leibniz answered it with his argument concerning a preordained harmony, Leibniz proved that we live in the best of all possible worlds, a view which exposed him to the satirical criticism of Voltaire. Voltaire’s satire made the point that these eternal truths are historical in form, something which Marx developed in terms of the systematic critique of existing society, historicizing what the defenders of the prevailing social order sought to naturalize. Marx thus gives us not an abstract eternalized reason but a social self-knowledge. And he gives us a vision of a truly human society in which individuals have reclaimed their social power from all the alien forms within which it has been incarnated. These alien forms refer to the state and capital, certainly, but also God. God, in this Feuerbachian view, exists as a projection of all the best qualities of human beings in ideal form. Marx draws the analogy between the critique of alienated social powers and the critique of God and religion frequently:

the more the worker exerts himself in his work, the more powerful the alien, objective world becomes which he brings into being over against himself, the poorer he and his inner world become, and the less they belong to him. It is the same in religion. The more man puts into God, the less he retains within himself. The worker places his life in the object; but now it no longer belongs to him, but to the object. The greater his activity, therefore, the fewer objects the worker possesses. What the product of his labour is, he is not. Therefore, the greater this product, the less is he himself. The externalization [Entdusserung] of the worker in his product means not only that his labour becomes an object, an external existence, but that it exists outside him, independently of him and alien to him, and begins to confront him as an autonomous power; that the life which he has bestowed on the object confronts him as hostile and alien.

Marx EW EPM 1975: 325

Marx draws the analogy between capitalist society and religion consistently, from his early writings all the way through to his later writings, returning to it explicitly in his analysis of the fetishism of commodities in Capital. (Marx C1 1976 ch 1). But the analogy doesn’t quite work. God is not an autonomous, alien and hostile power at all, and religion is not about power. There is no perfect ideal power to reappropriate and exercise as human. That is not what religious truth is all about, the very opposite in fact. Christ on the Cross was taunted by the Roman soldiers for his lack of power. That’s a vision of a human frailty and weakness that is redeemed by spiritual power. To conceive that power to be an illusion is a telling error. Marx seems to have had in mind the image of God the Creator being supplanted by a vision of human beings as the self-realizing self-creators of their history. For all that Marx recognized that religion expresses a ‘real suffering,’ he seems to have considered this an illusory expression of such suffering. That’s an error, in that religion is a very real expression of the fragility of human existence, hence the powerful psychic hold it has had on people over time and place. Human beings find a real solace in the reality of religious truth. Overlooking this, Marx condemns this religious expression as illusory and fantastical, and presumes that all suffering will disappear with the transformation of social conditions that generate that suffering in the first place. He envisages a place where all tears will be wiped away, and there will be no more ‘mourning or crying or pain, for the old order of things has passed away.’ The presumption is that, in the future transformed state of all-powerful, all-knowledgeable beings, there will no longer be any suffering. The implication is either that human beings will have become omnipotent and omniscient, beyond suffering because they are beyond weakness and vulnerability, or have become accepting of the inevitability of a natural finitude. The latter is entirely consistent with Marx’s naturalism as a humanism, implying no idolatrous claims to divine perfection and immortality. The former expresses an all-too human tendency to delusion.

As I shall shortly argue with respect to Nietzsche, there is a troubling incoherence in ethical positions that seek to realize fundamentally religious values without the tempering and earthing power of God. Without that grounding, self-realization – with nothing greater than the self to bound that realization – tips easily over into ‘men as gods’ fantasies that quickly turn into their opposites. The healthy concern with power as flourishing comes thus to be expressed as an unhealthy obsession which neurotically denies the reality of human weakness, frailty, pain and suffering. Such is the reality of the human condition as a natural condition subject to the corruption, decay and death of the flesh. Do we simply accept contingency impassively, and put an end to suffering by seeing it as unavoidable and therefore unlamentable? Perhaps, if God is a human invention, then maybe human beings have invented God in order to deal with something they find unacceptable and unliveable in the natural state. Do we merely grow up and accept the world as no more than a series of meaningless struggles for survival? Is there something deeper, or does it merely flatter and reassure us to think so? And in answering these questions, ask which view makes most sense of the richness and diversity and complexity of the human experience in the round. Can human beings live by disinfectants?

2 Nietzsche on interpretation
Nietzsche The Will to Power: An Attempted Transvaluation of all Values

Marx’s view that philosophers have ‘only interpreted the world in various ways, the point however is to change it’ needs to be compared to Nietzsche’s statement in The Will to Power, Nietzsche argues that there are no facts, only interpretations:

481
In opposition to Positivism, which halts at phenomena and says, “These are only facts and nothing more,” I would say: No, facts are precisely what is lacking, all that exists consists of interpretations. We cannot establish any fact “in itself”: it may even be nonsense to desire to do such a thing. “Everything is subjective,” ye say: but that in itself is interpretation. The “subject” is nothing given, but something superimposed by fancy, something introduced behind. Is it necessary to set an interpreter behind the interpretation already to hand? Even that would be fantasy, hypothesis.
To the extent to which knowledge has any sense at all, the world is knowable: but it may be interpreted differently, it has not one sense behind it but hundreds of senses. – “Perspectivity.”
It is our needs that interpret the world; our instincts and their impulses for and against. Every instinct is a sort of thirst for power; each has its point of view, which it would fain impose upon all the other instincts as their norm.

If everything is subjective, the ‘subject’ involved in interpretation isn’t given. The problem with grounds is that no sooner do you identify a particular ground for a view, then it turns out to rest on other grounds – it’s grounds, and interpretations, all the way down. For Nietzsche, this points to a perspectivism in accordance with which the knowable world is interpreted differently. The comparison with Marx here comes when Nietzsche argues that ‘it is our needs that interpret the world; our instincts and their impulses for and against.’ Marx set human needs and the dialectic of their denial and realisation, in the context of the labour/production that mediates the human interchange with the world. (Critchley 2018 ch 3). There is no objective ground outside of this that is knowable in itself, whether we refer here to ‘God’ or ‘Nature.’ Marx, in line with Aristotle, points to essences in the process of becoming and flourishing in specific historical forms. Nietzsche here writes that ‘every instinct is a sort of thirst for power; each has its point of view, which it would fain impose upon all the other instincts as their norm.’ Whilst Nietzsche opts for a vision of struggle and competition, Marx’s essentialism, concerned with natural power and its development and flourishing, envisages a more harmonious view; both are interpretations in Nietzsche’s sense. Nietzsche’s position is explicitly anti-moral. Marx’s position has been described as amoral. I have argued that the normative dimension is implicit in Marx’s concern with the growth of the potential of a thing to completion, something which Marx expressed in relation to the social metabolic order as a whole. It’s just that Marx’s interpretation of nature is different to Nietzsche’s. There are no natural facts here that are capable of deciding which interpretation is right or wrong, which serves to underline the ineradicable nature of the normative dimension to any emancipatory project such as Marx’s. 

Nietzsche rules out such claims for ethics and emancipation as the vestigial remnants of a belief in a God that no longer exists:

471 
The hypothesis that, at bottom, things proceed in such a moral fashion that human reason must be right, is a mere piece of good-natured and simple-minded trustfulness, the result of the belief in Divine truthfulness – God regarded as the Creator of all things. – These concepts are our inheritance from a former existence in a Beyond.

Any essentialism that remains is stripped of any normative dimension beyond the statement that a thing is as it is, and flourishes as it ought if it is to complete itself and become what it is. Marx himself did not propose any extraneous force guiding or shaping immanent development as a process of self-realisation. The normative dimension is implicit in the development. It’s just that Marx’s interpretation is clearly guided by a moral concern that, in Nietzsche’s view, comes from outside in the form of Christian morality. The belief in the unity of the free and full development of each and all is an expression of a Christian morality, affirming the equality of each and all in the eyes of God. There is no basis for such a moral commitment in nature, Nietzsche argues. Nietzsche thus reveals ‘rational freedom’ to be a moral view that ‘reason must be right,’ and must prevail, insofar as things are allowed to proceed in their normal course of development. This, Nietzsche states, is no more than a ‘piece of good-natured and simple-minded trustfulness’ that follows a belief in Divine truthfulness – God regarded as the Creator of all things.’ Marx, it follows, didn’t abolish God at all, but assimilated the divine qualities guaranteeing a meaningful, harmonious order to human beings as the self-creating authors of history. But that happy ending, Nietzsche would say, is a result of the continuing belief in Divine truthfulness, and ceases to be effective without it. Nietzsche’s interpretation of nature points to other outcomes.

This debate is really a modern instalment in the ancient conflict between realism and nominalism/antirealism. What is justice, really; what is anything, really? And how, if this real world exists behind and beyond our immediate senses, can we know it? The ontological status of all things is uncertain. Marx’s statement in the Theses on Feuerbach was concerned to move us beyond endless interpretations developed in abstraction from an ‘objective reality’ conceived as an external datum. For Marx, the human knowledge of the world is generated from an active position within the world and its transformation. That is where human needs are expressed, and the world and the human relation to it, comes to be known through the struggle over needs. Our interpretations, then, apprehend natural facts in terms of social positions and interests.

To repeat Nietzsche’s view: 

‘Against that positivism which stops before phenomena, saying "there are only facts," I should say: no, it is precisely facts that do not exist, only interpretations.’ 

Nietzsche, Notebooks, (Summer 1886 – Fall 1887). 

Here, Nietzsche is trying to expose as unwarranted the assumption upon which many philosophies base their claims to truth, the view that objective facts exist. The positivist view holds that the phenomena that human beings observe through sense experience are physical in nature and actually happen in a material world. Through their observation, these phenomena are presented as objective fact, forming the basis of natural explanation, for example, through the formulation of physical laws. The point of Nietzsche’s objection is that positivists are interpreting observed phenomena to be physical (rather than being non-physical, in the manner of a George Berkeley), identifying physical nature as the real world (rather than the real world being immaterial in the manner of a Berkeley), when the truth is that they have no definite justification to do so. For Nietzsche, there is nothing necessarily true about natural facts since they are the subjective result of information, their truth and meaning being determined by how they fit into a particular interpretation.

That may sound obviously wrong, implying that there is no real world, only an interpretation – or myriad competing interpretations – but that isn’t the point. Relate the view to Marx’s argument on conscious productive activity (labour/production) in society as the mediating term between humanity and nature, add Nietzsche’s reference to needs, instincts, impulses and power, and we see how ‘interpretation’ emerges from within the humanly objective world through an active relation to it on the part of situated human agents.

Those who consider Nietzsche obviously wrong in asserting interpretation over facts, questioning the identification of the real with the physical world, need to avail themselves of Berkeley’s philosophy. A comparison is instructive. In the very least, it would show us that the issue isn’t the one that impatient, unreflective minds tend to think it is. But Berkeley’s case is more profound than that, shedding interesting light on the key questions addressed in this piece.

Jonathan Swift refused to have a door opened for Berkeley, on the assumption that Berkeley’s immaterialism committed him to the belief that he could walk through physical substances. Famously, on being told that Berkeley’s immaterialism is irrefutable, Dr Johnson kicked a stone and declared: ‘I refute him thus!’ Johnson hadn’t understood Berkeley, let alone refuted him. Here is the tale:

Boswell and Johnson discuss Berkeley, 1763.
After we came out of the church, we stood talking for some time together of Bishop Berkeley’s ingenious sophistry to prove the non-existence of matter, and that every thing in the universe is merely ideal. I observed, that though we are satisfied his doctrine is not true, it is impossible to refute it. I never shall forget the alacrity with which Johnson answered, striking his foot with mighty force against a large stone, till he rebounded from it, ‘I refute it THUS.’ […] To me it is not conceivable how Berkeley can be answered by pure reasoning; but I know that the nice and difficult task was to have been undertaken by one of the most luminous minds of the present age, had not politicks “turned him from calm philosophy aside.” What an admirable display of subtilty, united with brilliance, might his contending with Berkeley have afforded us! How must we, when we reflect on the loss of such an intellectual feast, regret that he should be characterised as the man, “Who born for the universe narrow’d his mind, And to party gave up what was meant for mankind ?”

James Boswell (1907/1791) The life of Samuel Johnson, Vol. 1, London: Dent, pp. 292-3 on archive.org. 

The luminous mind referred to here, it seems, was Edmund Burke, whose talents, in my view, were much better employed elsewhere. Burke had a talent for criticizing Rousseau for views Rousseau never held, and for missing the fact that Rousseau stated Burke’s best ideas better than Burke did himself. Cameron (1973) makes the point less provocatively than I do – Burke and Rousseau, often considered polar opposites, are actually remarkably close in their critical view of the Enlightenment and abstract rationalism.

The complete failure to understand the point at issue gained a restatement recently when Bill Nye joked: ‘if you drop a hammer on your foot, is it real or is it just your imagination? You can run tests a couple of times and I hope you come to agree that it is probably real.’ That’s amusing only if you don’t understand the point at issue, and don’t want to take the time and trouble to find out what the point is, only feel reassured that we are dealing with yet another non-problem dreamt up by philosophers to keep themselves occupied. Massimo Pigliucci makes this comment on this peculiarly anti-intellectual strain among scientists. ‘Over the last several years we have seen a depressing list of prominent scientists or science popularizers (interestingly, almost exclusively physicists) who have made very public statements about the uselessness of philosophy, while clearly not knowing what on earth they are talking about.’ 
Mike, don’t listen to Bill Nye about philosophy
https://platofootnote.wordpress.com/2016/02/29/mike-dont-listen-to-bill-nye-about-philosophy/ (​https:​/​​/​platofootnote.wordpress.com​/​2016​/​02​/​29​/​mike-dont-listen-to-bill-nye-about-philosophy​/​​)

The point applies generally to those who weigh in on moral and theological questions without showing the remotest understanding of the point at issue. That said, read on, here with respect to Berkeley, and in other places with respect to theodicy, and there does seem to be a strong case for saying that theologizing and philosophizing on these questions does render a position vulnerable to common-sense refutation – hence my preference to explore what Marx offers on praxis and Nietzsche on interpretation. 

The view that Berkeley is claiming that all we believe to exist is not real is not only wrong, it is almost the complete opposite of what Berkeley does actually argue. Indeed, Berkeley was attempting to check scepticism and relativism concerning the world, seeing the dangers opened up by Locke’s view of the tabula rasa and the idea that all human beings can know are the mental images of objects as distinct from the objects themselves.

Our immediate concern is to establish precisely what is meant by facts, interpretation, reality and truth. In an immaterialist system, truths concern ideas and their orderings. Thus, to state that bodies are attracted towards one another according to an inverse square law is a statement that is understood to be true, to the extent that we understand the proposition to involve regularities in what we experience in the perception of sensory ideas and no more, i.e. the regularities revealed by sense experience, and no deeper causal experiences. Berkeley’s point is that materialists make the error of appealing to a deeper causal ordering beyond sense perception, with the result that they come to posit the existence of occult things like ‘forces’ to undergird their ideas. He thus comments in the Notebooks, ‘The supposition that things are distinct from Ideas takes away all real Truth, and consequently brings in a United Scepticism, since all our knowledge and contemplation is confin’d barely to our own Ideas.’ (George Berkeley (2012) The Works of George Berkeley, Vol. 1 of 4, Project Gutenberg (Project Gutenberg EBook of The Works of George Berkeley – pdf, pp. 105-6. Berkeley’s Commonplace Book)

For Berkeley, such a view undermines the very notion of truth:

And first as to ideas or unthinking things. Our knowledge of these has been very much obscured and confounded, and we have been led into very dangerous errors, by supposing a twofold existence of the objects of sense—the one intelligible or in the mind, the other real and without the mind; whereby unthinking things are thought to have a natural subsistence of their own distinct from being perceived by spirits. This, which, if I mistake not, has been shown to be a most groundless and absurd notion, is the very root of Scepticism; for, so long as men thought that real things subsisted without the mind, and that their knowledge was only so far forth real as it was conformable to real things, it follows they could not be certain they had any real knowledge at all. For how can it be known that the things which are perceived are conformable to those which are not perceived, or exist without the mind?
Colour, figure, motion, extension, and the like, considered only as so many sensations in the mind, are perfectly known, there being nothing in them which is not perceived. But, if they are looked on as notes or images, referred to things or archetypes existing without the mind, then are we involved all in scepticism. We see only the appearances, and not the real qualities of things. What may be the extension, figure, or motion of anything really and absolutely, or in itself, it is impossible for us to know, but only the proportion or relation they bear to our senses. Things remaining the same, our ideas vary, and which of them, or even whether any of them at all, represent the true quality really existing in the thing, it is out of our reach to determine. So that, for aught we know, all we see, hear, and feel may be only phantom and vain chimera, and not at all agree with the real things existing in rerum natura. All this scepticism follows from our supposing a difference between things and ideas, and that the former have a subsistence without the mind or unperceived. It were easy to dilate on this subject, and show how the arguments urged by sceptics in all ages depend on the supposition of external objects.

Berkeley, Of the Principles of Human Knowledge

For Berkeley, the order of ideas, the patterns found in sense experience, are real and there is no need to appeal to a deeper causal level in order to gain scientific knowledge. Proceeding from the concept of idea as something that exists only in a mind, Berkeley extends it to include perceptions or sensations that give us particular types of ideas. All the ideas we have have their origin in ideas conveyed by the senses. This is the easy bit that the unreflective souls out there will understand and agree with. But Berkeley now argues that any object we perceive is a collection of all the ideas (perceptions) that our senses have conveyed to us. Thus with an apple ‘a certain colour, taste, smell, figure and consistence having been observed to go together, are accounted one distinct thing, signified by the name apple.’ (George Berkeley (2012) The Works of George Berkeley, Vol. 1 of 4, Project Gutenberg (Project Gutenberg EBook of The Works of George Berkeley – pdf, pp. 350. (A Treatise Concerning The Principles Of Human Knowledge). Remove those ideas given by the senses, and there is no more apple, even its solidity and the space it takes up disappear. Since this is so, there is no need to presume the existence of some external substance causing perceptions, since nothing is changed should we come to lose this concept: ‘The philosophers lose their abstract or unperceived Matter…Pray wt do the rest of mankind lose? As for bodies, &c., we have them still.’ (George Berkeley (2012) The Works of George Berkeley, Vol. 1 of 4, Project Gutenberg (Project Gutenberg EBook of The Works of George Berkeley – pdf, pp. 178-9. (Commonplace Book).

Marc Hight, Berkeley’s Metaphysical Instrumentalism in edited by Silvia Parigi, George Berkeley: Religion and Science in the Age of Enlightenment 2010

Berkeley’s argument here savours a little of Marx’s rejection of abstract metaphysical materialism and questions of objective truth and reality as ‘scholastic.’ And there is a thread connecting Nietzsche’s interpretationism, Berkeley’s immaterialism and Marx’s praxis as an active materialism that is interesting to explore in relation to questions of objective reality and truth.

For Berkeley, all of our talk about existence is talk about ideas, or potential ideas: ‘The table I write on I say exists; that is, I see and feel it: and if I were out of my study I should say it existed; meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some other spirit actually does perceive it.’ (George Berkeley (2012) The Works of George Berkeley, Vol. 1 of 4, Project Gutenberg (Project Gutenberg EBook of The Works of George Berkeley – pdf, pp. 351. (A Treatise Concerning The Principles Of Human Knowledge). 

Berkeley proceeds to argue from this that to have an idea of a sensible object it must be possible to perceive it. The idea of a sensible object that cannot be perceived is incoherent, since all sensible objects are necessarily dependant on minds. 

You cannot walk through an unopened door, you will receive a physical sensation from kicking a stone, and the dropping of a hammer on the foot will hurt, and hurt all the more the more the action is repeated. The clever critics who point out what is obvious to common persons of ordinary common sense miss Berkeley’s key point that, like taste and smell, solidity is also a property perceived by the senses. Johnson’s supposed refutation has been dignified with the name of a type of fallacy: the Argumentum ad lapidem, the appeal to the stone, dismissing a position as absurd without demonstrating proof of its absurdity.

The interesting part with respect to my discussion in this work is that Berkeley’s immaterialist system derives less from the trouble that Locke’s epistemology caused him than from his concern to check the atheism and deism of philosophers such as Epicurus, Hobbes and Spinoza. Berkeley attacks Locke’s notion of abstraction primarily because it implies the existence of the matter and the universe of the deists and atheists, and only secondarily because of the scepticism it invites. Berkeley’s immaterialist doctrine is thus concerned to defend the omnipotence of God by denying the potency of materialist substances and thereby checking the atheistic consequences of the acceptance of the existence of matter: ‘Opinion that existence was distinct from perception of horrible consequence. It is the foundation of Hobb’s doctrine, etc.’ (Commentaries, #799). Berkeley saw clearly the great dangers that the doctrines of materialists such as Hobbes posed to key aspects of traditional Christian theism – God, the immortal soul and free will, all of which Kant later defined as ‘necessary presuppositions’ of moral thought and action – and so made these his central targets.

I make these points not to claim that Berkeley is right – his view cuts against the essentialist position I argue for - but to show how these themes of a traditional theology, attendant upon a belief in God, are not easily excised, without the character and coherence of the moral language we take for granted being drastically altered and upset. Berkeley’s immaterialist doctrine is philosophically expedient, subordinated to his greater theological commitment. It is a doctrine that many may be loath to swallow whole, for all of the impossibilities of its refutation – once understood - but it may well be worthwhile to take on board for, as Berkeley argues:





Just as praxis presents itself to Marx as the solution to the abstract problems plaguing philosophical interpretation, so immaterialism to Berkeley promises to resolve all the problems threatening religion. With immaterialism, ‘all that philosophy of Epicurus, Hobbs, Spinosa, &c., which has been a declared enemy of religion comes to the ground.’ (Commentaries #824). It is a happy, if expedient, conclusion – the common people lose only notions of objective truth and reality and the endless argumentation of philosophers over such an abstract hypothesis, and gain God in the bargain. 

A century after Berkeley, Rousseau split with Enlightenment materialism on precisely this point, seeing the inherent sophism and atheism of its doctrines in direct line of descent from Hobbes. Rousseau condemned atheism as the ‘philosophy of the comfortable,’ seeing the emergence of new elites and authorities raised over the heads of the common folk. It is the atheistic materialist philosophers who stand to lose by the doctrine, not the homo rudus, whose world remains unchanged, taking us away from endless interpretations about abstractions and restoring a sense of reality: ‘N.B. Only my Principles there is a reality, there are things, there is a rerum natura.’ 

Berkeley, of course, sees the obvious objection that his immaterialist doctrine conflicts with the common-sense experience of the material and extended nature of reality. He sees the obvious refutation, and checks it: ‘Mem: again & again to mention & illustrate the doctrine of the reality of things rerum natura etc.’ (Commentaries #550). Dr Johnson’s stone, Swift’s door, Nye’s hammer do indeed exist, and Berkeley never denied that they did. 

Berkeley’s immaterialism is also an inessentialism, eliminating as untenable all the doctrines of the Ancients and the Schoolmen who, on account of their belief in the existence of matter, were compelled to invent an actuating principle of some kind: ‘Anima mundi, substantial form, omniscient radical heat, plastic virtue, Hylaschic principle – all these vanish.’ (Commentaries #617). That’s Neoplatonism, Aristotelianism, Thomism, Marx, essentialism and my good self vanishing, then. God remains. But things do not end here. It is noteworthy that Berkeley eliminates the Neoplatonist Anima Mundi at this point. The fact that he brings it back in Siris suggests that Berkeley cannot do without some activating principle, and therefore holds some principle of animate matter, thus abandoning the immaterialist doctrine. Hence my claim that Berkeley’s immaterialist system is philosophically expedient, with the express purpose of checking the deist and atheistic implications of (Hobbesian/Spinozist materialism). 

Job done, the question is begged of Berkeley’s conception of reality. Is reality that which Berkeley suggests, the one accepted by the ordinary person on the basis of a ‘common sense’ knowledge of the world; or is it the world beyond this in which the only real existents are God and the souls to which God transmits a continuous sequence of images, which these souls take to be real, material and extended world. In the immaterialist system, the real remains real: ‘According to my doctrine, all are not entia rationis. The distinction between ens rationis and ens realse is kept up by it as well as any other doctrine.’ (Commentaries #474a). But this is merely Berkeley meeting the obvious objections. Beyond this, Berkeley swings between a panpsychism, in which the mind of God is the one and true reality, and the view that the world is really distinct from God. In fine, Berkeley is unable to reconcile his immaterialist doctrine with the common sense perception of the world, and his rejection of essentialism and substantial forms thus fails. He quotes Jean Le Clerc that ‘the real properties of all things, as much corporeal as spiritual, are contained in God.’ (Commentaries #348), expressing the same idea later when arguing that the properties of all things ‘are in God i.e. there is in the Deity Understanding as well as Will.’ (Commentaries #812). 

In this view, God is the only cause and all change must therefore be attributed to God directly. Note how Berkeley’s immaterialism inverts the arguments of materialism with respect to God: the question of the power of matter does not even arise, since, in the immaterialist system, matter is relegated to the order of unicorns, fairies and fables: ‘One idea not the cause of another, one power not the cause of another. The cause of all natural things is onely God. Hence trifling to enquire after second causes. This doctrine gives a most suitable idea of the Divinity.’ (Commentaries #433). And, indeed it does, to those who subscribe to the Christian God as the Creator and conserver of all that exists: ‘The Principle may be apply’d to the difficulties of conservation, co-operation, &c.’ (Commentaries #402; also Principles of Human Knowledge #45-48). If the world is conceived as a series of ideas produced in the mind of God and transmitted by God to the senses, then its conservation in existence ceases to be problematic. Berkeley, however, doesn’t quite subscribe entirely to a view of conservation that holds the world to be nothing more than the sensible images produced in the mind of man by the mind of God. Berkeley, indeed, does affirm the existence of the world outside of perception, holding that ‘bodies etc do exist even wn not perceiv’d they being powers in the active Being’ (Commentaries #52). 

Truth in Berkeley’s system is based on a correspondence to God’s decreed ordering of the ideas derived from sense experience. A claim made about the world either corresponds to what God has willed in the ordering of ideas, and hence is true, or it does not, in which case it is false. Truth therefore concerns the order of ideas:





In other words, the truth of a proposition concerns the extent to which it depicts accurately ideas and their relations to one another. But here an ambiguity opens up in Berkeley which indicates that his system is not self-contained. Berkeley recognizes the tensions within his immaterialist system, drawing attention to its apparent contradiction with the Biblical account of Creation as a world made for man but before man: ‘How was light created before man? Even so were Bodies created before man.’ (Commentaries #436). ‘I may say earth, plants etc were created before man there being other intelligences to perceive them before man was created.’ (Commentaries #723). If God’s perception of the world was sufficient to account for the existence of objects unperceived by human beings, then the question would not trouble Berkeley as it evidently does. Berkeley frequently justifies the immaterialist thesis by arguing that it is meaningless to affirm the existence of something when it is not perceived by human beings. But to argue that the perception of God alone is sufficient to uphold the existence of the world not only fails to appreciate the true significance of the immaterialist doctrine, it misses the problematic question that Berkeley, here, baulks over. And it is here that Aristotle, essentialism, substantial form and an activating principle within animate, purposeful matter are all reinstated:





At which point, we come back to problems of endless philosophising over arcane issues over objective truths and grounds that cannot be proven one way or the other. To attempt to find Berkeley’s final position on this question, writes Jennings, ‘always remains a fruitless exercise.’ It is only later on, Jennings writes, in the Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous (1713), that Berkeley can be less ambiguously interpreted as proposing a system in which there is reality outside the mind of man. It is here that Berkeley asserts that all things can exist outside man’s perception on account of existing in the mind of God. Strictly speaking, though, in adopting this Christian version of Neoplatonism, Berkeley loses the raison d’etre of his immaterialist system. As Jennings points out, though, this does not apply to the Commentaries or the Principles, where ‘ideas are not primarily in the mind of God, but are rather a dual creation of God and man.’ (Jennings 2018: 59). That’s a conclusion which brings us to notions of praxis as a co-creation between human beings and God/Nature in a ceaseless creative universe, which is the idea I advance later in this work.

To bring the discussion back to Nietzsche, where Berkeley writes of perceptions, Nietzsche writes of interpretations, with the key difference that for Nietzsche there is no cohering or ordering principle in the shape of God. Any co-creation for Nietzsche is one that proceeds between human beings and nature. Marx takes the standpoint of a social and a socialized humanity; Nietzsche opts for a view of nature as a competitive struggle for resources to ensure survival. Marx is well aware of that struggle and doesn’t deny its existence; it’s just that he affirms that there is more to life than this struggle. So, too, does Christianity. What is the source of Marx’s confidence in a harmonious world to come?

If it is all interpretations, then where does this interpretation rather than that one come from? From moral positions that have no place in nature? But nature is all about creation, and human beings create ethics and culture naturally. If humanity has invented God, then it has done so naturally. Which interpretation is the most plausible, in the sense of making most meaningful sense of the richness and depth of human experience? And what of social positions within the mediating term labour/production between humanity and nature?

Nietzsche’s perspectivism holds that the interpretation of the world is dependent upon the person observing. But no one observes in a vacuum. As Marx points out repeatedly, there is no ‘man’ outside of the world, the world is a social world of social beings in continuous relation to each other. Any truth here is an intersubjective truth, expressing the phenomenology of an interpersonal social experience which generates an objectivity of its own, independent of questions of the existence or otherwise of an ‘objective reality’ that belongs to ‘God’ or ‘Nature.’ Whilst Berkeley makes a claim as to the existence of such a God, Marx makes reference to neither such a God or Nature, and I take Nietzsche to be doing the same when arguing that there are no facts – whether divine or natural – only interpretations. We may read the same book but interpret its message differently, regardless of the intentions of the author. For Nietzsche, with respect to nature, there is no author whose meaning we are supposed to read in order to develop the ‘right’ interpretation. And since there is no such author, then there is no ‘right interpretation’ to apprehend. Nietzsche excises all notions of divine truthfulness, inner meaning and purpose, essences, teleology, metaphysics, and notions of moral and, indeed, scientific truth, with the result that there can be no one ‘correct’ interpretation of the world. It all depends on perspectives.

That may sound outrageous, but in a certain sense it develops Marx’s idea on praxis much more than do those who obsess over the ontological status and significance of God and Nature, attempting to determine questions of fact and value, and the relation between them, from positions abstracted from the practical human interchange with the world through which alone we come to know the world. To Nietzsche, it is not attaining an understanding of how the world works that matters, insofar as this is even a meaningful question for Nietzsche, but developing an interpretation that works for us. Putting it that way is greatly simplifying and distorting Nietzsche, but to his advantage, given the extent that he repudiates collectivism and social purpose. There is no ‘we’ or ‘us’ for no Nietzsche, no moral commitment to all humankind. That is the very thing he repudiates as a relic of Christian slave morality. I’m reading Nietzsche generously here in light of Marx’s retention of a normative and emancipatory dimension, although I am sure he would be less than appreciative. Reinstating an Aristotelian essentialism that places the accent on the development of healthy natural potentials – the teleology that Nietzsche eliminates, in other words – we can (re)present Nietzsche's central concern as the advance of humanity beyond its present dehumanized condition under the capital system in which the masses come to be ‘weak and botched’ as a result of falling short of their essential powers and potentials – the mediocrity of the ‘last man’ or ‘last race’ - to a stronger species, in terms of natural and cultural and intellectual health, with the proper interpretation of the world being the one most appropriate in aiding the realization of this healthy potential. Of course, drawing on such notions of what is ‘proper’ and ‘appropriate’ imply a standard drawn from essentialism as a normative anthropology that Nietzsche explicitly repudiates. But, interpreting generously to present Nietzsche’s view in best light, the interpretation that Nietzsche would favour would be the one that serves to free humanity from life-denying constraints such as Good vs Evil to enable human beings to become stronger/healthier through exercising the innate will to power, the Superman or Overman describing a condition of fulfilment. Some such view is possible only when buttressed by an essentialist metaphysics.

I’m rewriting Nietzsche here to restate his elitist, aristocratic anarchism in terms of Marx’s socialist commitment to the free and full fulfilment of the essential humanity of each and all. And I’m stating Marx’s views forthrightly in those terms in order to flag up what Nietzsche would identify and reject vehemently and contemptuously as the religious dimensions of Marx’s implicit ethic. At the same time, a more generous reading of the interpretation that Nietzsche favours makes sense only in terms of some such ethic. 

With respect to the question of facts and interpretations, Nietzsche is arguing that whatever the nature and status of the facts existing ‘out there’ in the objective world, human beings always have, and can only have, interpretations of these facts in their minds, coming from different perspectives. In stating that there are no facts, only interpretations, Nietzsche is making it clear that to presume identity between the what is in our mind and the facts that are out there out there is unwarranted, and that there can be no direct access to facts. To argue that this implies a repudiation of science or of reality is to misunderstand the point, which is that the principles upon which we access reality are always, and could only ever be, our interpretations as determinate human beings existing within certain times, places and cultures. Human beings as social beings always exist within social relations and see the world as interested beings from within certain social positions. There is no vantage point independent of this situatedness that gives direct access to object reality, and the endless attempt to find such a transcendent point is scholastic in Marx’s sense.

Neither Marx nor Nietzsche were anti-realists. To take their arguments as implying a denial of objective reality is an obvious non sequitur. The existence of objective reality, which Marx and Nietzsche considered a self-evident truth, and is as easy to prove as kicking a stone or dropping a hammer on one’s foot, is not the issue. The issue is how we may come to know that reality, given that there is no direct unmediated access to it. It is the means as to ascertaining the true nature of this reality that is the key question, since these can never be objective in the sense of being independent of human social relations, actions, positions, and perceptions – which means that the human view of the world is fundamentally subjective and for that reason very often wrong. We need to ask, then, not merely what the facts are, but what right the questions and methods of investigation that draw us into ascertaining the facts are. When Nietzsche states that there are no facts, he means that there is no absolute truth with respect to any assertions we make concerning the objective reality we live in, because the reality we live in is never objective in this sense.

That this is Nietzsche’s meaning is clear from the way in which he defines truth:

What then is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms - in short, a sum of human relations, which have been enhanced, transposed, and embellished poetically and rhetorically, and which after long use seem firm, canonical, and obligatory to a people: truths are illusions about which one has forgotten that is what they are; metaphors which are worn out and without sensuous power; coins which have lost their pictures and now matter only as metal, no longer as coins.

Nietzsche, On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense

The meaning is also clear in a number of other statements that Nietzsche makes, here with respect to the need for judgment or evaluation, since the facts can never be simply given:

Judgment is our oldest belief, our most habitual holding-true or holding-untrue, an assertion or denial, a certainty that something is thus and not otherwise, a belief that here we really ‘know.’

Nietzsche, The Will to Power

All of which brings us back to interpretation:





What are man's truths ultimately? Merely his irrefutable errors.

Nietzsche, The Gay Science

To understand the meaning, we need to go back to the idea that there can be no apprehension of reality unless there is a perceiving mind. To know the world is to perceive it, and this perception is necessary to even be able to see a fact, let alone judge it and ascertain its truth. Perception presumes the existence of human subjects, meaning that facts are accessed and evaluated through the filter of human subjectivity; there is no basis outside of this subjectivity for calling anything a fact. The human mind isn’t a passive neutral mirror that reflects reality back exactly as it is, and it isn’t a camera that takes pictures that are an exact copy of the way things are in the world. Human beings are always socially positioned and interested beings, always emotionally involved and influenced when it comes to their perceptions of the world. The struggle to attain a disinterested viewpoint, to find an Archimedean point which enables us to discern pure rational principles, is a chimera in this understanding, and may even be part of an ideological attempt to assert particular interests under the cover of claims to the universal good. Not only are we never in a position to be able to call something an objective fact, we are well advised to be suspicious of those who dress up their claims in terms of objectivity. Ultimately, all that human beings can do is perceive the world and interpret what comes to their senses. If we want to push the argument to extremes, and provoke a certain outrage, there are as many truths as there are perceivers. And these perceptions will always be infused with meaning, since there is no way of eliminating subjectivity from the picture. 

But if it is all interpretations, I’m interested to know on what grounds Nietzsche advances his interpretation over others, rather than accept the world as the endless circulation of interpretations, no one of which counts as more valid than another. Because Nietzsche was a man of decided views if nothing else. As a general position, we can say that Nietzsche does not dismiss perceptions and interpretations as illusions, since there are no objective standards of truth that enable us to distinguish truth from falsehood and error. ‘Whichever interpretation prevails at a given time is a function of power and not truth.’ (Nietzsche, Daybreak). And Nietzsche is against statements of absolute, objective truth: ‘What are man’s truths ultimately?’ he asks. ‘Merely his irrefutable errors.’ (Nietzsche, The Gay Science). It is this that stands behind Nietzsche’s repudiation of God, religious ethics and the whole notion of moral truth:

My demand of the philosopher is well known: that he take his stand beyond good and evil and treat the illusion of moral judgment as beneath him. This demand follows from an insight that I was the first to articulate: that there are no moral facts. Moral and religious judgments are based on realities that do not exist. Morality is merely an interpretation of certain phenomena — more precisely, a misinterpretation.

Nietzsche, The Twilight of the Idols

The key words in that passage are ‘the illusion of moral judgment’ and the assertion that ‘there are no moral facts,’ meaning that morality is not merely an interpretation of certain phenomena, to take its place alongside other interpretations, but a ‘misinterpretation.’ To be able to argue this with such certainty implies that Nietzsche holds a standard of truth that is objective, even if it is the negative view that all objective statements of truth and morality must be erroneous and illusory. Regardless of the view that all is interpretation, it seems that not all moral judgment is ‘beneath’ Nietzsche after all, and that he clearly favours certain interpretations over certain ‘misinterpretations.’ Which makes it clear that Nietzsche has an evaluative standard that is something other than and more than power, since power requires no such standard. The only way of making sense of the position is by reference to the normative anthropology that is central to essentialism, with Nietzsche being considered beyond good and evil in the same way that Marx is considered to lack a morality – that is, as against abstract moral statements that are derived from a transcendent standpoint lying outside of specific actions and practices. Unless we merely accept that morality is merely a congeries of value judgements, no one of which can claim to be superior to all others in accordance with an objective standard, merely in terms of their efficacy to each individual as a function of power. There’s a democratic egalitarianism in that crude, mutual self-cancellation that just doesn’t fit Nietzsche’s aristocratic anarchism. It fits the polytheism that Weber holds to be the ineluctable fate of the modern world. 

3 Foundations, Facts and Interpretations
No facts only interpretations – this follows Nietzsche

Max Weber drew the lesson from reading Nietzsche that, in a world incapable of yielding objective truth and knowledge, still less moral truth, we have no choice but to become existentialists. The truth is necessarily delivered through the filter of human subjectivity. Weber is a highly significant figure in that he approaches the world in the aftermath of Marx and Nietzsche. If his social and economic thought demonstrates the clear influence of Marx, even as he specifically challenges Marx, Weber’s moral standpoint clearly demonstrates his acceptance of Nietzsche's view. Karl Jaspers writes of Max Weber’s distinctiveness as a philosopher.





The themes that Jaspers touches on here - human essence, being as an act of being, spirit existing in the highest order or good – are not the inventions of modern existentialism. All these things are properly set out in the system of St. Thomas Aquinas, who was not simply an essentialist but, even more, an existentialist. For reasons I set out in my work on Aquinas, the claims made for the philosophy of Weber, which derive from the fundamental acceptance of Nietzsche’s position, cannot be substantiated, since at every crucial point, both these thinkers rule out the possibility of the normative essentialist anthropology their higher claims with respect to the Overman or the Herrenvolk require. Weber envisages a nation of ‘masters’ as a community of free individuals, not a master race, in control of their lives and exercising responsibility over their existence (Weber SD 1994: 129). But he lacks the philosophical anthropology that alone could make such a vision reality. Marx has that normative anthropology. Marx can establish the grounds for such a community of self-determining social individuals. I can find no such grounds in Nietzsche and Weber. 

As for Aquinas, he was all about being, proposing existence as an act of being that brings essence to life. Aquinas’ existentialism is of a very different order to the notion of modern individuals who are charged with the impossible task of finding meaning in a meaningless world:





For Aquinas, there was nothing to debate between being and not-being, since the question ‘to be or not to be’ could never arise in a universe that is properly ordered to its true ends. The question is why meaningless and thanatos have come to stalk the modern world. That was the question that Nietzsche posed:

Nihilism stands at the door: whence comes this uncanniest of all guests?
Nietzsche, The Will to Power, translated by Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale, New York, Vintage Books, 1968 book one, I, para. 1, p. 6

Chesterton continues in the above passage:

Never until modern thought began, did they really have to fight with men who desired to die. That horror had threatened them in Asiatic Albigensianism, but it never became normal to them--until now.

Existentialism is not a new philosophy. Only in recent times has existentialism come to be equated with atheism. Christian existentialism is often traced back to Kierkegaard, but the roots go back much further. Many see its origins in St Augustine, whilst many of the key passages in Pascal’s Penseés deal with key existentialist questions. In Existence and the Existent: An Essay on Christian Existentialism, Jacques Maritain identifies the core of true existentialism in the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas. The strict identification of Aquinas as an existentialist makes a distinction between essence and existence to establish a warrant for metaphysics that does not require any grounding in a philosophy of nature. No such grounds are possible, is the claim of existential Thomists. Etienne Gilson thus comes to argue for an existential Aquinas that transcends his Aristotelian influence. To critics, Gilson’s view amounts to the abandonment of philosophy in favour of a Christian philosophy that is indistinguishable from theology. (McInerny 2004 Pt 3). I believe that, in going beyond Being as a passive state to emphasise the act-of-being, existence, Aquinas retains the connection with an essentialist ontological nature. My view is that whenever thought and action gets back on track and points in the right direction, Aristotle is never far the scene. 

Aquinas goes beyond essence as a passive state of being to affirm be-ing as an active state. St Thomas was 'vitally and vividly alone in declaring that life is a living story, with a great beginning and a great close; rooted in the primeval joy of God and finding its fruition in the final happiness of humanity; opening with the colossal chorus in which the sons of God shouted for joy, and ending in that mystical comradeship, shown in a shadowy fashion in those ancient words that move like an archaic dance; "For His delight is with the sons of men." (Chesterton 2012).

Chesterton prefers the Latin Ens to the word ‘being.’ Here, Chesterton asserts language over logic, since Ens ‘has a sound like the English word End’: 'It is final and even abrupt; it is nothing except itself.’ And it was upon 'this sharp pin-point of reality' that 'There is an is', that Thomas had reared 'the whole cosmic system of Christendom'. (TA 489, 491, 517-18, 529.) With this word Ens, ‘being,’ Aquinas expresses the ‘cosmic conception’ that covers everything that there is, and everything that could ever possibly be.
And this view takes us beyond scholastic disputation over the ontological status of objective reality into virtues, practices, and agency, introducing practical dimension that I will explore at length with respect to Alasdair MacIntyre’s work later. The view is entirely in keeping with Marx’s breakthrough from philosophical critique to practical critique.

Aquinas goes beyond the passive state of being to affirm act-of-being. It is in this sense that Aquinas affirms the primacy of existence over essence, as an active state that is developed out of essence. Emphasising agency and act over rules, Aquinas claims virtuous activity, as an act of reason, to be the end of philosophy, arguing that all potency be ordered to its act. Aquinas thus shows how human beings act on the basis of dispositions, and shows how these dispositions are organised through the acquisition of virtues and right habits in the appropriate habitus, so that flourishing well proceeds hand in hand with acting morally. In such a way, Aquinas conceives the human good as attained through a rational virtuous activity on the part of human agents. To act is to be and to be is to act. The question ‘to be or not to be’ only arises as a result of losing touch with our roots in essentialist metaphysics and rational ontology, which in Aquinas is both material and spiritual. Aquinas insists that there is nothing in the intellect that was not previously in the senses. He was not 'ashamed' to point out that his reason was 'fed' by his senses, and that, with respect to his reason, he felt ‘obliged to treat all this reality as real.’ Aquinas held reason and the senses together rather than set them apart. Aquinas argues that all our rational knowledge of this world is acquired through sensory experience, upon which the mind comes to reflect. Aquinas’ view here reflects the good sense of Aristotle:

If at any future time [the facts] are ascertained, then credence should be given to the direct evidence of the senses rather than the theories.

Aristotle De Generatione Animalium 

What stands in need of explanation is the confusion of the moderns on the matter. Aquinas openly pointed out that his reason was ‘fed’ by his senses, and that, with respect to his reason, he felt 'obliged to treat all this reality as real.’ 

The key point is that Aquinas is both essentialist and existentialist at the same time, his thought being founded on the etymological link between 'essence' (essentia) and 'exist' (esse). There is no opposition between the two since existence is formed out of essence. To be is to exist as a thing of a certain kind, as given by the certain essence that thing has. The essence of a thing defines it as a member of a certain species of thing, the essence being that which is held in common by all members of that species. The essence of a thing defines what (quid) that thing is, quiddity being the whatness of a thing. We can also refer to the nature or the form of the thing here, pointing out, however, that the essence of a material thing amounts to more than just its substantial form. It is the essence of a thing that makes it exist as a thing of a certain kind.

Intelligibility
I have noted Aristotle’s influence throughout. Aquinas’ thought is firmly based on Aristotle, but we should note to the extent to which it incorporates significant elements from Plato. In reconciling Plato and Aristotle, Aquinas develops a position that integrates immanence and transcendence. The work of L.B. Geiger and Cornelio Fabro draws attention to the important place that Platonic participation metaphysics has in the philosophy of Aquinas. Also worthy of mention in this regard is the speculative metaphysics of Louis de Raeymaeker. 

Etienne Gilson refers to the soul divinized through ‘man's participation in the divine.’ To theoretical physicist John Wheeler, human beings are not passive observers in the world, but active participants, emphasizing the active role that mind plays in the universe. Human beings are thus actively involved in producing the world they see around them. Being and knowing are part of this same process. The discussion thus returns here to perception and the idea that knowing the world is involved in perceiving the world, human perceptions all being part of the greater, all-encompassing perception of God.

For Wheeler, the difference between observation and participation might be 'the most important clue we have to the genesis of the universe':

The phenomena called into being by these decisions reach backward in time in their consequences ... back even to the earliest days of the universe .... Useful as it is under everyday circumstances to say that the world exists 'out there' independent of us, that view can no longer be upheld. There is a strange sense in which this is a ‘participatory universe.’

Wheeler in Wheeler and Zurek 1983: 194).

In this respect, physics is catching up with metaphysics. The French philosopher-physicist Bernard d'Espagnat writes of the veiled nature of quantum reality. In contrast to most of his contemporaries, d’Espagnat had the nerve to address the thorny and profound philosophical questions posed by quantum physics. In contrast to classical physics, d’Espagnat argues, quantum mechanics cannot describe the world as it really is, merely make predictions for the outcomes of our observations. If there is, as Einstein believed, a reality that really is independent of our observations or perceptions, then this reality is either be knowable, unknowable or veiled. D’Espagnat argues that it is veiled. Science enables us to glimpse some basic structures of the reality that lies under the veil, but much of it remains an infinite, eternal mystery:

There must exist, beyond mere appearances … a ‘veiled reality’ that science does not describe but only glimpses uncertainly. In turn, contrary to those who claim that matter is the only reality, the possibility that other means, including spirituality, may also provide a window on ultimate reality cannot be ruled out, even by cogent scientific arguments.

As to what this ultimate but veiled reality really is, d’Espagnat calls it Independent Reality, Being or, much more suggestive, ‘a great, hypercosmic God.’ Whatever name we prefer, it describes a holistic, non-material realm that exists outside of time and space, upon which we impose the categories of time and space through the innate conceptual categories of our minds, a wonderfully Kantian notion that warms my heart and makes me think all those years studying Kant was time well spent after all.

That said, there is little encouragement here for those seeking a theistic understanding of the universe. ‘Independent Reality plays, in a way, the role of God – or “Substance” – of Spinoza,’ writes d’Espagnat, whose view is variant of Einstein’s belief in Spinoza’s God. Einstein equated this God with nature itself, unfolding in indifference to human affairs. For Einstein, this God/Nature was entirely knowable. In contrast, d’Espagnat’s veiled God is partially unknowable, in a fundamental sense, which makes it nonsensical to conceive it in the shape of a personal God, attributing to it specific concerns or commandments of special interest to human beings.

I’m less than sure how safe it is to draw any spiritual conclusions from nature, still less from what the latest science reveals about nature. It strikes me that many people are scared stiff of making a commitment based on faith, and so recoil from God and religion, only to prove to be all too willing to make unfounded and alarming leaps in logic based upon whatever happens to be the latest fashion in physics. I refer back here to the true grounding of religion in its own principles and experiences and the way that these are formed in lives lived in the raw. If d’Espagnat is right and there is a partially unknowable ultimate reality veiled beneath reality, I’m not clear how his science-based spirituality offers a viable means of giving us access to it. My view, set out at length in The Search for Meaning in the Universe: Seeing God in the Face of the Other, is that such questions, involving questions of meaning, value and significance, will always and necessarily come down to good old-fashioned faith, for those who have the guts to live life in the real and the raw. ‘Spinoza’s God’ is half a God, the God of physical creation, the God of facts, laws and imperatives – the easy stuff in life. It’s the God that impresses those who are more comfortable with things than they are with persons. But at least we are seeing that the universe is not objectively valueless after all, and once we start to reinstate will, consciousness and purpose, we will really be getting somewhere. 

But whilst I don’t think quantum mechanics proves anything spiritually, I do think it is suggestive. John Polkinghorne notes the way that Werner Heisenberg, the most genuinely philosophically reflective of the founding figures of quantum theory, employed Aristotle’s concept of potentia to make sense of the quantum world. Heisenberg wrote that:

In experiments about atomic events we have to do with things that are facts, with phenomena that are just as real as any phenomena in daily life. But the atoms or elementary particles are not as real; they form a world of potentialities or possibilities rather than of things or facts. 









Polkinghorne’s brief but telling closing comment makes the point that the old metaphysics is back. Modern philosophy had too readily accepted the driving of purpose from nature through mechanistic science as a completed and irrevocable achievement. We are now seeing science, in certain aspects, moving back in the direction of a living, animate, participatory and creative universe. The veiled potentiality of quantum reality reveals the latent power and promise of essentialist metaphysics.

But note Polkinghorne’s emphasis on intelligibility rather than objectivity in giving us the clue as to the true nature of reality. This, he notes, is entirely in keeping with the metaphysical tradition within which Aquinas is a towering figure. The search for objective grounds was misplaced from the first, and likewise extreme reaction to the discovery that such grounds do not exist does not mean ‘anything goes,’ it means looking at the ways in which human beings mediate their relation to the world and the truth about it.

Aquinas’ central idea is that human participation in the divine is key to the reunion with God. Aquinas writes that the natural law is nothing other than the rational creature’s participation in the eternal law. (STI-II, 91,2: ‘Unde patet quod lex naturalis nihil aliud est quam participatio legis aeternae in rational creatura.’) (Koterski in Hudson and Moran ed 1992).

And what of Heidegger? Heidegger is critical of Western philosophy in general and metaphysics in particular for what he calls their ‘forgetfulness of Being.’ He asks the key question:





It is interesting to note that Heidegger, who spent his entire life answering this question, was Catholic in upbringing and education. His concerns took him elsewhere, in search of that place beyond metaphysics from which to reclaim humanism. But Hugo Ott has shown that Heidegger's first publications appeared in Der Akademiker (1910-12), a Catholic journal that followed the line of Pope Pius X faithfully. In his twenties, Heidegger could be found in a series of book reviews defending the timeless wisdom of the Catholic tradition against the danger of ‘Modernism.’ Heidegger cites with approval the saying of ‘the great [Josef von] Gorres’: ‘Dig deeper and you will find yourself standing on Catholic ground.’ (see Caputo Heidegger and Aquinas: An Essay on Overcoming Metaphysics (1982). Heidegger dug deeper and found himself standing on no ground at all. That’s where he thought we all where, leaving us to contemplate what he meant when he said that ‘only a god can still save us.’

My interest in both Heidegger and Aquinas was sparked by reading Heidegger make a distinction between the philosophizing that Aquinas engaged in over the years in order to produce his vast body of work, and the system that was fashioned out of that philosophizing, ossifying it and robbing it of its vitality. (The very thing that happened to Aristotle, and made him the great authority standing in the way of intellectual advance that had to be slain by modern science).

For Aquinas, ‘Catholic ground’ is being as being, which is indeed ageless, the universal, the ground of our being. It is in this sense that Thomism is the philosophia perennis, the perennial philosophy. 

‘God’ and ‘Nature’ are not objective entities whose truth is immediately sensible and knowable, but realities that are mediated through human practices, social and intellectual.

Eagleton refers to the global war now underway between the forces of capital and a fundamentalist political enemy, considering it to be something which will force all in the West to increasingly, and deeply, reflect on the foundations of its own civilization. (Eagleton 2003 ch 3). That’s quite a challenge. How deep do we want to look? And what if, in the political and moral vocabulary we use, we have been assuming the existence of things that do not actually exist? So long as our stories have seemed plausible, we haven’t felt the need to see if they are true in being related to anything of any meaningful substance. But the stories are in increasing need of a self-examination. Things will become very uncomfortable at this point. As Terry Eagleton notes, the problem with a foundation is that it always seems possible to slip another one underneath it. ‘As soon as you have defined it, it seems to lose its finality.’ It may well be that the world is resting on an elephant and that the elephant is resting on a turtle, but what is it that the turtle resting on? Some may be happy with the elephant, others with the turtle. But if the questions won’t go away, then we need to look further. To say that there no foundations and that it’s just turtles all the way down resolves nothing since the question remains: all the all the way down to what? In Dostoevsky's Notes from Underground, the complaint is heard that ‘any primary cause I have immediately drags another one in tow, and that one is even more primary, and so on ad infinitum.’ The only way to avoid this infinite regress is to identify a foundation that is self-evident and self-justifying and therefore self-founding. In light of the failure of philosophy and science to identify any plausible candidates capable of performing this role, it’s God or nothing, and given the implausibility of God for many, that leaves us with our feet planted firmly in mid-air. That is not in itself an untenable position, so long as one understands intelligibility in Thomist metaphysics, or interpretation in Nietzsche or mediation in Marx. And it has the merit of finally abandoning the view that it is in any way meaningful for philosophy or science to attempt to fill the gap left by God. But this God has to be understood as embedded in a profoundly religious experience, not as the god of the philosophers and the natural scientists. There are no objective foundations discernible in the world of natural reason and knowledge – other than the Golden Ratio, that is …. 

Pascal sheds some interesting light on this question. Although he presents the first principles of the mind as simple and easy to grasp by the light of natural reason, Pascal makes a number of statements in Mathematical Mind and in the Penseés that make it clear that the natural knowledge of first principles is neither perfect nor universal. Thus, in Mathematical Mind Pascal argues that some people ‘are incapable of seeing that space can be divided ad infinitum’ (Pascal OC 11, 164). The infinite divisibility of space is one of the first principles of geometry, and a failure to grasp this renders one incapable of practising this science. Pascal compares this deficiency to a physical disability. In identifying the heart as an organ that perceives first principles, Pascal expresses the view that there is something inherently bodily and physical about this perception. Whilst we reason with our soul, our knowledge of first principles comes from the body: ‘Our soul is cast into the body where it finds number, time, dimensions; it reasons about these things and calls them natural, or necessary, and can believe nothing else.’ (Pascal L 418/S 680).

In other words, what makes a first principle first is nothing but the physical limitiations of our intuition. In the fragment Disproportion of Man, Pascal notes that scientific knowledge deals with two infinities: an infinite number of objects  and an infinite number of principles: 

Thus we see that all the sciences are infinite in the range of their researches, for who can doubt that mathematics, for instance, has an infinity of infinities of propositions to expound? They are infinite also in the multiplicity and subtlety of their principles, for anyone can see that those which are supposed to be ultimate do not stand by themselves, but depend on others, which depend on others again, and thus never allow any finality.

Pascal Penseés 1995: 62; Pascal L 199/S 230.

Searching for the first principles of scientific knowledge is a search into the infinitely small. No matter how small and minute any principle we identify might be, it can be further analyzed into principles that are increasingly small and minute. What an indivisible point is to a line, a principle is to science:

But we treat as ultimate those which seem so to our reason, as in material things we call a point indivisible when our senses can perceive nothing beyond it, although by its nature it is infinitely divisible.

Pascal L 199/ S 230

What makes a point seem indivisible is the limit in the power of resolution that is natural to the human eye. Likewise, first principles seem to us to be first principles only because our minds are not sharp enough. Thus, Pascal argues, writing a book about first principles in science is as presumptuous as writing a book about everything:

Of these two infinites of science, that of greatness is much more obvious, and that is why it has occurred to few people to claim that they know everything. ‘I am going to speak about everything,’ Democritus used to say.
But the infinitely small is much harder to see. The philosophers have much more readily claimed to have reached it, and that is where they have all tripped up. This is the origin of such familiar titles as Of the Principles of Things, Of the Principles of Philosophy, and the like, which are really as pretentious, though they do not look like it, as this blatant one: Of All That Can be Known.

Pascal L 199/ S 230

These points return us to intelligibility in the participatory universe, whilst also introducing notions of a tradition-constituted rationality, shared deliberation, dialogue and narrativity which I examine at length later. In addition to arguing that our knowledge of first principles is defined by the physical limitations of our bodies, Pascal argues in turn that our bodies are shaped by custom: social norms and beliefs determine the manner in which human beings feel and perceive things before any rational or explicit understanding of these matters. These norms and beliefs are registered in our bodies in ways that we can neither see nor alter, so that ‘custom is our nature’ (Pascal L 419/ S 680). Developing a theme drawn from Montaigne, Pascal argues that the critique of custom applies not only to social norms and beliefs but also to the first principles of natural knowledge:

Custom is our nature. Anyone who grows accustomed to faith believes it, and can no longer help fearing hell, and believes nothing else.
Anyone accustomed to believe that the king is to be feared …
Who then can doubt that our soul, being accustomed to see number, space, movement, believes in this and nothing else?

Pascal L 419/ S 680

Pascal’s thought may be summarized thus: Knowledge of first principles comes from the body but since the body is shaped by custom and is, therefore, variable, our knowledge is based on the shakiest of foundations. There is scientific truth, but it is always mediated. Pascal thus notes how unwilling people are, through force of custom, to give up familiar explanations of natural phenomena. ‘When we are accustomed to use the wrong reasons to prove natural phenomena, we are no longer ready to accept the right ones when they are discovered.’ Pascal gives the example of the circulation of the blood to explain why the vein swells below the ligature. (Pascal L 736/ S 617). Pascal goes further to argue that since our grasp of first principles is shaped by habit and custom, it is influenced by our interactions and connections with others:

Our minds [esprit] and feelings [sentiments] are trained by the company we keep, and perverted by the company we keep. Thus good or bad company trains and perverts respectively. It is therefore very important to be able to make the right choice so that we train rather than pervert. And we cannot make this choice unless it is already trained and not perverted. This is thus a vicious circle from which anyone is lucky to escape.

Pascal L 814/ S 658

Pascal argues that there is a continuous interaction between reason and ‘feeling’ (sentiment): 

Memory and joy are feelings [sentiments], and even mathematical propositions can become feelings, for reason makes feelings natural and natural feelings are eradicated by reason.

Pascal L 646/ S 531

That means that habitual reason can turn some propositions into principles that have the same status as first principles that are known by the light of natural reason. At the same time, critical reasoning can demote the status of some first principles by making them appear artificial and conventional rather than natural and given.

To understand precisely Pascal’s meaning here there is a need to grasp that by sentiment Pascal means a highly personal but nevertheless non-relativist perception of first principles. The problem is that since sentiment is located in the heart, it is difficult to distinguish it from an individual fantasy. Whilst the heart allows us to grasp first principles, it is also the organ of whim, fancy and passion. Since reason depends upon the heart for the knowledge of first principles, then ‘all our reasoning comes down to surrendering to feeling [sentiment] (Pascal L 530/S 455). And herein lies the problem: ‘One person says that my feeling is mere fancy, another that his fancy is feeling’ (Pascal L 530/S 455). How are we able to distinguish fancy from feeling? Pascal answers: ‘Reason is available, but can be bent in any direction. And so there is no rule.’ (Pascal L 530/ S 455).

What there is, is our own selves, the community of others, and the world around us. And what we know of the existence of these things is mediated through practices. To take our bearings here, the controversy over foundations and their loss is a revisiting of an old theme in light of a (post-)modern understanding that has come to discover that things are not so simple and never were. Under the sway of the modern advance of natural science, on a mistaken conception of God as an all-knowing, all-powerful objective foundation, there has been a belief that science can come to know and explain all things. Scientists are now recognizing that science cannot perform the ‘God-trick.’ (Kauffman 2008). 

The real insight here would be to recognize that there was never a ‘God trick’ in the first place, certainly not in the sense in which this is typically understood. There never were objective foundations in this sense, and the postmodern discovery that such foundations don’t exist has been the occasion for all manner of ‘anything goes’ fears and accusations. This is actually the opportunity to regain our bearings with respect to truth, reality and whatever grounds we do have for behaving as we ought. That brings us to the fact that human beings are social beings, story-telling beings, and meaning-seeking creatures who apprehend the world in communal relation to others. Truth is not merely a matter of our scientific knowledge of the external world, but of customs, habits, beliefs, norms, stories, traditions, practices and how all these shape perceptions. There is, to be sure, a circularity and a relativism to this way of stating the point, but at the same time there is no external vantage point available from which a pure objectivity can be brought forth and apprehended. Pascal writes of the way that both minds and feelings are ‘trained’ in community with others, a fact which enjoins us to take care to ensure the quality of our relationships, good company training us to make the right choices, bad company perverting our minds and feelings so that we come to make bad choices. It is in this sense that we see how a tradition-constituted rationality through participation within virtuous communities of practice gives us the intelligibility that is the only secure and identifiable foundation we can have for moral action.

‘To invent the idea of God is the swiftest solution to this problem,’ Eagleton remarks, the irony of the phraseology being immediately apparent and betraying any foundational claims we may care to parent on God. The plausibility and cogency of any objective foundation that is merely invented cannot withstand the conscious awareness of its invented nature. That same point applies to Stuart Kauffman’s notion of ‘reinventing the sacred’ (2008). The power of the sacred depends upon the extent we think it has not been invented, and do not realize, or dare admit to ourselves, that it has been. Herbert Fingarette, a philosopher interested in self-deception, writes:

It is the special fate of modern man that he has a “choice” of spiritual visions. The paradox is that although each requires complete commitment for complete validity, we can today generate a context in which we see that no one of them is the sole vision. Thus we must learn to be naive but undogmatic. That is, we must take the vision as it comes and trust ourselves to it, naively, as reality. Yet we must retain an openness to experience such that the dark shadows deep within one vision are the mute, stubborn messengers waiting to lead us to a new light and a new vision … Home is always home for someone; but there is no Absolute Home in general.

I write at length in my forthcoming Dante piece on the capacity of philosophical reason to undercut itself. Fingarette’s point applies not only to religion and to God as an invention but to all attempts to reinvent the sacred through the merging of science and the spiritual. The key question remains, where does value lie? A self-founding foundation which has its origins in self-legislating reason is also subject to dissolution by the same critical use of that reason. We can define God as that which you cannot go higher and deeper than, the ‘self-causing Cause’ that Spinoza describes, whose ends, grounds and purposes are entirely self-contained in a single substance. Many retain this very idea of God, just choosing to spell it ‘Nature.’ Spinoza proposes a God/Nature, which refers not to the personal God but to the harmonious ordering and unfolding of the universe, in indifference to human affairs. The problem with this kind of God is that it doesn’t speak to human beings, who are far from indifferent in their interpersonal relations. 

Eagleton makes the obvious critical point with respect to a belief in a personal God: ‘if God really was the foundation of the world, he had clearly rustled the whole thing up in a moment of criminal negligence and had a lot of hard explaining to do. Quite why he needed to provide us with cholera as well as chloroform was not entirely obvious. The whole project had clearly been insanely over-ambitious and required some radical retooling. It was hard to reconcile the idea of God with small children having their skin burnt off by chemical weapons.’ (Eagleton 2003 ch 7). I shall return again that question a little later, and the hard explaining that theologians have done on God’s behalf. The whole point of God lies in the sense of a human moral autonomy from natural processes and imperatives, human beings as moral agents involved in a ‘great partnership’ with God in realizing the good inherent in Creation (Sacks 2011). 





Creation in this respect is a co-creation, God requiring the conscious participation of human beings in bringing the Creation to fruition as the good world it is. With that moral autonomy comes moral responsibility. The creative agency of human beings can go two ways, good or bad, which is why small children can have their skin burnt off by chemical weapons. If we ask God where He was whilst such actions were taking place, he would in reply ask where we were. In that sense, the question of theodicy possesses a social dimension, asking of us the questions we ask of God.

The fact that Eagleton refers to ‘God’s apparent brutality’ here indicates that he knows the truth of this, and is really concerned to establish another point. ‘What you needed from a foundation was a sense of why things were necessarily as they were,’ Eagleton writes, ‘but God was no adequate answer to this.’ I have argued this point in terms of an essentialist metaphysics, with which Eagleton seems to be in agreement, emphasising the Aristotelian roots of Marx’s thought throughout After Theory (2003). God, Eagleton remarks, is in one sense ‘exactly the opposite’ of this – there are no necessary potentialities, lines of development or relations to the idea of God, claims Eagleton:

The idea of Creation meant that he had manufactured the world just for the hell of it, as a quick glance around the place is enough to confirm. He did not need to do it. Being God, he does not need to do anything. The creation is wholly contingent. It might just as well not have been. This is one thing that is meant by the claim that God transcends his world. God is the reason why there is anything at all rather than just nothing. But that is just a way of saying that there really isn't any reason.

Eagleton 2003 ch 7

I can remember an argument made by Karen Armstrong concerning the age-old ‘debate’ over the existence or non-existence of God, which Armstrong silenced in emphatic terms by pointing out that of course God does not exist! Debate over as a non-debate. As transcendent, God is non-existent, and as non-existent, God cannot be a foundation, not in the sense of the objective foundation being sought through the tools of theoretic reason.

Eagleton now comes to the point about moral autonomy I raised above – noting the irony that in giving human beings reason and freedom, God fashioned the critical weapons that could be used in his overthrow. ‘God had committed a fatal blunder in fashioning the universe,’ he states:

He had made it so that it could be free, meaning autonomous of himself. For the world to be his creation meant that it shared in his own freedom, and thus was self-determining. And this applied especially to human beings, whose freedom was an image of his own… Paradoxically, it was by being dependent on him that they were free. Freedom, however, cannot be represented. It is elusive, quicksilver stuff which slips through our fingers and refuses to be imaged. To define it is to destroy it.

Eagleton 2003: 194 195

Quite. Human beings have the freedom to transgress all boundaries, divine, social and natural. They also possess the common moral reason that enables them to live an ordered existence in recognition of those limits, achieving a bounded fulfilment. That is the optimistic claim of a humanist rationalism, and is the one that I have argued many times in terms of a Kantian community of co-legislators. But if God as a self-founding foundation is a self-contradicting, self-dissolving notion, then so too, and for same reason, is reason and freedom. If the world has its foundation in freedom and in a self-legislating reason, then this is no objective foundation at all, and if what ensues works all by itself, with no extraneous force required, then there is no need for God: 

We could develop instead a discourse which accepted the world in its autonomy and left aside its absentee manufacturer. This was known as science. God had been made redundant by his own creation. There was simply no point in retaining him on the payroll. It was his rashly big-hearted decision to allow the world to operate all by itself that had finally done for him. Like an inventor whose scheme for an indestructible brand of leather is bought up by a shoe company and consigned to the flames, he had been too clever by half and had done himself out of a job.

Eagleton 2003 ch 7

The witty way that Eagleton makes the point about the moral autonomy and capacity for freedom that God granted to human beings coming to rebound on God comes with an even greater counterpunch: it rebounds also on human beings and the world they have created in their image too: self-made man and his undoing. 

Without God, human beings have been involved in an increasingly desperate, and clearly futile, search for alternative candidates for foundations: Nature, Reason, History, Spirit, Power, Production, Desire: the modern age has seen them all come and go as narratives of Man. Since reason and freedom have the distinctive power to undercut themselves, foundations cannot be established in this way. 

Man seemed a more promising candidate than God for foundational status because he was fleshly and palpable. The invisibility of God had always been a grave drawback to his career prospects as a foundation, leading many to the not unreasonable conclusion that it was not that he was there but hiding; it was simply that he was not there.

Eagleton 2003 ch 7

But the circularity in seeing Man as the foundation of Man resolves nothing, merely exposes the clear inadequacies of attempts to identify secure foundations. Replacing nothing with something raises more questions than answers. Which begs the question of why replace nothing with something, particularly when this entails turning that something into an abstraction every bit as unreal as the God to be replaced? Here, Eagleton identifies the autonomous subject of the liberal ontology as an abstraction that bears no relation to real individuals: 

Man had to be stripped of his flesh and blood to perform this role. He had to be reduced to the abstract human subject - the word “subject” meaning that which lies underneath, or foundation. To play this august role, he had to shed his carnal reality. Man as historical was too finite to be an effective foundation, whereas Man as universal subject was too intangible. Since he, too, was constituted by freedom, he ran into all the problems which had already scuppered God. To take your stand on freedom seemed like taking it on thin air. If to be free is to be unknowable, then Man became as inscrutable as God, not least to himself. At the very peak of his powers, then, he was self-blinded. Man was an enigma at the centre of the world. He was the baseline of the whole business, but could not be represented within it. Instead, he was a haunting absence at its heart. 

Eagleton 2003 ch 7

It was a remarkable piece of self-flattery on the part of human beings to raise ‘Man’ to this quasi-divine status, and profoundly pleasing in consequence to feel the whole world to be a human self-creation that depended on us, with anything lying outside of human experience considered objectively meaningless, of importance only with respect to human valuation. Ironically, the overthrowing of God has served to reinforce the very anthropocentrism that is claimed to be the source of our ills, unless, for reasons of consistency, one abandons all meaning, value and purpose in acceptance of a world that came from nowhere and is going nowhere. Do we really think it possible for meaning-seeking creatures to live in awareness of a destinationless voyage? To think so is neither true to human nature nor to nature. To live as gods is a potent source of anxiety. Even if we state the challenge more modestly, to live in accordance with our own common moral reason as human beings is no less onerous: 

It meant that there was nothing independent enough of ourselves with which to conduct a dialogue, and thus assure ourselves of our value and identity. All dialogue became self-dialogue. It was like trying to play hockey with oneself. What conferred supreme value on us was what simultaneously undermined it. We were free to do what we wished, as authors of our own history - but since it was we who invented the rules, this freedom seemed grotesquely gratuitous. We were absolute monarchs whom nobody dared to cross, yet whose existence seemed increasingly pointless the more power we had. What made us special was also what made us solitary. We were stuck with ourselves for all eternity, like being trapped with an intolerable bore at a sherry party.

Eagleton 2003 ch 7

In no time, having overthrown God, ‘Man’ became ripe for overthrowing. Reason and freedom come to undercut their own foundations, which serves to make the point that there is no possibility of metaphysical foundations, in the abstract, whether we consider ourselves to have need of such foundations or not. 

In announcing the ‘death of God,’ Nietzsche announced the collapse of an overarching moral framework grounded in metaphysical foundations. Nietzsche expressed his contempt for those who employed a moral language as though absolute values still existed, failing to recognize that their foundation in God was no more. In murdering God through our secularizing reason, Nietzsche argued, we had kicked away the metaphysical supports of our moral vocabulary, and yet continued to use moral terms as if nothing had changed. For Nietzsche, everything had changed, it’s just that human beings were concealing their deicide from themselves:

We were assassins of divinity, but cravenly disavowed our deicide. And this disavowal was the artificial respirator which was keeping a terminally ill God alive. Nietzsche, like his postmodern disciples, was simply asking us to come clean about this. We were like a couple whose marriage has been dead for years but who will simply not admit it. We were caught in a performative contradiction, our protestations absurdly at odds with our behaviour. A banker or politician may claim he believes in absolute values, but you can generally see that he does not simply by observing what he does. You do not need to peer into his soul. The White House believes devoutly in the Almighty, and transparently believes in no such thing. 

Eagleton 2003: 196 197

Putting the point this way makes it clear that the argument can be interpreted as a demand for genuine moral activity, for a practice that is in conformity with the values expressly stated, placing less emphasis on verbal fidelity and more on acting morally. Nietzsche’s point, however, goes much deeper. Nietzsche sees the death of God as the death also of objective morality and absolute values, of standards of good and evil, right and wrong by which we evaluate behaviour, the death of the moral standards which we seek to live in accordance.

Nietzsche emphasizes the pointlessness of replacing God with Man, it’s just the same thing in different form, subject to the same acid of critical reason. Not only is there nothing to be gained by replacing the idolatry of religion with the idolatry of humanism, there is much to be lost at the hands of a human power which, no longer bounded by any greater power, ceases to recognize any limits, either in God or Nature, to human self-realization, proceeding to consume the world in an infinite desire. I see the view as entirely consistent with Marx’s critique of abstraction and of the idealistic character of human modes of thought. Marx did not write of an abstract ‘Man’ and put no such figure in place of God. He wrote of determinate human beings as certain kinds of beings, possessing certain essential potentialities and powers which are to be expressed positively in specific social forms if freedom and happiness are to be realized. That essentialism gives history a meaning and a purpose. But is it a foundation?

Human beings, writes Eagleton, are the jokers in the pack, ‘the dark stain at the centre of the landscape, the glory, jest and riddle of the world.’ For Pascal, humanity is a freak, 'a monster that passes all understanding.’ We are prodigious, chaotic and paradoxical: 'feeble earthworm, repository of truth . . . glory and refuse of the universe!’ Man, Pascal concludes, ‘transcends Man.’ Violating or transgressing our nature is what comes naturally to human beings. In Hegel’s eyes, pure being is utterly indeterminate, and so indistinguishable from nothingness. For Schopenhauer, the self is a ‘bottomless void.’ For the anarchist Max Stirner, humanity is a kind of 'creative nothing'. For Martin Heidegger, to live authentically is to embrace our own nothingness, accepting the fact that our existence is contingent, ungrounded and unchosen. For Sigmund Freud, the negativity of the unconscious infiltrates our every word and deed. (Eagleton 2003 ch 8). 

It would seem that the obvious solution, then, is to end idolatry and end any notion of being as gods: the death of God must therefore entail the death of Man, who is merely God's avatar on earth. Eagleton notes that this, ironically, is actually an inversion of what Christianity itself had taught: ‘For Christian faith, the death of a man (Jesus) was the death of the image of God as vengeful patriarch. God is revealed as friend, lover and fellow victim, not as Nobodaddy… It is this image of the patriarchal God which Nietzsche is out to dislodge, unaware that this is to kill God twice over.’ (Eagleton 2003 ch 7).

The upshot of Nietzsche’s view is that human beings must have the courage to live relatively and provisionally, without the support and sanction of objective foundations. The death of God refers to the recognition that these metaphysical foundations do not exist, a recognition that since God has never existed we have been living relatively and provisionally in any case. Nietzsche is demanding that we bring our beliefs into conformity with our practices, ensuring that what we say must be embedded in and expressed through what we actually do, otherwise it is merely an impotent moralism that lacks any practical force. The problem is that, in living relatively and provisionally all this time, we have felt the need to have God with us. Once we realize that we really are on our own, can we go it alone?

Which provokes the thought that if, in our deeds and practices, we have been living successfully with what is now considered, in light of a secularizing reason, to be a false belief in God as an objective foundation, then maybe that belief is not so false after all. Or to put the point another way, what matters is not so much the objective content and ontological certainty of belief, and any possibilities of rational proof one way or the other, but the practices. What has gone awry in the modern world and its morality pertains to the practices and communities in which the virtues are fostered, nurtured, acquired and exercised. I pursue this point in relation to Marx and a mediation that goes beyond abstract entities like ‘God,’ ‘Nature,’ ‘Reason,’ ‘Man,’ and ‘Humanity,’ and also in relation to MacIntyre and tradition-constituted rationality, narrativity and virtuous communities of practice, of which more later. Moral terms acquire their force within genuine moral practices, insofar as these are possible within the communities and traditions we have or have not constituted.

In The Ecology of Good I bring philosophy back to its first and most important question, that of how human beings are to live well together. This is the question you start with, and the question you focus on. It is there that any riddles of existence will be resolved. If you start by wanting to prove the nature of God or existence, you will never end. The ontological status of all things is uncertain. Nothing worthy of being proven is capable of being proven, wherefore be wise and cleave to the Greater Love that moves, carries, and sustains all things. See how we have lived well, see what it takes for all to live well, and cleave to that necessary, essential desire that makes us want to live well. My work is a powerful assertion of the knowledge of the possibility of living well. And it comes from a Love that stands in no need of proof.





There are no foundations in abstraction. I reiterate that Marx did not write of an abstract ‘Man’ when writing of the human essence and its realization. I can quote Kant here, too, who argues that ‘Freedom is the alone unoriginated birthright of man, and belongs to him by force of his humanity; and is independence on the will and co-action of every other in so far as this consists with every other person’s freedom.’ (Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Ethics by Immanuel Kant, trans. J.W. Semple, ed. with Introduction by Rev. Henry Calderwood (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1886) (3rd edition). Chapter: GENERAL DIVISION OF JURISPRUDENCE). That humanity, as it is expressed in specific social relationships in time and place, is no abstraction, and no nothingness, either, but consists of determinate individuals in possession of essential powers, potentials and purposes that are creatively unfolded in society. Marx’s foundation or standard of evaluation is here, not in ‘Man’ or ‘Reason,’ and implies a standard that is immanent in the historical process. The big question is not so much the death of God, but a disenchantment that has come to strip the world of its objective value, meaning and purpose. Here, you will find not the ‘we’ of rational humanity as a population of deicides but capitalist social relations annexing the world and putting all things on a monetary basis, stripping away all notions of inherent worth.

Nietzsche anticipates the movement of bourgeois civilization into a post-metaphysical era. Eagleton relates this abandonment of metaphysical foundations to the rise of a capital system that sees no true ends outside of its own accumulative monetary imperatives – we are involved in a showdown between metaphysics and money:





Examining the question from this direction, I would strongly suggest, is far more profitable than endlessly debating ‘God’ and ‘Man’ as rival claimants to supremacy, only to conclude, in the sterility of rational argumentation, that neither entity actually exists, not in the abstract terms presented in the ‘debate.’

4 God and Evil
I hesitate to plunge into this question, because it isn’t clean and pure and simple; like real life and real people, it is messy, difficult and often ambiguous. And the controversies over this question are tedious, irrelevant and resolve nothing. I wade into the area, well aware of the dangers of shadow boxing, trading false arguments and partial understandings for equally false arguments and partial understandings, inflating the number of misplaced words by participating in controversies that feed on themselves. Such debates generate plenty by way of heat and passion, but merely by missing the important point to simply give and take offence. Frankly, I would have been well advised to pass this section by, and so, too, are you. The problem with such debates is that clarifying one line of misunderstanding often requires a dozen lines, which for me can become a couple of pages, every line of which has the potential to provoke counter-claims that serve to take us even further from the point. Many wise heads point me in the direction of clarity, and advise me to stay clear. But here I go again.

I really don’t care to restate God against assertions of Nature, or vice versa, those questions really are beside the point. As non-questions, they are incapable of being resolved, and would resolve nothing even if they could be. I’m reluctant to engage and indulge these false debates. I join the argument here for a specific reason. Certain aggressive statements speaking against the existence of God do come with specific moral implications that the deicides amongst us are perhaps not aware of. So I engage in the hope of highlighting the troubling implications of certain benign expressions of naturalism, to make it clear that things are not so simple.

It is easy enough to say that since there is evil, then then there cannot be a God. Or, if there is a God, then the existence of evil indicates that such a God must also be evil. (And not an omnipotent Creator either). That common objection has been recently restated by Stephen Fry, who made up in force of expression what the view lacks in originality. God is a monster and worse, Fry asserted. It’s not an original claim. Here is Alister McGrath on Richard Dawkins’ God:

Religion is evil! When it is banished from the face of the earth, we can live in peace! It is a familiar theme. The God that Dawkins does not believe in is 'a petty, unjust, unforgiving control freak; a vindictive, bloodthirsty ethnic cleanser; a misogynistic, homophobic, racist, infanticidal, genocidal, filicidal, pestilential, megalomaniacal, sadomasochistic, capriciously malevolent bully'. Come to think of it, I don't believe in a God like that either. In fact, I don't know anybody who does.




McGrath points precisely to the ‘insipid’ God I point to in challenging notions of power with notions of humility. It’s a God that the deicides are even more contemptuous of. Dawkins is, of course, entirely right to expose and challenge religious violence, as part of a general commitment to expose and challenge violence in all its forms. The great secular myth is that religion is the cause of most of the trouble on the planet and that, if we could only end religion, then conflict on earth would end. The mistake here is to see the verbal trappings of conflict but not the causes. The causes lie elsewhere and religion, like all cultural forms and symbols, is merely used to rationalize actions. ‘All of us need to work to rid the world of the baleful influence of religious violence. On that point, Dawkins and I are agreed.’ (McGrath 2007: 47). All of us need to work to rid the world of violence in all its forms. McGrath rejects the view that violence is a necessary feature of religion. I’d reject the view that violence is a necessary feature of anything, arguing in Thomist terms that evil is the privation of good, resulting when the development of healthy potentials is blocked.

Let’s try to keep it simple to avoid the inflation of words that follows a deliberate provocation: If there is a God and God is good, then why do bad things happen? It’s a simple question that is as old as God, so it is hardly unlikely that theologians would not have had a crack at answering it over the centuries. In its simplest formulation, the fact that human beings can recognize evil and register moral outrage wherever and whenever it occurs indicates that humans are not merely survival machines comprising sinews and bones that evolved on Earth by accident. Human beings certainly don’t need a conscience to survive as natural beings. As the example of Socrates and countless many others in history shows, individual human beings would often have much longer lives had they lacked a conscience. But not happier lives, in the sense of being at ease with themselves, fulfilled, feeling as though they are living according to some purpose. In Robert Bolt’s play A Man for All Seasons, Thomas More argues that a human being is defined by conscience. In the play, Sir Thomas More says: ‘I think that when statesmen forsake their own private conscience for the sake of their public duties, they lead their country by a short route to chaos.’ I am remembering a line that More delivers in the film version: ‘first people will deny their conscience, then they will have no conscience. I pity the people whose statesmen tread your path.’ I’m not sure of the version of More presented by the Bolt play, it is a liberal view which very much emphasizes the private conscience. Many will be sympathetic to that view, and it makes an effective point with respect to the existence of a moral surplus beyond naturalism. My understanding of St Thomas More, however, is that he very much addressed his conscience to God and not to himself, and that he emphasized that all consciences be both formed and informed by something much greater than private belief. But the simpler point with respect to private conscience will suffice. The possession of a conscience on the part of an individual can be a positive health hazard in the material world as a very political world. Like Socrates, More died for a reason that escapes biological explanation. Or maybe the likes of More, Gandhi, Martin Luther King jr are merely delusional, should have accepted that free will doesn’t exist, and that we are nothing but a pack of neurons.

God, Stephen Fry charges, is ‘utterly evil, capricious and monstrous.’ The world that God made, he says, is a place of ‘pain and injustice’, pointing to the existence of insects that have no other purpose than to eat the eyes of children out. If there is indeed a God, then it is clear ‘that He is monstrous, utterly monstrous, and deserves no respect whatsoever.’ 

Those who praise Fry’s stance should pause here and notice that what he says is hardly flattering to nature. Of course, Fry doesn’t have to be flatter nature, only unflatter pompous and unwarranted claims that the world, and its purported author, are any better than they are or could ever be. Nature is what it is, and natural things do as natural things do, with neither good nor evil as moral categories having any role to play whatsoever.

It’s just that Fry does himself employ moral categories. By throwing examples of evil drawn from the natural world back into the face of God, and by expressing a clear moral judgement that transcends biological imperatives, Stephen Fry gives a conscious demonstration of the fact that there is something of God in him, although we could just call it a conscience or a moral sense that is entirely natural. He clearly thinks these eye-burrowing worms to be a bad thing, but from a naturalist perspective such an evaluation makes no sense. The worms, should they possess a moral capacity, would consider their activity a good. 

So the clear implication is that we would be better off without categories of good and evil. Fry thus states that ‘the moment you banish Him, life becomes purer, simpler, cleaner and more worth living.’ The eye-eating worm doesn’t go away, and nor does any number of natural threats to human life and happiness. We just have to accept that God’s promise of justice, meaning and mercy are mere comforting fictions contradicted by all the evidence that life is cruel and pitiless, and that nature carries on in utter indifference to human concerns. That, of course, has always been the case against naturalism in ethics, and the case for religion as a relative moral autonomy that transcends amoral natural processes and biological imperatives. Human beings are not and can never be indifferent, and if naturalists think this an anthropocentric conceit, then they are revealing an inability to understand human nature. Human beings are moral beings as well as natural beings, and it is that degree of moral autonomy which takes us beyond a natural amoralism. That autonomy is irreducible and transcendent.

The fact that Fry could make certain judgements with respect to evil indicates a moral standard on his part that strictly, in accordance with a natural amorality, it is inadmissible for him to make. Of course, he could merely be employing religion’s own concern to fit nature into a moral framework against God and religion, with no commitment that framework on his part. But his identification of eye-burrowing worms blighting the lives of little children at least indicates an awareness on his part that some such thing is a bad thing. That’s the problem with wielding a double-edged sword. We could carry on cutting each other down until there is nothing of either side left. The argument, insofar as it is an argument rather than a negation and a provocation, is utterly self-contradictory, as clear a double edged sword as there is. The fact that there is no God doesn’t alter the fact that the world is a place of ‘pain and injustice.’ For it to be cease to be so, and become something ‘purer, simpler, cleaner’ requires that we abandon moral judgement and just accept things as they are. That would make the argument coherent and consistent. There would be no evil anymore. The eye-burrowing worm continues to menace the lives of little children, but we now accept such things as natural rather than condemn them as evil. Or, refusing to respond to provocation with a further provocation, we identify remediable ills and fight them with whatever skills and technologies we devise for the purpose. That identification, however, remains a moral evaluation, however we may want to dress it up in technical and instrumental language.

That wouldn’t necessarily make life ‘more worth living,’ not in an objective sense – the worm still exists – but only in the subjective sense of coming to appreciate life when we have it. Which is a lesson that runs right through the Bible. It’s just that the Biblical view, for all of the hysteria over misinterpretations of the word ‘dominion,’ is plainly theocentric, setting human beings and their purposes and activities within a bigger picture. I’m just wondering if the implication of the Fry view, as plain an anthropocentrism as there is, is that human beings have the right to do whatever is in their power to rearrange nature and eliminate species in order to make the world a pleasing place for humans.

It would, of course, be unwise to build an argument and draw too many conclusions from a clear provocation that attempts to turn the religious ethic against itself. I know the argument from David Attenborough who, when told that he doesn’t credit God enough for the wonders of nature, declared ‘I always reply by saying that I think of a little child in east Africa with a worm burrowing through his eyeball. The worm cannot live in any other way, except by burrowing through eyeballs.’ It’s not clear that Attenborough was even right on the biology, let alone the theology. Such a worm doesn’t seem to exist. It’s probable that Attenborough was referring to the Loa eye-worm, which the New Scientists says is ‘endemic to the swamps and rain forests of central and west Africa, and, contrary to [the] horror-movie vision of bursting eyeballs, are rarely life-threatening and no more harmful than the myriad other human parasites in the region.’ ‘I guess that eye-burrowing parasites are just one more test for that age-old religious dilemma about how God can let bad things happen.’ 

Eye-burrowing worms, national treasures... and creationism
https://www.newscientist.com/blogs/shortsharpscience/2009/01/eye-burrowing-worms-national-t.html (​https:​/​​/​www.newscientist.com​/​blogs​/​shortsharpscience​/​2009​/​01​/​eye-burrowing-worms-national-t.html​)

Fry’s claim that without God, life is ‘more worth living’ is only true if, in eliminating God, we abandon moral evaluations of good and bad in nature too, so we accept life in its own terms, and accept the many ways in which nature can bring it short of its full flowering. I take that to be Attenborough’s view, too, seeking to remove moral categories from nature where they do not belong. Life, like nature, is one big accident, and we ride our luck. I shall come shortly to the implications of a society that is beyond good and bad.

The question still stands, if God the Creator is good, why is the natural world full of parasites? Such is life. And such is nature. A naturalist explanation has no need of moral justification. Can human beings, as social beings, live with that? In truth, religious folk should calm down and not rise to the provocation. They need to understand that nature is not and never could be the validation of God’s existence. Where is the source of wisdom? The religious viewpoint answers plainly: it is not in the earth. ‘The deep says, “It is not in me”; And the sea says, “It is not with me.”’ It is beyond earthly price. (Job 12-19). The demand from Creationists that a natural scientist give thanks to God for the wonders of Nature is foolish and unnecessary, and opens religion to precisely the charges Fry and Attenborough level against it.

The question can be reformulated thus: if nature is wonderful, then why is it so full of bad things? What, in the end, redeems nature? If, that is, we stand in need of redemption. Life, after all, doesn’t have to mean anything. It’s just that human beings, in being human, seem to possess this cosmic longing for meaning. (as the works of Victor Frankl examine at length).

If life is its own principle, its own end, and if there is nothing beyond death, then the only point to the game is to stay in the game. That view is backed by any number of biologists. Death comes to all things, extinction too. There’s no point and no meaning. Does that make sense of human life?

To be fair to Attenborough, his statements on this do seem to have come as a response to those who wish to see God given the credit for the natural wonders of the world that Attenborough has had a long career presenting for the general public. Attenborough’s concern is with natural science, and he is perfectly entitled to firmly reject those who wish to impose an ideological filter of their own. But it is somewhat ironic to note that the most damning thing that proponents of naturalism have to say about God is that His Creation isn’t always moral in its natural operation… Of course, they don’t need to express any moral judgement with respect to nature and its happenings, and the point against religious encroachment is that such judgement has no place here. In that sense, the naturalists are teaching the religious a lesson about their own religion – God is transcendent, and there is no validation for such a God in nature. The beauty of the stars above no more prove the existence of God than the activities of eye-eating worms disprove that existence, and those who argue the one or the other are arguing beside the point. If religious folk insist on pressing the claims of a good God as the Creator of the wonders of the world, naturalists are entitled to object that the natural world isn’t always so wonderful. That’s fine. Nature is amoral. The bit I’m interested in is the spillover into social affairs and statements of value and significance from human beings with respect to life and its meaning. Here, naturalists express a moral judgement with respect to an amoral nature, a judgment that certainly does apply in human society that functions in accordance with something much more than biological imperatives. It’s that potential spillover from nature to society that is my concern here. The naturalists don’t appear to see that once God is removed from the picture here, then all that remains are biological imperatives, to which moral judgements do not apply. To be consistent, they need to dispense with the moral judgements too, and live without a conscience. Which, to be fair, is precisely what the likes of Attenborough do in their natural science presentations. Our moral valuations have no place in nature. But does a natural amoralism have any place in human society? That would appear to be the implication of removing God by reference to nature and its operation. 

Is it possible to be moral without God? Many argue for a natural sympathy, empathy and sociability, and that view would be consistent with my reading of Marx as an essentialist, requiring no extraneous teleology. We should be wary of falling for Nietzsche’s provocations, but Nietzsche considered the end of God to be the end of the moral geography of good and evil. He may be wrong, but his view of nature is much less benign than the view of others. I prefer Kropotkin’s view, myself, but recognize that my choice is based not on explanations of nature but on a moral evaluation of what human beings are and what they need to do in order to flourish. For Nietzsche, such an evaluation is a remnant of Christian morality, writing a morality into nature that is contrary to natural processes. Moral valuations have no place in nature. Nietzsche goes further and claims they have no place in society either. Nietzsche excoriated those who thought they could discard God and yet still employ the moral language that is attendant upon God’s existence. He demanded a consistent amoralism on this.

There is no justice in the world, therefore there is no judge. Fry doesn’t quite say this. He says there is ‘pain and injustice,’ and therefore makes a judgement. That’s a moral position that is contradicted by his reference to nature. That view is incoherent, and is plainly intended to expose the incoherence of the religious position, a just God creating an unjust world. ‘The moment you banish Him,’ Fry says, then ‘life becomes purer, simpler, cleaner and more worth living.’ Nature is as nature does, and the world is at it is, and we live better without the moral pretence, hypocrisy and rationalization. But to point to a ‘purer, simpler, cleaner’ world without God and without the moral judgement of an amoral nature that goes with it begs the question as to why life thus becomes ‘more worth living.’ It’s not an argument that naturalists can make objectively, not least for the very reason that the eye-burrowing worm and much worse besides will still exist. Do we just accept subjectively that bad things happen because ‘it is nature?’ And do we say that since nature doesn’t give a damn, then neither should we? We take our chances, and ride our power to our own ends while we can. That’s Nietzsche’s view. I don’t think the ensuing world will be agreeable to those many on the receiving end of such egoistic assertions of power.

Of course, the arguments in the statements of Fry and Attenborough are directed specifically against the notion of God as the objective ground for morality and are not necessarily for nature as establishing that objective ground. A morality based upon natural sympathy in conditions of intersubjective personal experience has no need of God to ground its morality. At which point I shall restate Marx’s view that all such terms – ‘God,’ ‘Nature,’ ‘Man,’ ‘Reason,’ ‘Humanity’ – are mere abstractions constituting no basis for morality, and that what really counts is the specific ways in which human beings mediate their interchange with each other in the social and natural environment. And that, I humbly suggest, is the path to the socialist future, steering us clear of the twin reefs of ‘God’ and ‘Nature’ as the very uncertain objective grounds for morality, without thereby putting Humanity in their places. You don’t have to be as gods, just human beings.

But there is a strong naturalist movement that doesn’t settle for that, and instead does put Nature where God once was (Marx gets rid of both as idealistic abstractions), even if it does so by default (nature is all that exists, and just is). A naturalism of this kind opens up the prospect of a very unpleasant world, a world not only of ‘pain and injustice’ but lacking the objective morality that even allows us to say that these things are wrong, let alone act to remedy them. Life is what it is, and man is wolf to man: homo hominis lupus est. In the state of nature, Thomas Hobbes wrote, life is ‘poor, nasty, brutish and short.’ The naturalists overturn the tenets of moral philosophy, and undermine notions of moral action aimed at the good with, crudely but not inaccurately put, an apologetics fashioned by the justification ‘it’s natural.’ For, as Hobbes writes in Leviathan, ‘there is no such finis ultimus (utmost aim), nor summum bonum (greatest good), as is spoken of in the books of the old moral philosophers.’ (chapter XI). As is spoken of by the greatest of the modern moral philosophers too. For Kant, moral acts aim at the summum bonum (the highest possible good), containing two aspects: moral justice and happiness. For Kant the summum bonum holds moral justice together by connecting each individual with all other individuals, something which the self-interested acts of individuals is incapable of doing. The argument running throughout this work is entirely consistent with the way that Kant establishes the moral requirement to transform society in order to realise the summum bonum, the highest possible good:

The moral law .. determines for us . . a final purpose toward which it obliges us to strive, and this purpose is the highest good in the world possible through freedom (Kant CJ 1951:30). 

Kant’s highest good is 'a moral kingdom of purposes., viz., the existence of rational beings under moral laws' (CJ 1951:295; cf Prac 1956:114/5). Human beings, therefore, have a duty to promote the highest good:

Human beings 'are a priori determined by reason to promote with all our powers the summum bonum, which consists in the combination of the greatest welfare of rational beings with the highest condition of the good itself, i.e., in universal happiness conjoined with morality most accordant to law.' 

Kant CJ 1951: 304

Looking backwards, that is not the view of Thomas Hobbes, and looking forwards, it is explicitly repudiated by Nietzsche. Kant thought reason sufficient to realize the highest good and establish the free society of co-legislative co-operators. Once God is removed, Nietzsche says, and the ethic has lost its metaphysical support. Without God, all there is power as a natural force. Hobbes presents this as the driving force of a world in which one accumulates power or is accumulated by those with power:

So that in the first place I put for a general inclination of all mankind a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death. And the cause of this is not always that a man hopes for a more intensive delight than he has already attained to, or that he cannot be content with a moderate power; but because he cannot assure the power and means to live well which he hath present, without the acquisition of more. And from hence it is that kings, whose power is greatest, turn their endeavours to the assuring it at home by laws or abroad by wars; and, when that is done, there succeedeth a new desire, in some of fame from new conquest, in others of ease and sensual pleasure, in others of admiration or being flattered for excellence in some art or other ability of the mind.

Hobbes Leviathan chapter XI

Hobbes’ view banishes God and all notions of the supreme good, presenting instead a clean and simple outline of a natural existence that proceeds on minimal assumptions, untroubled by morality. I just don’t see how that godless view makes life ‘more worth living,’ except in being grateful for how lucky we are in being alive. Giving thanks is a theme that runs right through the Bible, of course. There are many examples: ‘give thanks in all circumstances; for this is God's will for you in Christ Jesus.’ 1 Thessalonians 5:18. And Hobbes isn’t so naïve as to present it in such a way. Hobbes is a relentless and ruthless logician: he knows that once God is gone, then moral judgement is gone too. His naturalism is based upon the restless searching for power after power in a war of ‘all against all.’ Hobbes brings naturalism right to the heart of human society:

Competition of riches, honour, command, or other power, inclineth to contention, enmity, and war; because the way of one competitor, to the attaining of his desire, is to kill, subdue, supplant, or repel the other.

Hobbes Leviathan ch XI

Marx didn’t care for the view, and sought to supplant the universal egoism and antagonism of the bourgeois civil society that Hobbes saw emerging in his day with the universal association of human beings. This is the moral association that Hegel sought with his doctrine of Sittlichkeit, the realization of Kant’s highest good. This is the very antithesis of Hobbes’ view, challenging Hobbesian naturalism as a sophism in which might is right and justice is the interests of the strongest. It’s just that Marx also thought it would be possible to remove God in order to realize the pure, simple and clean life that is more worthy of living. Marx praised Darwin. Yet Darwin’s view that life is a struggle for survival in a world of scarce resources fits more the Hobbesian society of universal egoism and antagonism that Marx condemned than it does Marx’s view. Marx’s condemnation can only be described as a moral judgement, a judgment that is unwarranted in the naturalist terms of power and its exercise and circulation. Peter Singer argues for a Darwinian left, opposing competition and the private economy as more productive than Marx’s cooperative socialist economy. Human beings are competitive, egoistic, and respond more readily to self-interest, Singer argues from a utilitarian perspective. Avoid pain, pursue pleasure, and there’s no need of notions of the summum bonum.

I have cited several barbed comments from Marx directed against Bentham and utilitarianism. He would have thought Singer’s notions of a left utilitarianism risible. Singer for his part finds Marx’s view of human nature ‘false,’ with the failures of communism following as a result. And Marx’s position may not be quite as pure, clean and simple as Singer’s or Hobbes’ or Bentham’s or that of the naturalists. They can discard God and remain consistent. Marx discards God and yet retains moral judgements and assumptions which would seem to imply the continued existence of God. 

As Martin Buber argues, ‘every ethos has its origin in a revelation, whether or not it is still aware of and obedient to it.’ (Buber 1992: 142). I shan’t risk outraging Marxists by stating that I see God running right through Marx’s emancipatory commitments, and I see the lack of awareness of that dynamic, even more the denial of it, to be the gravest danger, threatening to bring about not the freedom that Marx sought, but the deepest unfreedom. (Tucker 1961 ch 16). I addressed the issue above, concluding that Marx needs God in order to make good his emancipatory claims and that, without God, his ambitions for social transformation risk rebounding spectacularly.

Let us admit that there is a hidden God in Marx, that the moral language he employs cannot be supported by naturalism alone. To achieve consistency, Marx would either have to eliminate that God, and the moral judgement that goes with it – that is, thoroughly extinguish the moral assumptions attendant upon a belief in the objective goodness of the world – or render his implicit morality explicit by coming to terms with God and religion. One of the most thorough critics of Marx and Marxism came to an appreciation of the necessity of the religious dimension:





In God Owes Us Nothing: A Brief Remark on Pascal's Religion and on the Spirit of Jansenism (1995) Kolakowski reflected on ‘Pascal’s sad religion’ based on a belief in a ‘hidden God’ incapable of being reached by reason. Though he abandoned Marxism, calling it ‘the greatest fantasy of our century,’ Kolakowski was equally scathing about the secularist, liberal certainties of the western enlightenment, seeing western relativism as every bit as dogmatic and corrosive as Marxism (Kolakowski 1978 1990a 1990b). 

These are important questions worthy of extensive treatment. Pressures of time mean I have to leave them for another day. 

Marx seems to have presumed that, given the right social conditions, the natural sociability of human beings would flourish and we would live happily as one. I think he has misread religion and that is a big loss that vitiates his vision and leaves it dangerously unmoored. In a godless universe, human beings could, Jonathan Sacks writes, ‘choose the way of Epicurus and live quietly among friends and innocent pleasures. But not all, and there's the rub.’ (Sacks 2011 emphasis added). 

Imagine, should we require a pure, simple and clean truth, that Hobbes was right and that an amoral state of nature is indeed the ground of social behaviour. If that is so, then there is no moral standard of good and bad, only a power that ceases only in death. Will Durant argues that ‘Darwin unconsciously completed the work of the Encyclopedists.’ I would argue that the Enclyclopedists themselves had rediscovered the materialism of Thomas Hobbes. Rousseau saw this clearly from within the Enlightenment, and denounced its materialism as a sophism. 

Durant points out the significance of Darwin to Nietzsche’s view on morality. The Encyclopedists ‘had removed the theological basis of modern morals, but they had left that morality itself untouched and inviolate, hanging miraculously in the air; a little breath of biology was all that was needed to clear away this remnant of imposture.’ He points out the implications of such naturalism:

Men who could think clearly soon perceived what the profoundest minds of every age had known: that in this battle we call life, what we need is not goodness but strength, not humility but pride, not altruism but resolute intelligence; that equality and democracy are against the grain of selection and survival; that not masses but geniuses are the goal of evolution; that not “justice” but power is the arbiter of all differences and all destinies. So it seemed to Friedrich Nietzsche.




It is Nietzsche who forces the issue by spelling out the consequences of a Darwinian naturalism (which itself completes the work of Hobbesian materialism and the eighteenth century Encyclopedists), consequences which those retaining a moral conscience would find unpalatable. Nietzsche despised democracy. We need to judge whether he despised human beings as such when, in The Antichrist, he described the masses as the ‘weak and the botched; or whether was this a demand that human beings throw off their mediocre slavish existence and come to live as Supermen. It’s clear that Nietzsche is an outright elitist, but let’s be generous and read his demands as an argument for the healthy human flourishing Marx opposed to the dehumanisation of the capital system. The problem with that generous reading is that Nietzsche despised Christianity for way it affirmed the equality of each and all, and thus gave birth to democracy and socialism. I read Marx’s argument for the universal flourishing of each and all in terms of the realization of ‘true democracy.’ Nietzsche’s argument is motivated by other concerns. 

As Will Durant argues, ‘Nietzsche was the child of Darwin and the brother of Bismarck.’ The fact that Nietzsche criticized the English evolutionists and the German nationalists is often cited to distance the true meaning of Nietzsche’s joyous science from the joyless excesses of Social Darwinism and Nazism, but Nietzsche’s assertions of amoral power serve to establish his much greater distance from Christian morality, democracy, egalitarianism and socialism and much more emphatically. Plus, as Durant points out, Nietzsche was ‘accustomed to denounce those who had most influenced him; it was his unconscious way of covering up his debts.’ (Durant SP 2006: 522).

I don’t care for Nietzsche’s view, but I do appreciate its starkness and clarity, in contrast to those who think that they can dispense with the Christian God and yet retain (however implicitly or unconsciously) a Christian morality. Nietzsche insists ‘that the death of the Christian God would be the death of Christian morality, with its emphasis on kindness, compassion, forgiveness and all the rest, which he despised as the morality of slaves.’ (Durant SP 2006). Is that the death of morality as such? Is Nietzsche, in his provocation, forcing a false choice upon us – God and Christian morality or nature and amoralism?

Nietzsche was concerned to point out the flagrant hypocrisies of those who abandoned a belief in God and rejected Christianity in favour of an evolutionary understanding of life, and yet continued to espouse a Christian morality, that is, employ moral terms that presupposes the very things they claimed to have repudiated. If life is indeed merely a struggle for existence in which the fittest survive and the weak go to the wall, then strength is the ultimate virtue, and weakness is the worst vice. As Will Durant argues, ‘good is that which survives, which wins; bad is that which gives way and fails.’

Only the mid-Victorian cowardice of the English Darwinians, and the bourgeois respectability of French positivists and German socialists, could conceal the inevitableness of this conclusion. These men were brave enough to reject Christian theology, but they did not dare to be logical, to reject the moral ideas, the worship of meekness and gentleness and altruism, which had grown out of that theology. They ceased to be Anglicans, or Catholics, or Lutherans; but they did not dare cease to be Christians. So argued Friedrich Nietzsche.

Durant SP 2006: 522

With an admirable clarity and conciseness, Nietzsche confronts erstwhile Christian moralists with the moral and logical problems contained in the rationalist position on ethics:

They have got rid of the Christian God, and now feel obliged to cling all the more firmly to Christian morality … With us it is different. When one gives up Christian belief one thereby deprives oneself of the right to Christian morality . . . Christianity is a system, a consistently thought out and complete view of things. If one breaks out of it a fundamental idea, the belief in God, one thereby breaks the whole thing to pieces … Christian morality is a command: its origin is transcendental ... it possesses truth only if God is truth - it stands or falls with the belief in God. If the English really do think they know, of their own accord, ‘intuitively,’ what is good and evil … that is merely the consequence of the ascendency of Christian evaluation.' 

Nietzsche 1968: 80—1; Nietzsche G IX 5

It gets fractious here. Nietzsche famously abused John Stuart Mill as a ‘blockhead’ for arguing the equality of individuals. ‘I abhor the man's vulgarity,’ Nietzsche wrote, ‘when he says "what is right for one man is right for another.”’ 

Such principles will fain establish the whole of human traffic upon mutual services, so every action would appear to be a cash payment for something done to us. The hypothesis here is ignoble to the last degree; it is taken for granted that there is some sort of equivalence in value between my actions and thine; the most personal value of an action is simply cancelled in this manner (that part of an action which has no equivalent and which cannot be remunerated). “Reciprocity” is a piece of egregious vulgarity: the mere fact that what I do cannot and may not be done by another, that there is no such thing as equivalent (except in those very select circles where one actually has one’s equal, inter pares), that in a really profound sense a man never requites because he is something unique in himself and can only do unique things, - this fundamental conviction contains the cause of aristocratic aloofness from the mob, because the latter believes in equality, and consequently in the feasibility of equivalent and “reciprocity.”

Nietzsche, The Will to Power - An Attempted Transvaluation of All Values - Vol II Books III and IV 927

I feel the need here to praise utilitarianism’s democratic and egalitarian spirit against Nietzsche’s elitist aristocratic anarchism. But Nietzsche is right, utilitarianism’s equality is indeed vulgar and reductive, and fits a market society of monetary valuations and calculations like a glove. The ‘reciprocity’ Marx argues for can be constituted in much better ways. Utilitarianism as the unity of each and all under the nexus of callous cash payment is an ethics appropriate to the ‘objective dependency relations’ of the capital economy: capital as the new god, commodity fetishism as the new religion, and not a genuine democracy at all, merely a democracy of universal unfreedom. 

But there’s no justice and fairness in Nietzsche, only a contempt for the ‘weak and the botched’ (Nietzsche Antichrist). Nietzsche disliked the English for their utilitarianism and philistinism: ‘shop-keepers, Christians, cows, women, Englishmen, and other democrats belong together.’ (Nietzsche, quoted in Durant SP 2006: 562). He must have been charming company. I wonder what he would have put Elvis fans and football supporters. 

Nietzsche loathed democracy. But here’s the important point: Nietzsche loathed Christianity most of all. He saw Christianity as the greater threat. He understood that people are always more loyal to their God than they are to their government. He understood that people commit themselves more readily to a moral cause than they do to reasons and interests. And he understood that people have more awe and respect for a power and truth that is outside of their own creation than they do for their own creation. Nietzsche considered Christianity to be at the root of democracy, with its egalitarian commitments and assertions of rights. And who can deny that Christianity’s affirmation of the equality of all souls is much more the democracy we know and love than the elitist, exclusive and slave-based conceptions of Athens? ‘The New Testament is the gospel of a completely ignoble species of man. Christianity is the most fatal and seductive lie that ever existed,’ writes Nietzsche. 

Jonathan Sacks writes that Nietzsche repudiated Judaism for precisely the same reason. Sacks describes Nietzsche as ‘the most profound of all modern thinkers.’ Nietzsche from time to time expressed admiration for Jews, calling them ‘the most remarkable nation of world history.’ (Nietzsche 1968: 134). But Nietzsche ‘consistently opposed Judaism for a most unusual reason: not because Jews rejected Christianity, but because Jews had given birth to Christianity. Judaism was wrong, he said, because it was the inversion of all natural instincts. It found God in right, not might; in compassion, not ruthlessness; in humility, not aristocratic disdain.’ (Sacks 2000: 182 183). Judaism represented all the things that Nietzsche despised: ‘pity, the kind and helping hand, the warm heart, patience, industriousness, humility, friendliness.’ (Nietzsche 1973: 178). Nietzsche denigrated these things as the ‘slave virtues’ and considered those who embraced them to be weak and envious. The only true ethic was the precise opposite of such religious virtue, the ‘will to power.’ 

Those who condemn God and religion as illusions to be removed, as standing in the way of the flourishing of human power, need to think hard here. The greatest lie, for Nietzsche, is the equality of human beings, which he sees as rooted in a religious ethic and nowhere else:

Consequently, the road to the superman must lie through aristocracy. Democracy – “this mania for counting noses” - must be eradicated before it is too late. The first step here is the destruction of Christianity so far as all higher men are concerned. The triumph of Christ was the beginning of democracy; “the first Christian was in his deepest instincts a rebel against everything privileged; he lived and struggled unremittingly for ‘equal rights’”; in modern times he would have been sent to Siberia. “He that is greatest among you, let him be your servant” – this is the inversion of all political wisdom, of all sanity; indeed, as one reads the Gospel one feels the atmosphere of a Russian novel; they are a sort of plagiarism from Dostoievski. Only among the lowly could such notions take root; and only in an age whose rulers had degenerated and cased to rule. “When Nero and Caracalla sat on the throne, the paradox arose that the lowest man was worth more than the man on top.” (Nietzsche Antichrist, 195). 

Durant SP 2006: 558

As the conquest of Europe by Christianity was the end of ancient aristocracy, so the overrunning of Europe by Teutonic warrior barons brought a renewal of the old masculine virtues, and planted the roots of the modern aristocracies. Here is Nietzsche’s society of manly vigour:

These men were not burdened with “morals”: they “were free from every social restraint; in the innocence of their wild-beast conscience they returned as exultant monsters from a horrible train of murder, incendiarism, rapine, torture, with an arrogance and compromise as if nothing but a student’s freak had been perpetrated.” It was such men who supplied the ruling classes for Germany, Scandinavia, France, England, Italy, and Russia.

Durant SP 2006: 559

A herd of blond beasts of prey, a race of conquerors and masters, with military organization, with the power to organize, unscrupulously placing their fearful paws upon a population perhaps vastly superior in numbers … this herd founded the State. The dream is dispelled which made the State begin with a contract. What has he to do with contracts who can command, who is master by nature, who comes on the scene with violence in deed and demeanour?

Nietzsche GM 40; Nietzsche in Durant SP 2006: 558-559

Nietzsche really did give up the belief in God, in that he gave up the moral evaluation of life in terms of good and evil that comes with such a belief. Rationalists, humanists and naturalists think that morality is independent of God, and that we can discard God and religion and retain morality – even realize morality, as something lived for real as opposed to existing as mere illusion (such would be Marx’s position). Nietzsche’s scathing words directed against David Strauss and his book The Old Faith and the New apply here. Like Strauss, such people give up the belief in God and abandon Christianity, and yet do not suffer from the ‘death of God’ at all, because they haven’t seen the depth of the predicament. Instead, they are cheerily and blandly optimistic about the future – because they have neither really given up the belief in God and religion, nor have seen what an onerous task it is to assume the responsibility to live as gods. They haven’t addressed the issue in its depths, they still live off the moral capital of past religion.

In The Gay Science of 1882 Nietzsche has a madman declare that ‘God is dead. And we have killed him.’ Nietzsche refers to the ‘death of God’ as a tragedy. The collapse of an absolute foundation for morality means that we must, in some way, become gods ourselves:





Nietzsche expresses a complete contempt for Strauss and his ilk: Strauss can renounce God and Christianity and welcome Darwin as a benefactor of humankind and suffer no distress of spirit for the simple reason that he doesn’t know what he is doing (Hollingdale 1965):





For Ludwig Feuerbach, God is the ideal expression of all the best human qualities, which human beings need to reclaim for themselves through the abolition of God. Marx stated the point differently, as the positive affirmation of the human essence through the transformation of a competitive, divided society that required religion illusion into a unified society in which the human essence could be expressed creatively. Marx praised Darwin and sought to align his work with Darwin. And yet Marx also saw that it was the condition of society as the ‘war of all against all’ that generated the need for religion in the first place, the ‘soul of soulless conditions,’ an expression of a commonality that is denied in a diremptive society. Marx wanted to end such a world, expressing a moral view that owes more to the religious ethic he denied than to the Darwinian view he embraced. In contrast, Nietzsche challenges those who abandon belief in God for a naturalist view to derive their moral code for life out of the bellum omnium contra omnes and the privileges of the strong. Of course, Nietzsche is not arguing for such a thing, he argues for a consistent view that is genuinely godless and hence without either good or evil, without objective moral standards. He is trying to get moralists to understand that no such standards exist, since there is no God. Strauss acknowledged the world as the bellum omnium contra omnes, but didn’t face the problem of how the moral qualities of human beings could arise in such a world, nor explain the very possibility of ethics in such an amoral world. Nietzsche thus issues a challenge to those who deny the existence of God:





Nietzsche’s point is aimed against those who discard the belief in God and the tenets of religion as untenable in face of Darwin and the truth of evolution, and yet carry on as if nothing has changed in moral terms – expressing moral views on the presumption that there are still objective standards of right and wrong, good and bad, and that it still makes sense to pursue justice and condemn injustice, to call for fairness against unfairness, defend the weak against the strong, and demand universal treatment of each and all. Nietzsche exposes the incoherence of such a moral view – lose the former, and the rest goes too. Without God, everything changes. In an objectively valueless universe, it no longer makes sense to talk of good and bad, right and wrong; morality is merely a series of value judgements, subjective statements without any means of objective evaluation enabling us to differentiate between them and determine which view is better than another. The standards of right and wrong have gone. Weber understood the implications perfectly when he wrote that ‘where there is nothing’ both the Kaiser and the proletariat have lost their rights. (Weber Politics as a Vocation 1970: 128). There may well be class struggles and power struggles, and the protagonists may well employ moral language to justify their demands and actions, but they are struggles over power, of one side against other sides, of no more moral significance than that.

And yet people keep fighting injustice and pressing for their rights, on the clear presumption that the objective standards of right and wrong, good and bad, attendant upon the existence of God, still exist. Such an ethics and politics make no sense in that they lack substantive grounding in a world that no longer possesses any meaningful moral reality. Hence Nietzsche described the ‘death of God’ as placing an onerous burden upon human beings to live as gods. Nietzsche criticizes Strauss for his inconsistency in shirking the task of deriving morals from the bellum omnium contra omnes. Nietzsche spells out the conclusions:

To talk of just and unjust in themselves has no sense whatsoever — it's obvious that in themselves harming, oppressing, exploiting, destroying cannot be 'unjust,’ insofar as life essentially works that way, that is, in its basic functions it harms, oppresses, exploits, and destroys - and cannot be conceived at all without these characteristics. We must acknowledge something even more alarming—the fact that from the highest biological standpoint, conditions of law must always be exceptional conditions, partial restrictions on the basic will to live, which is set on power—they are subordinate to the total purpose of this will as its individual means, that is, as means to create a larger unit of power. A legal system conceived of as sovereign and universal, not as a means in the struggle of power complexes, but as a means against all struggles in general, something along the lines of Dühring's communist cliché in which each will must be considered as equal to every will, that would be a principle hostile to life, a destroyer and dissolver of human beings, an assassination attempt on the future of human beings, a sign of exhaustion, a secret path to nothingness.

Nietzsche GM 1994 Second Essay

Nietzsche is no Christian, and he is no democrat, no egalitarian, no socialist and no communist, either, for the very same reason:

The secret stimulus of the French free-thinkers from Voltaire to August Comte was not to remain behind the Christian ideal … but to outbid it if possible. Comte, with his “Live for others,” out-Christianizes Christianity. In Germany it was Schopenhauer, and in England John Stuart Mill, who gave the greatest fame to the theory of sympathetic affections, of pity, and of usefulness to others as the principle of action … All the systems of socialism placed themselves unwittingly … upon the common ground of these doctrines.

Nietzsche quoted in Durant SP 2006; On Reading Nietzsche 1918: 71

Note well the implications of his argument, which is very pure, simple, and clear in that it is logical and consistent – those who argue for justice, for universal rights, for the equal treatment of each and all, and for a public community that embodies a commitment to these things presuppose God and the religious ethic, the transcendent standards that say that we live in an objectively valuable and meaningful reality. That even applies to the natural sympathy that atheists from Hume to Mill would rest morality upon. Remove those standards in favour of a naturalism, and democratic, egalitarian, liberal and socialist commitments cease to have any substantial grounding. All collective purpose goes; all that there is is a naked power struggle between egoistic individuals. That breaks us right down to the self-alienation of the individual pursuing only egoistic need, with nothing outside of that to expand being outwards.

That places us firmly within the universal egoism and antagonism of capitalist society. Capitalism can only work when set within a moral, social and institutional matrix. The problem, however, is that the capital system is constituted by the emancipation of the economic from such embedding. The bitter irony is that this freedom results in a new bondage. No one expressed this pathos of free individuals enslaved to their social conditions better than Marx. (Critchley 2018 chs 2 9). Marx’s great critic Max Weber looked at this process in terms of the inversion of means and ends, means coming to be so enlarged as to displace true ends, bringing about a diminution of meaning. Marx thought that religious illusion could be dispelled through a social transformation that put an end to conditions that, in denying true fulfilment, generated a need for illusion. A Nietzschean and Weberian perspective would see that concern with a common human flourishing as grounded in a religious commitment, something as illusory, or not, as religion itself. 

Against Marx’s materialist conception of history, Weber traced the power of religious ideas to motivate action and change the world. But his argument contained a powerful punchline – the inversion of means and ends that Marx analysed ensured that the light cloak of faith turned into the iron cage of the capital economy:

The Puritan wanted to work in a calling; we are forced to do so. For when asceticism was carried out of monastic cells into everyday life, and began to dominate worldly morality, it did its part in building the tremendous cosmos of the modern economic order. This order is now bound to the technical and economic conditions of machine production which to-day determine the lives of all the individuals who are born into this mechanism, not only those directly concerned with economic acquisition, with irresistible force. Perhaps it will so determine them until the last ton of fossilized coal is burnt. In Baxter's view the care for external goods should only lie on the shoulders of the "saint like a light cloak, which can be thrown aside at any moment". But fate decreed that the cloak should become an iron cage. 
Since asceticism undertook to remodel the world and to work out its ideals in the world, material goods have gained an increasing and finally an inexorable power over the lives of men as at no previous period in history. To-day the spirit of religious asceticism—whether finally, who knows?—has escaped from the cage. But victorious capitalism, since it rests on mechanical foundations, needs its support no longer. The rosy blush of its laughing heir, the Enlightenment, seems also to be irretrievably fading, and the idea of duty in one's calling prowls about in our lives like the ghost of dead religious beliefs. Where the fulfilment of the calling cannot directly be related to the highest spiritual and cultural values, or when, on the other hand, it need not be felt simply as economic compulsion, the individual generally abandons the attempt to justify it at all...




Weber thought such a condition to be irrevocable. In identifying the social forms of the modern world as ‘rational,’ as part of a general process of rationalization that encompasses the entire world, Weber could not conceive of an alternative to them. We live in a disenchanted world, a world that, lacking in objective value, truth and meaning, is a mere congeries of subjective will and opinion. In such a world, issues are settled by power struggles. In effect, the atheistic sophism and conventionalism of Hobbes’ materialism is all that there is. Nietzsche saw it too, and saw its challenges, and challenged individuals to live up to the responsibility of living as gods themselves. Weber opted for the existentialism of an ethics of responsibility – each chooses their own gods or devils. Nietzsche plainly did not believe that human beings in the mass could assume such a responsibility. He rejected democracy and all collective movements such as socialism and communism. Significantly, this rejection was grounded in Nietzsche’s fundamental rejection of a belief in God and a rejection of fundamental religious tenets. Nietzsche demanded coherence and consistency on this, hence he analysed ethics and ethical positions in light of the ‘death of God.’ Nietzsche didn’t see how it was possible to retain the old moral language concerning rights, justice, good and evil since the entire overarching moral framework supporting that language had collapsed. And people continued to argue in moral terms as if nothing had changed. Nietzsche had seen that everything had changed. Weber was very much writing in the aftermath of Marx and Nietzsche, and his conclusions clearly show that he considered Nietzsche to be right on the ethics. 

We live Under Weber’s Shadow. (Breen 2012).
Nietzsche would convict Marx of incoherence and inconsistency, to the extent that Marx’s collective ethical commitments do indeed imply the continued existence of God and religious assumptions with regard to the unity of each and all. These assumptions, Nietzsche would charge, are attendant upon a belief in God. To Nietzsche and Weber, the metaphysical foundation supporting such an ethic had crumbled. Marx seems to have thought that human beings could positively appropriate that ground and live it in the real. To Nietzsche, this is incoherent – you cannot appropriate what isn’t there – you can’t eat a transcendent cake that doesn’t exist. Of course, Marx’s human appropriation was more a case of transforming real conditions so as to realize healthy human potentialities for the free and full development of each and all. From where, Nietzsche would ask, does this commitment to each and all come from, if a pitiless struggle for scarce resources on the part of individuals is all that there is and all that there could be in nature?

Against this trail of thought leading from Hobbes to Nietzsche to Weber, Marx located the source of this paradoxical development in an alienated system of production and, through the practical reappropriation of this alienated social power, can conceive of a way out of the iron cage. The evidence is that capital is the most jealous God of all and can suffer no rival allegiances and communities. There is no peaceful co-existence with ethics and religion, and no tempering the economic motive with generosity of spirit – modern capitalism is absolutely irreligious, in the words of John Maynard Keynes.

Hence my disquiet, not merely over atheists and naturalists and their points against God and religion, but over Marx and his belief that we can realize something akin to a Heaven on Earth, on the presumption that we can have our transcendent cake and eat it too. I see how, socially, Marx overcomes the alienated forms of the capital system. But his attack on capital’s bellum omnium contra omnes presumes a moral standard that transcends society and its class/power relations. Nietzsche slams such a position as incoherent. Marx seems to think that all humanity could come to live as one as self-realized beings once we realize a condition of human flourishing on Earth. Nietzsche knows the reality of power and power struggles in a naturalist environment, and knows that only a few will be capable of living as Supermen. A world of gods without God is not the Kantian democracy of ends that Marx sought, it is an aristocracy. And a sophism, too. As Jonathan Sacks comments with respect to Nietzsche’s argument: ‘A world in which there is no God is one in which there are no limits to hubris, no principled constraints to the will to power.’ (Sacks 2011: 240). As Kolakowski writes, it is a sense of the sacred that imposes limits on ambitions arising in the realm of the profane; lose the sacred, and we invite the illusion that there are no limits:





Without limits, Marx’s commitment to self-realization is dangerously unmoored, projecting human power to infinity. Without God, self-realization is a self-immolation, human beings eating themselves and their world from the inside:





By ‘the death of God,’ Nietzsche meant the end of the metaphysical foundations that had supported the western world for two millennia. It meant the end of the ethical world that we call the Judaic, or Judeo-Christian. Jonathan Sacks brings us back to the religious roots of conscience:





‘For only as the image of God is human life not part of nature, but sacred.’ In that line, Jonathan Sacks nails the truth of this issue. Remove God and leave us only with nature, then the Hobbesian and Nietzschean view of a power limited only by other power prevails. Only the strong survive in such a world. 





I have read widely over the years, and thought deeply. For a long time, my writing could be described as atheist, arguing for the grounding of freedom and happiness in natural reason, arguing for the democratisation of power on the basis of that reason. I still retain key elements of that reasoning, hence I am very sympathetic to the work of the likes of Stuart Kauffman. But time and again, thinking on these issues leads me back to this conclusion. It is not a conclusion I can be accused of drawing in order to prove the truth of my political commitments. In fact, it is a conclusion that causes all amount of trouble for me with respect to my extensive writings on Marx. The only way I can square the arguments I have made over the years is by arguing that Marx, despite his historicism, requires transcendent standards in order to buttress his claims to truth and emancipation.

Myriad voices can be heard proclaiming in the contemporary world that human beings are natural beings, insisting that our salvation will come only when we recognize we are parts of nature. Such hopes are naïve and misguided, failing to see that the ends they seek are fundamentally moral in nature, not natural. For only as the image of God are all human beings entitled to justice, equal consideration, respect, dignity, not as part of nature. Nature is amoral and indifferent; there is no moral law in nature. The moral law exists only if God exists. And it is through their existence that conscience exists. Here are the real limits to power. The recognition that human beings are natural beings does not suffice. The fact that human beings are natural beings is not difficult to understand, we have daily reminders of it in the most basic of natural functions. People who insist that human beings come to recognize that we are natural beings are waiting for a revelation that will never come. It is certainly possible to argue that human beings are in denial of their natural qualities, and try to cover up the traces in myriad ways, but that begs the question of how naturalists see human beings as coming to live naturally. If we are not talking about shedding culture, rules and codes and the various taboos with which human civilisation covers human behaviour, then we are talking about the recognition of limits. Plato’s old question was whether democracy was capable of supplying a self-limiting principle from within itself. I take naturalists here as calling for the conscious recognition on the part of human beings of the fact of natural limits. Does nature supply a self-limiting principle? It does, but only in the negative sense of suffering the inevitable consequences of a transgression of limits. If human beings are natural beings, and no more, then the truth is that they are beings involved in a ceaseless pursuit of power and aggrandisement, a pursuit that ceases only with death. There is no internal recognition of limits within nature, the very opposite. The limits to power, and the recognition of those limits, is moral, not natural. As Sacks puts it: ‘If God exists, then the moral law exists. If the moral law exists, then conscience exists; and if conscience exists, there are limits to power.’ To argue for naturalism with respect to limits, ignoring its central moral aspect, is a profound error. A recognition of limits can only be internal, a conscious choice; natural limits are something felt only as an external check upon natural power and its expansionary imperative.





Nature, hailed by many as a benevolent mother, is a dangerous guest, writes Camille Paglia. ‘The ancient cult-followers of Dionysus knew that subordination to nature is a crucifixion and dismemberment.’ Paglia writes that human identity is obliterated in the Dionysian conversion of matter to energy, a theme of Euripides' Bacchae. Romanticism, like the Swinging Sixties, misunderstands the Dionysian as the pleasure principle, when it is in fact the gross continuum of pleasure-pain. ‘Worshipping nature and seeking political and sexual freedom, Romanticism ends in imaginative entrammelment of every kind. Perfect freedom is intolerable and therefore impossible.’ (Paglia 2001 ch 8). Those who see nature as benign, Paglia declares, must confront Sade in all his ugliness. Satirizing those who see nature as a benevolent mother, Sade prefigures the theories of aggression in Darwin, Nietzsche, and Freud. ‘It is his violence far more than his sex which is so hard for liberals to accept. For Sade, sex is violence. Violence is the authentic spirit of mother nature.’ (Paglia 2001 ch 8). 

Force, not love is the law of the universe, the highest pagan truth. Sade's daemonic mother nature is the bloodiest goddess since Asiatic Cybele. Rousseau revives the Great Mother, but Sade restores her true ferocity. She is Darwin's nature, red in tooth and claw. Simply follow nature, Rousseau declares. Sade laughing, grimly agrees. "Cruelty is natural," he says in Philosophy in the Bedroom (1795). 

Paglia 2001 ch 8

In Justine (1791), Sade calls nature our ‘common mother.’ The world is ruled by a female titan. The Great Mother is Sade's supreme female character, beginning and ending all: ‘No, there is no God, Nature sufficeth unto herself; in no wise hath she need of an author.’ (Justine, Philosophy in the Bedroom, and Other Writings, comp. and trans. Richard Seaver and Austryn Wainhouse (New York, 1965), 253, 608, 49). Taboos, Sade makes clear, are social in their nature, not natural. Nature does not care one way or the other: ‘Would not a man have a conscience that never varied? From one end of the earth to another, would not all actions be the same for him? But is that actually the case? No, there is nothing real in the world, nothing which… though unjust here, is not legitimate five hundred leagues away.’ Illicit acts are nothing more than natural, that the moral conscience in society has in time come to prohibit. Although, when in need, Sade is not averse to citing biblical precedent to argue for the legitimacy of his views. Sade, however, denigrates religion as something whose sole purpose is ‘to frighten people without ever being of use to them.’ Eugénie de Franval stands out in Sade’s work in that it opens with a sober warning:

To enlighten mankind and improve its morals is the only lesson which we offer in this story. In reading it, may the world discover how great is the peril which follows the footsteps of those who will stop at nothing to satisfy their desires.

What, then, characterizes Sade’s philosophy? ‘At its heart lies the rejection of any kind of transcendent moral order in favour of the rule of Nature. This means that the transcendent God is rejected, or at best used as an entity against which to transgress.’ ‘Sade rejects any morality based upon a high view of what it is to be human in contradistinction to the rest of the animal world. In Sade’s universe, there is no justice, only the ‘natural’ law of survival of the fittest, which, in practice, means survival of the strongest. This suggests that the ‘Nature’ Sade advocates emulating is not the idyllic and harmonious Nature of a Wordsworth. Sade’s Nature is severe, brutal and destructive, resonating with Hume’s description of ‘a blind nature, impregnated by a great and vivifying principle, and pouring forth from her lap, without discernment or parental care, her maimed and abortive children’ (Hume [1779] 1947: 211). Sade, in similar vein, understands Nature’s ‘purpose’ to be entropic, for ‘her’ ultimate goal is destruction, even if, through that destruction, new things are created. As one of Sade’s characters, Bressac, puts it, ‘Of what concern is it to Nature, endlessly creating, if a mound of flesh which today has the shape of a woman, should reproduce itself tomorrow as countless insects of different types?’ (Sade [1787] 1992: 40). To kill is thus to accept and replicate one of Nature’s most basic laws.’

This is not to say, however, that Nature is always portrayed as the friend of the libertine. Their relationship is categorized by both amity and enmity. Nature is friend insofar as she provides a rationale for the libertine’s actions. She is enemy, in the sense that she has the ability to crush even the libertine. As I shall argue, it is possible to discern a similar ambivalence behind Sade’s account of the mother: while she provides a possible (all-encompassing) source of nourishment and possible partner for the child, she also threatens the child with annihilation. Identifying this ambivalence offers a possible way of reading Sade that goes some way to explaining the deliberate violence perpetrated against the maternal in his writings, and that connects his behaviour and attitudes with more general trends in human psychic development.

Clack 2009 17: 273

Sacks addresses head-on the question of evil in a good world, and his answer is emphatic:





That truth is a universal truth. A world, a nation, a religion that does not have room for Judaism or Jews, Sacks continues, is ‘a world, a nation, a religion that does not have room for humanity.’ I quoted earlier George Monbiot, who is contemptuous of truths written on the human heart and describes religion as contrary to reason. I would caution against the coldness in the arid rationalism of such views and point instead to the grounding of religious truth in real experience, life lived in the raw (and note also the schizophrenia, given that Monbiot also claims that we act out of love when it comes to protecting the environment. This from a man who accuses others of ‘chaotic thinking’).





In recovering the truth of religion, Nietzsche is an unwitting ally. He is scathing of the complacency of those who think it possible to give up the belief in God and leave nothing unchanged. He would be contemptuous of those who think that doing so would necessarily make life more worthy of living, if, by that, they mean for all beings. He has no time for the comfortable mediocrity of the ‘last man’ or the ‘last race.’ Only some, says Nietzsche, are capable of living the best lives. And the standards are not moral, they are subjective, egoistic, assertive – they are about power. Because, as Sacks argues, ‘if we give up belief in the God of justice, we relinquish belief in the objective reality and categorical imperative of justice also.’ Sacks spells out the consequences:





Sacks describes all such philosophies as ‘philosophies of acceptance,’ going on to make it clear why all philosophies of protest must ultimately have their grounds in God and religion. ‘Abrahamic monotheism is not a religion of acceptance. It is a religion of protest. It does not try to vindicate the suffering of the world. That is the way of Job's comforters, not Job.’ (Sacks 2011: 240).

Why do we hear more about servitude than we do about salvation, I hear people ask. We don’t. We hear much more about emancipation, and service, sacrifice and salvation hardly at all. Following Sacks’ reasoning, if people are to be serious about grounding their emancipatory commitments in something other than self-assertion, then they must come to see that their protests against injustice, inequality and oppression can only have their grounds in God and religion, because nature is entirely indifferent. 

Sacks asks how it is that people have come to think otherwise. As I noted earlier, there is, after all, a whole discipline of theology, known as theodicy, which concerns ‘the vindication of God’s goodness and justice in the face of the existence of evil.’ But, importantly, Jonathan Sacks claims that this entire discipline is inapplicable to the Hebrew Bible and the original form of Abrahamic spirituality, and his reasons why are key to my argument here pointing to the truth of religious experience, a truth that is neither an ideal or fantastical projection of human power nor a mere illusion, but something much more profound: an expression of faith that weaves being and belonging, worship and witness together as one.

It took faith to create mankind. The moral bond—the covenant—is a relationship between free agents, each respecting the integrity of the other. In seeing the moral bond as the personal reality of the universe, Jews could not but believe in a free God who creates free human beings. Free human beings are the only creations capable of committing evil. And since they are free, God does not prevent them from committing evil. God, who seeks only justice and righteousness and peace in the world, must therefore create the possibility of violence and torture and bloodshed in the world.





That’s the answer to sceptics and critics, and it is an answer drawn from religious principles and experiences, having no need to resort to philosophy, science, physics or any other discipline in a futile attempt at grounding. Throughout The Great Partnership, Sacks emphasizes that Hebraic religious beliefs only imperfectly translate into the language of ancient Greece. Those whose argument is rationalist in this sense, will make no sense of the issue:

Fundamental to Aristotelian logic is the law of the excluded middle: either a proposition is true, or its negation is true. It is this principle that frames the existence of evil as a theological problem. Either God exists, or evil exists. If God exists, then evil does not exist. It is either a prelude to, or a preparation for, the good. Seen in full context, it is not evil after all. Alternatively, evil exists, therefore God does not exist.

Sacks declares this to be a philosophical, detached, disengaged, and analytical way of thinking about facts. Rationalists would call it rational, of course, or logical. It’s just that in being impeccably, but narrowly, rational, it misses the whole picture and the whole point. Faith, Sacks states, does not operate by the law of the excluded middle. ‘It feels both sides of the contradiction.’





That sounds very … dialectical, describing a world in which everything is in inextricable relation with its opposite. Marx would have understood the idea perfectly. Where things go awry with Marx is in his apparent abandonment of transcendent standards of an objective morality, even though his incredibly strong and passionate protest against the ills of the world most certainly do presume the existence of transcendent truths, norms and values. Marx’s philosophy presents a strange combination of protest and acceptance, stemming from the way he locates his ethics within the unfolding of the historical process. He protests the dehumanisation of the capital system, yet also counsels against lamentation in face of historical necessity. A religious ethic gives us the cry, however futile rationalists insisting that there is no alternative consider that to be. In that cry, there is an insistence that God is alive and that there is hope for a better world.

Marx is certainly inconsistent in Nietzsche’s sense, in that he doesn’t bury his moral commitment deeply enough. In which case we need to decide what the best direction to take would be in order to achieve consistency. I don’t see Marx as attempting to derive a morality from the power struggles of the ‘war of all against all;’ on the contrary, I see him as still attempting to realize a genuine universality and commonality to overcome egoism and antagonism. In which case, Marx needs to get back on terms with God and make an explicit commitment to transcendent standards. ‘To what avail lamentation in face of historical necessity,’ Marx asks at one point. Yet Marx plainly laments the fates of those crushed by the impact of capital, even as he praises the progressive aspects of capitalist exploitation and alienation in developing the productive forces and integrating the world. Imagine that the political economists that Marx criticised were right and Marx were wrong, would Marx cease to pity all those human lives crushed under what he calls the Juggernaut of capital? Marx called what he was doing scientific, and his systematic analysis is extensive. But Marx is plainly driven by a moral concern. It’s a cry, not an apologetics, and I call it religious. Read every line of this passage in which Marx describes/denounces the antagonistic character of capitalist accumulation, and the cry is plain:

We saw in Part IV, when analysing the production of relative surplus-value, that within the capitalist system all methods for raising the social productivity of labour are put into effect at the cost of the individual worker; that all means for the development of production undergo a dialectical inversion so that they become means of domination and exploitation of the producers; they distort the worker into a fragment of a man, they degrade him to the level of an appendage of a machine, they destroy the actual content of his labour by turning it into a torment; they alienate [entfremden] from him the intellectual potentialities of the labour process in the same proportion as science is incorporated in it as an independent power; they deform the conditions under which he works, subject him during the labour process to a despotism the more hateful for its meanness; they transform his life-time into working-time, and drag his wife and child beneath the wheels of the juggernaut of capital. But all methods for the production of surplus-value are at the same time methods of accumulation, and every extension of accumulation becomes, conversely, a means for the development of those methods. It follows therefore that in proportion as capital accumulates, the situation of the worker, be his payment high or low, must grow worse. Finally, the law which always holds the relative surplus population or industrial reserve army in equilibrium with the extent and energy of accumulation rivets the worker to capital more firmly than the wedges of Hephaestus held Prometheus to the rock. It makes an accumulation of misery a necessary condition, corresponding to the accumulation of wealth. Accumulation of wealth at one pole is, therefore, at the same time accumulation of misery, the torment of labour, slavery, ignorance, brutalization and moral degradation at the opposite pole, i.e. on the side of the class that produces its own product as capital.

Marx CI 1976 ch 25 798-799





There is a difference between a contradiction and a cry, Sacks writes. 





I think this is precisely why Marx broke through from philosophy to reality, leaving the endless interpretation of the world to the philosophers so as to demand instead that we come to know the world through changing it. Whilst Marx analysed the contradictory dynamics of the capital system at length, he didn’t just engage in the abstract investigation of contradictions, but instead sought their resolution through the practical transformation of the world. Marx did not want to leave the world unchanged, and his practical concern was driven by the cry of protest against the injustice of prevailing conditions. There is something in his repudiation of philosophical interpretation here that savours of the cry of religious experience:





Marx retained the cry, but was also inclined to suppress it in the name of science, knowledge and power. And it is this suppression that is the source of my disquiet. Because instead of taking us into the socialist future of mutuality and concord, it could, with a power that is not tempered by love, mercy and forgiveness, take us instead into a world of universal enmity between men as rival gods.

Alasdair Maclntyre made a distinction between two types of atheist, the one who simply does not believe, and the other who disbelieves with an almost religious fervour. (Maclntyre 1971: 12-13). Of the latter kind, Jonathan Sacks notes, ‘a disproportionate number—they include Spinoza, Marx and Freud—have been Jews.’ (Sacks 2000: 216-217). They made the wrong choice, says Sacks, and his reason why is worth stating at length:

To be a Jew is to be part of the ongoing dialogue between earth and heaven that has persisted for two thirds of the recorded history of civilization and whose theme is as urgent now as at any time in the past: to build a society that honours the human person in our differences and commonalities, our singularity and interdependence. Rarely have we needed it more than in our present age of Promethean technological powers, and sel​dom has its power been more evident than now as, throughout the West, families, communities, the moral sense itself, have come under assault.








There are some deeply troubling elements in the human condition. This was Leonard Cohen's final message to us: God I love you, but I don't love the world you created - I don't like the human beings you have made in your image. If you are the dealer, then I'm out of the game. If you're the healer, I'm broken and lame. And yet for all of that, Leonard Cohen continued to affirm life and God and light and hope. And that is extraordinary. Everywhere, there are broken vessels, but within those vessels is the divine light - that is the power of God's love to reach everywhere:
 
"I greet you from the other side of sorrow and despair
with a love so vast and so shattered it will reach you everywhere."
Leonard Cohen - Heart with No Companion
 
And that, of course, is the Greater Love that enfolds, nourishes and sustains us, each and all.

Rabbi Sacks on Leonard Cohen’s ‘You want it Darker’ and parsha Vayera (​https:​/​​/​www.youtube.com​/​watch?v=2s3kQSZ_Qxk" \t "_blank​)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2s3kQSZ_Qxk

Even in the midst of darkness there is the light that never goes out.

Marx thought religion the opium of the people, a solace and a consolation in face of real suffering. I will stand by Marx's critique of the inversions at the heart of a world that generates such suffering. But I conclude here, yet again, that religious ground is our true ground, and to uproot this is to unleash not emancipation but universal hatred. We cannot embark on a destinationless journey without going mad and turning in on and against each other and ourselves, and that our souls are bent on going home to our true native land. I write at length on Marx and emancipation above, only to conclude that emancipation doesn't go far enough if it isn't a salvation grounded in servitude. In the end, the social restitution of power is an invitation to a new idolatry if it isn't tempered by humility - a hollow freedom that misses the personal moral effort involved in overcoming alienation through an egoistic need severed from God. We become curved inwards on ourselves when we need to expand our being. Are we doomed? I keep hearing this question. It is a question that fixates on the physical. And if that is the limits of your concern, then of course we are doomed. Inevitable defeat is the human condition as a physical condition. The real question we should be asking is 'are we damned?' And what do we need to do to be saved? Love and Redemption in face of the inextinguishable light is the only hope. If you put your faith elsewhere, then you are indeed doomed. 
 
No one would believe the trouble I have had in writing, editing and organising the materials of these works, doing my best to keep health and sanity together whilst being beset by all manner of devils and demons, of the all-too-human kind. I have a friend who told me that he had no faith other than a 'faith in man.' That's a faith that real life men can surely test beyond endurance. I'll say it plain, being good at being human is hard work: it isn't spontaneous and it requires nurturing the right behaviour and forming the right character so as to create the inner motives that lead to a internal self-control, on the part of both the person and society at large. Failure to do that, out of the view that there is no overarching substantive good, and that to affirm such a good is to be repressive of individual liberty, difference and otherness, since there are only individuals pursuing the good as they see fit, leaves us all prey to an atomistic society as no more than a congeries of possessors, predators and pursuers. I've seen communities implode from within as a result of this fake subjectivist freedom, and I've suffered the consequences of callous, self-interested behaviour too many times now to mince words. We need a culture of discipline training individuals in the cardinal virtues to give society an internal self-control, lest the chaos and disorder that issues results in the imposition of order through the most punitive sanctions involved in external control. Because there is no centre ground in between. Half-way houses fall in on themselves sooner or later, and in recent times the debris has been falling in on me. And if people object to the harsh tone of the message, then I am doing no more than reading the writing on the walls that are still standing at the moment. The walls of true community, internally constituted through right relationships, won’t be standing much longer at this rate. I can see external walls going up all over, as people try to deal with the chaos and disorder of a world falling in on itself. Then there are the invisible walls of electronic miscommunication. Liberals can do themselves a favour and cease warning of the fascism they see on the horizon – they are the ones who need to heed the warning, and see the roots of reaction in the antinomies of the liberal ontology - the false split between individuality and sociality, the assertion of the self-possessed individual as morally and ontologically ultimate, the way that social atomism below breeds political centralism above etc. - that creates these monstrous conditions.

The death of God in Nietzsche comes with an invitation to live and flourish as human beings. (Stauth and Turner 1988). Marx sought such flourishing for all humankind, a commitment to each and all that would have struck Nietzsche as evidence of a continued belief in God and a retention of a Judaeo-Christian morality. To be consistent, Marx has either to extirpate not just God but also the moral standards of good and bad, and with them notions of justice and flourishing for each and all equally, and thereby abandon socialism; or he has to recognize that without God and religion, there can be no philosophy of protest, no cry, no emancipatory commitment and no possibility of the salvation which alone makes sense of emancipation.

Nietzsche wanted power to be expressed creatively as a condition of human health. That’s Nietzsche’s Übermensch, the ‘Beyond-Man,’ ‘Overman,’ ‘Superman,’ ‘Superhuman.’ Marx wanted all to be such supermen, in the sense that he wanted a society which integrated the free and full development of each and all. For Nietzsche, it can’t be done. Nietzsche’s view may sound ‘joyous’, but we should relate this world of power to Nietzsche’s rejection of Christianity as a ‘slave morality’ which preserves the weak and constrains the strong. In Nietzsche’s world without morality, the strong must eliminate the weak, might must prevail over right, the rich must prey on the poor. Such is nature’s imperative. It is pure, clean and simple. And it is ruthless and pitiless. The principle of caring for the weak and the needy is condemned as contrary to nature and stands in the way of the full working of the logic of power. Nietzsche condemns the Christian ideal of the universal love of humanity for the way it means, in practice, ‘the preference for the suffering, underprivileged, degenerate: it has in fact lowered and weakened the strength, the responsibility, the lofty duty to sacrifice men.’ It must therefore be discarded. Nietzsche words in The Will to Power are chilling to all who retain a conscience in light of standards of good and bad:

The biblical prohibition 'thou shalt not kill' is a piece of naivete compared with the seriousness of the prohibition of life to decadents: 'thou shalt not procreate'. Life itself recognizes no solidarity, no 'equal rights', between the healthy and the degenerate parts of an organism: one must excise the latter - or the whole will perish. - Sympathy for decadents, equal rights for the ill-constituted - that would be the profoundest immorality, that would be antinature itself as morality!

Marx would find the language loathsome. But Nietzsche has the merit of coherence and consistency. It’s not clear that Marx has the same. 

At which point it is necessary to reject this splitting into false dichotomies and bring these warring sides back together. We don’t have to accept the Nietszchean-Sadist view of nature as amoral, or cruel and pitiless, and we don’t have to see the universe as objectively valueless, meaning that we are charged with having to live as existentialists finding meaning as best we can in a meaningless world. Earlier, I argued for the existence of the ceaselessly creative universe in which agency, will and consciousness, as well as meaning, purpose and value, are immanent, emergent forces. We can refuse the demands of those who would make reductive arguments and force splits on false antitheses. We can embrace nature as the creative universe and retain a morality that presupposes inherent value, goodness and meaning, recognising that creative human agency is part of realizing that inherent purpose. The argument is teleological, certainly, and involves telos that is more than a human projection upon a purposeless world. Human beings as creative agents are part of the creativity of the world, playing an essential part in the unfolding of creation.

Establishing the point this way not only resolves – better still, dissolves, since there is nothing to resolve - this science vs religion ‘debate,’ it also checks naturalism as a reductionism that rejects any emphasis on human agency as anthropocentric. Certain green positions attack Marx as anthropocentric for his focus on labour, pointing out that the world is more than human beings and human powers. They claim that Marx neglected the claims of nature. They are wrong. Marx wrote at length on the human-nature interaction, affirming labour and nature as the sources of wealth. He would have wondered why the simple truth that human beings are parts of nature was considered some deep and necessary principle. In the Critique of the Gotha Programme Marx points out that the fact that nature is a source of wealth can be found in any ‘children’s primer.’ That offhand comment indicates that Marx would have considered endless assertions that human beings to be natural beings to be kid’s stuff, not a point that anyone has missed, and not worthy of endless assertion as some deep, necessary principle. People who repeat this simple truth are themselves guilty of missing the important point – mediation and its specific character. Marx’s neglect lies elsewhere. The ‘more to life than human powers’ refers not just nature, but to a much bigger picture besides relating: the spiritual dimension. In diminishing the religious roots of the question and therefore missing the deepest roots of self-alienation in order to focus only on its social aspects, Marx appears to have abolished alienation only at the price of inviting idolatry, with the result that the ‘truly human society’ becomes a form of collective self-worship, at best. This is a vision of society of free individuals self-enclosed within their own materialist immanence, a world that has lost the sense of transcendence. This brings me back to the point I made earlier with respect to Marx’s misreading of religion. Alienation is not merely a social condition concerned with power, but an individual matter, the counterpart of egoism. Marx came very close to grasping this, when writing that human beings come to produce under the compulsion of ‘egoistic need.’ 

There is an important point here which requires emphasis and, indeed, extensive treatment in its own right. I have in these volumes on Marx stressed the social aspects of alienation and its overcoming. Having unmasked alienation in its holy form, Marx declared, there is a need to move quickly to unmasking it in its unholy forms. Marx thus proceeded to the state and capital as alienated social powers, demanding the restitution of that power to the social body from which it originated. Such is Marx’s definition of human emancipation in general, and it has formed the bulk of the analysis in these volumes. But there is, in this emphasis, a danger of stating a social justice that emphasizes its social content and forms at the expense of ignoring the personal conditions of emancipation as a true salvation. Social justice and virtue are nothing if they are not grounded in personal qualities. And that means placing due emphasis on character formation, modes of conduct, individual moral effort and responsibility, forming the inner motive to give a moral as well as a social content to the emancipatory project.

This is what shared deliberation and participation in virtuous communities of practice are all about. Reconstituting the form/s of the common life is as much a personal question as a social one. The unity of human beings in community is in large part the unity of common action, something established through the proper ordering of relationships at all levels, from the family up to the state, shaping and directing the common life from within. This is also a matter of moral effort and responsibility on the part of the individual, each ‘finding his or her own self-fulfilment (at least in part) in helping the other members to fulfil themselves, by caring for them and helping them to grow in freedom and responsibility and other basic aspects of human flourishing.’ (Finnis 1980).

Reclaiming the forms of the communal life, then, is a question not merely of reclaiming alien power from the state and capital and restituting it to the social body, but of establishing the conditions of small-scale practical reasoning, social proximity, the ties that bind, establishing practical reasonableness and tradition-constituted rationality in community with others. And that is decidedly not a thickly-textured communitarianism that elides individual effort and responsibility but a thick community that is constituted by the full recovery of the personal development. 

Very early on in his career, Marx wrote at length on individual self-alienation, egoistic need and personal salvation. 

Reading a progress report of mine, my DoS Jules Townshend highlighted the phrase ‘redemption comes from below,’ my view of proletarian self-emancipation in Marx. ‘It’s a bit Biblical that,’ said Jules, advising that I strike it out. To which I responded by pointing out the religious roots of the concept of alienation, the emphasis on loss and redemption. If you read at length on Marxism and alienation, though, you will quickly see an antipathy to religion, István Mészáros’ Marx’s Theory of Alienation, for instance. Those Marxists keen on the concept – and the same applies to those keen on essentialism – are at pains to distinguish Marx’s view from God, religion and theology. Structuralists and materialists were always suspicious of the concept, suspecting that in no time ethical Marxism would lead us back to religion. At every stage of my writing, I seem to have been accompanied by Terry Eagleton, particularly his criticisms of postmodernism. In 2003, in After Theory, Eagleton came out big time for morality, essentialism, truth and the importance of Aristotle as an influence on Marx, all key elements of my own work. These days, Eagleton can be found challenging the militant new atheism with a passion that many Marxists find unsettling. ‘Eagleton the apologist’ writes Theo Hobson (2010). ‘Terry Eagleton is not prepared to come out as a Christian. Yet his most recent book shows he is closer to Christianity than Marxism.’ I’m wondering if that sums up my position too. I can only note the scepticism of both Christians and Marxists to what I write. And note too that one of my favourite writers, the ever-inspiring Joel Kovel, combined Marx and Freud and became a Christian. I really have no axe to grind on this. The only political party I have ever been a member of is The Green Party, who strike me as pagan, secular, atheist, and liberal. I go wherever the truth-seeking impulse takes me.

Hobson describes Eagleton’s Reason, Faith and Revolution as ‘one of the most important works of Christian apologetics to have emerged in recent years – despite the fact that its author is not quite willing to wear the "Christian" label.’ It’s a lively read, let down mainly by the fact that Eagleton’s atheist adversaries here are intellectually poor, making it fairly easy to identify errors and clarify meanings. The atheist position has much better advocates than the likes of Hitchens and Dawkins. I love the work of Kauffman and Flanagan, more substantial figures who make a positive argument. 

I’m much more interested in the question as to why Terry Eagleton, a lifelong Marxist, who wrote the book Why Marx was Right, is showing so much interest in religion and Christianity. I suspect he has seen the missing spring in moral action, motivation and character, the very things I am concerned to highlight in this volume. His book After Theory (2003) points very much in this direction. Eagleton’s impatience with the libertarianism of contemporary leftist cultural thought is very much apparent in this book, something which has him encouraging us to embrace some very ‘traditional’ truths. That’s the direction I had already been taking with ‘rational freedom.’ Against the encouragement of libertarian fantasies, I am interested in embedding individuals in the forms and the form of the common life. In which case, I would urge people to see rights not as the claims held by discrete individuals against other discrete individuals and against society in general, but as ‘fundamental components in the way of life of a community’ committed to certain forms of human flourishing for all (Finnis 1980: 222). That’s the view of natural law theorist John Finnis, a view which implies a conception of the good life ordered to true ends. Here, we start to reclaim the personal dimension of change and transformation, in terms of right character and conduct and a willingness to assume personal responsibility in committing to a purpose greater than the ego:





Marx’s emphasis falls very heavily upon the social aspect of alienation, arguing for social restitution as a process which recovers power alienated to the state and capital for the social body. The great danger with that emphasis is that the personal dimensions of this transformation come to be missed, with the result that a vision which is strong on social content fails for being deficient in personal content. Without personal moral effort, initiative and responsibility, society, no matter how empowered, becomes an empty shell. Here, we remember Aristotle’s old lesson that in a society where everyone owns everything, no-one does anything – the care for the common life and common good always proceeds from the personal care of the individual. 

Virtue is a personal quality, not a social one. Without that personal dimension, notions of social justice and virtue are abstract, empty, without true content. I add these passages here not to repudiate Marx’s view of social restitution but to buttress his notion of human emancipation in general with a deeper view of salvation. The root of alienation is individual self-alienation from God, and salvation as the overcoming alienation is always, ultimately, the return of the individual to God. 

The early Marx was indeed very close to this deeper understanding. Marx criticizes the ‘needy, egoistic interest’ that dominates modern society, from the pious ‘self-seeking which puts personal salvation above the salvation of all’ to the ‘pressing need of private interests [which] is the architect of the political system based on estates.’ (Marx ‘On the Commissions of the Estates in Prussia,’ p. 303). The problem is that Marx is so concerned to challenge and overcome this split between the individual and the social which characterized modern atomistic society, that he misses a crucial insight into alienation as an individual self-alienation, not only as a social process. The result is that Marx misses the importance of overcoming alienation through personal moral effort, not just by a socio-structural transformation. It’s not an either/or, forcing us to choose between the personal and the social: a true emancipation requires both together. Marx was so annoyed by the tendency of apologists to locate the problems suffered by individual victims of the system in personal failings that he was inclined to overlook a right and proper emphasis on personal moral effort, effectively splitting the emancipatory project between the individual and the social. That allows conservative critics to play both ends against each other, criticising ‘social justice’ and ‘social virtue’ as merely egoistic assertion and liberal hypocrisy. I don’t disagree with respect to the specific point, but make it clear that both sides are at fault in this false opposition. 

Note well the religious connotations of the way that Marx expresses the problem, referring to salvation rather than emancipation. He is so concerned to check those who focus on personal salvation at the expense of ‘the salvation of all’ that he inverts the priorities, instead of seeing personal moral effort and social transformation as mutually compatible in the one singular process of emancipation. It can be done, and Marx did put the accent on individuals overthrowing alienated forms, bringing relationships back under their control. But there is something missing, and that is the specifically religious aspect of a ‘needy, egoistic interest’ that denotes the alienation of the individual from God, something that requires a personal moral effort for its overcoming. Without that, there is no genuine salvation, and means and mechanisms of a collective control are existentially bereft of meaning, however much they may succeed in controlling collective forces of politics and economics. There is a failure to genuine repersonalize existence.

Marx was right to understand that the ‘natural gift’ of freedom was socially mediated, but not necessarily realized through social forms, and often contradicted. His discovery of the extent to which private interests, centred on the institution of private property, dominated Prussian society caused Marx to ask: ‘Are not most of your court cases and most of your civil laws concerned with property?’ (‘Leading Article in No. 179 of the Kolnische Zeitung, CW vol 1 p.199). And so Marx, rightly, sought to challenge alienation in its socio-institutional aspects. It’s just that the neglect of alienation as an individual self-alienation puts a lacunae in Marx’s emancipatory project with respect to personal moral effort and responsibility which has the potential to render his collective concerns existentially deficient. 

No doubt reacting against the abstract individualism of the liberal ontology, Marx quickly moved away from seeing ‘man’ as an abstract being squatting outside of society, locating the individual and self-alienation within specific relations. That was the right move in uprooting alienation as a social condition, but it had the consequence of seeing alienation as an impersonal, anonymous, inhuman force governing all things externally. That certainly describes the capital system. The problem is that the sense of individual self-alienation, the personal aspect, was lost, and with it the fundamentally and profoundly religious dimension of the problem. That comes with practical consequences. 





The failure to locate the compulsion of 'egoistic need' within the personality of the alienated individual person, by seeing it as exclusively in specific social relations, involves a failure to integrate personal effort and social transformation. Through an emphasis on practical social transformation, Marx neglected the centrality of each individual’s own moral effort in overcoming egoism and achieving the most profound transformation of self.

Protestant reformer Martin Luther (1483-1546) loved the Latin phrase Incurvatus in se. He took it from St. Augustine. The phrase means to be curved in on oneself. Luther understood this to mean that human beings have a tendency not just to worship their own selves, but to see the world only in accordance with their self-interest. Instead of seeking to serve God, as something outside of the human ego and will, then, human beings constantly attempt to make God serve them, calling upon God to do our bidding. Instead of reaching outwards to others and to the world, the ego draws everything into itself, thus negating the world instead of relating to it. One of the worst aspects of Incurvatus in se is that human beings cease to enjoy the world for what it is, valuing it only for what benefit it promises to them as self-maximising egoistic individuals. This is not freedom but enslavement to desire. Likewise, seeing the world of value as the self-made human world, with no domain of any value or significance outside of human agency, is not ‘open’ at all, but the worst kind of closure. Freedom requires humility and repentance through entering into a loving relation with the world as something greater than we are. As Rousseau saw clearly, we expand our being in relation to society (The Social Contract), God (Savoyard vicar) and nature (reveries). 

Rebecca Goldstein writes of ‘the sad sight of human life untouched by transcendence.’ (Goldstein 2010: 308).

Without transcendence, Marx’s socialism can read like a collective version of the Nietzschean Ubermensch and, reduced to such a thing, doesn’t offer a coherent alternative to the individualist liberalism and moral subjectivism that characterises modernity at all, but is merely a fantastical collectivist version of it. Implicit in Marx’s view of the community of free individuals is a radical individualism that reads less as an alternative to liberal individualism than as a claim that the liberal principle of individual autonomy come to be universalized so as to apply to all. Marx does not merely repudiate the liberal principle of individual freedom as autonomy, but instead desires a community in which that principle is realised for each and all as a communist individuality. Marx thus proposes a ‘new individual’ which is much more than the social individual of Aristotle, but realises freedom as autonomy for all individuals within community. (Forbes 1990: 58-59).

So far so good. But Alasdair MacIntyre knows that optimistic marxist view from the inside and declares it wanting. He asks that ‘if the moral impoverishment of advanced capitalism is what so many Marxists agree that it is, whence are these resources for the future to be derived? It is not surprising that at this point Marxism tends to produce its own versions of the Übermensch: Lukács's ideal proletarian, Leninism's ideal revolutionary. When Marxism does not become Weberian social democracy or crude tyranny, it tends to become Nietzschean fantasy.’ (MacIntyre 1981 ch 18).

Where, one asks, is the principle of transcendence to be found? Nietzsche’s Übermensch translates as the ‘Beyond-Man,’ or ‘Superhuman.’ It should be compared to Dante’s term trasumanar, and brought into connection with Dante’s transcendent conditions of a genuine transhumanism. They are entirely different notions – one is a complete fantasy inviting us into a world of subjectivist delusion. (Critchley Dante’s Sweet Symphony of Paradise 2018 forthcoming). 

Marxism in these terms is an invitation into collectivist delusion on the part of individual narcissists. But the failure isn’t just that of Marxism. In arguing that Marxism is exhausted as a political tradition, MacIntyre is careful to add ‘that this exhaustion is shared by every other political tradition within our culture.’ Liberal modernity is imploding within and lacks the capacity to generate the moral resources to save itself from its own internal pressures, let alone from the external forces assailing it. Repeated alarm calls that liberalism, Enlightenment and reason are under assault and stand in need of defending sound like cries to a hopeless last stand. The roots of liberal society have been withering for decades, we live in a post-liberal society and economy. Paradoxically, marxism was modernity’s best and last hope, realizing the liberatory potentials of the Enlightenment and industrialism and capitalism. Its failure and defeat have more fundamental causes than politics and social systems and strategies.

I put the personal and the collective together in the emphasis on character formation and social formation, joining conservative and radical socialist standpoints in uprooting the liberal ontology at source. And I don’t think that this is as paradoxical as it sound. As John Haldane writes of Alasdair MacIntyre: 





I examine MacIntyre at length in the final chapter.

5 God and Man: Partners in Creation
Stuart Kauffman argues that we are now going beyond reductionist, mechanistic science to see that life is irreducible. He thus writes:

the human economy cannot be reduced to physics. The way the diversity of the economy has grown from perhaps a hundred to a thousand goods and services fifty thousand years ago to tens of billions of goods and services today, in what I call an expanding economic web, depends on the very structure of that web, how it creates new economic niches for ever new goods and services that drive economic growth. This growth in turn drives the further expansion of the web itself by the persistent invention of still newer goods and services. Like the biosphere, the global economy is a self-consistently co-constructing, ever evolving, emergent whole. All these phenomena are beyond physics and not reducible to it.




Kauffman describes an emergence in the universe that is not reducible to physics, giving scientific meaning to our common intuition that the origin of life, agency, meaning, value, doing, economic activity, and consciousness are beyond reduction to physics. ‘We live in a different universe from that envisioned by reductionism.’ The reality of emergence is a reality that is irreducible to physical laws. In Volume 2 Part 2 on essentialism, I noted the distinction between a teleology that sees purpose as an intrinsic and as an extrinsic force. Teleology in history has been traditionally associated with the extraneous purpose and design of a transcendent God. Naturalists are, of course, to rule out such a view. Kauffman’s view points to a force that cannot be reduced to and explained by physical laws. That doesn’t make it extraneous, and Kauffman is at pains to underline the extent to which agency, will and consciousness are properties of the creative universe. They are, that is, intrinsic or immanent, forces within the universe. They are irreducible all the same, an excess that cannot be captured by physical laws.

The implications are profound, certainly with respect to the essentialism I define in terms of a creative unfolding:

In the physicist Murray Gell-Mann's definition, a "natural law" is a compact description beforehand of the regularities of a process. But if we cannot even prestate the possibilities, then no compact descriptions of these processes before​hand can exist. These phenomena, then, appear to be partially beyond natural law itself. This means something astonishing and powerfully liberating. We live in a universe, biosphere, and human culture that are not only emergent but radically creative. We live in a world whose unfoldings we often cannot prevision, prestate, or predict—a world of explosive creativity on all sides. This is a central part of the new scientific worldview.
Let me pause to explain just how radical this view is. My claim is not simply that we lack sufficient knowledge or wisdom to predict the future evolution of the biosphere, economy, or human culture. It is that these things are inherently beyond prediction. Not even the most powerful computer imaginable can make a compact description in advance of the regularities of these processes. There is no such description beforehand. Thus the very concept of a natural law is inadequate for much of reality. 

Kauffman’s point here does not count against essentialism and its categories of form, law and necessity, but against the atomism and reductionism of mechanistic science which sought to render the world explicable in terms of its component parts and discrete happenings. Kauffman thus states openly that his view breaks ‘the Galilean spell, the belief that all in the universe unfolds under natural law.’ (Kauffman 2008: ch 1).

Such a self-organized, but partially lawless, set of coupled processes stands unrecognized, and thus unseen, right before our eyes. We appear to need a new conceptual framework to see and say this, then to understand and orient ourselves in our ever creative world. We will find ourselves far beyond reductionism, indeed.

Kauffman 2008 ch 1

A ceaselessly creative universe as God enough? Or even as God as such? Kauffman goes beyond Biblical stories to highlight the essential creativity such stories convey:

Is it, then, more amazing to think that an Abrahamic transcendent, omnipotent, omniscient God created everything around us, all that we participate in, in six days, or that it all arose with no transcendent Creator God, all on its own? I believe the latter is so stunning, so overwhelming, so worthy of awe, gratitude, and respect, that it is God enough for many of us. God, a fully natural God, is the very creativity in the universe. It is this view that I hope can be shared across all our religious traditions, embracing those like myself, who do not believe in a Creator God, as well as those who do. This view of God can be a shared religious and spiritual space for us all.
This view is not as great a departure from Abrahamic thought as we might suppose. Some Jesuit cosmologists look out into the vast universe and reason that God cannot know, from multiple possibilities, where life will arise. This Abrahamic God is neither omniscient nor omnipotent, although outside of space and time. Such a God is a Generator God who does not know or control what thereafter occurs in the universe. Such a view is not utterly different from one in which God is our honored name for the creativity in the natural universe itself.

Kauffman 2008 ch 1

By making claims to omniscience and omnipotence, theologians saddled God and religion with a problem of explaining evil, as well as other antinomies, against which atheistic and rationalist critics focus their attention. We are now in a position to see this as a problem that human beings brought on themselves through a misplaced conceptual certainty. 

Because of the narrow time-limits of his own life, it is natural that man should think of the universe itself as having a beginning and an end. Too easily, he conceives of cosmic events as having been set in motion by forces similar to those that intervene in human life. Man himself, as Vico observed, can understand things well only by creating them: so in the effort to understand the universe, he was disposed, in conformity with his own nature, to assume a creator who stands outside his creation and commands it. In an effort to arrive at intelligibility, man placed both the physical agency and the moral responsibility upon the gods, or upon the centralized authority of a single God: omnipotent and omniscient figures who, in their turn, were the reflections of the more mundane control and leadership exercised by the priest-kings of the earlier civilizations in which the high religions first flourished. These were naive presumptions and gratuitous explanations; but natural.
So conceived, as encompassing the universe yet outside it, as moving but unmoved, as immanent in all its creatures yet separate from them by unspeakable distances, towering above them in awful perfections and finalities, God himself has become more of a problem than the problems his existence would solve. In order to come closer to this mystery, man has then conceived God in more human shapes that are themselves equally contradictory and self-negating: as Yin and Yang, as Hora and Osiris, as Eternal Male and Eternal Female, as omnipotent power and all-embracing love: as the phallic principle of fertility and as the divine seed that is buried in the earth in the dying year and resurrected with the awakening of the vegetation in the spring. In one aspect, God is unpicturable fathomless immensity, the nameless one; and in another, he becomes incarnated as Krishna the Archer, as Buddha the Illumined One, as Christ the Saviour. In all these forms, God both accounts for the existence and completes the meaning of human life. 

Mumford 1952 ch 3

If you want to expose the inconsistencies and contradictions of religion and the religious attempt to envisage God and the world, then there is an endless supply of material to work on. It is a job for life. A fairly pointless life, I would say, merely correcting errors, whilst missing the fundamentally important point that led so many to be so wrong – the quest to make sense of existence and make the facts of that existence existentially meaningful. ‘Historically, the sense of the divine is almost inseparable from man's sense of his own destiny,’ Mumford writes, ‘he lacks the complacency of the other animals: he is obsessed by pride and guilt, pride at being something more than a mere animal, guilt at falling perpetually short of the high aims he sets for himself. Behind this strange discontent lies his persistent belief, visible almost from the time that the presence of man can be identified by burial mounds, that the course of life does not fully reveal man's meaning and destiny: that all existence has goals and ends, still almost impenetrable, which in their further unfolding will give fuller meaning to the cosmic solitude and the frustrating brevity of man's life.’

Even now these ends are difficult to approach by pure speculation; and no wonder: could the earliest one-celled .organism anticipate the eventual emergence of a multi-celled, highly organized, self-conscious creature, living in a world re-made in part through his own arts, in colonies and partnerships whose complexity had no parallel in the primal ooze?

Mumford 1952 ch 3

Mumford emphasizes that the ‘sense of the divine is an historic fact of man's nature’ and that ‘no theory that ignores it or explains it away can do justice to all the dimensions of human existence.’ He goes on to point out that ‘what is gratuitous on man's part is the belief that he has any positive knowledge of cosmic intentions or any definite clues to the ultimate goals of this process.’ What human beings ‘too confidently characterizes as divine revelation is often premature and presumptuous.’ (Mumford 1952 ch 3). And, of course, it is this that gives critics ample material to feed their critiques. It seems clever, but it is actually intellectually very easy. What feeds this endless ‘debate’ is the extent to which both sides miss the point. The need to invest life with meaning doesn’t go away no matter how often previous investments are revealed to be erroneous, and the pointing out of errors is felt so keenly as a denial of the quest for meaning. It’s a clash between reason and emotion, which continues in so far as these things are held apart rather than integrated. And it can all be avoided. Mumford here anticipates the argument of Stuart Kauffman and those who emphasize emergence, and is worth quoting at length:

But for man's life to have meaning and purpose, one need not conceive that any part of it existed predetermined, foreordained, from the beginning of time: still less that time itself has a beginning or an ending. Every step in the process of cosmic evolution, no matter how plausible the connections, how closely related the stages when one looks back upon them, may be a magnificent series of improvisations, in which each emergent element, in its very novelty, may suggest a still further step not even dimly defined at the earlier stages of the process. As the action proceeds, it becomes increasingly significant, gathering meaning and value as a snowball gathers bulk and momentum when it rolls downhill.




That view is entirely in keeping with the essentialism I have set out. It is also in keeping with the concern to scale ambitions and ideals to humble, yet noble, dimensions and proportions. In writing of God’s omniscience and omnipotence, human beings were writing of themselves, projecting their own ideals of knowledge and power. We need to separate the awe, reverence and mystery as legitimate expressions of the spiritual dimension of human life from the projections of total knowledge and power. 

Plainly, it is man's littleness that has prompted him to affix his own special interests and preoccupations, often of the most limited range, to cosmic and organic processes. We must discount these anthropomorphic projections, even when they appear in the sterile laboratory garb of science. What is at fault is not our sense of mystery and divinity, for this rests on valid translations of human experience: we err merely in our effort to cast this intuition in a too-familiar mold, in order to pass more freely from the known to the unknown. Our mistake has been to regard the process of development as being predetermined at either the beginning or the end: we have looked for an enclosed system with a single cause at the beginning, a single consummation at the end. But the tendency toward organization, development, life, personality does not in fact become wholly intelligible by tracing it back to its origins: the climax of meaning lies, in all probability, in the future.

Mumford 1952 ch 3

Mumford thus reveals the search for certain foundations to be chimerical, since we can never achieve such certainty. Much that is fundamental in life has to be taken on faith: ‘In other words, a large part of man's nature and destiny must be taken on faith; and the groundwork of that faith is no firmer in science than it is in religion.’ (Mumford 1952 ch 3). There is no certainty to be had, no possibility of complete knowledge, because the universe of which we are an active part is always in the process of unfolding:

The equation of life cannot be solved more quickly by sneaking a look at the answer in the back of the arithmetic book. Improvisations and surprises are as deep in the grain of reality as necessity. If the creative power knew the answer beforehand there would be no reason to work it out. 

Mumford 1952 ch 3

That’s how I’ve always understood God, as requiring the moral agency of human beings as partners in drawing out the essential goodness, adding too, in endlessly completing Creation. The way Mumford and Kauffman state the point is slightly different, in that they point to an endless creativity rather than a finished book. This is how Marx presented communism too, not the end of history, but the beginning of a process of endless creativity.

On this understanding, ‘religion has so far erred in identifying God with totality of existence or being: or, worse, in trying to make God the groundwork of all processes and events: the all-powerful and all-knowing providence.’

By placing God in a position of active responsibility for the cosmic processes, or for man's special existence, almost every system of theology has saddled itself with false dilemmas, and seeking an answer to the unanswerable, has come up with childish rationalizations.

Mumford 1952 ch 3

And exposing such rationalizations is child’s play, hence my irritation with the characters that waste their intellect doing it, as well as those who do likewise in defending the indefensible. We shouldn’t need a Stephen Fry or a Christopher Hitchens or Richard Dawkins to expose such rationalizations. Enlightenment thinkers did the same, Voltaire earning himself a huge, and I’d say hugely inflated, reputation in the process. The problem, as Lewis Mumford points out, was spotted in ancient days:

For mark this: if one puts God at the beginning, as the creator of all things, he becomes a monstrous being, as the God of the Old Testament in fact seemed to the sensitive Manichees, who took note of his irrational angers and his bloody commands long before Voltaire. That God is a god of matter, bestiality, darkness, and pain: not a god of love and light. If, on the other hand, one attempts to unbind deity from responsibility for having produced a world half lost to the powers of darkness and death, by promising some redemption, at least for man, in an eternal future which will balance up accounts and make love prevail: if one does this one seems to turn a brutal god into a demented one, a creature capable of condemning human beings to an eternity of torture for sins committed in the briefest of lifetimes: a savagely disproportionate system of punishment repulsive to reason and justice. If the God who permitted the slaughter of the innocent in the Lisbon earthquake shocked Voltaire, what would he have said to the God who permitted his creatures to invent the insane horrors of Buchenwald and Auschwitz?

Mumford 1952 ch 3

Such a God is indeed a monster. Once we understand this, we can put aside name-calling over childish rationalizations to proceed to the core of religious reality. How much is lost if we lose the all-knowing, all-powerful God? How much do we gain by humility in the midst of creation? We lose the need to engage in pretty debates concerning misplaced investments and projections of reason, which is no loss at all:

Neither faith nor reason could bring such complete defilements and miscarriages of life within the compass of human acceptance, if a divine purpose actually presided over all the occasions of human life. Plainly, if there is a loving God he must be impotent: but if he is omnipotent, truly responsible for all that happens within his domain, capable of heeding even the sparrow's fall, he can hardly be a loving God. Such contradictions drive honest minds to atheism: the empty whirl and jostle of atoms becomes more kind to human reason than such a deity.

Mumford 1952 ch 3

But, of course, that empty whirl and jostle of atoms is nowhere near enough. It’s a disinfectant for tired people in tired times, no ideals to have to live up to, no hopes and expectations to strive towards, no meaning, no purpose, no nothing. Mumford retains purpose and accents creativity, and makes a statement which, in the least, has God and humanity as co-creators or partners in the unfolding of the universe:





That argument reminds me of American physicist Frank Tipler, who writes: ‘People talk of God as the creator of life. But maybe the purpose of life is to create God.’ (Tipler 1994). At which point we really are reinventing the sacred in the sense that Stuart Kauffman suggests – as parts of an endlessly creative universe in which agency, will and consciousness are emergent properties. 
Instead of seeing God as the active creator, as conceived in the Sacred Books, God comes to be seen as ‘the ultimate outcome of creation; so that the Kingdom of God, latent in nature, is the ideal consummation of the whole process. That assumption, I submit, makes better sense.’ (Mumford 1952: 71-71). Kauffman sees this God as the endlessly creative universe itself, which makes even more sense of an ever-insurgent world that is irreducible to physical laws.





What this draws attention to is the existence of an anarchic excess, a surplus that is core to being, a creativity that is beyond explanation by physical laws, an extraneous force that is ever-insurgent, something that is irreducible and axiomatic. You can give that whatever name you like. As co-creators in the ceaselessly creative universe, we are involved in what Jonathan Sacks calls the ‘great partnership.’ Intelligibility, rather than dualisms of subject and object, is what matters in the participatory universe.

Leaving aside the non-issue of the existence or non-existence of God, it is worthwhile following his reasoning, because it points to the need for human beings to be drawn out of themselves and to come to see themselves as part of a greater whole. Sacks emphasises the fact that religious values are grounded in an absolute reference point for existence beyond the self. Sacks calls this God. Others may refer to Nature. I argue for a moral ecology that recognises values as something human beings define and develop and give themselves, moral codes which are at a remove from purely natural processes. Sacks simply calls such a thing God, which, as a three letter word, is good short hand for ‘nature plus culture, biology and ecology with a moral dimension’. Either way, this God for Sacks is an absolute truth which is morally binding, offering a clear standard by which we should seek to live our lives. (Sacks 2005: 36ff).





Sacks refers to a sacred discontent, a protest against the way things are that is based on the hope and expectation that things can be better and ought to be better:

Belief in God is an assertion of human dignity in the face of humiliation, and of hope in the midst of the dark night of despair. It is a refusal to accept evil as inevitable, but at the same time an acknowledgement that we cannot leave redemption entirely to God. He rescued Noah, but Noah had to build the ark. He dwelt among the Israelites in the wilderness, but they had to build the sanctuary. The very fact that the Bible devotes some fifteen times as much space to the Israelites' constructing the sanctuary as it does to God creating the universe tells us that our deeds are precious to God. God is not the solution of a contradiction, but a call to become his partners in the work of redemption.




Is rapprochement possible here? I think so. Jonathan Sacks quotes atheist John Stuart Mill’s words: 'If Nature and Man are both the works of a Being of perfect goodness, that Being intended Nature as a scheme to be amended, not imitated, by man.' That, Chief Rabbi Sacks says, ‘is precisely what the rabbis had in mind when they spoke of people becoming “God's partner in the work of creation.” They believed that God left the world incomplete to be completed by humanity. That, in Judaism, is not heresy but mainstream belief.’ (Sacks 2011: 80). Praise Be, Hallelujah and any number of Amens that! It’s my view too. Not for the first nor the last time, I shall quote my favourite text of the Bible:

This is what the LORD says: 
"Heaven is my throne, and the earth is my footstool. 
Where is the house you will build for me? 




They are practical questions put to us, inspiring our efforts and actions. Human beings are co-creators, says theoretical biologist Stuart Kauffman. Human beings and God are partners in creation, says Chief Rabbi Jonathan Sacks. In the absence of clear, discernible foundations, ‘a large part of man's nature and destiny must be taken on faith,’ declares Lewis Mumford, ‘and the groundwork of that faith is no firmer in science than it is in religion.’ (Mumford 1952 ch 3). This is precisely what theoretical biologist Stuart Kauffman is saying about the impossibility of ever having complete knowledge, and yet having to act as if we knew:

Because we cannot know, but must live our lives anyway, we live forward into mystery. Our deep need is to better understand how we do so, and to learn from this deep feature of life how to live our lives well. Plato said we seek the Good, the True, and the Beautiful. Plato points us in the right direction.

Kauffman 2008 ch 14

‘We see opportunities and take them, acting as if we knew, but we do not, and we do not know the long term consequences of what we do. Yet we wish to act wisely. What does it mean to act wisely when we cannot calculate the consequences? This will be part of our issue in considering a global ethic.’ 

If for no other reason, we must try to invent a shared global ethic that will help us shape what we will deem to be an appropriate global civilization. For the first time in human history we have both the necessity to do so as our cultures are crushed together by globalization of commerce and by global communications, and the elements of the means to jointly partially shape what will become via global communications and international discussions at many governmental and non-governmental levels.
It is our very making of meaning in our lives. It is emergent. And it is as amazing, awesome, and as worthy of respect as the creative biosphere. As we see ourselves in a creative universe, biosphere, and culture, I hope that we will see ourselves in the world in a single framework of our entire humanity that spans all of human life, knowing, doing, understanding, and inventing. The word we need for how we live our lives is faith, bigger by far than knowing or reckoning. A committed courage to get on with life anyway….

Kauffman 2008 ch 14

Repeat: ‘The word we need for how we live our lives is faith, bigger by far than knowing or reckoning. A committed courage to get on with life anyway.’ 

Our choice is between life and death. If we choose life, we must live with faith and courage, forward, unknowing. To do so is the mandate of life itself in a partially lawless, co-constructing universe, biotic, and human world.

Kauffman 2008 ch 14

To say that there is little here that those practising a religious ethic would find surprising is just another way of saying that we have found grounds for common agreement and shared meaning. 





Faith is a relationship in which we become God's partners in the work of love. The phrase sounds absurd. How can an omniscient, omnipotent God need a partner? There is, surely, nothing he cannot do on his own. But this is a left-brain question. The right-brain answer is that there is one thing God cannot do on his own, namely have a relationship. God on his own cannot live within the free human heart. Faith is a relationship of intersubjectivity, the meeting point of our subjectivity with the subjectivity, the inwardness, of God. God is the personal reality of otherness. Religion is the redemption of solitude.




Kauffman’s idea of living into mystery by taking our place as co-agents within an endlessly creative universe stands in line of descent from the idea of mystical union. This has been a perennial and universal idea in human history, the pinnacle of the expression of the cosmic longing for meaning. It seems to be a perennial theme that ‘man is more than man,’ to cite the words of the Priest in the first scene of King Oedipus by Sophocles (c.495-406 BCE). The view expresses the idea that human beings possess the capacity to experience a ‘mystical’ reunion with the divine, regardless of the way in which we conceive God. 

The idea crops up in the oddest places. We just have to be careful that we see the difference between being created in the image of God and being as gods. I’m intrigued by the fact that Erich Fromm, a social psychologist who put Marx and Freud together in a normative humanist ethics, could cite Cicero in this manner. He argued that we need to be as bold as Cicero, who declared:

‘We must now conceive of this whole universe as one commonwealth – of which both gods and men are members…’ (Cicero quoted in Fromm 1998). That sounds wonderful. Should we find a place for other beings and bodies, then we have the commonwealth of virtue that I argue for in Being at One (2016). Fromm misses out the line that follows, though: ‘men are grouped with Gods on the basis of blood relationship and descent.’ (Cicero, Laws I, 7.23.) That line is significant in explaining what lies behind Cicero’s idea. The ground for this blood relationship, Cicero argues, is that ‘while the other elements of which man consists were derived from what is moral, and are therefore fragile and perishable, the soul was generated in us by God. Hence we are justified in saying that there is a blood relationship between ourselves and the celestial beings; or we may call it a common ancestry.’ That is a denial of naturalism and a natural moral ethic and an embrace of an explicitly divine ethic. That’s not what the likes of Marx, Freud, Fromm and Kauffman have in mind. You can see why the scientifically inclined are leery of teleology. Kauffman argues that the endlessly creative universe in which agency, will and consciousness are active forces is ‘God enough.’ Cicero has a view of such a universe:

Since the universe is wholly filled with the Eternal Intelligence and the Divine Mind, it must be that human souls are influenced by their contact with divine souls.





6 Service, Sacrifice and Love: The Humility of Religious Experience
I return now to the truth and reality of religious experience.

Acts 4:32–35 (NRSV) 
Intensity of generosity
Now the whole group of those who believed were of one heart and soul, and no one claimed private ownership of any possessions, but everything they owned was held in common. With great power the apostles gave their testimony to the resurrection of the Lord Jesus, and great grace was upon them all. There was not a needy person among them, for as many as owned lands or houses sold them and brought the proceeds of what was sold. They laid it at the apostles’ feet, and it was distributed to each as any had need.

Michael Mitton writes beautifully on this: By this stage the disciples are becoming accustomed to living in a world of miracle and wonder. House-shaking prayer, tongue-speaking and miracle-working are the order of the day. Their confidence is sky high. The Jesus who had died and risen again is manifestly with them and their opponents are at a loss to know what to do about them. Such ‘success’ and confidence often breeds selfishness and arrogance. But today’s passage tells us that all this power was definitely not going to their heads. If anything it was going to their hearts, and their hearts were opening up in remarkable generosity. They had not forgotten the new commandment of Jesus, which was all about love (John 13:34–35). The more the disciples connected with the resurrection power of Jesus, the more they were drawn into the way of love, and one of the visible signs of loving your neighbour as yourself is sharing what you have with them. When a disciple staggered out of another powerful prayer meeting, they could not bear to see a poor person without planning how to care for them.
Thus it was that this disciple community gained an early reputation for extreme generosity. They risked personal vulnerability in order to care for others. We can read endless books and listen to countless sermons on generosity, but the fact is that we only freely give when something happens in our hearts. Giving from anything less is usually motivated by guilt, not love. Any charismatic life that is not expressed in generosity has missed something vital about the Spirit.
--Dear Jesus, visit my soul with Holy Spirit's generosity.
Michael Mitton

Marx's famous statement in the Critique of the Gotha Programme – ‘From each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs!’ - comes straight out of Acts. Over two volumes, I made a strong case for Marx, and stand by those views as far as they go. The disquieting observations of this final volume concern a missing dimension, the dimension which is the most important of all, deciding the direction and character of emancipation. The argument I set out here threatens to undermine the entire case I made for Marx in previous volumes, so I was inclined to cut the entire piece. The issues, however, are too important to be skirted. Here I argue that the greatest threat to Marx’s emancipatory project comes not from capitalism or liberalism or green environmentalism or anarchism or any of the political positions normally ranged against marxism. True, any socialist alternative has to prove itself in practice as a viable system of governance and economic provision, but that is a different test concerning institutional arrangements and systems. I have supplied arguments to check every criticism of Marx from those sources. Marx, as he writes before the above quote from the Critique of the Gotha Programme, affirms a society that crosses ‘the narrow horizon of bourgeois right.’ I agree very much with that. Except ... the fatal flaw, the fatal temptation, lies in the idea of ‘men as gods,’ the idea that God is merely the projection of the best human qualities that we can reclaim and so revolve around our own Sun, as against the illusory Sun of religion. I think this is a delusion, and a dangerous one, one that brings us not into the society of universal peace and love, based on humility, and the figure of Christ as shorn of power, but a universal hatred based upon a collective narcissism, radically free individuals asserting their power. That’s not Marx’s vision of human flourishing, of course, and he is concerned to provide the associative forms of mediation to bring social individuals together. The danger lies in a power that is without the restraint of a standard outside of itself. Hence my interest in Marx’s relation to religion, and Sacks’ view that Marx was the kind of atheist who ‘disbelieves with an almost religious fervour.’ The issue is complicated because Marx, in his stated views, actually argues against atheist colleagues and friends and their overtly atheist pronouncements. Marx tells them that this is not the real struggle. His views seem softer on religion than those of the atheists. Read deeper, though, and Marx’s views are much more radical. He charges atheists with settling for driving religion from public life, for settling for political emancipation, whereas Marx seeks a human emancipation in general that drives religiosity from the inner and outer world, both public and private life. He proposes to achieve this not by a direct assault on God and religion but by a positive human affirmation and appropriation of the sensuous world, abolishing the inverted social conditions generating the need for religious illusion. The atheists that Marx criticises are mere liberals settling for half-measures. Marx goes at the question of emancipation with a ‘religious fervour.’ My point is this, if this is religion, then let’s do it properly, with a proper recognition of religious truths and experiences, and not mere assertions of human power unbounded by God’s Love. 

Bishop North points us to the future with a statement of Radical Christianity:

The first Christians dealt with their wealth in so daring and counter-cultural a way that it proved powerfully attractive (Acts 2.44). Property and income was pooled so that there was no distinction between rich and poor, slave and free.

Yet this was no crypto-Marxist, hippy commune. Resources were shared because this was a community founded on the sacrificial love of the cross. Those dependent on Christ’s sacrifice knew that they were dependent also on each other. Those whose lives had been saved by the freely offered love of the cross could live only to the same values of generosity, gift, and grace.

It is interesting to see how far we have fallen. Anglican leaders (me included) love to rail against social inequality and the ever growing divide between rich and poor. Yet any analysis of the data shows that, across our own diocesan structures, we graphically model the inequality we so freely condemn.’

There’s a future for the Church if Evangelicals put the poor first, Bishop North tells New Wine

Focused primarily on the needs of the wealthy, the Church of England is ‘complicit in the abandonment of the poor’ and models the social inequality that it so often condemns, the Bishop of Burnley, the Rt Revd Philip North, Bishop of Burnley in Blackburn, told an Evangelical gathering.

Marx would have been unmoved and unimpressed. He lived at a time when Christianity rolled over and died in face of the ascendency of capital. Christian Socialist R.H. Tawney details the sorry tale in Religion and the Rise of Capitalism:

The rise of a naturalistic science of society, with all its magnificent promise of fruitful action and of intellectual light; the abdication of the Christian Churches from departments of economic conduct and social theory long claimed as their province; the general acceptance by thinkers of a scale of ethical values, which turned the desire for pecuniary gain from a perilous, if natural, frailty into the idol of philosophers and the mainspring of society - such movements are written large over the history of the tempestuous age which lies between the Reformation and the full light of the eighteenth century. Their consequences have been worked into the very tissue of modern civilization. 

Tawney 1987 ch 5





When the moral guidance and force of religion and the Church was needed most, they abandoned the terrain to capital. Marx saw it plainly and spoke contemptuously of a Christian morality that proved so toothless in face of the forces of mammon. It was Marx who took the role of Old Testament Prophet, calling out injustice and demanding its removal where he saw it. The notion of religious controls on economic behaviour was swept away as part of the general process of capitalist disembedding. Marx lost any patience he may have had with Christianity, indeed with morality and moral positions, in the process.

His words in the Communist Manifesto make it clear that he felt the radical Christian message to be a cover for a hypocrisy in practice. Scepticism arises when we see the politics of ‘tax and spend’ explicitly rejected in favour of an attitude of generosity, gift, and grace which springs from hearts transformed by the cross. Rather than a social transformation to resolve a socially structured problem, there is an appeal to a voluntary change of heart on the part of the ‘haves’ to help the ‘have-nots,’ within an acknowledgement from both sides that we are as one in a co-dependent community of Christians. The claim is that this Radical Christianity is more in keeping with the spirit of Acts 2, pointing to a Church that God richly blessed, than is Marx’s version of the same principle in the Critique of the Gotha Programme. What is also interesting is the extent to which a passage from Marx’s critical commentary on a political programme, a passage clearly drawing upon a well-known biblical text, should have become so popular.

My view draws on both the Christian and Marxist arguments, hence my concern above to ground the abolition of social alienation and restitution of social power in the personal transformation of self as a moral effort on the part of the individual. That latter is the religious dimension that went missing from Marx, with potentially damaging and disastrous consequences for the emancipatory project. From Christianity comes the awareness that real power lies in the humility of sacrifice, and in service to others. Freedom comes through service to others, a commitment to something greater than we are in ourselves, and a joy that comes through solidarity. People who complain of hearing more about servitude than they do of salvation need to ponder the words of Eamon Duffy in this call to practice:

Not sad, high-minded men with a handful of high-minded, bleak ideals, but citizens of a world whose heart is love. We know in the way of Jesus, not a law, but a liberation into true humanity; the power to love, to belong to one another, to start again when things go wrong, to be grateful, to adore.

Every one of us, every human being, confronts at some time the collapse of meaning and direction in our lives – in anxiety, in illness, in unemployment or broken relationships, in all the forces that frustrate and diminish us as persons, and, at the last, in our own deaths. The Church has no pat answers to the dilemmas of existence, only a witness to what she knows. That under the mercy of God our perplexities, our failures, our betrayals, our limitations, can open into new freedoms, if we follow the way of Jesus. A century and a half ago, Coleridge wrote: ‘Christianity is not a theory, or a speculation, but a Life; not a philosophy of life, but a Life, and a living process . . . Try it.’ I don’t know how to better that advice; like Coleridge, I have found life in the God of Abraham and Isaac and Jacob, like millions of others in every age, like the psalmist before us:

I love the Lord, for he has heard the cry of my appeal. For he turned his ear to me
in the day when I called him.
They surrounded me, the snares of death, with the anguish of the tomb:
They caught me, sorrow and distress: I called on the Lord’s name . . .
Turn back, my soul, to your rest, for the Lord has been good.
He has kept my soul from death, my eyes from tears, and my feet from stumbling.
I will walk in the presence of the Lord, 






That involves a commitment to a society of volunteers rather than conscripts, a social transformation that is indeed driven by a transformation that occurs in the hearts of men and women. If Christianity is to play a significant part in the renewal of life, then it will come from the edges, from the margins, among the poor, the downtrodden, and the forgotten – a change of heart on the part of the haves to help heal the broken hearts of the have-nots. 

So help your brother along the road, no matter where he starts! 
For the God that made you, made them too. These men with broken hearts!

Hank Williams, Men With Broken Hearts

Yet the problem is not merely in the hearts of men and women, it is structurally rooted in prevailing social relations, and hence needs to be systematically uprooted. The division between haves and have-nots is a class division, and can be effectively addressed only in those terms. We can wait forever for a change in individual hearts that is strong enough to overcome the social roots of division. For Marx, what matters is not a change of heart on the part of the haves but the structural capacity to act on the part of the exploited. The danger lies in resting content with heart-felt pleas to Christian unity, no matter how sincere, which are incapable of uprooting structural injustices. Ye cannot serve two masters, says Matthew, you have to choose between God or mammon. Mammon is a transliteration into New Testament Greek of the Aramaic mamona, meaning ‘profit’ or ‘wealth.’ Jesus is emphatic that the attachment to material wealth serves to estrange men and women from God since ‘no man can serve two masters . . . Ye cannot serve God and mammon' (Mt 6 : 24). Jesus thus urges, ‘Make to yourselves friends of the mammon of unrighteousness’ (Lk 16 : 9), by which he cautions individuals to avoid dishonest gain and use their money to benefit their fellow-men and women. And that is precisely the meaning of the text from Acts. 

Power or humility? Or an appreciation that true power resides in humility? Not the assertion of the power of men as gods, but the unity of each and all that comes in the suffering of Christ on the Cross, where all debts were paid, and all were redeemed to live in joy. Christ’s redemption has freed us from guilt, being ‘justified freely by His grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus’ (Romans 3:24). We were slaves to sin, condemned to an eternal separation from God. In paying the price to redeem us, Jesus freed us from slavery to sin and rescued us from the eternal consequences of that sin. As a result, we will sing a new song — a Redemption Song of praise to the Redeemer (Revelation 5:9). 

In these words lies the strongest case against Marx. God is not a projected ideal of a human power that is to be reclaimed socially, but a transcendent standard that is the source and end of all things; Jesus is not a Superman, but a very human figure reduced to an utterly powerless state; and religion is not an illusion but an expression of 'real suffering', as Marx does say, and a real experience, a cosmic longing for meaning that involves something much more profound than power. A vision that is all about power and is lacking in ‘generosity’ is a heady vision that, without personal transformation as a moral effort inspired by God, tempts us into the moral wasteland adumbrated above in Nietzsche’s pitiless world. 

I had thought to cut this last volume because it requires further and deeper reading and undermines the very good case I have made for Marx in the volumes. It risks negating the conclusions of previous volumes, utterly confusing – or annoying - everyone who agrees with one or the other part. But I have kept it in, to give a strong recommendation to read Marx and absorb his lessons in seeking to change the world, whilst being sure to keep our feet on the ground of personal transformation and act with humility, respect and reverence. Power, even power as the natural growth and flourishing I describe – and support – in Marx, has to be tempered by love and humility, and enriched by a religious experience that understands human weakness and frailty. That cannot just be 'abolished' and socially realized, in however dialectical a sense, and has naught to do with alien power and illusion. It is profoundly real. Deny that, and we are into a 'men as gods' delusion that will make a Hell of Earth. My greatest worry with Marx is this sense of idolatrous power, it could never end well. Hence the quotes above from Georges Bernanos, Leszek Kolakowski, Middleton Murry and Will and Ariel Durant.

Are Marx, the Enlightenment, science and technology and capitalism are responsible for this Hell on Earth? No, my conclusion is not a reactionary one. I stand by the view that Marx shows us a way out of this disenchanted world, shows us what we need to do to reclaim our physical, ethical and political commons from the new god of capital. But he rules out a way back to the true God for the very reason he thinks no such thing exists – we are charged with the responsibility of becoming our own gods and thereby living up to our powers creatively.

Can it be done?

7 Men as Gods: The Dangers of an Idolatrous Humanism
I want now to tie this debate up by examining Marx’s essentialist argument for evidence not only of an abstraction of reason from the concrete reality of real individuals, but of an idolatrous humanism. The delusions of progress are not resolved if, by reappropriating alienated powers, we merely come to venerate those powers in a social a form of idolatry. In that case, we come to be curved in ourselves, merely moving from one delusion to another. Marx argued that the social world is a human-made world and therefore capable of being known, comprehended and controlled by human beings. I want to know if Marx also believed that men became as gods in the process of achieving this self-knowledge; or whether, merely, Marx was dealing with the challenge of realizing freedom, democracy and justice in a world in which moral action had been shorn of its divine support and sanction. Without God, human beings are charged with the task of establishing their freedom and dignity in their own terms, without a divine sanction written into the fabric of the good universe. I’ve given the arguments of those who think this cannot be done above. Now I want to focus on Marx himself.

Marx’s critique of alienation makes him very interesting on this question. Alienation is a condition in which the human creators come to be dominated by their own creations – money, capital, commodities, the state, bureaucracy etc. Human beings come to be reduced to the status of determined things as things come to acquire an existential significance. The obvious solution is to this inverted world is to put subject and object back in their right places. Marx thus sought to recover, both conceptually and practically, the constitutive role of human subjectivity from behind the alienated structures and relations which constrain human beings in an external and deterministic sense. Through this alienation, human powers come to confront the human subjects as external, objective 'things' with an independent life of their own.

This becomes interesting when Marx draws the analogy between religious and secular alienation. In one sense alienation is a form of idolatry. The domination of the human subjects by the objects which they themselves have created denotes a condition of alienation. The state, capital, commodities and money become the new idols which dominate human beings, to which human beings sacrifice, whether voluntarily or involuntarily.

Marx’s association of atheism and communism here is significant. Remember that Marx does not simply negate or abolish God but positively affirms human fulfilment through the human appropriation of the world, humans seeing their realization as bound up with the natural world. With that direct materialist affirmation, there is no need to engage in the intellectual negation of God through an atheist humanism. It is in that positive sense that Marx associates communism and atheism. I want to come later to the question of idolatry and the extent to which Marx believed that human beings could become as gods. I want also to examine the extent to which such a notion slides into a kind of teleological thinking that works independently of human purposes, thus violating the real premises I have developed in the previous volumes.

The argument here proceeds from Vico’s New Science and the principle verum ipsum factum. This states that knowing the truth of something is conditional upon having made it. Vico’s argument is that whereas Nature is made by God, and therefore knowable only by God, the human world is a human creation. Vico’s central epistemological thesis is the identity of the true with what is made or done, that is, with that which owes its very being to having been made. This is the verum-factum concept. As a human creation, the human world is capable of being known by human beings. The state and politics, trade and commerce, war and peace, etc. are all the product of creative human agency; the world of nature is the province of God. Creating is an activity and thus logically implies the existence of a creator. The human world is the creation and human agency is the creator. How do the human creators relate to their creation? Does the Creation in some way reflect a divine power and glory upon the human creators? Marx’s answers are thoroughly humanist. And more than humanist: Marx demands the complete fulfilment of the human essence at the highest level of development. Marx writes of human beings becoming the sovereign of circumstances. He justifies the English rule in India in terms of progress from a condition characterised by nature worship and domination by external circumstances to a condition in which human beings are in conscious control of these circumstances:

We must not forget that these little communities were contaminated by distinctions of caste and by slavery, that they subjugated man to external circumstances instead of elevating man to be the sovereign of circumstances, that they transformed a self-developing social state into never-changing natural destiny, and thus brought about a brutalizing worship of nature, exhibiting its degradation in the fact that man, the sovereign of nature, fell down on his knees in adoration of Kanuman, the monkey, and Sabbala, the cow.

Marx AIC SE 1973: 307

Marx explicitly repudiates the ‘back to nature’ argument in any of the forms in which it is presented. He refers to the ‘brutalizing worship of nature’ as a ‘degradation’ in that ‘man’ is ‘the sovereign of nature.’ But who says that ‘man’ is the ‘sovereign of nature’? There is no scientific basis for this claim. Darwin argued that human beings differ from other animals only in degree, not in kind. The biologist E.O. Wilson emphasises the centrality of insects to life on Earth. If the insects were wiped out, life on Earth would end within a year; if the human species were wiped out, life on Earth would flourish. The argument that ‘man’ is the ‘sovereign of nature’ is a theological argument, stemming from the idea that God made man in his own image and from the Judaeo-Christian view of human uniqueness and moral autonomy. Marx, by rights, is not entitled to draw on that argument. It may be a remnant of the Judaeo-Christian ethic he now rejects. But its retention is significant and denotes a dangerous switch. In the Judaeo-Christian tradition, human beings are seen as made in the image of God but, crucially, not as gods. Marx’s vision is of human beings unbounded by the existence of God, a view which implies that human beings in becoming the sovereigns of circumstances have themselves become as gods. This is where things get delusional and dangerous. In its religious formulation, the argument is not anthropocentric but theocentric, since assertions of human power and significance are set within something greater, with all things in subordinate relation to God. Once God is removed, then those assertions become the plainest anthropocentrism, dangerously unmoored, and out of kilter with the natural world/created world.

We need something deeper than this: ‘It was like a religious conversion – being bound back into a system that doesn’t begin and end with humans.’ (Richard Powers). Powers is talking about the trees, hence hastens to add that this is a religious conversion not in a theistic sense. He rejects humanism too: ‘”Environmentalism” is still under the umbrella of a kind of humanism; we say we should manage our resources better. What I was taking seriously for the first time … was: they’re not our resources; and we won’t be well until we realize that.’ (Richard Powers: 'We're completely alienated from everything else alive' https://www.theguardian.com/books/2018/jun/16/richard-powers-interview-overstory (​https:​/​​/​www.theguardian.com​/​books​/​2018​/​jun​/​16​/​richard-powers-interview-overstory​) The Guardian 16 June 2018). 

Not a theism and not a humanism is what? A naturalism? The trees won’t pay no mind, so why should we? And how can we without becoming guilty of a humanism? A nature-worship and idolatry is a dead-end, an unthinking surrender of the moral sensibility to physical laws and biological imperatives that could care less about human concerns. If human beings are completely alienated from their sources of life, there is nothing to be gained from simply inverting the relation and prostrating ourselves before natural powers that are completely indifferent to human concerns. If the choices are humanism or naturalism, then I opt for theocentrism:

In a high-entropy culture, the overriding purpose of life becomes one of using high energy flow to create material abundance and satisfy every conceivable human desire. Human liberation is thus equated with the accumulation of greater wealth. A primary value is placed upon transforming the environment to extract its riches.
Having banished God from society, the high-entropy, materialist value system attempts to provide a heaven on earth. In so doing we have placed man and woman at the centre of our universe, and defined the ultimate purpose of our existence as the satisfaction of all possible material wants, however frivolous. We have reduced 'reality' to that which can be measured, quantified, and tested. We have denied the qualitative, the spiritual, the metaphysical. We have entered into a pervasive dualism - our minds separated from our bodies, our bodies divorced from the 'surrounding' world. We have gloried in the concepts of material progress, efficiency, and specialization above all other values. In the process, we have destroyed family, community, tradition. We have left behind all absolutes, except for our absolute faith in our ability to overcome all limits to our physical activity.
Now our world view and social system are falling victim to the very process of their creation. Everywhere we look, the entropy of our world is reaching staggering proportions. We have become creatures struggling to maintain ourselves in the midst of growing chaos. Each day we experience the truth that biologists have long known: an organism cannot long survive in a medium of its own waste. 

Rifkin 1991 ch 6

These arguments point to the need not only for a massive socio-institutional realignment but a spiritual realignment. 

Marx’s argument for flourishing needs to be set within a notion of natural limits, thereby checking the invitation to fantasy contained in theological claims shorn of theological grounding. I want, therefore, to return to a passage quoted earlier.

But atheism and communism are no flight, no abstraction, no loss of the objective world created by man or of his essential powers projected into objectivity, no impoverished regression to unnatural, primitive simplicity. They are rather the first real emergence, the realization become real for man, of his essence as something real. 

Marx EW EPM 1975: 395/6

Once more, Marx rejects the ‘back to nature’ argument as an ‘impoverished regression to unnatural, primitive simplicity’. Human beings acting upon nature, transforming both nature and themselves, is natural for human beings. Camile Paglia is restating Marx’s view here when she writes that ‘the Buddhist acquiescence to nature is neither accurate about nature nor just to human potential.’ (Paglia 2001: ch 1). Marx needs no lessons on human beings being natural beings who are a part of nature. Marx knows this, and knows, further, that human beings are culturally creative parts of nature. To confine humans within a passive acceptance of natural laws is neither accurate nor just with respect to natural human potential and power. But Paglia’s next sentence here makes this assertion of natural human creativity most interesting: ‘The Apollonian has taken us to the stars.’ (Paglia 2001 ch 1). To the stars, to the heavens. Are we meant to ascend to the heavens by our own efforts? Or draw the heavens down to earth, to create Heaven on Earth, again by our own efforts? To answer in the affirmative here would be to reveal that the human self-realization that Marx is advocating, the transcendence of alienation so that ‘man’ becomes the ‘conscious sovereign of circumstances,’ is itself a secular myth of progress – the very thing implicated in the planetary unravelling. It is a very different notion to Dante’s trasumanar, a self-realisation that is bounded in God’s Love. 

Marx’s presentation of the secular myth is a positive and more creative affirmation of natural human potentials and powers, overcoming human self-alienation to create the realized human society of realized individuals. Marx thus demands the projection and realisation of the essential powers of human beings so as to overcome their domination by an alien and external objectivity in society. Alienation implies a failure on the part of human agents to comprehend the social world as their own creation, and hence as amenable to human intervention, alteration and control. The question, though, is how far Marx takes the ‘sovereignty’ of man. 

For Vico, Nature is the realm of God and therefore unknowable and uncontrollable with respect to human agency. Marx draws no such line and disparages human subjugation to ‘never-changing natural destiny.’ Marx is surely correct in his assumption that the transformative human interchange with the environment has brought Nature within the province of the human social world, so that the question of the existence of a ‘Nature’ apart from the human world is academic, incapable of philosophical resolution, and best left merely as a background assumption. In focusing on the mediated character of the human experience of nature, Marx nowhere denies the independent existence of Nature and does, on occasion, acknowledge the independence of nature in its own right. There are countless books which make this point. (Morris ed 2003; Simmons 1996; Odum 1993; Chapman and Reiss 1999; Doyle and McEachern 2001; Barry 1999; Harris ed 2004).

Marx is correct to emphasise the importance of human transformatory activity. But when he disparages ‘natural destiny’ we need to know what, precisely, he is getting at. Notions of human beings as the ‘sovereign of circumstances’ who are somehow able to evade or escape ‘natural destiny’ suggest much more than human beings realising their essential powers creatively within the world they create. It implies that that social world created by human beings somehow trumps the natural world. It implies that human beings in their social world have transcended Nature and the eternal cycles of birth, life, death and rebirth. It suggests something like Dante’s transhumanism shorn of the belief in the existence of God that alone keeps the ambition within bounds, preventing it becoming a dangerous delusion.

Marx, at these points, strays over into teleology in the bad sense – as a telos that does indeed unfold over the heads and against the wills of individuals.

The question is not what goal is envisaged for the time being by this or that member of the proletariat, or even by the proletariat as a whole. The question is what is the proletariat and what course of action will it be forced historically to take in conformity with its own nature.

Marx The Holy Family 1956

The strong language here with reference to being ‘forced’ is the kind of argument that brings essentialism into disrepute. That argument does imply that the realisation of a natural essence is given and that a course of action is inevitable regardless of will, choice, morality etc. The passage needs to be re-phrased to take account of the fact that making history for Marx (and Hegel) is a matter of relatively free choice and design. An essentialist metaphysics is teleological. Note Marx’s identification of a goal, something given by the nature of an essence. If the proletariat is to realise its nature, then it must take a course of action which corresponds to, rather than contradicts, is nature. By using the terms ‘forced historically’, Marx is stating the essentialist case too strongly, giving his critics an easy target to hit. A necessary line of development is not an inevitability and, as he rightly argues, ‘history does nothing’. What Marx means is that if the working class is to realise its nature as the class of concrete labour, the value creating class, then it needs to institute the society of the freely associated producers. For Marx, there is a necessary relation between the working class as the producers of value and a socialist society in which social labour is supplied directly through the free association of the producers, rather than indirectly through the value form. Those who object to that essentialist argument, who deny such a necessary relation between class position and political ideology, who deny the nature of an essence, can have no objection to the proletariat being politically constructed for a slave society, a Fascist society, and can have no necessary objection to the proletariat remaining within the exploitative relations of capitalist society.

Marx expresses himself too strongly in the above passage, minimising the importance of the subjective factor, drawing the argument away from his usual emphasis on the extent to which the proletariat has to develop its organisational, political, moral capacities in the process of their self-emancipation. That process of self-development is all part of the proletariat coming to realise its nature. 

Marx is similarly over-emphatic in the Manifesto of the Communist Party. He writes: ‘What the bourgeoisie therefore produces, above all, are its own grave-diggers. Its fall and the victory of the proletariat are equally inevitable.’ (Marx MCP Rev1848 1973). If the fall of the bourgeoisie and the triumph of the proletariat are inevitable, then why bother writing the Manifesto, why urge ‘working men of all countries, unite!’? These are both political and moral interventions in the historical process, designed to influence human agents and shape outcomes. Of course, one can appreciate the statement of inevitability as an attempt to inspire hope and boost confidence in the middle of a political battle. But it is still worth highlighting, just to be on our guard against a bad teleology that steals political and moral responsibility out of human hands and invests it in some external agency.

I want to come to more substantial cases, beyond manifesto speak, when Marx does seem to defend human action in more philosophical terms, terms which are all of a piece with the secular myth of progress through industry, science and technology. Marx admits that England is ‘causing a social revolution’ in India for the ‘vilest interests’. ‘But that is not the question’, he states. ‘The question is, can mankind fulfil its destiny without a fundamental revolution in the social state of Asia? If not, whatever may have been the crimes of England she was the unconscious tool of history in bringing about that revolution.’ (Marx AIC SE 1973). That’s a very Hegelian argument. Marx brushes past the actual actions and wills of human agents, the cases that were put for and against English intervention in India, and reverts to the bad old device of human actors being ‘the unconscious tool of history’. Marx envisages human beings as the ‘unconscious tools’ of a historical development that results in them becoming the ‘sovereigns of circumstances.’ At what point do human beings become conscious of this process and take it over from within? In the idea of humans being ‘unconscious tools,’ however, there is none of the moral autonomy here that comes with assertions of human uniqueness in the Judaeo-Christian tradition. We are back to Hegel’s slaughter bench of history. ‘Then, whatever bitterness the spectacle of the crumbling of an ancient world may have for our personal feelings, we have the right, in point of history, to exclaim with Goethe: “Should this torture then torment us Since it brings us greater pleasure? Were not through the rule of Timur Souls devoured without measure?”’ (Marx AIC SE 1973: 320).

Marx’s defensible point is this, that any hope for overcoming the moral and social failures of capitalist modernity does not lie in the past, neither in Nature worship nor in the ancient or medieval communities, but in the present, in those necessary lines of development which point towards an alternative future in which human beings can objectify their powers without having to alienate them. Rather than yearning for a past that is beyond recall, seeking to revert to older solidarities appropriate to social relations that no longer exist and which left human beings far short of their potentials, Marx is looking to build new solidarities through a re-personalisation at a higher level of development. The liberal criticism of Marx as offering a 'thickly textured communitarianism' (Femia 1993: 170) is too abstract a claim to be either right or wrong – the specific social forms and relations of this ‘communitarianism’ establish its character. The idea that Marx is proposing an homogeneous collectivism is simply wrong. If anything, as I have argued above, Marx’s view can be criticized as erring too much in the liberal direction, radicalizing the free individual of the liberal order, possibly creating a community of self-assertive god-like egos. The creation of new solidarities is key to bring individuals into associative relation to each other, ensuring that communist individuality is not a collective egoism. 

Marx, like Hegel before him, takes the high road of modernity, seeing alienation as a progressive force, objectifying human power in such a way that they can be reclaimed in future at a higher level. Marx was well aware of conservative critics of the capital system, whose rejection of modernity was absolute and who took refuge in those remnants of the past which continued to exist in the modern world. Such solidarities are beyond recall and presuppose a social identity that no longer exists. Marx has no sympathy with the crumbling of an older world. Against the nostalgic mode, Marx looked to redeem the potentials contained in the alienated social world, finally making progress live up to its name. 

But questions remain. Take Schumpeter’s point that capitalism is a moral parasite, living off the moral capital created by past civilisations, but doing nothing to replace it. Take the evidence that it is those nations, such as Germany, who most held onto their feudal structures and practices, who have shown greater social resilience as well as long term economic success. In False Dawn: The Delusions of Global Capitalism, (1999) John Gray accuses Marx of modelling capitalism on the particular British experience of the nineteenth century. Such a capitalism leaves us with no ties other than the nexus of callous cash payment.

In the two passages quoted above, Marx uses the term ‘destiny’ in two different ways. He justifies English intervention in India in terms of a social revolution which allows human beings to escape a ‘never-changing natural destiny’. Fine, human beings transform nature and in the process transform themselves, coming to express and manifest more and more of their essential powers in history. I have argued strongly that that telos is strongly grounded in real human being. Yet Marx does, at times, detach the historical process from human actors and thus abstract purpose from human self-realisation. In this manner he asks: ‘The question is, can mankind fulfil its destiny without a fundamental revolution in the social state of Asia?’ The idea of humankind fulfilling its destiny strongly suggests a supra-individual purpose at work. In the same way Marx writes of human actors being ‘the unconscious tool of history’.

Marx’s argument can be salvaged from such bad teleology. And it needs to be, since stated thus, Marx is clearly an adherent of the secular myth of progress. Destiny implies a fate that is out of the hands of human agents. This could just simply be a case of an inappropriate word. Marx’s meaning is teleological in the good sense of human beings realising their essential powers, fulfilling their species essence within the historical process. Human beings as ‘the unconscious tool of history’ is more difficult. However, the view is consistent with the idea of alienation as a progressive force, with human beings objectifying their powers in such a way that, at first, they become alien forces determining social action with inexorable, external force. At this stage, human beings are indeed unconscious tools, in that they do not comprehend these alien powers as their own social powers in alien form, and in that human action is determined from the outside by the imperatives associated with these alien powers. The condition of alienation is characterised by human beings becoming instruments of their own powers.

The morally dubious aspect of Marx’s argument is his justification of this ‘unconscious’ instrumentalism in alienated social conditions as progressive, his dismissal of moral objections and protests, his underscoring of the futility of lamentation. It begs the question at what point does this ‘unconscious’ progress over the heads of human actors cease and human beings finally come to consciously assert moral ends over technical means? Because precisely these same justifications for progress are being made in the contemporary world, in favour of ‘globalisation’, industrial development in India and China, the BRIC nations and everywhere, in favour of drilling in the Arctic and on the ocean bed, in favour of GM food and biotechnology. 

If, as Marx argues, ‘personal feelings’ don’t matter when set against ‘history’, we need to ask what does? Marx is open here to the criticism that he has failed to take personal morality seriously and that his historicism makes his argument prone to end up with what Popper called a ‘moral futurism’. Marx’s implicit morality, embedded in the practical struggles of making history, needs to be made explicit, and needs to be done so in terms of responsibility as a repersonalisation. Marx, I repeat, has missed the crucial aspect of alienation as an individual self-alienation, and has therefore missed the key religious aspect of the question in the emphasis on personal moral effort. That self-alienation, at core, denotes the alienation of the individual from God and the swallowing up of the self in egoistic self-assertion. Lose God, and there is nothing to prevent human beings from curving in on themselves, individually and socially. Any social transformation that lacks that core element will fail and, more than likely, backfire.

Marx seems to historicise the Judaeo-Christian principle of moral autonomy from nature and its imperatives and cycles. And that entails a denial of the view that morality is autonomous from progress as defined in the realisation of essential human powers. The danger is, in alienated conditions, such a position could end up transferring moral responsibility to a ‘history’ which proceeds in some degree of abstraction of human individuals. Alienation is a progressive force for Marx (and Hegel). In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel argues that the ‘rational is the high road where no one stands out from the rest.’ Both Hegel and Marx uphold the high road of modernity characterised by ‘the vision of a socially responsible human freedom.’ (Dallmayr 1993: xxiv). (F Dallmayr Hegel: Modernity and Politics 1993 Sage). What Dallmayr writes on Hegel applies also to Marx. I shall quote this passage at length because it brings us back to Enlightenment, to the concept of rational freedom, and to the importance of Hegel in influencing Marx. I suggested from the first that we need a blending of Hegel and Marx. What Dallmayr writes here on Hegel can be easily rewritten to present Marx’s views on social self-mediation:

Hegel leads us onto the high road of modernity rather than its shadows or abysses; still loyal to classical teachings, he perceives the modern age as a station in the education and possible perfection of humanity, an education nurtured by the ascent of reason and absolute spirit. Although marked by growing individuation, modernity for Hegel heralds not simply the upsurge of private self-centeredness or else of anthropocentric self-enclosure. Although an agent of differentiation and determinate negation, reason in his work does not simply serve as an instrument of domination or technological mastery. Private-individual autonomy remains embedded in the framework of the polis, just as reason exceeds partisan designs through its universally mediating capacity.
Mediation, to be sure, is not easily accomplished and the road of modernity far from smooth. One of the most important and distinctive contributions of Hegel's philosophy is the emphasis on divisiveness or diremption (Entzweiung) as an unavoidable stage in individual and social maturation. In embarking on the path of reflection and self-knowledge, reason or spirit necessarily distances itself from familiar surroundings and customary habits, thereby undergoing the travail of alienation or estrangement, an alienation dividing individual consciousness both from others and from itself. Similarly, in the process of modernization or rationalization, society is wrenched away from traditional moorings and quasi-natural conventions, and thus is set adrift in the turbulent sea of competition and agonistic struggle (for recognition)…
In the context of political philosophy, the bent toward reconciliation and sublation surfaces in numerous ways, particularly in the celebration of public life or the polis as the arena of shared Sittlichkeit. As indicated, the modern state for Hegel was the actualization and embodiment of objective spirit, that is, an institution geared not merely to the satisfaction of private needs or to the advancement of partisan schemes but to the promotion of the common good, or of the good life (where justice and happiness blend). To buttress and safeguard the common good, his Philosophy of Right provided for a series of devices designed to counteract social atomization and excessive divisiveness. An important device was the establishment of a rational civil service seen as a universal class able to mediate and sublate the conflicting interests of individuals and social groups. Closely linked with this device was the provision for a welter of intermediary institutions and associations, and particularly for the complex fabric of social estates—the latter viewed not as closed or ascriptive bodies but as freely chosen organs representing concrete occupational or professional concerns. Still on the public level, divisiveness was also checked by the system of interlocking (though separate) governmental powers, by the harmonious juxtaposition of church and state, and by the scrupulous observance of the rule of law and the protection of civil rights (including equality before the law). Beyond the range of legal and governmental safeguards, Hegel's writings also made room for social and economic antidotes to diremption, especially for programs of social welfare and public assistance which, without hamstringing individual initiative, were intended to curb class division and the growth of an impoverished underclass (or rabble)— those glaring by-products of industrialization. Counterweights to divisiveness extended from the domestic arena to international conflicts. Although not strongly critical of modern warfare, the Philosophy of Right stressed various breaks on enmity, especially cross-cultural learning and the need to conduct hostilities with a view to peace—brakes that still deserve careful attention in our age of "total" wars. 
In large measure, the present study means to remind contemporary readers of the high road of modernity and of Hegel as a teacher of this road. In our own time, when the shadows and drawbacks of modernity are in plain view and expose (in a famous phrase) the inner tension or "dialectic of enlightenment," it is important to remember the deeper point of that road. Contrary to claims of historical randomness, Hegel saw modernity not as a contingent or accidental occurrence but as a crucial phase in human development, although a phase that eventually we may have to pass through. Far from serving partisan (bourgeois) class interests, the modern era for him was the harbinger of general or universal freedom, a freedom permeating cognitive inquiry, ethical Sittlichkeit, as well as social and political institutions (in the form of constitutional government).




I agree fundamentally with this notion of the ‘high road of modernity’ and the vision of a social and rational freedom that lies at the end of that road. There is just a need to emphasize the establishment of this future society as an act of freedom on the part of human agents, not an act of some abstract, anonymous ‘history.’ And there is a need to emphasize the personal moral effort required in overcoming individual self-alienation. The danger is that we can easily remain within a progress that treats human beings as the unconscious tools of history.

Kolakowski is certainly right to point out that Marx’s historicism as a moral futurism invites a moral wasteland. Kolakowski recovers the moral responsibility that lies at the heart of the Judaeo-Christian tradition: 





For Kolakowski, the moral failure of Marxism in this respect that made its political failures not only understandable but inevitable. There is, therefore, a need to take morality seriously. ‘Morality matters’ (Trigg 2005). Marx’s morality is implicit in the progressive unfolding and full realisation of innate human potentials and powers. Marx denies any autonomy of morality from the telos of human self-realisation in history. The position is defensible, although it underestimates the extent to which human social praxis is also a moral praxis by rendering morality implicit within social struggles and practices. Marx could present creative human self-realisation as a normative ideal grounded in the human species essence and its unfolding. Such an ideal could work in the Kantian sense as the object of our willing, motivating and inspiring human beings to act and obligating them in a common cause leading to the fuller expression of essential human powers. 

But, even so, there remains the danger of mistaking essential human powers for the objectified products of those powers. In the simplest case, that would denote a condition of alienation. The problem runs deeper than that, though. Even with the transcendence of alienation there is the danger that Marx, uniting human creators and human creation, is engaging in a form of idolatry. This is to define idolatry as the worship of the products of the human hand or, more generally, as the worship of human powers. It could immediately be objected that Marx is simply calling for the proper fulfilment of the human essence, human beings coming to recognise the social forces dominating the world as their own powers in alien form. Human fulfilment, the telos of the historical process, requires that the human creators assume conscious control of their human powers. This is, indeed, Marx’s view. But what are these human powers? Do they also pertain to the products of human power? Where is the line drawn?

Marx makes surprisingly few references to Vico, despite the pertinence of Vico’s verum-factum principle to the issue of objectification, alienation and human self-knowledge and self-realisation. In fact, I am aware of only the one reference to Vico in Marx’s writings, and even that is presented only in a footnote. Nevertheless, it is a highly significant passage:

Darwin has aroused our interest in the history of natural technology, i.e. in the formation of the organs of plants and animals, as instruments of production for sustaining life. Does not the history of the productive organs of man, of organs that are the material basis of all social organization, deserve equal attention? And would not such a history be easier to compile, since, as Vico says, human history differs from natural history in this respect, that we have made the former, but not the latter? Technology discloses man's mode of dealing with Nature, the process of production by which he sustains his life, and by which also his social relations, and the mental conceptions that flow from them, are formed. Any history of religion even, that fails to take account of this material basis, is uncritical. It is, in practice, much easier to discover by analysis the earthly core of the misty creations of religion, than, conversely, to infer from the actual relations of life at any period the corresponding 'spiritualized' forms of those relations. But the latter method is the only materialistic, and therefore the only scientific one. The inadequacy of the abstract materialism of natural science, which leaves out of consideration the historical process, is at once evident from the abstract and ideological conceptions of its spokesmen, whenever they venture beyond the bounds of their own specialism. 

Marx C1 1976: 389, footnote 89

Marx argues that the history of the productive organs of man, the material basis of social organisation, deserves equal attention with the history of natural technology, the formation of the organs of plants and animals, as ‘instruments of production for sustaining life.’ Marx cites Vico’s distinction between human history and natural history to the effect that human beings have made the former, but not the latter. The key argument in this passage is that ‘technology discloses man’s mode of dealing with Nature, the process of production by which he sustains his life, and by which also his social relations, and the mental conceptions that flow from them, are formed.’ Marx describes the failure to take this material basis into account as ‘uncritical.’ He is referring to religion. It is significant, however, that the passage starts with a quibble about Darwin’s exclusive concern with natural technology and ends with a criticism of ‘the inadequacy of the abstract materialism of natural science’, as evidenced by the ‘abstract and ideological conceptions of its spokesmen’ who leave the historical process out of their considerations.

The point to emphasise here is Marx’s critique of abstracting tendencies and idealistic expressions in all their forms. Marx’s accent is upon human productive powers as they develop in history and form the material basis of all social organization. The emphasis is upon the process of production by which human beings mediate their relation with nature and produce the conditions which sustain human life. Any materialism which is detached from this process is an abstract materialism. Marx is thinking of natural science here, but he also condemns mechanical materialism in similar terms. And it makes the point that Marx combines both immanence and transcendence. The actual world is a field of immanent potentiality in the process of completing itself and becoming something else. 

So Marx can be cleared of the charge that his self-knowledge through the connection of human creators and their social creation entails immanence as an enclosed world of human self-importance: Marx does not propose an idolatrous world curved in on itself, and his associative freedom does not necessarily take the form of a fantasy of collective narcissisms. 

However, the danger of idolatry remains. In associating ‘atheism and communism’ Marx is attempting to emphasise the positive expression of essential human powers, human creators in conscious control of the world that they have created:

But atheism and communism are no flight, no abstraction, no loss of the objective world created by man or of his essential powers projected into objectivity, no impoverished regression to unnatural, primitive simplicity. They are rather the first real emergence, the realization become real for man, of his essence as something real. 

Marx EW EPM 1975: 395/6

But one has to question why Marx doesn’t just simply refer to communism. Why atheism? Marx knows Vico’s distinction between human and natural history. Nature is God’s creation, argues Vico. In truth, Marx considers that the human exchange with nature renders such a distinction obsolete. Hence his call for natural scientists to give up their abstract materialism and recognise that the material world is a human world. Marx’s emphasis upon mediation here is aimed against abstract notions of ‘Man,’ ‘Reason,’ ‘God,’ and ‘Nature.’ Philosophical disputation over the ontological status and truth with respect to any and all of these things is inevitably inconclusive and therefore idle. The question as to whether denied the independent existence of Nature and the existence as such of God is far from idle, and determines whether or not we have a self-assertive egoistic humanity curving in on itself.

The question is whether Marx goes further than a human self-realisation bounded within natural limits and steps into the idolatrous realm of human self-veneration. Instead of fulfilled human beings realising their powers within a whole organism they see as a human creation, we enter the realm of ‘men as gods’ absorbing the greater substance into themselves.
In examining this question we need to return to Marx’s argument that religion is the ‘opium of the people’. Marx does not condemn religion as a delusion which is made up by the ruling class to dupe and stupefy the masses. That popular view is a crude caricature which says more about the blinkered prejudices of his adherents than it does about Marx. The caricature serves only to invert Marx’s real meaning:

Religious suffering is at one and the same time the expression of real suffering and a protest against real suffering. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people. 

Marx EW CHPR:I 1975

If religion is a drug then it is a drug that is self-administered. The important question is why human beings need to have recourse to this opium. Religion is the ideal expression of a condition people yearn for but which is denied in real life. Religion is the cry of alienated individuals living within an atomistic market society. Within such conditions, these individuals can overcome the separation experienced in the real world only by projecting the unity and commonality desired upwards into the realm of fantasy. Fantastic religious ideas will only be dissipated when human commonality is achieved in real society and the alienation and atomism associated with the ‘rule of property’ has been overcome. 

Marx is not therefore simply saying that religion is wrong or false, quite the contrary. Religion expresses a real human yearning and need in abstract, fantastical form. Marx is criticising not just illusion but most of all the social conditions which require illusion:

The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of the people is the demand for their real happiness. To call on them to give up their illusions about their condition is to call on them to give up a condition that requires illusions. The criticism of religion is therefore in embryo the criticism of that vale of tears of which religion is the halo. 

Marx EW CHPR:I 1975

Real human happiness, then, requires social transformation so that human beings no longer need have recourse to illusions in order to nourish their heart and soul. But the implications go further than this. Such a social transformation implies the abolition of religion. This would be abolition in the sense of positive transcendence, so that religion dissolves to the extent that it comes to realise its ideals. That, surely, is what every religion aims at? Not quite. In aiming for heavenly behaviour on earth, no religion ever forgets that Heaven exists in a transcendent realm, along with God, with that realm remaining in existence. With Marx, however, this notion of realization implies the self-abolition of religion so that human beings become the centres of their own Earthly Heaven. Marx believes that we can have our transcendent cake and eat it too – for good:

The criticism of religion disillusions man, so that he will think, act and fashion his reality like a man who has discarded his illusions and regained his senses, so that he will move around himself as his own true sun. Religion is only the illusory sun which revolves around man as long as he does not revolve around himself. 

Marx EW CHPR:I 1975

‘Man’ moving around himself as his own true sun is a clear statement of the ‘men as gods’ thesis. There is plenty wrong with this optimistic thesis, not least the abundant evidence from history that human beings are nowhere near as rational, free and humane as humanists believe they are or could be. That, in itself, doesn’t change much, given that we are dealing with a teleological argument that ends when human beings have fully realised themselves as free and rational and truly human beings. But the idea of human beings revolving around their own sun is a clear statement of self-absorption, human beings coming to be curved inwards, implying an egoism and narcissism that eats away at the soul. Human beings need to come out of their own egos and see themselves as part of a greater whole, see themselves in relation to others. That is precisely how these moral terms Marx uses work in relation to God. Remove God, and those terms cease to work as they ought. Marx, of course, knows this and, throughout the main body of his work, develops this intersubjective and communitarian thesis at length. My concern is with a certain strain in Marx’s argument which could tip a legitimate interest in creative human self-realisation over into full blown idolatry and the bad teleology of a ‘history’ abstracted from human purpose. My concern is with the dangers of moving from a legitimate concern with the fulfilment of human powers to a veneration of the products of those powers.

Marx is concerned with exposing the fetish systems of politics and production by revealing their basis in the material world of human power. He is concerned with truth as against both illusion and the alienated social conditions which generate and require illusion:

It is therefore the task of history, once the other-world of truth has vanished, to establish the truth of this world. It is the immediate task of philosophy, which is in the service of history, to unmask self-estrangement in its unholy forms once the holy form of human self-estrangement has been unmasked. Thus the criticism of heaven turns into the criticism of earth, the criticism of religion into the criticism of law and the criticism of theology into the criticism of politics. 

Marx EW Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Introduction 1975: 245

Note the references to the ‘task of history’ and philosophy in ‘the service of history’. What ‘history’? Is this ‘history’ in abstraction from human purpose? Marx’s essentialist metaphysics is grounded in the essential natures of human beings and the essential nature of human society. But references to ‘history’ like these above are not so firmly grounded. To be fair, Marx does state that ‘to be radical is to grasp things by the root. But for man the root is man himself.’ But even this begs the question what is this ‘man’ that Marx is referring to. In these passages, Marx seems to be referring to an ideal human being outside of the historical unfolding of the human essence in specific social relations. And this uncoupling from socio-historical reality can easily slide into a more ethereal realm. And note, too, the self-referential nature of this man rooted only in himself. Marx has discarded God here.

Marx, we have to remember, was still developing his mature thought, and he sharpened his categories up markedly beyond the early writings. He thus comes to place individuals within their social relations. But Marx stated his own categorical imperative from the first – the abolition of social conditions which denied the Kantian ethic of treating persons as ends in themselves:

Clear proof of the radicalism of German theory and its practical energy is the fact that it takes as its point of departure a decisive and positive transcendence of religion. The criticism of religion ends with the doctrine that for man the supreme being is man, and thus with the categorical imperative to overthrow all conditions in which man is a debased, enslaved, neglected and contemptible being - conditions that are best described in the exclamation of a Frenchman on the occasion of a proposed tax on dogs: Poor dogs! They want to treat you like human beings!

Marx EW CHPR:I 1975: 252-253

We return to the conception of positive transcendence, an abolition that preserves, raises up and realises as it puts an end to something. The abolition of religion amounts to the realisation of religious ideals. But what are those ideals? The abolition of religion realises the doctrine that for man the supreme being is man. ‘Do you mean God?’, the young boy in the film Time Bandits asks. ‘We don’t know him that well’ comes the reply from the time travelling dwarves.

There is no doubt that Marx is on the ground of theology here. He refers to Germany's revolutionary past in the form of the Reformation, drawing an analogy between the monk and the philosopher in whose brain the revolution begins. (Marx EW CHPR:I 1975). Marx wants to complete the job of the Reformation, to achieve a thoroughgoing reformation as a secularisation and humanisation of the world:

Luther certainly conquered servitude based on devotion, but only by replacing it with servitude based on conviction. He destroyed faith in authority, but only by restoring the authority of faith. He transformed the priests into laymen, but only by transforming the laymen into priests. He freed mankind from external religiosity, but only by making religiosity the inner man. He freed the body from its chains, but only by putting the heart in chains. 

Marx EW CHPR:I 1975: 252

A thoroughgoing Reformation is a lofty ideal. It requires the complete abolition of religiosity, inner and outer. 

But even if Protestantism was not the true solution, it did pose the problem correctly. It was now no longer a question of the struggle of the layman with the priest outside himself, but rather of his struggle with his own inner priest, with his priestly nature.

Marx EW CHPR:I 1975: 252

That Marx is asking for Heaven on Earth is clear enough. But he seems also to be asking that human beings become saints and philosophers. Are human beings so free, rational and humane? Is Marx implying that human beings could become gods, supreme beings? One recalls here Kant’s statement that out of nothing so crooked can something entirely straight be made. Kant also referred to the irrational use of reason. An attempt to straighten something so crooked is prone to rebound spectacularly. So Marx is sailing into dangerous waters.

Marx is seeking to trace the products of the human hand and the human mind back to source – human praxis in the material world:

The foundation of irreligious criticism is: Man makes religion, religion does not make man. Religion is indeed the self-consciousness and self-esteem of man who has either not yet won through to himself or has already lost himself again. But man is no abstract being squatting outside the world. Man is the world of man, state, society. This state and this society produce religion, which is an inverted consciousness of the world, because they are an inverted world. 

Marx EW CHPR:I 1975: 244

It soon becomes clear, however, that Marx isn’t repudiating religion in any simple sense. Marx writes of ‘irreligious criticism’ but in truth his statement proceeds to list all the qualities of religion which Marx demands to be realised in the world:

Religion is the general theory of this world, its encyclopedic compendium, its logic in popular form, its spiritual point d'honneur, its enthusiasm, its moral sanction, its solemn complement and its universal basis of consolation and justification. It is the fantastic realization of the human essence since the human essence has not acquired any true reality. The struggle against religion is therefore indirectly the struggle against that world whose spiritual aroma is religion. 

Marx EW CHPR:I 1975: 244-245

In fine, Marx’s case is not primarily against religion but against an irreligious world in which religious ideals can obtain only illusory form. It’s just that Marx saw these religious ideals as, in their root, human ideals. Marx is demanding the true realisation of the human essence. Religious ideals are the fantastic realisation of the human essence in conditions which block that essence obtaining true reality:

Religion remains the ideal, unsecular consciousness of its members because it is the ideal form of the stage of human development which has been reached in this state. 

Marx EW OJQ 1975: 226

The realisation of the religious ideal implies a further stage of human development in the sense of realising fully innate human potentials. The abolition of religion as a positive transcendence implies the replacement of an unsecular consciousness by a secular consciousness. But this is tricky in the sense that Marx defines religion as the ‘fantastic realisation of the human essence.’ This implies that giving the human essence a true reality is a material realisation of the religious ideal. And this would seem to imply that Marx is indeed committed to the realisation of the theological assumptions underpinning the figure of God, even as he is prepared to abolish God as no more than the projection of the human essence in ideal form. 

It is easy enough to get rid of God; it is much more difficult to shed the theological assumptions which have been the necessary accompaniment of the belief in God throughout history. My point is that far from producing the secular consciousness that Marx demands, his positive transcendence of religion implies communism not as atheism but as a disguised religion. That, in Nietzsche’s sense, is inconsistent and incoherent. And it is this concealed religiosity, shorn of the overarching commitment to God which orders all things to their proper object, which opens up the route from the fulfilment of the human essence to the worship of the products of human powers, from the realisation of human species being to ‘man’ as the ‘supreme being’, from the good teleology which culminates in the realised human society of realised human beings to the bad teleology of a ‘history’ abstracted from human purpose and in the service of the alien powers of industry, technology, capital, the state, bureaucracy etc. etc. 

In fine, we need to be careful in reconstructing Marx’s essentialist metaphysics so as to avoid turning Marx’s positive transcendence of religion into the secular myth of progress, the false teleology which dominates the alienated world in the form of the false fixities of economic growth, capitalist accumulation, technological imperatives, state encroachment, state expansion, bureaucratisation, urbanisation …

Marx is well aware of the sin of idolatry. He sets idolatry within the context of an alienated system of production:

Money is the jealous god of Israel before whom no other god may stand. Money debases all the gods of mankind and turns them into commodities. Money is the universal and self-constituted value of all things. It has therefore deprived the entire world - both the world of man and of nature - of its specific value. Money is the estranged essence of man's work and existence; this alien essence dominates him and he worships it. 

Marx EW OJQ 1975: 239

Long before John Gray and the exposure of the delusions of progress, Marx is very well aware of the extent to which ‘progress’ can become a secular myth undertaken through the agency of alien power. ‘The god of the Jews has been secularized and become the god of the world. Exchange is the true god of the Jew. His god is nothing more than illusory exchange.’ (Marx EW OJQ 1975). 

Marx is criticising alienation but also idolatry. Does it then follow that the abolition of alienation is also an abolition of idolatry? That isn’t necessarily the case. 
Alienation is the condition in which human creations come to dominate the human creators. Idolatry is the worship of the products of one’s own hands. It would therefore seem possible that the practical reappropriation of alienated human powers could still be a form of idolatry. It all depends upon whether human powers are being exercised in such a way as to enhance human flourishing and fulfilment or whether these powers are being venerated as power as such, that is, not in terms of their effects with respect to creative human self-realisation. Marx’s commitment to a truly human society would seem to clear him of the charge of idolatry, but things are not so simple. It all depends on how one reads Marx’s critique of religion. The question depends upon the extent to which what Marx proposes as the free and full development of individuals could also be construed as the claim that human beings could become as gods.

Marx does draw the direct analogy between what human beings invested in God as an alien power and capital and the state as alienated social powers. The practical restitution of human power therefore implies that human beings no longer project their divine power upwards to the ideal realm of God but instead become in some sense deities themselves:

Finally it follows that even when man proclaims himself an atheist through the mediation of the state, i.e., when he proclaims the state an atheist, he still remains under the constraints of religion because he acknowledges his atheism only deviously, through a medium. Religion is precisely that: the devious acknowledgement of man, through an intermediary. The state is the intermediary between man and man's freedom. Just as Christ is the intermediary to whom man attributes all his divinity, all his religious constraints, so the state is the intermediary to which man transfers all his non-divinity, all his human unconstraint. 

Marx EW OJQ 1975: 219

Just as the working class invest their labour in capital, and the demos invest their sovereign power in the state, and thereby create alien powers which dominate them, so human beings invest their divinity in God, and so create the abstract Christ who dominates them. The implication of this is that Marx believes that human beings could indeed become as gods. 

Marx is certainly aware of the dangers of following false gods.

Mill aptly sums up the whole essence of the matter in a single concept when he describes money as the medium of exchange. The nature of money is not, in the first instance, that property is externalized within it, but that the mediating function or movement, human, social activity, by means of which the products of man mutually complement each other, is estranged and becomes the property of a material thing external to man, viz. money. If a man himself alienates this mediating function he remains active only as a lost, dehumanized creature. The relation between things, human dealings with them, become the operations of a being beyond and above man. 

Marx EW JM 1975: 261

Alienative social relations result in the estrangement of the products of human activity. As a result, the existential significance which properly belongs to human beings coming to be invested in a material thing external to human beings. Marx, here, refers to money. In time, with a more thorough critique of political economy, Marx would come to identify capital as the principal ‘agent’ of a historical development that proceeds above the heads of the ‘lost, dehumanized’ human actors. The false teleology at work in the secular myth of progress therefore describes a condition of alienation. Capital and its imperatives reveal are ‘the operations of a being beyond and above man.’ 

Marx demands the social self-mediation of associated producers against the alien mediation of things. Alien mediation is a false religion with a false god:

Through this alien mediator man gazes at his will, his activity, his relation to others as at a power independent of them and of himself - instead of man himself being the mediator for man. His slavery thus reaches a climax. It is obvious that this mediator must become a veritable God since the mediator is the real power over that with which he mediates me. His cult becomes an end in itself. Separated from this mediator, objects lose their worth. Thus they have value only in so far as they represent him, whereas it appeared at first that he had value only to the extent to which he represented them. This reversal of the original relationship is necessary. Hence this mediator is the lost, estranged essence of private property, private property alienated and external to itself; it is the alienated mediation of human production with human production, the alienated species-activity of man. All the qualities proper to the generation of this activity are transferred to the mediator. Thus man separated from this mediator becomes poorer as man in proportion as the mediator becomes richer. 
Christ originally represents (1) man before God, (2) God for man and (3) man for man.
In the same way money originally represents (1) private property for private property; (2) society for private property; (3) private property for society. 
But Christ is God alienated and man alienated. God continues to have value only in so far as he represents Christ, man continues to have value only in so far as he represents Christ. Likewise with money. 

Marx EW JM 1975: 262

Marx draws a directly analogy between the alienation of social power and God. The more that human beings invest in an object, the less they are in themselves:

All these consequences are contained in this characteristic, that the worker is related to the product of his labour as to an alien object. For it is clear that, according to this premise, the more the worker exerts himself in his work, the more powerful the alien, objective world becomes which he brings into being over against himself, the poorer he and his inner world become, and the less they belong to him. It is the same in religion. The more man puts into God, the less he retains within himself. The worker places his life in the object; but now it no longer belongs to him, but to the object. The greater his activity, therefore, the fewer objects the worker possesses. What the product of his labour is, he is not. Therefore, the greater this product, the less is he himself. The externalization [Entdusserung] of the worker in his product means not only that his labour becomes an object, an external existence, but that it exists outside him, independently of him and alien to him, and begins to confront him as an autonomous power; that the life which he has bestowed on the object confronts him as hostile and alien. 

Marx EW EPM 1975: 325

Marx defines human emancipation and freedom in terms of the practical reappropriation of the power alienated to the state and capital and its reorganisation and exercise by associated individuals as their own social power. (Marx OJQ EW 1975). ‘Not the gods, not nature, but only man himself can be this alien power over men.’(Marx EW EPM 1975). But, if the above analogy between alien power and God applies, that is, if God is the human essence in ideal form, then it follows that the practical restitution of human power not only dissolves God but at the same time turns human beings into gods. In Marx’s defence, if this is indeed what the abolition of alienation entails, then all human beings will become gods. But maybe Marx’s meaning here is very different. 

Marx’s view can be compared to the view of the esteemed Christian writer C.S. Lewis:

Man's conquest of nature, if the dreams of some scientific planners are realized, means the rule of a few hundreds of men over billions upon billions of men. There neither is nor can be any simple increase of power on man's side. Each power won by man is a power over man as well. Each advance leaves him weaker as well as stronger. In every victory, besides being the general who triumphs, he is also the prisoner who follows in the triumphal car.

C.S. Lewis The Abolition of Man 1947

Such a view is entirely consistent with Marx’s conception of democratisation as a universalisation:

The sovereignty of man - but of man as an alien being distinct from actual man - is the fantasy, the dream, the postulate of Christianity, whereas in democracy it is a present and material reality, a secular maxim. 

Marx EW OJQ 1975: 225-226

That would be a thoroughgoing secularisation, not a secular religion of progress. Is it possible? Note that C.S. Lewis considers that the abolition of God implies also the abolition of Man. Marx’s view requires nothing less than universal human emancipation:

The question is: What is the relationship between complete political emancipation and religion? If in the land of complete political emancipation we find not only that religion exists but that it exists in a fresh and vigorous form, that proves that the existence of religion does not contradict the perfection of the state. But since the existence of religion is the existence of a defect, the source of this defect must be looked for in the nature of the state itself. We no longer see religion as the basis but simply as a phenomenon of secular narrowness. We therefore explain the religious restriction on the free citizens from the secular restriction they experience. We do not mean to say that they must do away with their religious restriction in order to transcend their secular limitations. We do not turn secular questions into theological questions. We turn theological questions into secular questions. History has been resolved into superstition for long enough. We are now resolving superstition into history. The question of the relationship of political emancipation to religion becomes for us the question of the relationship of political emancipation to human emancipation. 

Marx EW OJQ 1975

Heady stuff. We are still engaged in the process of answering that question. But if Lewis is right, then Marx’s emancipation in general could mean not the full realization of all humankind but the utter abasement of each and all. Dante has the answer. A transhumanism is quite distinct from notions of Superhumanism.

Imagine




Or just don’t respond to the provocation and return one badly formulated argument for another. There is a danger of arguing as though Nietzsche was right on the amoralism of nature as the ground for human behaviour, which may well not be the case.

You don’t replace nothing with something;
You don’t have to become as gods, merely human beings; 
You don’t abandon something for nothing;
Engage in the positive fulfilment of life’s healthy potentialities; 
We have a moral sensibility that allows us to evaluate social and natural existence and live in accordance with rules and laws we have had a hand in making.
Co-creators in Nature, partners with God.
Fact and value in the purposive, creative, participatory universe.

In other words, this whole argument over grounds for morality may well be utterly misconceived, involving us in a search for something that either doesn’t exist, or can’t be found by such means. I return to the argument I set out in the previous volumes on Marx – ‘God,’ ‘Nature,’ ‘Reason,’ ‘Man,’ are all abstractions with no reality outside of human practice and interchange. The danger lies in rising to the challenge of ‘the death of God’ by looking to press ‘Nature’ or ‘Man’ into the gap that seems to open up in the absence of God. For Marx, there is no gap, and hence no such ground to occupy and fill. The dangers and delusions come when we think that there is, and start to press our creations and inventions into theological service. 

Is this right? Marx’s implicit morality eschews transcendent standards of eternal principle, taking Proudhon to task on this very point. If we take Marx at face value, then the accusation that there is a hidden God in his work is inaccurate, meaning that Marx doesn’t have to make any such choices. For Marx, reason can go a long way, and take rational social form. The question, then, resolves to this: is morality attendant upon the existence of God and is nature amoral? Actually, human beings as social and natural beings possess an innate moral grammar that is expressed as a sympathy in interpersonal relations. To that extent, nature is moral, and is something more than biological imperatives. A natural morality is irreducible to the physical laws and processes of nature, and it is provocateurs such as Nietzsche who force us into making false choices.

At which point, we come to a meeting of Marx and Heidegger in that space beyond metaphysics. In the ‘Letter on 'Humanism,’ Heidegger argues that ‘Every humanism is either grounded in a metaphysics or is itself made to be the ground of one.’ Heidegger wants to go beyond such humanism and metaphysics – and the problem of ‘men as gods’ is entirely a problem of remaining within these old terms, thinking and acting as though God were still around. For Heidegger, it is only in that place beyond metaphysics, where the articulation of the fundamental questions of ontology were fundamentally possible, that any possible meaning to the word ‘humanism’ can be restored (that is, re-give [redonner]). ‘Only a god can save us now.’

The view of ‘Nature,’ like the view of ‘God,’ is an interpretation from a certain perspective. 
I could detach morality from God and argue that our morals are entirely naturally based. To those who point to an amoral nature, nature as nothing more than a competitive struggle for survival, I can offer a natural sympathy as the grounds of a moral sensibility, pointing in the direction of a cooperative society based upon mutual aid. And I can look for, and find, evidence in nature in support of that view. Others can follow the Hobbesian-Darwinian-Nietzschean line and look for, and find, evidence in nature for a competitive struggle for survival, the end justifying any means. The ‘facts’ here are selected in accordance with perspectives. The argument is one of rival interpretations. My argument for a natural sympathy is a moral choice. I can back it with evidence showing human sociability and cooperation in nature. Those who say nature is a competitive struggle can do likewise. On moral grounds, I would present my interpretation as the superior view, but that moral surplus over what can be decided by natural facts alone points to the relative autonomy of morality with respect to natural laws. Those so inclined would point to this as ‘God.’

Read closely and carefully, but generously, Nietzsche’s argument on power is Aristotelian, and fits the view on essentialism that I develop on Marx. That view is quite distinct from rationalising a non-morality patterned on nature’s amoral struggle for survival. Demanding that those who have rejected the belief in God achieve consistency by abandoning Christian morality in favour of a morality derived from a competitive amoral nature, Nietzsche is provoking further thought in order to bring moral assertions more in tune with realities. Nietzsche is looking to generate insight.

In which case, it makes complete sense to conceive Marx’s ‘hidden god’ as the ‘God within,’ the implicit or immanent moral dimension that is built into the essentialist position. This comes with a normative concern with power as flourishing and self-realization. In less heady moments, Nietzsche’s view of the Superman or Overman fits some such reading, with the proviso that Marx saw such self-actualization as available to each and all, Nietzsche only the few. This internal, intimate, subjective view of power fits well with the idea of action and practice, interpretations as perspectives as things that human beings as social and interested beings develop from actual positions within the world.

Against the view that Marx rejects morality and lacks a moral position, I have argued that Marx develops an implicit, active morality. This takes two basic forms, in terms of a normative essentialist anthropology, advancing a developmental view of human beings, and in terms of an emphasis on the collective practical struggles through which human beings contest injustice and exploitation, developing the virtues of solidarity in the process which in turn furnish the basis of a future sociality. Here, we start to develop Habermas’ insight into learning as proceeding through the formation of inner motives.

I return again here to that famous thesis of Marx that philosophers have interpreted the world in various ways, the point however is to change it. Knowing the world, for Marx, is a condition of acting within the world, transforming it from a position inside the world. Marx identifies conscious practical activity, labour/production, as the mediating term between humanity and nature. It is the precise form that this activity takes that shapes reality and what we know of it. Driving that activity are human needs based upon what it is to become and be a fully realized human being. The interpretations that make facts existentially meaningful are generated from within communities of practice.

8 Radicals, Traditionalists, Conservatives and Liberals




Kreeft presents a discussion between four people, a radical, a traditionalist, a conservative and a liberal, and finds a union and a division here that concerns more than politics:

It became obvious to all four of us that there was some sort of a serious spiritual division between “us” and “them”: with the radical and the traditionalist on the one side, and the liberal and the conservative on the other. It was more than a set of aesthetic preferences. It soon became clear that it unexpectedly flowed over into social and political issues. Dick [the radical] and I [the traditionalist] discovered that we shared a preference for “small is beautiful” populism, a suspicion of bigness whether in government or business, a lack of interest in economics, a dislike of suburbs, a love of nature, and a concern for conserving the environment. (I’ve never understood why “conservatives” aren’t in the front rank of conservationism.) We didn’t get into moral and religious issues, but I suspect that even there we would have found a psychological kinship beneath our philosophical differences.




Anyone familiar with MacIntyre would not be surprised by the surprise alliance and division here. There are people who believe in a substantive good on the one side, and liberals on the other. Much of what I have written in these volumes would be classed as a radical socialism. The repudiation of the liberal ontology has been explicit. This final volume evinces a clear turn in a conservative direction, revaluing tradition, the key concerns of a traditional morality, and emphasising a tradition-constituted rationality. Here is where shared agreements are achieved and shared commitments undertaken, in a community based upon a shared language and shared moral values. And here is where radical socialism and traditionalism combine in a rational freedom that is embedded in the form and in the forms of the common life. 

Kreeft has identified something in his essay. 

The work I have done over the years, and the work still to come in the near future, is a variation on a single theme – rational freedom. Grasp that principle, read on it, understand it, and see what needs to be done if we as a society are to live in accordance with it. Because if we don’t, we will divide and we will fall. Whether people realize it or not, all human beings apply a discount rate to future events, and if individuals persist in the tendency to prefer instant gratification then that discount rate will always be too high for environmental survival and success. Human beings struggle to comprehend large numbers, large-scale forces and events, longer time periods. People struggle with abstraction, and apprehend the universal only through concrete particulars. People struggle to keep things in appropriate perspective. And in the absence of appropriate means and mechanisms bringing the world within individual reach, it all makes for is a recipe for failure and disappointment. The intractable nature of the political divisions I see bringing common ruination to the contending parties have their origins not merely in social division but in the tyranny and violence of abstraction, replacing natural sympathy and connection and anarchy with ideology and systemic power. The world needs to be scaled to human proportions and dimensions enabling small-scale practical reasoning grounded in a sense of place and belonging. It gives us firm ground from which to scale up, as indeed we must.

And here I draw on the ideas of Roger Scruton in Green Philosophy:

there is a lesson in this for the environmentalists. No large-scale project will succeed if it is not rooted in our small-scale practical reasoning. For it is we in the end who have to act, who have to accept and co-operate with the decisions made in our name, and who have to make whatever sacrifices will be required for the sake of future generations. It seems to me that current environmental movements, many of which demand far-reaching and even unimaginable government projects, as well as fundamental changes in our way of life, have failed to learn this lesson. Their schemes, like their cries of alarm, frighten the ordinary citizen without recruiting him, and he stands in the midst of a thousand warnings hoping to get through to the end of his life without going insane from the noise….





I agree so much with this, hence I have quoted at length rather than paraphrased. In a meeting with a Green friend and eco-designer, I summarised the views here and presented them as my own view. The ambitious projects of large-scale environmental action we most certainly need will only succeed if they are grounded in small-scale practical reasoning, the warm, affective ties of community, and the love of place as home. He said that way of expressing the environmental question was beautiful and asked me to repeat. At which point I made it clear that I got the idea from Roger Scruton, and that I read widely, and will take any lesson that needs to be learned. I like the way that Scruton brings the environmental question within human comprehension whilst recognizing it as a transcendental issue requiring that we see ourselves as part of a bigger picture, something deeper than the state:





I note, however, that Scruton’s critical ire against abstraction is focused on the state, bureaucracy and top-down environmental legislation and regulation. I can match him and more in that critique of the tyranny and violence of abstraction removing the world from human comprehension and control. It’s called the capital system, and the state is merely capital’s political command centre, one of the system’s alienated second order mediations. There is not a word of criticism from Scruton on commodification, enclosure and the extension of monetary relations into all areas, the original social sin which has profaned all that is holy. 

And here there are parallels with the work of Chris Hedges. In conversation with radical friends, I had been surprised to hear the name of Chris Hedges being cited with approval. I didn’t know Hedges as a radical leftist at all, and raised the question as to which Chris Hedges we were talking about. The Hedges I knew was the man who wrote I Don’t Believe in Atheists (2008), a book which eviscerated contemporary rationalistic atheism. I enjoyed the book very much and absorbed its lessons:





That’s a message that I keep trying to hammer home, not merely against atheism, but mostly against misplaced theological ambitions on the part of all-too-human beings. Atheists, of course, can point out here that these ambitions are not humanist ones at all, but relics of religious delusion. I’m just not sure that religion is indeed a delusion. On the contrary, I consider religious truth a very profound one, and one that is ineliminable in the human condition. Attempts to extinguish religious illusion will serve only to produce a much greater humanist illusion, with potentially catastrophic consequences. That’s my view, and it is Hedges’ view. And Hedges, too, points to the fallacies and inevitable failures of attempts to press science into doing service as ethics and politics. That’s been a point I have sought to make in these volumes, and is a point I have made repeatedly over the years in an attempt to define an environmentalism that takes the field of practical reason seriously, as against its continued overreliance on scientific knowledge and technological know-how. It won’t work, for the reasons that Hedges gives:













Those with power have always manipulated reality and created ideologies defined as progress to justify systems of exploitation. Monarchs and religious authorities did this in the Middle Ages. Today this is done by the high priests of modernity—the technocrats, scholars, scientists, politicians, journalists and economists. They deform reality. They foster the myth of preordained inevitability and pure rationality. But such knowledge—which dominates our universities—is anti-thought. It precludes all alternatives. It is used to end discussion. It is designed to give to the forces of science or the free market or globalization a veneer of rational discourse, to persuade us to place our faith in these forces and trust our fate to them. These forces, the experts assure us, are as unalterable as nature. They will lead us forward. To question them is heresy…




The ridiculous positivism, the belief that we are headed toward some glorious future, defies reality. A challenging view, certainly, and placing a very reasonable emphasis on taking responsibility for our actions, instead of transferring that responsibility to some anonymous history or extraneous force or collective body. With respect to the criticism of Marx, I was careful to add an explanation of Marx’s essentialist metaphysics, pointing out that whilst the realisation of immanent lines of development may be necessary, this is not inevitable, and that these lines are frustratable. Marx openly acknowledged the possibility that, instead of ‘progress,’ there could just as easily be the opposite. It all depends … on agency and on making history as an act of freedom. Hence the need to take politics and ethics seriously, beginning by coming to appreciate what politics and ethics actually are, and how they constitute the field of practical reason, the field in which human knowledge and know-how is tried, tested, applied, in terms of will, motivation, the springs of action.

Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes.

Marx MCP Rev1848 1973: 68-69

There is no uni-linear progress. It all depends on creative agency, and whether and how it acts, if it acts all. ‘History does nothing,’ Marx and Engels wrote: 

History does nothing, it possesses no immense wealth, it wages no battles. It is man, real, living man who does all that, who possesses and fights; ‘history’ is not, as it were, a person apart, using man as a means to achieve its own aims; history is nothing but the activity of man pursuing his aims.

Marx, The Holy Family, Ch VI, 2) Absolute Criticism’s Second Campaign

For Marx, there are only human beings and the social forms and forces they engender. Nowhere did Marx lose sight of the 'active side,' the subjective factor, to deliver some crude linear progression. So I defended Marx whilst agreeing with Hedges’ criticisms of progress.

For this, I received a dismissive comment to the effect that Hedges and I were repudiating all the great scientists in history for what amount to an ignorant rant. There are times when even I despair. And it never ceases to amaze how utterly blinded by the light some enlightened folk really can be. Having spent years trying to get ‘greens’ and environmentalists to take ethics and politics seriously, I looked at this comment and just gave up, feeling a mixture of contempt and disgust at such blinkered incomprehension. I’ll put it bluntly – the world of fact is easy, try doing the hard yards in the world of value and we may actually start getting somewhere. And I reserve my rants for personal encounters.

There is nothing in the above that involves the rejection of science, only a rejection of the scientism that thinks science can serve as ethics and politics. And a rejection of a scientific establishment that is working in service of the corporate machine that Hedges targets. Maybe Hedges goes too far with his general denunciations – such is the hazardous nature of having to generalize in short works. I had actually cited the Hedges article alongside Carl Sagan’s defence of science as a way of life. That was missed by critics, who were obviously irked by the attempt to place rational limits on reason. That’s basic Kantianism, in line with a proper understanding of the Enlightenment. Would Sagan be enamoured of the ‘corporate totalitarianism’ that formed Hedges' specific target? Clearly not. Sagan calculated that the Cold War cost $10 trillion. Noel Brown takes up the story: ‘I asked Carl what can you buy with $10 trillion? He said everything. Every boat, every factory, every farm, everything.’ So I asked my critic as to what it is that goes wrong here, what it is that diverts resources of all kinds into death and destruction? And as I asked, I repeated a point I made with respect to Stephen Pinker, to the effect that I'm not prepared to abandon civilisation for the kind of doom that is popular at the moment. I called it a decadence, and a loss of confidence. But in describing the ‘knowledge which dominates our universities’ as ‘anti-thought,’ Hedges, I suggested, is surely not referring to knowledge as such. The critics disappeared. I just hope I left them with something to think about. Because whatever else this argument is, it is anything but a rant, and is firmly based on the ancient Greek distinction between theoretical reason and practical reason. 

As for ‘progress,’ I am tired of defending Marx against sweeping statements that accuse him of being some naive modernist, apostle of progress, and Promethean, with nothing to say on ecology. And I’m not sure exactly who does see history as preordained. But Hedges’ general point is cogent enough. Hedges is thus keen to reject a blind faith in progress as anesthetizing us against taking responsibility and taking the actions required to bring about a desirable situation:

The naive belief that history is linear, that moral progress accompanies technical progress, is a form of collective self-delusion. It cripples our capacity for radical action and lulls us into a false sense of security. Those who cling to the myth of human progress, who believe that the world inevitably moves toward a higher material and moral state, are held captive by power. Only those who accept the very real possibility of dystopia, of the rise of a ruthless corporate totalitarianism, buttressed by the most terrifying security and surveillance apparatus in human history, are likely to carry out the self-sacrifice necessary for revolt.
The yearning for positivism that pervades our corporate culture ignores human nature and human history. But to challenge it, to state the obvious fact that things are getting worse, and may soon get much worse, is to be tossed out of the circle of magical thinking that defines American and much of Western culture. The left is as infected with this mania for hope as the right. It is a mania that obscures reality even as global capitalism disintegrates and the ecosystem unravels, potentially dooming us all.

‘The naive belief that history is linear, that moral progress accompanies technical progress, is a form of collective self-delusion.’ To whom exactly does this apply? The Enlightenment thinkers were not so foolish. Stephen Pinker backs his argument with a battery of facts and figures. I'm always intrigued to know why people are drawn to sweeping generalisations when it comes to denunciations of civilisation. Hedges will, of course, say that he is doing something more specific here, trying to get us to see the distinction between wisdom and knowledge, highlighting a reason with its emotional and ethical component in place as the condition of saving civilisation from those who are reductionists with respect to money and power - covered by a positivist ideology. 

Conservatives may or may not be inclined to agree with Hedges’ point that global capitalism is unravelling the social and the planetary ecology, but they will certainly respond to the critique of a misplaced optimism and hope that causes human beings to neglect the real conditions of well-being and stability as something more than scientific knowledge and technical know-how:

Wisdom is not knowledge. Knowledge deals with the particular and the actual. Knowledge is the domain of science and technology. Wisdom is about transcendence. Wisdom allows us to see and accept reality, no matter how bleak that reality may be. It is only through wisdom that we are able to cope with the messiness and absurdity of life. Wisdom is about detachment. Once wisdom is achieved, the idea of moral progress is obliterated. Wisdom throughout the ages is a constant. Did Shakespeare supersede Sophocles? Is Homer inferior to Dante? Does the Book of Ecclesiastes not have the same deep powers of observation about life that Samuel Beckett (​http:​/​​/​www.samuel-beckett.net​/​speople.html" \t "_blank​) offers? Systems of power fear and seek to silence those who achieve wisdom, which is what the war by corporate forces against the humanities and art is about. Wisdom, because it sees through the facade, is a threat to power. It exposes the lies and ideologies that power uses to maintain its privilege and its warped ideology of progress.
Knowledge does not lead to wisdom. Knowledge is more often a tool for repression. Knowledge, through the careful selection and manipulation of facts, gives a false unity to reality. It creates a fictitious collective memory and narrative. It manufactures abstract concepts of honor, glory, heroism, duty and destiny that buttress the power of the state, feed the disease of nationalism and call for blind obedience in the name of patriotism. It allows human beings to explain the advances and reverses in human achievement and morality, as well as the process of birth and decay in the natural world, as parts of a vast movement forward in time. The collective enthusiasm for manufactured national and personal narratives, which is a form of self-exaltation, blots out reality. The myths we create that foster a fictitious hope and false sense of superiority are celebrations of ourselves. They mock wisdom. And they keep us passive.
Wisdom connects us with forces that cannot be measured empirically and that are outside the confines of the rational world. To be wise is to pay homage to beauty, truth, grief, the brevity of life, our own mortality, love and the absurdity and mystery of existence. It is, in short, to honor the sacred. Those who remain trapped in the dogmas perpetuated by technology and knowledge, who believe in the inevitability of human progress, are idiot savants.

I agree with Hedges here. Pinker reminds us that actually, yes, whisper it, there is ... (horror for some) .. progress. There, I said it - and I agree with that view. It's not an inevitable progress written into history (possibly Pinker gives the impression that it is? I can find works such as Wright’s which sees natural selection as leading the world to the positive sum society). And it involves many of the forces that Hedges denigrates. And it is also won in the teeth of the forces that Pinker denigrates. And some of the things that Pinker celebrates are actually instrumental to social and planetary unravelling. Complicated, isn’t it? Or ... should we be generous and say that he is demanding the forces of reason actually be more enlightened and more questioning with respect to constituted authority? Challenge and response is what gets us through. I'm breaking with people who are relentlessly negative and take civilisation lightly, indulging some 'back to nature’ fantasy. I think it's a decadence. The Enlightenment is an unfinished project, and there is nothing linear or inevitable or preordained about it, whether there is indeed progress depends on us, and whether we are up to the job. That’s my point on Hedges here, hence the added quotes from Marx. That said, let's not miss the fact that Hedges' target here is the corporate form, and the way that science and technology, along with anything else of value, can come to be caught in its tentacles. 

The distinction between wisdom and knowledge is well enough known, and his point on that, with respect to progress, is solid enough - and the danger comes in missing that - knowledge and know-how give us the ability to act, they don't make us want to act, nor determine the ends for which we should act. That point is valid, it's the one Viktor Frankl made with respect to an expansion of means bought at the expense of a diminution of meaning. There is plenty to ponder here with respect to reductionism here. I take Hedges to be warning against a naive faith in external forces bringing automatic progress. Is that a warning we need? Who believes such a thing? It's a warning against a belief in salvation by extraneous force - seeking to get us to look within ourselves and activate our own capacities, our own agency, to shape the world in a way as to make living in it worthwhile. Which seems reasonable. In his book Self-Made Man and His Undoing, the zoologist Jonathan Kingdon warned that the human species risks being made orphans of its own technology. (Kingdon 1993) I see Hedges warning of the same thing. Sagan justifies science as a way of life. Hedges makes a distinction between technical and moral capacities, between knowledge and wisdom. I'll go with theoretical biologist Stuart Kauffman in Reinventing the Sacred who argues that we need to integrate all the human faculties. And I would relate that to Marx’s concern to realize the one ‘unified science.’ Marx wouldn't much have liked the unsocial socialisation of the corporate form, either.

As an undergraduate, by far and away the best mark I ever received for an essay was for one I wrote on Hegel, one that impressed on account of noting that there was no uni-linear progress in history for Hegel, and that creative agency, as an act of freedom, consciousness and reason on the part of human beings is involved. So I noticed Hedges' comment on Marx in the article and frowned, seeing plainly someone who dismisses 'scholars' in general for being part of the system, whilst making errors that show the merits of scholarship. The thing Hedges calls for was actually integral to the thinkers he seems to be attacking (certainly Marx). And Blanqui is a very dubious figure for Hedges to cite, for any number of reasons. Marx did well to try to wean radicals away from that elitist model of politics and thought. Marx sharply distinguished himself from the elitist and conspiratorial politics of the Blanquist-Buonarroti tradition, and good on him for that. Although, again, Hedges' quotes from Blanqui are ... reasonable, although it doesn't take a Blanqui to have made them - try the political economist the Earl of Lauderdale from 1819, for whom public wealth diminishes as private riches increase. Economists as anti-thought? Use value (labour and nature, true wealth) neglected in favour of the pursuit of exchange value? Marx could have told us what Hedges says Blanqui told us on the despoliation of the natural world – ‘The axe fells, nobody replants. There is no concern for the future’s ill health.’ I have plenty of quotes from Marx on industrialised agriculture, soil, deforestation etc to that effect, denying the ‘chain of generations.’ So, yes, there's plenty in Hedges' view here that I don't agree with. And there’s plenty from Hedges I do agree with.

And much of that plenty emphasises the necessity of politics and ethics as the practical field in which human beings as social beings determine the terms upon which they are to live together and, if all goes well, live well together. The great error of the modern world has been to see the expansion of science, knowledge, industry and technology as being able to do the job for us. Here is the philosopher John Grey:





At some point, if we are serious about transformation, then the worlds of theoretical reason and practical reason have to be brought into relation. And I mean into relation, as against the former dictating to the latter. There is a tendency to look down on the world of politics and ethics as a messy and ambiguous world full of murk and bias and interested behaviours and actions. Such is social life! And such are human beings! There is no clean, logical workaround here. Examining all that needs to be done with respect to environmental reformation, Gus Speth admitted: ‘We scientists don’t know how to do that.’ That’s not a criticism of science, that’s finally a recognition that we need a politics and ethics fitted to the task. 





I know the traditions and disciplines that do know. This is the point I have sought to make throughout these volumes, repeating the case I have developed over the years on a moral ecology. Speth’s recognition of the need for a spiritual as well as a cultural transformation rightly points to the need to set environmentalism within the sense of the sacred. I have noted elsewhere that to atheists like George Monbiot this serves only to identify environmentalists as enemies of reason. I’d strongly suggest it is people like Monbiot who are pressing reason beyond its limits to invite an irrationalism. Some things in life are non-rational or arational, and not necessarily irrational or contrary to reason. Rationalist atheists and humanists, who emphasize scientific knowledge and truth, but deny the same thing to ethics, are the ones wearing the blinkers here:





Once more, this view is not against the Enlightenment. As Arendt pointed out, Kant discovered the ‘scandal of reason’ in the fact that the mind raises questions that it cannot answer rationally. To demand more is to go beyond and against reason, with disastrous consequences:





As Hedges points out, it is often the case that the ‘ideas that prevail are not the best ideas but more often ideas backed by power.’ (Hedges 2008: 66-67). To return to the article:

Those with power have always manipulated reality and created ideologies defined as progress to justify systems of exploitation. Monarchs and religious authorities did this in the Middle Ages. Today this is done by the high priests of modernity—the technocrats, scholars, scientists, politicians, journalists and economists. They deform reality. They foster the myth of preordained inevitability and pure rationality. But such knowledge—which dominates our universities—is anti-thought. It precludes all alternatives. It is used to end discussion. It is designed to give to the forces of science or the free market or globalization a veneer of rational discourse, to persuade us to place our faith in these forces and trust our fate to them. These forces, the experts assure us, are as unalterable as nature. They will lead us forward. To question them is heresy.

The interesting thing about Hedges is that he is a radical leftist in politics, and that my radical leftist friends were not aware of his book I Don’t Believe in Atheists (2008), where he first made the strong arguments he makes in the article criticising the mania for progress and positivism.  (​http:​/​​/​www.truthdig.com​/​report​/​item​/​our_mania_for_hope_is_a_curse_20150524​)Conservatives would possibly disagree with Hedges in some of the areas where I raised objections, with respect to the sweeping denunciation of religious authorities in the Middle Ages as creating ideologies to justify systems of domination and exploitation. He paints with this broad brush in order to draw a parallel with the new high priests of modernity, the technocrats, scholars, scientists, politicians, journalists and economists. It is too simplistic a view of the past, and fails for the same reason with respect to the present, although that is the inevitable pitfall of having to address complicated issues in a short essay. On balance, the Church was an important agency of civilisation, and the times would have been much worse in its absence. 

The interesting point is that conservatives who will disagree greatly with Hedges’ politics would certainly agree with his view that a misplaced hope and optimism with respect to progress has become so pervasive in the public square that individuals no longer see reality as it is, and so no longer respond as they ought. It is a moral and spiritual blind spot.

Hedges writes that ‘resistance will take place outside the boundaries of popular culture and academia, where the deadening weight of the dominant ideology curtails creativity and independent thought.’ It is here that we see radicals and traditional conservatives converging, pulling away from a corrupt and corrupting mainstream pervaded by a dominant liberalism. And it is here that I can reconcile the themes of this last volume with the radical politics of the previous two. Properly understood, emancipation is at base salvation, a return to the source and end of life. Conservative Rod Dreher writes in appreciation of Hedges’ critical points here, whilst highlighting where he differs:





Dreher is the author of The Benedict Option: A Strategy for Christians in a Post-Christian Nation (2017), described by David Brooks as the ‘most important religious book of the decade.’ In this book, Dreher calls on Christians to prepare for the coming Dark Age by withdrawing from the corrupt politics and institutions of the prevailing public world and build communities that embrace the ancient Christian way of life. He sees keeping Hilary Clinton out of the Whitehouse as only a temporary victory in face of the ‘neutral’ state’s onslaught against religion in the name of a secularizing culture. The title of the book comes from the closing passage in MacIntyre’s After Virtue, where MacIntyre draws a parallel between the contemporary age and the epoch in which the Roman empire declined into the Dark Ages:





In pondering these words, I am struck by the parallels with certain environmentalist, deep green and anti-civilisation voices who call for the creation of local communities and communities of resistance that withdraw from the dominant culture. In The Coming Ecological Revolution (2011) I compared and contrasted MacIntyre’s view with those of eco-communitarians, such as Rudolf Bahro, who writes of ‘a change so deep that one must speak of a break with basic European patterns of behaviour,’ and ‘the building of a new psychology.’ Bahro argues that the fall of the Roman Empire is ‘the only event which can be compared in dimension with the present-day crisis of civilization.’ Bahro took the communal monastic orders which emerged to found civilisation anew as the inspiration for an ‘eco-monasticism’ that models the way forward. 
Critchley, P. 2011., The Coming Ecological Revolution [e-book] Available through: Academia website <http://independent.academia.edu/PeterCritchley/Books

Where MacIntyre looks to the remnants of communality from premodern times that have survived into the modern age to ground attempts to preserve human civilisation, Bahro looks to the creation of ‘zones liberated from the industrial system,’ the liberation of ‘surplus consciousness’ and the ‘surplus energies’ that human beings have not yet surrendered to the system. For his part, Rod Dreher looks to St. Benedict of Nursia, the sixth-century monk who, horrified by the moral chaos attendant upon the decline and fall of Rome, withdrew from the public square to the forest in order to foster a new way of life for Christians through enduring communities founded upon principles of order, hospitality, stability, and prayer. Such communities serve as spiritual centres of hope keeping civilization alive. Taking his cue from the closing passage of MacIntyre’s After Virtue, Dreher sees the reign of a new form of barbarism already upon us. Even many believers are blind to it, their churches are too weak to resist it, whilst political institutions have been captured by it and are thus implicated in it. The view sees no hope in politics and the state in coming out of what is at base a spiritual crisis. He therefore advocates the Benedict Option, drawing on the authority of Scripture and the wisdom of the ancient church to withdraw from the dominant culture and politics and construct a resilient counterculture from the outside. I know Dreher most of all from his book on Dante, How Dante Can Save Your Life: The Life-Changing Wisdom of History's Greatest Poem (2017), and now it seems that Dreher is advocating that we embrace exile in order to save civilisation.

Later, I shall argue for scaling up MacIntyre’s vision of virtuous communities of practice. Dreher may be arguing that, in the first instance, there is a need for retreat so as to create those communities free from the corruptions of the world in the first instance, before any notion of their expansion can be envisaged. I shall address the issue in the final chapter. At this stage, I have neither time nor energy nor space to address the substantial implications and issues raised by these questions. It would take a full-scale presentation of MacIntyre’s thought alone to begin with. I have work to come on this on Rousseau, at the moment I am still gathering materials and mapping the field. Here, I can only address the question in relation to the dominant themes of these volumes. In what follows, I will be particularly concerned with the repudiation of large-scale politics, seeing this as a self-defeating hope. That’s my key point with respect to those who think they can retreat from the dominant culture and build local communities of resistance, whether we see these as moral or ecological communities or both – there is no longer a forest to retreat to.

I shall focus on those aspects where MacIntyre rejects the political world as a corrupt and corrupting force. Dreher writes of ‘the refusal to deal with reality, of being captured by various Medusas that captured the gaze and paralyzed the will, led to destruction that was avoidable if only those involved had been willing and able to let go of the outdated and inaccurate certainties by which they had explained their world to themselves.’ That could be MacIntyre writing of state politics or other of the alien forms of capitalist modernity. MacIntyre, we should remember, no longer sees the high road of modernity that Hegel and Marx once saw so clearly:

A Marxist who took Trotsky's last writings with great seriousness would be forced into a pessimism quite alien to the Marxist tradition, and in becoming a pessimist he would in an important way have ceased to be a Marxist. For he would now see no tolerable alternative set of political and economic structures which could be brought into place to replace the structures of advanced capitalism. This conclusion agrees of course with my own. For I too not only take it that Marxism is exhausted as a political tradition, a claim borne out by the almost indefinitely numerous and conflicting range of political allegiances which now carry Marxist banners — this does not at all imply that Marxism is not still one of the richest sources of ideas about modern society —but I believe that this exhaustion is shared by every other political tradition within our culture.

MacIntyre 1981 ch 18

Which, if true, leaves us with no option but retreat, withdrawal and escape, a voluntary exile to a place from where we may build the future alternative. I just don’t think that capital, as an all-embracing system of rule, has left us with any such places. Dreher’s view sounds more like a counsel of despair in face of an inevitable defeat at the hands of a dominant and all-pervasive liberal secularism:

Consider how insane it is that after the twin catastrophes of the last decade — the Iraq War and the economic crash — the country is facing the likelihood that the next presidential election will be a contest between members of the same families whose presidential administrations set us up for both disasters. Even if Jeb Bush isn’t the GOP nominee, you can be certain that the advisers that the nominee surrounds himself with will be the same establishment conservatives that led us into the ditch. And if you seriously think that Hillary Clinton will avoid the same neoliberal Democratic elites that guided her husband’s economic and foreign policies, you are dreaming.
The media, as the gatekeepers of the national conversation, set the bounds for what it is permissible to discuss. Because I have a special interest in religion, the family, and culture, I have closely watched the way the discussion of gay rights and same-sex marriage has unfolded over the last 15 years. It has been nothing but propaganda for the liberationist side. There was never a fair and honest discussion or coverage of the full range of perspectives around the issue, and never was going to be, because the overwhelming majority of people in the media accepted the liberationist position, and thought those who opposed them were bad people who didn’t deserve consideration. Their ideological conviction, and faith in Progress, dictated the boundaries of their collective moral imagination, which in turn set the borders of wider discourse around the topic.
That’s how it all came down. Now, if I can see that dynamic at work in an issue that I care a lot about, and know a fair amount about, I see no reason why similar discourses about foreign policy, economics, and other key issues are not similarly distorted. American liberalism’s belief in the universality of liberalism, and the progressive global march of liberalism (by which I mean the philosophy of 19th century classical liberalism), blinds us to harsh realities, and prepares us to accept delusional conclusions like, “All the Iraqis need to do is to get rid of the dictator, and they will be on the road to liberty and democracy, which are the natural states of humankind.”

The totalitarian universalism and naturalism of that last claim is precisely what I have attempted to contest from Marx’s radical socialist standpoint. Dreher, as a conservative, is more concerned to press other issues. But it is evident that we share a common enemy. Dreher charges: ‘Christians have raised a couple of generations who have been far more catechized by secular, capitalist, hedonist, individualist culture than by the church.’ The threat to the Church is the same threat to socialism, and it lies in that assertion of the moral and ontological ultimacy of the individual against each, any and every form of collective purpose, authority, good, constraint and control. And it is a threat, too, to the environment. If you are a libertarian committed to freeing the individual from the shackles of authority, then don’t make any appeal to the common good, whether you see that good in terms of God, social justice and equality or the climate system and the planetary ecology. 

I trust, by stating the point so bluntly, I have made it clear. Something that can’t go on won’t go on. In the environmentalist idiom, liberalism is unsustainable. For those who celebrate the advance of the forces of secularisation, consider them as forces for disenchantment, removing not merely God and the sacred from the world, but all notions of objective value and meaning. With that goes the common good, socialism, the universal interest, in a general and all-pervasive disembedding and unravelling.

Dreher is a conservative, but he sees precisely what a radical leftist like Chris Hedges is getting at, and I see it too – the morally and socially corrosive effects of liberalism and the way it dissolves commonality into egoistic interest and assertion. I see it as the enemy of socialism and environmentalism, Dreher bemoans its effects upon Christianity:

As I have been writing for some time, the broader culture is turning increasingly anti-Christian, and this will accelerate. You don’t have to believe that the Apocalypse draweth nigh — I don’t believe this — to confront the fact that Christians in this country are facing a rolling disaster that we are not ready to deal with, because our leaders and their followers are captive to an ideology of optimism. Yesterday I wrote to a Catholic friend who is trying to raise his family in a large coastal city where most of the local institutions of Catholicism inculcate an indifference or even a hostility to orthodox Roman Catholicism. He and his wife have been taking Benedict Option measures simply to make it more likely that their children will grow up as faithful Catholics. I asked him what his take on the Irish vote was. He responded:
I suppose the Irish have simply become Europeans. Ireland hasn’t been the Ireland that Sean Thornton discovered in The Quiet Man for quite a long time. I spent a month there in 1990 (I was 19), and even then young Irish girls were more than willing to fornicate with American tourists. I don’t recall any of the Irish kids I met being concerned with the opinions of the Church. They were too busy smoking hash and trying to get jobs in the States. I don’t think we are seeing a revolution, we are seeing an abandoned battlefield. The bones are white and the armor is rusted through.

You can become as paralyzed by cartoonish pessimism as you can by cartoonish optimism. This is not the End of the World, but it is and is becoming the end of a world. Dreher writes of finding meaningful hope by refusing the ideological blinders that prevent us from seeing reality as it is. ‘We have to act radically in the face of radical challenges.’ 

Dreher notes the comments of Father Dwight Longenecker with respect to the prophecy of Benedict XVI: (​http:​/​​/​vaticaninsider.lastampa.it​/​en​/​the-vatican​/​detail​/​articolo​/​papa-el-papa-pope-benedetto-xvi-benedict-xvi-benedicto-xvi-22434​/​​)

In five little known radio speeches made in 1969 and published again a while ago by Ignatius Press in the volume “Faith and the Future”, the future Pope gave his vision of the future of man and the Church. His last teaching, which he read out on “Hessian Rundfunk” radio on Christmas day, had a distinctly prophetic tone.
Ratzinger said he was convinced the Church was going through an era similar to the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. “We are at a huge turning point – he explained – in the evolution of mankind. This moment makes the move from Medieval to modern times seem insignificant.” Professor Ratzinger compared the current era to that of Pope Pius VI who was abducted by troops of the French Republic and died in prison in 1799. The Church was fighting against a force which intended to annihilate it definitively, confiscating its property and dissolving religious orders.
Today’s Church could be faced with a similar situation, undermined, according to Ratzinger, by the temptation to reduce priests to “social workers” and it and all its work reduced to a mere political presence. “From today’s crisis, will emerge a Church that has lost a great deal,” he affirmed.
“It will become small and will have to start pretty much all over again. It will no longer have use of the structures it built in its years of prosperity. The reduction in the number of faithful will lead to it losing an important part of its social privileges.” It will start off with small groups and movements and a minority that will make faith central to experience again. “It will be a more spiritual Church, and will not claim a political mandate flirting with the Right one minute and the Left the next. It will be poor and will become the Church of the destitute.”
The process outlined by Ratzinger was a “long” one “but when all the suffering is past, a great power will emerge from a more spiritual and simple Church,” at which point humans will realise that they live in a world of “indescribable solitude” and having lost sight of God “they will perceive the horror of their poverty.”
Then and only then, Ratzinger concluded, will they see “that small flock of faithful as something completely new: they will see it as a source of hope for themselves, the answer they had always secretly been searching for.
As I see it, the Benedict Option has as much to do with Benedict XVI as Benedict of Nursia. The hope is that this approach to the faith, whether you undertake it as a Protestant, Catholic, or Orthodox, will not only strengthen oneself and one’s family and community against the challenges of the present moment, but will also do what is necessary to make sure that the faith survives to be that source of hope for an exhausted world.

At the same time those who wish to affirm the fullness of the Catholic faith are expressing an increasing desire to belong to a strong community that builds up that faith for them and their families.
Is it time to hunker down and be committed to such communities?

Dreher says it is.
I am sceptical, and will explain at length why with respect to the politics of Alasdair MacIntyre.

(I need to cut discussion short here. My training is in history, and writing in very broad-brush ways about grand events in history make me nervous indeed. The tale of the decline and fall of Rome as a descent into hedonism is often told, but is not the way I would choose to present the issue. I had a stab at it in a 1200 page book that I don’t think anyone has ever read, although one person did message me saying that they will try, since they thought it ‘might be useful.’ Useful for what, I have no idea. (Critchley, P. 2004., The City of Reason [e-book] Available through: Academia website <http://mmu.academia.edu/PeterCritchley/Books). And going from memory, there wasn’t much on the fall of Rome in that, either. I’d rather not get involved in a debate about a moral collapse as a result of the loss of religion. I put it here to note where radicals, traditionalists and conservatives find common ground.)


9 The Normative and the Transcendent against Morality
MacIntyre’s publishing career began with the article on “Analogy and Metaphysics” in the (English Benedictine) Downside Review of January 1951. This was written in the aftermath of a logical positivism that had consigned metaphysical, religious, and ethical language to the realm of the non-sensical. Against this, MacIntyre argues first that linguistic meaning may be analogical as well as univocal and that science and observation themselves rely in part on the former. In establishing the usefulness, and maybe even the indispensability, of analogical meaning, MacIntyre, in the words of John Haldane, ‘opened the way to the rehabilitation of transcendent and normative discourse.’ (Haldane 2017). These are very strong themes in my own work, hence the keen interest I take in MacIntyre.

MacIntyre’s After Virtue was a key text in the modern recovery of virtue, attracting widespread interest. Critics consider the text, particularly its conclusion, to be implausible in modern plural conditions, ‘but few, if any, of these have provided anything like a serious and effective philosophical challenge to his ideas and arguments,’ writes Haldane. (Haldane 2017). 

An exception to this is Bernard Williams: ‘His intellectual breadth, depth, and stamina matched those of MacIntyre, and they share a similarly bleak diagnosis of the pathologies of modern moral philosophy. But Williams was an atheist and a skeptic of attempts to revitalize ethical life by ethical theories, either restorations of earlier traditions or developments of new accounts.’ (Haldane 2017).Williams drew attention to the weaknesses of MacIntyre’s work, in particular nostalgia for pre-modernity and an exaggeration of the philosophical differences between past and present, but reading the work of MacIntyre and Charles Taylor caused Williams to reflect on his own view. He writes:

If Taylor and MacIntyre will forgive my putting them into a mere cartoon sketch, one set of relations between our positions might perhaps be put like this: Taylor and MacIntyre are Catholic, and I am not; Taylor and I are liberals, and MacIntyre is not; MacIntyre and I are pessimists, and Taylor is not (not really).

If I can put myself in this company, I am a Platonist-Aristotelian, Thomist, Rousseauan, Hegelian, Marxist who employs a category of ‘rational freedom’ that encompasses radical socialism, traditional conservatism and anarchism. I’m not a liberal. Pessimism and optimism are mere moods. I take a dialectical and essentialist view with respect to realizing necessary lines of development. History is an act of freedom.

Morally, Williams had more in common with Taylor’s liberalism, philosophically he had more in common with MacIntyre’s critique of modern moral philosophy, so that was the focus of his attention. In turn, Williams is the only contemporary philosopher that MacIntyre engages in Ethics in the Conflicts of Modernity. Williams, it is clear, is the figure who presents the most substantial case against MacIntyre’s view; he is the figure whose objections need to be met, and who is to be hypothetically persuaded of the force of MacIntyre’s Thomist-Aristotelian argument. Both MacIntyre and Williams are profoundly sceptical of the dominant modes of moral philosophy on account of their lack of historical, social, and cultural awareness, taking an abstract ‘Morality’ as their subject. MacIntyre and Williams hold that this ‘Morality’ is a serious distortion of the proper subject of ethics, the question of what it is to live well as a human being. And this is my view, as set out above, and in other places (including work to come). 

Here, MacIntyre and Williams diverge on what it is to live well as a human being. For Williams, this question is a matter of enabling personal meaning and authenticity by each person finding something within himself or herself that can be made the core of personal concerns and commitments. MacIntyre considers this view to be problematically self-referential since turns ethical issues into questions to be answered by the individual. ‘The problem is not that Williams is an ethical egoist, for Williams believes that one’s commitments and concerns will extend to the welfare of others. The problem is rather that at any level of depth, complexity, or protraction, we cannot deliberate alone, both because the conditions required for such reasoning involve others checking and correcting the adequacy of our ideas and inferences, and because what is to be deliberated about generally concerns common interests.’ (Haldane 2017). 

MacIntyre is thus concerned to establish the common conditions that form the context of ethical reasoning, pointing to the necessary commonality in addressing and resolving ethical questions. Personal concerns thus arise, take shape, and become intelligible only as a result of networks of past, present, or anticipated relationships; shared interests and values; and common goals. 

MacIntyre is also concerned to establish the content of ethical reasoning. Williams, he argues, cannot address the central question of ethical: what ought a person do? MacIntyre wants to know if the feelings, desires, and tendencies to which Williams refers are actually good. Which is to ask whether the objects of these feelings, desires and tendencies good. To be able to answer such questions requires an objective standard beyond personal desire and commitment. An ethical existentialism cannot supply that standard, hence any choices it makes will be empty in terms of content. For Williams, human nature, insofar as the existence of some such thing can be assumed, is only a source of value-free biological and psychological facts, and can offer no view of the good. For MacIntyre, as for Aristotle and Aquinas (and, as I have argued with respect to essentialism, Marx), there is such a thing as human nature and it provides both a factual and evaluative ground. ‘What ought a person do?’ is also the question ‘what ought we do?’ given the fact that human beings, in the Aristotelian sense, are social beings. It is thus not a question of merely personal concerns and commitments but a question that concerns establishing what it would be good for a person to do in order to live well, given the kind of (common) nature we have, about what pertains to it as conducive to or constitutive of human flourishing. And that question can only be answered in a social and communal context. Ultimately, no one person can flourish well unless all persons flourish well, and all can flourish well as individuals only in community with others. Here I restate the key principle of rational freedom I have set out throughout. And that view, I have argued, is essentialist, holding that human beings are essentially something and something essentially: ‘I know my good in so far as I know the kind of thing I am, and unlike an angel, I am not a species unto myself. So the standard by which to determine what to do is “common” twice over, being the good of a common human nature and being a good that is realized and shared in common.’ (Haldane 2017). That’s an essentialist view, it is dynamic, and concerns the active realization of healthy potentials, and it entails a clear normative commitment. Whether it requires, too, a transcendent standard, is the controversial issue. Marx is immanentist and historicist. MacIntyre opens the way to an appreciation of the transcendent. Haldane and I argue explicitly for the need for transcendent standards enabling the evaluation of the good.

To understand why this is the key issue we need only to go back to the original route into moral philosophy, the question “Is something good because we desire it, or do we desire it because it is good?” Some say that beauty is in the eye of the beholder; Plato in the Symposium referred to the beauty which is beheld by the eye.

‘The contemplation of beauty absolute; a beauty which if you once beheld, you would see not to be after the measure of gold.’





The idea of a ‘true’ ‘divine’ beauty which is beheld with ‘the eye of the mind’ is a very different notion to that of beauty being in the eye of the beholder.

Which view is true? Subjectivists say something is good because a person desires it, and something is beautiful because a person says it is so; objectivists refer to the inherent properties of a thing in itself, which it is for us to appreciate. MacIntyre’s critical focus is upon ‘expressivism,’ a variant of ‘emotivism,’ as subjectivist views of ethics, dominant in the modern world. According to this view, the individual ‘judges’ something to be good merely in accordance with personal attitudes or states of feeling, likes and dislikes. Against this, the objectivist standpoint holds that a person expresses a favourable attitude toward something because s/he considers it in fact take it to actually be good. The question then is, ‘is a thing really good?’ which in turn begs the further question of how could we know. In fine, we require an objective standard of value, transcendent truths, norms and values as against subjectivist states and irreducible subjective preference.

In line with Aristotle and Aquinas, and in line with the essentialist view of Marx I have presented, MacIntyre argues that human nature and its fulfilment in various species-specific activities offers an objective standard of value by which to evaluate the good. He understands, of course – as I was at pains to emphasise in part 2, vol 2 on essentialism, that the particular forms these activities taken are often culture-dependent, all human productive activity is mediated as part of our ‘second nature.’ The universal, as Aristotle argued, is expressed through concrete particulars. ‘Thus, while human beings are by nature language-users, they are not by nature English-speakers. English is only one of the culture-dependent determinations of the general capacity for language.’ (Haldane 2017). 

Haldane presses the expressivist counter-attack:





How, then, can the case for the essential, inherent and objective good be made good, and deployed also against Williams’ ethics of authenticity, against subjectivism and against existentialism? I’ll give Haldane’s conclusion here before examining MacIntyre’s virtuous communities at length:





Conservative? Traditional? Radical socialist? My friend Quincy Saul, writing on a man whom I was proud to call my friend, Joel Kovel, uses the apt phrase ‘the liberal inferno.’ That is what we are having to navigate in what Kovel called ‘the age of desire.’ ‘Funny how it comes down to taste,’ Kovel writes in The Age of Desire, which is about as concrete as one can get. (Kovel 1981: 31). Which is about as concrete as ethics under liberalism can get. 

This subjectivism is my target here. My affirmation of the transcendent truths of an objective morality are inclined to be dismissed as espousing a ‘traditional’ morality, as though criticism of liberalism renders one’s position nostalgic and reactionary. MacIntyre has been accused of such things. I made the criticism myself in my thesis (Critchley 2001). I was wrong. The restatement of objective truth and inherent value and goodness against the subjectivism of desire and preference actually contains revolutionary implications. To be radical is to go to the root, and to go to the root in contemporary conditions is to expose the groundless nature of modern ethics and politics. 

Quincy Saul writes of the fight that Joel Kovel waged over the course of his lifetime with liberal institutions such as The New York Times, and calls for the score to be settled. (Saul 2018). Liberalism delegitimizes alternate positions even as it celebrates conflict pluralism and diversity. Too often, critics of liberalism are portrayed as reactionary or worse. There is a form of blackmail involved, which has people of left of centre persuasion having to accept the liberal standpoint, or else become culpable in the victory of conservativism. The truth is that the liberal monolith is utterly reactionary in precluding any change that deviates from liberal institutions and values. Saul refers to Joel Kovel’s ‘radical and uncomfortable truths,’ and it is in that spirit that I write. I expect to be criticised as ‘illiberal’ for the systematic repudiation of the liberal ontology and its consequences in an atomist society incapable of constituting true law and order. So be it. 

As the plow follows words, so God rewards prayers. 
The tygers of wrath are wiser than the horses of instruction. 
Expect poison from the standing water. 
You never know what is enough unless you know what is more than enough.

William Blake, The Marriage of Heaven and Hell

We live in a world that equates happiness with the endless accumulation of material quantity, no amount of which could ever fill the gaping hole where the soul of the world once was. And by now, enough is more than enough.

Joel Kovel’s memoir is entitled The Lost Traveller. The phrase comes from William Blake, a man who, with Dante Alighieri, is my favourite writer. For Blake, the first level of vision, single vision, is transcended when we learn to see beyond the immediacy of the material through thought, ideas, reason. But this merely confines us within another narrowing vision, within rules, structures and standpoints particular to what we are - a lawyer thinks like a lawyer, an engineer like an engineer. This is as much an imprisonment of vision as was single vision. Blake wants to break through and go much further in terms of vision. Hence he writes in the Epilogue to Gates of Paradise:

"To The Accuser Who is
The God of This World

Truly My Satan thou art but a Dunce
And dost not know the Garment from the Man
Every Harlot was a Virgin once
Nor canst thou ever change Kate into Nan

Tho thou art Worshipd by the Names Divine
Of Jesus & Jehovah thou art still
The Son of Morn in weary Nights decline
The lost Travellers Dream under the Hill"

We should be able to cope with accusations of being illiberal from liberal accusers. We can repudiate the liberal legal fetishism which sees the letter of the law as the condition of social order. It is, as Montesquieu wrote, the spirit of the law that lies behind true order, and that spirit is the product of right relationships. Blake’s ‘accuser’ is one whose job it is to ensure that the law is obeyed, one who is concerned to hunt down the lawbreakers and begin the process of meting out punishment. ‘The accuser’ is the God of this world, the disordered world, a world that Marx calls ‘inverted.’ It is a world that has departed from true standards, with the result that ‘the accuser’ is unable to distinguish between the underlying reality and the world of appearance, between true humanity and the facade which this world presents. ‘The accuser’ is not aware of the human identity that is Eternal and which moves through various states without losing its essential nature. Most of all, ‘the accuser’ doesn’t know that we have the power to touch true reality in the form of that which is Eternal within each and all human beings. And here I tie up the key themes of the previous volumes. I trust my interest in Blake, essentialism, transcendence and Marx as against atomism and accidentalism is now plain. Joel Kovel understood clearly:





The bureaucrats of knowledge and politics love the thickets of accident, and love to render necessary relations opaque. They dissolve ethics into subjectivism and employ the same acid to purpose, meaning and forms of the common life. They involve us in antinomies produced by their own bifurcated thinking, splitting that which belongs together, the individual and the social, and thereby work to prevent any clear answers to the problems we face. They have a vested interest in rendering the simple complicated, removing the world from our grasp, and making the clear and the distinct vague and fuzzy. And the result is to prevent a clear understanding of the world such as might encourage and facilitate the transformative self-activity that is key to emancipation as a genuine and truly profound salvation.

10 MacIntyre and Virtuous Communities of Practice
The work of Alasdair MacIntyre sheds interesting light on the idea of ethics as a practice, with virtues as qualities acquired and exercised in community. His work is also pertinent with respect to themes of reason, freedom, community and what it is to engage in genuine moral and political activity. The central theme running throughout these volumes has been that of ‘rational freedom,’ examining the problematic relation of reason and freedom within a consideration of the social, moral and institutional requirements of their embodiment. Marx showed that such embodiment as a human emancipation in general entailed the abolition of the state as the realisation of a rational political order. For Marx, freedom in this sense entailed the practical restitution of the alien power of the state back to the social body from which it originated and its reorganisation as social power. Communism is thus the stateless, classless society. MacIntyre, too, emphasizes local communities of virtuous practice, insisting that they have as few dealings with the corrupting force of the state as possible. Unlike Marx, however, MacIntyre does not argue for the abolition of the state but instead accepts its indispensability with respect to certain functions. There is, therefore, a difference between the pair when it comes to the state and the nature of the political. Marx’s abolition of the state does retain a much stronger sense of ‘the political’ than MacIntyre. However, in terms of key political questions such as law, authority, sovereignty and citizenship – all essential elements of a viable and legitimate political order – Marx could also be considered deficient, or question begging. The point is more clearly established in relation to MacIntyre, but genuine political and moral activity requires a political architectonic, and this points to the need neither to reject the state as does MacIntyre nor abolish it as does Marx, but to transform it in such a way as to realize ‘the political’ in the true sense of the word (as is entailed in a proper understanding of Marx’s ‘abolition’). MacIntyre, I shall argue, is unable to achieve the extensive embodiment of the good he establishes as the one, true good. Scaling up beyond local communities to achieve a large-scale moral community, I shall argue, requires a politics that is adequate, appropriate and effective. That, I argue, is what Marx means by abolition in any case, realizing the political as co-extensive with social life in its multiplicity, so that the ‘true state’ is realized as something akin to a modern polis democracy. Here, with respect to a critical examination of MacIntyre, I shall call it simply the state transformed beyond its liberal incarnation. In what follows, then, I shall highlight the strengths of both Marx and MacIntyre as complementary, the key insights of the one serving to fill gaps and overcome deficiencies in the other, in the end proposing something that goes beyond both, whilst nevertheless being consistent with their ambitions. Here, we find personal and social transformation integrated, social life being resolidified and repersonalised within the form/s of the common life.

MacIntyre’s publishing career began with the article on “Analogy and Metaphysics” in the (English Benedictine) Downside Review of January 1951. This was written in the aftermath of a logical positivism that had consigned metaphysical, religious, and ethical language to the realm of the non-sensical. Against this, MacIntyre argues first that linguistic meaning may be analogical as well as univocal and that science and observation themselves rely in part on the former. In establishing the usefulness, and maybe even the indispensability, of analogical meaning, MacIntyre, in the words of John Haldane, ‘opened the way to the rehabilitation of transcendent and normative discourse.’ (Haldane 2017). These are very strong themes in my own work, hence the keen interest I take in MacIntyre.

Much of what follows draws upon the arguments of Thaddeus J. Kozinski in his critique of Alasdair MacIntyre, The Political Problem of Religious Pluralism: And Why Philosophers Can't Solve It (2012). Kozinski’s key concerns are pertinent to my theme, and in this section I develop them in relation to my own central theses. By this stage of proceedings I had run out of time and energy and was being overtaken by a dramatic turn of events back home. I had no option but to complete as best I could as quickly as I could.

Alasdair MacIntyre has developed a powerful and extensive critique of liberalism in both theory and practice, offering virtue-ethics and ‘tradition constituted rationality’ as an alternative to the utilitarianism and relativism of liberal moral theory. With regard to the latter, he puts me in mind of Michael Oakeshott and his attempt to re-establish a balance against the Enlightenment ethical position through ‘traditional knowledge’, ‘conversationally traditional intimation,’ as well as his concern with ‘the politics of faith’ and ‘civil association.’ Oakeshott’s critique of rationalism, too, as laid out in Rationalism in Politics (1962) and Experience and It Modes (1933) in particular, whilst often dismissed as ‘traditional’ and ‘conservative,’ bears comparison with MacIntyre’s thinking. Also worthy of mention is Religion, Politics and the Moral Life (1993). Like MacIntyre, Oakeshott’s critique of philosophisme and Rationalism focuses on the sense of the crisis of philosophical modernity and is concerned with the re-establishment of completeness and with modes of experience as self-consistent worlds of discourse, transcending the abstractness of modes of understanding. The big difference lies between Oakeshott’s ‘politics of scepticism’ and MacIntyre’s commitment to not only identifying the good but socially embodying it. I can’t compare and contrast the work of MacIntyre and Oakeshott here, merely suggest a similarity with the position I am laying out here, Sceptical Politics and Idealistic Historiography: Michael Oakeshott as a Critic of Enlightenment Positions Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy by Kuo-Shiang Roy Tseng. Only to say that I am not a sceptic, although I admire the sceptical temper of Montaigne as one that enjoins us to eschew dogmatic certainties; I affirm Enlightenment values, although in a way that is very critical of liberalism.

In The Limits of Liberalism: Tradition, Individualism, and the Crisis of Freedom (2018), Mark T. Mitchell demonstrates the necessity of tradition to a coherent conception of freedom. He argues that a rejection of tradition is both philosophically incoherent and politically harmful. Mitchell exposes the incoherencies and harms of liberal cosmopolitanism and identity politics on the basis of a flawed conception of tradition through an examination of the works of Michael Oakeshott as well as Michael Polanyi. Mitchell demonstrates that the rejection of tradition as an epistemic necessity has served to generate a false conception of the human person - the liberal self - which in turn sustains a false conception of freedom. Mitchell proceeds to demonstrate what is required to restore tradition to its proper place.

I shall add a substantial note on truth and tradition here, since a few comments are in order on these things. Others may consider this one of my usual digressions, and are free to move on. I think that they should stay and read, because there are important questions of value and valuing here that are pertinent to the argument as a whole.

In the article High culture is being corrupted by a culture of fakes, (2012) Roger Scruton takes a swipe at the likes of Althusser and Lacan, Foucault and Rorty to a lesser extent. I’m not unsympathetic. ‘Universities are propagating nonsense where the fake intellectual invites you to conspire in his own self-deception.’ Scruton defines high culture as a ‘precarious achievement’ that ‘endures only if it is underpinned by a sense of tradition,’ a ‘broad endorsement of the surrounding social norms,’ and a ‘shared frame of reference among educated people.’ I’m saying that some such thing applies to society too, in terms of a shared moral language, religion, community and norms. In this article, Scruton is more concerned with high culture being superseded by a culture of fakes as a result of the evaporation of these things.

‘Faking depends on a measure of complicity between the perpetrator and the victim, who together conspire to believe what they don't believe and to feel what they are incapable of feeling.’ To be able to distinguish between the fake and the authentic implies the existence of an objective standard to distinguish true beliefs, judgments, emotions and expertise from false ones. It implies the existence of a ‘real world’ and the possibility of objective standards giving us access to it. ‘The kitsch work of art is not a response to the real world, but a fabrication designed to replace it. Yet both producer and consumer conspire to persuade each other that what they feel in and through the kitsch work of art is something deep, important and real.’ Which implies that Scruton affirms the existence of something ‘deep, important and real,’ criticising those who depart from it as shallow, ephemeral and false, ‘made up.’

Scruton distinguishes between lying and faking. To lie, a person needs only to say something with the intention to deceive. To fake, however, a person has to take people in, including yourself. Whilst the liar pretends to be shocked when his lies are exposed, that pretence is merely a continuation of his lying strategy. ‘The fake really is shocked when he is exposed, since he had created around himself a community of trust, of which he himself was a member.’ This phenomenon, Scruton holds, is integral to understanding how a high culture works, and how it can become corrupted.

High culture matters, Scruton reasons, because of the high esteem in which we hold the life of the mind, entrusting this to institutions on account of its social benefit. Even if only a few individuals are capable of living the life of the mind to the full, he argues, all benefit from its results, in the form of knowledge, technology, legal and political understanding, and the works of art, literature and music that evoke the human condition and also reconcile us to it. For such reasons, Aristotle identified contemplation (theoria) as the highest goal of mankind, and leisure (schole) as the means to it. Kantians would say that it is through the life of the mind that human beings transcend the world of means to reach the kingdom of ends, leaving behind the routines of instrumental reasoning to enter a world in which ideas, artefacts and expressions exist for their own sake, as objects of intrinsic value. ‘We are then granted the true homecoming of the spirit,’ Scruton happily concludes.

That’s how I understand Plato and Aristotle, and that’s what I understand Rousseau and Kant have been attempting to do among the moderns. This is why I keep affirming the existence of transcendent truths, norms and values against conventionalism, sophism and relativism, seeking a way of reconciling disclosure vis an objectively valuable reality with the imposure of praxis-based philosophies. Is truth, beauty and goodness merely a projection upon the objectively empty world on the part of human agents? Scruton writes that ‘the life of the mind has its intrinsic methods and rewards. It is concerned with the true, the beautiful and the good, which between them define the scope of reasoning and the goals of serious inquiry. But each of those goals can be faked, and one of the most interesting developments in our educational and cultural institutions over the past half century is the extent to which fake culture and fake scholarship have driven out the true varieties. It is important to ask why.’

I think the problem goes much, much deeper than faking, but relates to the question I identified above – the relation of disclosure and imposure in asking the question as to where value lies – with the valuer, the thing valued or the connection between them.
 
I am in broad agreement with Scruton so far, although he is speaking so broadly as to invite agreement. But here is where things become contentious. The most important way of clearing intellectual space for fake scholarship and culture, he argues, is ‘to marginalise the concept of truth.’ Since every utterance, every discussion, every argument would seem to involve truth claims advanced by the contending parties – if they didn’t, what is the point of exchanging views? – then the concept of truth would seem central to human affairs, and not easily marginalised. Marginalisation is achieved by a method that ‘disregards the truth of another's words, since it is concerned to diagnose them, to discover "where they are coming from", and to reveal the emotional, moral and political attitudes that underlie a given choice of words.’ And this method of marginalisation, undermining the concept of truth and opening the doors to the culture of fakes, was, Scruton declares, invented by none other than Karl Marx. Having praised Scruton for some good sense earlier, I have to call him out for errant nonsense here. He writes: ‘The habit of “going behind” your opponent's words stems from Karl Marx's theory of ideology, which tells us that, in bourgeois conditions, concepts, habits of thought and ways of seeing the world are adopted because of their socio-economic function, not their truth. The idea of justice, for instance, which sees the world in terms of rights and responsibilities and assigns ownership and obligations across society, was dismissed by early Marxists as a piece of bourgeois "ideology". The ideological purpose of the concept is to validate "bourgeois relations of production" which, from another perspective, can be seen to violate the very requirements that the concept of justice lays down. Therefore, the concept of justice is in conflict with itself, and serves merely to mask a social reality that has to be understood in other terms – in terms of the powers to which people are subject, rather than the rights that they claim.’

I’ve quoted at length because Scruton does go into the dangers of reductionism, in Marx certainly, but also in any mode of thought. There is a danger of morality, ideas, principles, not to mention the expressed views of human agents coming to be dismissed as mere ideological deceptions and self-deceptions in a crude understanding of Marx’s view. Part 3 of volume 3 Ethics, Essence and Immanence was concerned precisely to show that Marx does have an ethics, one that is in danger of being buried and, indeed, overlooked on account of its immanence, opening the doors to a moral and political wasteland. I have also criticised the overlooking of alienation as an individual self-alienation that requires personal moral effort to overcome, not merely social transformation. Scruton draws attention to the way in which the idea of justice, in seeing the world in terms of personal responsibilities and rights, and which assigns ownership and obligations across society on an individual basis, came to be dismissed as a piece of ‘bourgeois ideology.’ I hope to have restated the reality of those things, and checked tendencies to reductionism. I’ll repeat my view, I believe that there is a transcendent ethic in Marx, although his heavy emphasis is upon immanence, that Marx’s emancipatory claims certainly presuppose some such ethic, and that there is every need to recover and foreground the transcendent dimension. It is for this reason that I have been concerned to emphasise that when Marx does criticize ‘eternal principles’ and ‘eternal truths’ – as he does – his specific target is not so much those truths and principles as the way that thinkers conflate them with particular social forms and institutions, thereby rendering natural and permanent things which are historical products. That said, I would have been far happier had Marx made that distinction himself, and make a clearer statement on truth when he engaged in criticism of particular forms. Rather than repeat myself – again – I would just refer to Part 2 of volume 3 on essentialism, where Marx makes a clear distinction between appearance and reality and declares his commitment to truth. Marx’s interest in ‘going behind’ any statements and declarations made by people was motivated by a concern to identify the truth. To those who take the truth claims of people at face value applies what Marx wrote of Gustav Hugo: ‘He is a sceptic as regards the necessary essence of things, so as to be a courtier as regards their accidental appearance.’ (Marx MECW I 1975: 204). Marx taught us not to take self-image and self-identity at face value, and to test truth claims by standards that are more than self-referential. And that view is entirely consistent with an affirmation of the true, the good and the beautiful. It’s just that Marx is concerned to check statements of eternal truths and principles becoming ideological covers for particular social arrangements.

Vulgar economics actually does nothing more than interpret, systematize and turn into apologetics the notions of agents trapped within bourgeois relations of production. So it should not surprise us that precisely in the estranged form of appearance of economic relations that involves these prima facie absurd and complete contradictions - and all science would be superfluous if the form of appearance of things directly coincided with their essence - that precisely here vulgar economics feels completely at home, these relationships appearing all the more self-evident to it, the more their inner connections remain hidden, even though they are comprehensible to the popular mind.

Marx C3 1981: 955

That’s a commitment to truth against those who fake it. That Scruton doesn’t quite get it – or doesn’t want to – is indicated by the fact he claims that Marx’s theory of ideology, despite being ‘tied to socio-economic hypotheses that are no longer believable’ ‘survives in the work of Michel Foucault, and other intellectuals.’ (If an ideology was believable would it therefore be true? Religion, as Marx well knew, has succeeded in making the unbelievable believable, but it didn’t stop Marx from demanding its abolition – and the inverted conditions that gives rise to it - as an illusion.) Marx and Foucault are chalk and cheese, Foucault has no sense of the normative, no philosophical anthropology, and no concept of truth. Marx’s essentialist metaphysics are anathema to the intellectuals that Scruton writes of. I don’t mind the swipes that Scruton takes at the fakes, so long as Marx is not held responsible. Scruton writes: ‘Foucault's approach reduces culture to a power-game, and scholarship to a kind of refereeing in the endless "struggle" between oppressed and oppressing groups. The shift of emphasis from the content of an utterance to the power that speaks through it leads to a new kind of scholarship, which bypasses entirely questions of truth and rationality, and can even reject those questions as themselves ideological.’ I said pretty much the same thing in criticism of Foucault in my thesis Marx and Rational Freedom, rejecting Foucault from Marx’s ‘rational’ standpoint. 
Scruton next criticizes Richard Rorty for his rejection of objective truth, ‘giving a variety of arguments for thinking that truth is a negotiable thing, that what matters in the end is which side you are on. If a doctrine is useful in the struggle that liberates your group, then you are entitled to dismiss the alternatives.’ That view is closer to the view I have set out on Marx and mediation. But, again, the choosing of sides for Marx – his identification of the proletariat as the ‘universal class’ – involved standards of objective truth with respect to emancipation in general. We may reject Marx’s argument here, but the point is that Marx’s emancipatory commitment was not arbitrary but based on an objective analysis of social reality. Truth is not a function of political efficacy in this conception, even if we may consider that Marx got it wrong and that the capital system is the greatest human invention in history that resulted in people being healthier, wealthier, better educated, longer lived, and in greater numbers than all the civilisations in history put together. It could be the best of times and the worst of times, a world in which ‘everything seems pregnant with its contrary’ (Marx AB SE 1973: 289-90). 

In the end, I defend transcendent standards, above and beyond Marx’s relation to such things, and I have certainly been concerned to challenge the ‘fake’ intellectuals criticized by Scruton, and have done so in advancing Marx’s normative essentialism.

Scruton recognizes that Foucault and Rorty were ‘genuine scholars with a distinctive vision of reality’ and ‘not fakes themselves.’ They merely opened the door to fakes. Scruton proceeds to discuss Althusser and Lacan, who between them run up more references in the academic literature in American than Kant and Goethe combined. 

At which point, criticism becomes pointless. It could easily be that Scruton is merely rejecting something he doesn’t understand. Richard Dawkins describes Michel Foucault and Roland Barthes as ‘icons of haute francophonyism.’ (388). Of course, the only thing that Dawkins knows nothing about Foucault and Barthes is that he doesn’t understand them, and doesn’t want to. We could dismiss it as plain anti-intellectual bigotry. Chomsky, who knows something about linguistics, finds such thinking empty. Then there is the famous Sokal affair. Scruton calls it ‘nonsense:’ ‘Their claims to scholarship and erudite knowledge intimidate the critic and maintain fortified defences against critical assault. They illustrate a peculiar kind of academic Newspeak: each sentence is curled round like an ingrowing toenail, hard, ugly, and pointing only to itself. The fake intellectual invites you to conspire in his own self-deception, to join in creating a fantasy world.’ 

I tangled with this world in the 1990s and have no intention of going back in. I’d just issue a caution, that those most assertive of the existence of objective truth and reality here, particularly those with a natural science background, can tend to miss the important issue of a reality mediated by power, relations, practices, interests etc (which doesn’t mean that those who write of ‘gendered equations’ are not talking nonsense). 

Be careful of an anti-intellectualism masquerading as a commitment to objective and absolute truth. Here, truth is used as a trump card to avoid dealing with awkward and difficult questions. 

My view is expressed by Sokal here:









At which stage, I can only repeat views expressed in the previous volumes, as well as in Being at One (2016), that these science-culture wars are treacherous, and is not the ground I would choose to fight on. Simple truth is rarely simple. But it does exist. The problem with impatience with respect to truth is that you may not see the baby in the bath-water, or be able to distinguish the one from the other, or see how the one may need the other. Things can be interconnected. Which isn’t to replace objectivism with subjectivism.

Either way, the fact that both Sokal on the left and Scruton on the right struck such a chord on this indicates that there is something to their complaint. 

Truth has not been ‘marginalised’ in certain parts of academe, it has been abolished, say people in agreement. 

In the comments below the article, someone writes: ‘I prefer Terry Eagleton, myself - even more impressively read than Scruton, far more subtle and nuanced, resists unthinking retreats into traditions like the devil, and is witty.’

Eagleton is indeed subtle and nuanced. What makes him of particular interest to my argument is the way that, as a Marxist, Eagleton is urging the Left to engage with some ‘traditional’ concerns – the normative, community, mass constituencies, objective reality, absolute truth, concerns which are actually crucial to any emancipatory politics. Eagleton resists any unthinking recovery of these things, of course. Which brings me to tradition and the notion of a tradition-constituted rationality. Following the above, truth is more than a cultural creation, more than customary, meaning that any enabling tradition must conform to certain standards with respect to the good life for human beings. 

To return to truth, tradition, community and practice.
Whilst Oakeshott, MacIntyre, and Polanyi approach tradition in different ways, they each emphasize the essential role of tradition. Mitchell identifies useful elements within the work of each of these thinkers to develop an argument for a reconstructed view of tradition as a condition of a reconstructed view of freedom. Mitchell argues that only by developing an alternative to the liberal self can society escape the incoherencies and pathologies inherent in the liberal conception.

Against the individualism and bureaucratization of liberal moral practice, MacIntyre affirms the practices and politics of local community. MacIntyre’s critique of liberalism is contained in After Virtue (1981), Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (1988) and Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry (1980) and is developed throughout various articles, lectures, and interviews.

There’s no denying the brilliance and depth of MacIntyre’s work, but there are grounds for arguing that his argument contains internal inconsistencies that serve to vitiate his vision of small-scale, tradition-constituted communities. The result is that far from presenting a coherent alternative to liberalism, MacIntyre remains trapped within its confines. The problem lies in MacIntyre's emphatic repudiation of the state, seemingly identifying the state as such, and all large-scale political communities, with the liberal state, so that the rejection of the latter also necessarily entails the rejection of the former. As a result, MacIntyre’s alternative forms of common life fail for want of being sufficiently political, for lacking in political significance, a quality which by default fosters the very political liberalism he is concerned to uproot.

Answering the question ‘Why human beings need the virtues?’ MacIntyre engages in an extended analysis of the politics adequate to virtue-needing human beings as ‘dependent rational animals.’ (MacIntyre 1999). He addresses particular moral norms and ideal political structures to identify the particular social and political forms that best sustain and promote the virtues. With respect to the emphasis on power in an essentialist conception of flourishing, MacIntyre asks a pertinent question: 





This line of questioning is of a piece with MacIntyre’s consistent critique of the Enlightenment conception of the human being as the autonomous and independent ‘individual,’ and the way that this assigns the highest moral imperative to the emancipation of human beings from vulnerability and affliction. Whilst Enlightenment thinkers identify these to be remedial defects that are rooted in faulty environments, MacIntyre considers them to be ineradicable aspects of the human condition. This is precisely the area I have been concerned to target with respect to the emphasis on power in Marx. There is a presumption that, with remedial defects in social arrangements removed, human beings will be restored to health, growing naturally to realize and exercise their power. That view of a society of health and happiness is cogent and is surely the true end of human development. But, without a recognition of the inevitability of human vulnerability and affliction, it is not only imbalanced, it fails to develop a certain empathy and compassion, becoming intolerant and contemptuous of weakness in the process, arrogant and cruel, cold and inhuman. It lacks a sense of the fragility of goodness. (Nussbaum 1986).

Such thinking identifies an essential defect in the Aristotelian conception of virtue, even as it praises the cogency of Aristotle’s account in general. MacIntyre thus insists that rational agency requires the ‘virtues of acknowledged dependence’ as the ‘necessary counterpart’ to the virtues of the independent rational agent:

To ask this question returns us to the discussion of the virtues and why they are needed. The emphasis in my earlier account was on the indispensable part that the virtues play in enabling us to move from dependence on the reasoning powers of others, principally our parents and teachers, to independence in our practical reasoning. And the virtues to which I principally referred were familiar items in Aristotelian and other catalogues: justice, temperateness, truthfulness, courage, and the like. But if we are to understand the virtues as enabling us to become independent practical reasoners, just because they also enable us to participate in relationships of giving and receiving through which our ends as practical reasoners are to be achieved, we need to extend our enquiries a good deal further, by recognizing that any adequate education into the virtues will be one that enables us to give their due to a set of virtues that are the necessary counterpart to the virtues of independence, the virtues of acknowledged dependence.

MacIntyre 1999 ch 10 

‘Conventional understandings of the virtues, even the conventional names for the virtues, may be unhelpful at this point,’ MacIntyre comments. MacIntyre proceeds to write of an ‘uncalculating giving’ and the relationship between justice and generosity. He develops his argument with respect to Aquinas:

Aquinas considers as one objection to the view that liberality is a part of the virtue of justice that justice is a matter of what is owed, and that therefore, when we give to another only what is owed to that other, we do not act with liberality. It is on this view the mark of the liberal, that is, the generous individual to give more than justice requires. To this Aquinas replies by distinguishing obligations that are a matter of strict justice, and of justice only, from the decentia required by liberality, actions that are indeed justly due to others, and are a minimum in the reckoning of what is due to others (Summa Theologiae Ila-IIae 117, 5). If we are to understand what Aquinas is saying here, we need to put it in context by considering also his treatment of the virtue of charity, or friendship towards God and human beings, of the virtue of taking pity, misericordia, and of the virtue of doing good, beneficentia.. In discussing beneficence Aquinas emphasizes how in a single action these different virtues may be exemplified by different aspects of that action. Suppose that someone gives to another in significant need ungrudgingly, from a regard for the other as a human being in need, because it is the minimum owed to that other, and because in relieving the other's distress I relieve my distress at her or his distress. On Aquinas's account that individual at once acts liberally, from the beneficence of charity, justly, and out of taking pity. There is indeed that which is required by liberality, but not by justice, that which may be due from pity, but not from charity. But what the virtues require from us are characteristically types of action that are at once just, generous, beneficent, and done from pity. The education of dispositions to perform just this type of act is what is needed to sustain relationships of uncalculated giving and graceful receiving.

MacIntyre 1999: ch 10

MacIntyre thus comes to the crucial point, arguing that the education of dispositions must include the education of the affections, sympathies, and inclinations. He points out that the deprivations to which just generosity is the appropriate response are characteristically ‘not only deprivations of physical care and intellectual instruction, but also and most of all deprivations of the attentive and affectionate regard of others.’ (MacIntyre 1999 ch 10).

MacIntyre proceeds to ask a second question: ‘What type of social relationship and what type of the common good are required, if a social group is to be one in and through which both the virtues of rational independence and the virtues of acknowledged dependence are sustained and transmitted?’ (MacIntyre 1999: 9). To understand MacIntyre’s answer requires that we are clear as to what he means by the virtues of acknowledged dependence. MacIntyre’s reasoning proceeds thus: In order to flourish, human beings need to understand themselves as practical reasoners about goods, coming to learn this identity as reasoners, and the particular goods about which they reason, through arguing about them with others. This is an example of our intrinsic dependence. To learn ‘how to stand back in some measure from our present desires, so as to be able to evaluate them,’ and to ‘imagine realistically alternative possible futures,’ is necessary for human beings to become independent practical reasoners, but this learning also requires the presence and occasional intervention of others. Thus, our identities depend upon our being recognized by others: ‘I can be said truly to know who and what I am, only because there are others who can be said truly to know who and what I am.’ Acknowledging this is a prerequisite for gaining the virtues of acknowledged dependence: ‘Acknowledgment of dependence is the key to independence.’ In the first instance, accurate knowledge of one’s good requires accurate knowledge of one’s self, and this can only occur ‘in consequence of those social relationships which on occasion provide badly needed correction for our own judgments.’ (MacIntyre 1999: 68-95).

MacIntyre argues that the ‘social relationships of giving and receiving’ that enable self-knowledge and knowledge of one’s good are indispensable in the attainment of this good. In becoming institutionalized, though, these relationships come to be bound up with ‘unequal distributions’ and ‘established hierarchies’ of power, with the result of creating a possibility of corruption in social relationships that comes to ‘frustrate us in our movement towards our goods.’ (MacIntyre 1999: 102-103). MacIntyre argues in After Virtue that practices can remain immune from institutional corruption so long as the goods of effectiveness required to sustain institutions are subordinated to the goods of excellence that are internal to practices and required for human flourishing. He presents the same argument in different language in Dependent Rational Animals: 





This contrast between the two kinds of subordination is the first of MacIntyre’s fundamental ideas in examining the ‘social relationships’ of the modern state. The common good is the second fundamental idea. Analysing practical reasoning as a ‘reasoning together with others,’ MacIntyre argues that a condition of reasoning together effectively about the means to certain goods is a common agreement on the part of reasoners with respect to these goods themselves. Since reasoning is an essentially social activity, then it is only as good as those others with whom we reason: ‘The good of each cannot be pursued without also pursuing the good of all those who participate in those relationships.’ In contradistinction to the liberal notion of the autonomous subject, MacIntyre’s view of the good is premised upon the Aristotelian idea that human beings are social beings, with an emphasis on our radical dependence upon others at different stages of our lives. If, at vulnerable times in the ordinary course of life, such as infancy, childhood, illness, and old age, others did not make the good of another person their own good, then none of us would survive, or would survive only with a severely attenuated capacity for the virtues and activities of independent practical reasoning. 

If I am to flourish to the full extent that is possible for a human being, then my whole life has to be of a certain kind, one in which I not only engage in and achieve some measure of success in the activities of an independent practical reasoner, but also receive and have a reasonable expectation of receiving the attentive care needed when I am very young, old and ill, or injured. So each of us achieves our good only if and insofar as others make our good their good by helping us through periods of disability to become ourselves the kind of human being— through acquisition and exercise of the virtues—who makes the good of others her or his good, and this not because we have calculated that, only if we help others, will they help us, in some trading of advantage for advantage. That would be the kind of human being who consults the good of others, only because and insofar as it is to her or his good to do so, a very different kind of human being, one deficient in the virtues, as I have characterized them.

MacIntyre 1999 ch 9

For a person to have a reasonable expectation of receiving the care he or she needs at crucial stages in their life, a care that they must receive if they are to become an independent practical reasoner, then he or she must be prepared to give this care to others, and do so unconditionally:





In a flourishing community, then, where there are vibrant networks of giving and receiving, and where the virtues of acknowledged dependence are in abundance, a person is able to make the goods of the community his or her own. 





Although they are not reducible to rules, these networks and virtues require rules, so that there is no deficiency in deliberating about responsibilities nor in mutual trust in the fulfilment of them:





For John Finnis, the primary bond of society is a 'shared understanding both of the good for man and the good of that community’ (Finnis 1980: 220). We should not, however, leave the character of these goods open to historical contingency but, following Aristotle, define these goods according to a set of characteristics held to be distinctive of the human species. These demand a form of life which enables the full expression of the potentialities specific to human beings. Whilst contemporary communitarians are aware that human desires and interests do not all necessarily point to an all-inclusive way of life, as Aristotle seemed to assume, they do imply a certain moral order in the universe so that the diversity of goods may be compatible. Thus Raz's argument is predicated on:





Whilst MacIntyre would appear to be in broad agreement with this communitarian attempt to secure the core liberal value of individual autonomy within a communal context, his view is actually quite distinct – going beyond the autonomous liberal self.

Macintyre establishes a clear opposition between the conceptions of the common good, social relationships, and practical reasoning in his argument and in those of modern liberal culture, in which ‘good’ has no more moral significance than the satisfaction of desire on the part of individuals. MacIntyre is nevertheless as insistent on individual goods as any liberal, and makes a point of emphasizing that his view does not involve subordinating the individual and the individual to the community and the communal good. Individual and community are interdependent but irreducible:





In the culture of modern ‘market-based’ society, the only unchosen constraints that individuals are prepared to accept on their behaviour and commitments are those determined by a rationality that is guided by the self-interested motive of preference maximization. Whilst there are other commitments and responsibilities, these are not considered fully rational since they are chosen with regard to our ‘affections’ and ‘sympathies.’ Affection and sympathy are things that individuals owe to others, and therefore are inexorably bound up with ‘norms of giving and receiving.’ For this reason, whilst market relationships of rational, calculative self-interest are not evil in themselves, MacIntyre argues that they need to be attached to relationships of giving and receiving if they are not to corrupt human flourishing and the common good. Social practice is required to provide the context for both aspects of human behaviour, lest they become prone to vice. (MacIntyre 1999: 166-118). ‘Just generosity’ is the virtue that forms the bridge between affectivity and intelligence with regard to social relationships. This is the virtue that directs a person not only to give to others, but give an amount that is disproportionate to what one hopes to receive, even if those others live outside of that person’s recognized community. Once more, some very old lessons need to be relearned. This is the virtue that enable misericordia, in which one feels others' suffering as if it were one’s own. (MacIntyre 1999: 122-125).









The Politics of Tradition
For MacIntyre, politics essentially concerns the attainment of the common good, which is ‘found in the activity of communal learning through which we together become able to order goods, both in our individual lives and in the political society.’ (MacIntyre, "Politics, Philosophy and the Common Good," in The MacIntyre Reader 1998: 243).

MacIntyre is as concerned to establish the necessary conditions for the practice of politics as he is to identify the particular content or values inherent in this practice. In Dependent Rational Animals and "Politics, Philosophy, and the Common Good," MacIntyre establishes six conditions that political structures must meet if individuals are to learn about and achieve their individual and common goods. Three conditions are concerned with achieving the good, three with learning the good.

With respect to the three conditions for a justifiable political order concerned with achieving the good, the first condition is the requirement that politics ‘afford expression to the political decision-making of independent reasoners on all those matters on which it is important that the members of a political community be able to come through shared rational deliberation to a common mind.’ The second condition is that the norms of justice comprise the virtue of just generosity, with a view to securing the desert and needs of independent and dependent citizens respectively. The third condition concerns the provision of spaces enabling all citizens to engage in communal deliberation about the norms of justice, with ‘proxies’ established to speak for those who are unable to speak for themselves. (MacIntyre 1999: 129-30). Participation in political activity on the part of all citizens is particularly important to MacIntyre, its importance implicit in the view of the common good as a good that is acknowledged by all via a ‘common mind,’ an acknowledgment that issues from community-wide rational deliberation.

With respect to the three conditions for a rationally justified politics concerned with learning the good, both individual and common, the first condition is the communal recognition of and obedience to the natural law, and a ‘shared understanding of goods, virtues, and rules.’ In Natural Law as Subversive, MacIntyre presents the natural law as ‘the exceptionless precepts . . . which, insofar as we are rational, we recognize as indispensable in every society and in every situation for the achievement of our goods and of our final good, because they direct us toward and partially define our common good.’ (MacIntyre 1996: 68). MacIntyre holds that universal agreement on a particular and authoritative conception of the good is an indispensable condition both for knowing and for achieving personal and common goods. The second condition for a justifiable political order concerns size, MacIntyre insisting upon ‘a relatively small-scale society whose relationships are not deformed by compartmentalization.’ (MacIntyre 1998 249). By compartmentalization MacIntyre means more than the differentiation of social roles and institutions that is a normal part of every healthy and functional political order, large and small-scale, but refers to the differentiation of virtues, norms, and goods in accordance with each particular social role and institution. Such compartmentalization issues in the disintegration of the individual, who is fractured as a result of having to aim at conflicting goods, follow contradictory norms, and adopt irreconcilable virtues. From this disintegration of the individual follows the disintegration of society too, since the purview required for the ordering of the various goods pertaining to differing roles and institutions to the good of society as a whole, which is the very purpose of politics, comes to be lost. As MacIntyre argues:





For MacIntyre, compartmentalization is an inevitable feature of large-scale political structures, the complexity and scope of which serve to prevent the ‘face-to-face encounters and conversations of local community.’ (MacIntyre 1999: 142). MacIntyre affirms the essence of politics as lying in the communal ordering of all internal goods and practices to the common good, identifying this ordering as a ‘practice’: 





In Aristotelian fashion, MacIntyre identifies politics as the highest of practices, since it ‘affords the best opportunity for the exercise of our rational powers.’ (MacIntyre 1999: 142). A justifiable political order thus involves not merely permitting but actively facilitating engagement on the part of all citizens in terminable rational inquiry and debate with respect to the justification of those political structures. Here, MacIntyre is involved in calling back the ancient dignity and justification of politics as an inquiry into and debate about how best to organize and integrate personal and institutional goods and practices within a commitment to achieving the common good:

Suppose however that there were a culture with the following conception of political community: political community exists for the sake of the creation and sustaining of that form of communal life into which the goods of each particular practice may be integrated so that both each individual and the community as a whole may lead a life informed by these goods.

MacIntyre, "Practical Rationalities as Forms of Social Structure," 123

The large-scale structures of modern political systems work to prevent the establishment of the deliberative media required for the attainment of the common mind that is capable of rationally integrating private and lesser common goods and orienting them to the comprehensive common good that all could share. This leads to the third condition of a justifiable political order, which targets the way that ‘large-scale so-called free market economies’ (MacIntyre, "Practical Rationalities as Forms of Social Structure," 249) work to prevent citizens from freely pursuing and securing their common good. The iniquitous asymmetries in wealth and power that such arrangements produce, as well as the individualistic ethos they foster, generates an endless and irresolvable conflict ‘between rival conceptions of the common good,’ confining the individual within a self-seeking, self-regarding bourgeois identity and preventing the emergence of a public-interested, other-regarding identity.

Far from being the Hegelian ethical agency of rational freedom, MacIntyre holds that the modern nation-state fails to meet any of these six conditions for a rationally justified and commonly acceptable political order. In MacIntyre, the nation-state ceases to be any kind of locus for the authentically moral and rational political activity of citizens. 

MacIntyre’s six-fold criteria for a rationally justified politics serve to establish the terms for the evaluation of any political community’s capacity for facilitating both the learning and the achievement of personal and common goods. With respect to learning, MacIntyre writes:





MacIntyre’s repudiation of modern politics and the terrain upon which it stands is complete:





These six conditions of a rationally justified political order stand at the heart of MacIntyre’s critique of the modern nation-state, accenting his understanding of moral learning as a social practice, and his understanding of social practice as essentially an activity of learning. The politics of the nation-state cannot be a social practice or craft in this sense, since it lacks the essential feature of all well-ordered practices, the means by which individuals learn about and achieve both personal and common goods. Whilst not every non-practice is oppressive, since all practices rely upon institutions, which are non-practices, for their existence and sustenance, and whilst not every institution is oppressive, the institution of the nation state is oppressive in that it pretends to be a practice. Since it is not a practice, the nation-state cannot afford its members the knowledge and possession of goods of excellence that are constitutive of human flourishing. (167-168). However, the nation-state must still pretend to be a practice in order to retain its status as a political structure based on the moral allegiance of its citizens, who aspire to goods higher and more common than self-interested and instrumental and see these aspirations as being met in the political community. The result is that the nation-state must exclude from public discussion any philosophical arguments that could expose its true nature even as it maintains the pretence of securing the public and common good. To the extent that the nation-state succeeds in maintaining this pretence, it serves to prevent the practice of communal deliberation and argument concerning the rational justification of political activity, its own and in general, which is one of the constituent goods of human flourishing and which is an essential component of an authentic politics. (MacIntyre 1998: 250). The oppressive nature of the nation state thus lies in its pretence to be a practice. MacIntyre writes:





Among his conditions for a rationally justifiable political order, MacIntyre insists that practices for must be governed by a ‘shared understanding of goods, virtues, and rules,’ and be governed by the precepts of the natural law, which serve to ‘direct us toward and partially define our common good.’ (MacIntyre 1996: 68). 

MacIntyre identifies the natural law as the set of precepts that include both the necessary rules and enjoinments of the acts of the virtues that the common good requires. (MacIntyre 1999: 110-111). To the extent that the natural-law norms governing the activities of a political community are absent, the state’s activity cannot be conducive to human flourishing. MacIntyre’s view that the nation-state is incapable of embodying the precepts of the natural law and shared substantive values begs the question of the authority by which the state governs its citizens, and itself:

It is central to the life of the modern state that from its point of view there can be no appeal to anything beyond its sovereign authority. When positive law and the natural law conflict, there is no appeal beyond positive law.

Alasdair MacIntyre, "Natural Law against the Nation- State: Or the Possibility of the Common Good against the Actuality of the Public Interest," (unpublished lectures) from Laws, Goods, and Virtues: Medieval Resources for Modern Conflicts, the 1994 Agnes Cuming Lectures in Philosophy, delivered at University College, Dublin, March 1–3, 1994, 43.

The problem with this justification for political authority lies in its self-referential nature. Further, as a result of its great size, scale, and complexity, the nation-state precludes the possibility of any ‘shared understanding’ among the majority of citizens, beyond a mutual commitment to individual self-interest and a pragmatic tolerance in order to maintain the civil peace. With politics defined as a neutral sphere that is agnostic on the good, the nation-state cannot justify its political authority by arguments that demonstrate the conformity of its norms with the precepts of the natural law, since this would be deemed oppressive and unjust to those who deny even the existence of the natural law, let alone its political authority. Instead, the political sphere is reduced to being a neutralized terrain which cannot speak on the good, with the nation-state having to justify itself by arguments that are concerned to demonstrate the extent to which it allows individuals to attain their individualistic, self-chosen goods. 

Whatever else that is, it is not a genuine politics; it is an anti-politics. The word ‘politics’ derives from the ancient Greek polites, referring to a concern with public goods. Its antonym, idiotes, refers to those interested in private affairs only. There is nothing inherently wrong with such private goods. In themselves, however, they are incomplete goods, requiring a properly constituted political order for their completion. The politics of the nation-state becomes an anti-politics when it presents the incomplete goods of private self-interest as complete goods, justifying its politics in those terms. The problem with this mode of justification is that the nation-state lacks any kind of a shared understanding of moral reality, which thus precludes the possibility of the public discussion required to enable citizens to evaluate whether the activity of the modern state and its rationale is justified: 





Moreover, the absence of natural-law norms by which to govern its activities ensures that the activity of the nation-state is not conducive to human flourishing. This begs the question that if the activity of the nation-state cannot be authoritative in terms of the precepts of the natural law or shared substantive values, then upon what authority does the state’s claim to govern rest? (168-169).

It is central to the life of the modern state that from its point of view there can be no appeal to anything beyond its sovereign authority. When positive law and the natural law conflict, there is no appeal beyond positive law.

Ungrounded positive law is a highly unstable foundation for the justification of political authority, its self-referential nature making it a form of self-validation, which is no validation at all. Of course, the problem with grounds is that no sooner do we identify a ground, we face the further question of identifying what that ground itself stands. Even if the world is turtles all the way down, we still face the question of down to what. Why not go up instead, and embrace the transcendent? The precepts of natural law do give us grounds beyond the conventional standards of time and place. Marx mediates between the up and down of the escalator, and focuses on practices that enable us to keep walking.

At this point, we need to ask as to what the practical import of MacIntyre’s politics is. A Marxist would locate the source of demoralisation and depoliticisation not in the state as such but in the capital system as a system that alienates human beings from their physical, ethical and political commons. That points to a social transformation that reappropriates the power alienated to the state and capital to the social body and reorganises it as social power. In the terms of the argument above, this would involve the creation of the social conditions enabling a shared morality and commitment to the common good to emerge. MacIntyre, however, does not countenance such substantial social transformation. His concern is to expose rather than extinguish the forms of the dominant order, to direct energies to the creation of forms of the common life outside of the prevailing order. As he writes, his purpose is not ‘to reform the dominant order, but to find ways for local communities to survive by sustaining a life of the common good against the distinguishing forces of the nation-state and the market.’ 

At this point, MacIntyre pulls his punches, recognising the necessity of the continued existence of the nation-state on account of the fact that it supplies indispensable goods and services for both individuals and communities, such as the rule of law, public justice, relief of suffering, and protection of liberty. That is a realistic recognition of the necessity of certain political functions performed by the state, and allows us to revisit Hegel’s claims for the state as the ethical agency that embodies and articulates the universal interest. But this justification, surely, is what MacIntyre is concerned to contest:

The importance of the good of public security, without which none of our local communities could achieve our common goods, must not be allowed to obscure the fact that our shared public goods of the modern nation-state, are not the common goods of a genuine nation-wide community and, when the nation-state masquerades as the guardian of such a common good, the outcome is bound to be either ludicrous or disastrous or both. In a modern, large-scale nation-state, no such collectivity is possible and the pretense that it is, is always an ideological disguise for sinister realities. I conclude that insofar as the nation-state provides necessary and important public goods, these must not be confused with the type of common good for which communal recognition is required by the virtues of acknowledged dependence, and that insofar as the rhetoric of the nation-state presents it as the provider of something that is indeed, in this stronger sense a common good, that rhetoric is a purveyor of dangerous fictions.

MacIntyre, ‘A Partial Response to my Critics,’ in 1994: 303

MacIntyre’s argument benefits from a comparison with Marx, whose abolition of the state entailed eliminating the class and coercive aspects of the state whilst realizing its rational principle with respect to the universal interest. In The Civil War in France Marx writes of the way that the Commune put an end to the state power as a force that is independent of society, realizing its legitimate governmental functions in a new form of political authority:

The few but important functions which still would remain for a central government were not to be suppressed, as has been intentionally mis-stated, but were to be discharged by Communal, and therefore strictly responsible agents. The unity of the nation was not to be broken, but, on the contrary, to be organized by the Communal constitution and to become a reality by the destruction of the state power which claimed to be the embodiment of that unity independent of, and superior to, the nation itself, from which it was but a parasitic excrescence. While the merely repressive organs of the old governmental power were to be amputated, its legitimate functions were to be wrested from an authority usurping pre-eminence over society itself, and restored to the responsible agents of society.

Marx CWF FI 1974: 210

MacIntyre does not countenance such a move. And yet he emphasizes the state’s great potential for evil, particularly with respect to its pretence to be serving the common good. Here, the state’s representatives speak and act as if the state were a genuine political entity that embodies and articulates the common good and functions in accordance with a rational and moral purpose determined by a deliberative common mind. The view savours a little of the Kantian community of colegislators as well as the communication community of Jurgen Habermas. (Peter Critchley, Habermas and the Rational Utopia 2001). I support the view. But this is very much the rationally justifiable and commonly acceptable political order that stands in need of creation. It is not the reality of the state as currently constituted. It is here that MacIntyre, so sharp on critique, becomes so question-begging and evasive. MacIntyre articulates here the morally ambiguous nature of the nation-state as the institutional agency of rational freedom, condemns the pretence of the state as a ‘purveyor of dangerous fictions,’ claiming a common good it does not and cannot express. 

In a lecture, ‘Natural law against the Nation-state: or the Possibility of the Common Good against the Actuality of the Public Interest,’ MacIntyre identifies the nation-state as a ‘common-interest’ organization as distinct from a ‘common-good’ organization. This means that whilst the state may have a shared aim, it is an aim that is constituted by the summing of individual aims. The true substantive good, however, is always more than an aggregate of individual aims. Thus common-good organization ‘can only be pursued by those individuals who are acting as parts of some communal whole,’ and who ‘understand their individual good as partly constituted by a good … characterizable independently of and antecedently to the characterization of their particular individual good.’ The nation-state is necessarily structured as a common-interest organization and it cannot be other than it is, since its size, scope and complexity, preclude shared deliberation about goods between individuals, and the sheer impersonality of the state precludes the intimate knowledge of and trust in each other that enables each citizen to see the good of the other as one’s own good. For these reasons, MacIntyre argues, the attempt to embody a common good through the nation-state as a common-interest structure is bound to fail. Such embodiment is possible only in the political community as the common-good organization. (MacIntyre, “Natural Law against the Nation State 1994: 29).

MacIntyre analyses the communitarian attempt to achieve a robustly moral political community based upon a shared culture and oriented toward a particular conception of the good. MacIntyre supports this aim, but criticizes the communitarian view that identifies this community as an unconditional good in itself; that political community only counts as good insofar as it fosters the virtues. For MacIntyre, the political community in which citizens engage in a shared deliberation is only possible at levels below the size and scale of the nation-state. MacIntyre notes that the attempt to embody and express moral community through the nation-state level achieves not genuine community, only a greater tyranny, hence the force of libertarian criticism. In this respect, the communitarian position is not merely self-defeating, it actually may serve to bring about the very opposite of what it seeks to achieve, effectively investing the common-interest organisation of the nation-state with a moral justification that properly belongs to a common-good organisation, and with it the moral imperative with which to cover the implementation of its inherently amoral and apolitical self-aggrandizing power. In the name of the good, we get the opposite. MacIntyre’s point is that whilst the state is not an immoral agent in itself, merely a common-interest organisation, it becomes immoral in invested with a moral significance it does not have and a moral responsibility it cannot perform. On the contrary, rather than articulate the common good, the nation-state takes matters of moral import and re-presents them in terms of its own non-moral vocabulary: 





The mistake of communitarianism is to see the state as an ethical and rational agency when, as a common-interest organisation, it is an amoral and arational entity. The power of such an entity, as liberals have understood, needs to be staked down and hemmed in by rules and laws, protecting the rights and liberties of individuals, but the institution can never be humanized. 





MacIntyre shares the non-individualistic conception of the common good advanced by communitarianism, but his conception of political community is quite distinct.

MacIntyre argues that the modern state is ‘grotesquely unfitted to be the protagonist of any substantive conception of the human good’ (MacIntyre, "Natural Law against the Nation State," 1994: 29). A liberal would agree with that statement, but for an entirely different reason than the one MacIntyre offers. The liberal view is premised upon the moral and rational autonomy of the individual, seeing this autonomy as impaired by each, any and every supra-individual political structure that embodies a ‘substantive practical agreement upon some strong conception of the human good.’ (MacIntyre, "A Partial Response to My Critics," 1994: 303). MacIntyre favours such a conception. The liberal view, in contrast, insists on a morally and ideologically neutral state that is agnostic on the good. For MacIntyre, however, a political community that is united on a particular and strong conception of the good is essential to the achievement of rational and moral autonomy. And since, in MacIntyre’s view, the nation-state can never embody such a conception, then the form of the authentic political community must be established elsewhere.

MacIntyre advances neither a morally particularistic nor a morally neutral state but a position that is not merely between but beyond liberalism and communitarianism: 

The contemporary state is not and cannot be evaluatively neutral, and secondarily . . . it is just because of the ways in which the state is not evaluatively neutral that it cannot generally be trusted to promote any worthwhile set of values, including those of autonomy and liberty.’

MacIntyre, "Toleration and the Goods of Conflict," 143

The liberal view demands state neutrality with respect to particular goods as a requirement for securing and protecting the universal goods of individual autonomy and liberty. Such neutrality, MacIntyre argues, is an impossibility: 

The activities of government are such that they are not in their effects neutral between ways of life, but undermine some and promote others.

MacIntyre, "Politics, Philosophy, and the Common Good," 1998: 238

MacIntyre’s rejection of the modern nation state isn’t quite total in that he recognizes its indispensability with respect to certain functions and calls it the ‘ineliminable’ feature of the contemporary landscape (MacIntyre 1999: 133), but his rejection of its ability to embody a substantive conception of the good is. MacIntyre’s argument here contains a certain inner tension. He argues that the state isn’t and cannot be evaluatively neutral in the way that liberals claim it is and ought to be, and he further argues that its evaluations are certain to cause harm. As against the state coming to embody a substantive conception of the good, MacIntyre argues that the prudent course would be to make the state as evaluatively neutral as possible. This involves MacIntyre in advancing a necessary fiction: 

Even although the neutrality is never real, it is an important fiction, and those of us who recognize its importance as well as its fictional character will agree with liberals in upholding a certain range of civil liberties.

MacIntyre, "Toleration and the Goods of Conflict," 144

In effect, MacIntyre is arguing for the morally neutral state in theory, whilst claiming the impossibility of such a state in practice. That suggests an internal incoherence in MacIntyre’s argument and it is interesting to identify its roots. MacIntyre seems to focus so much upon exposing the internal ideological contradictions of liberalism that he fails to develop his own principles fully. He argues:

Every political and social order embodies and gives expression to an ordering of different human goods and therefore also embodies and gives expression to some particular conception of the human good.

MacIntyre, "Politics, Philosophy, and the Common Good," 1998: 247

MacIntyre is right to expose the duplicitous way that liberalism sanctions the key institutions of liberal political order in the form of the ‘particular good’ of ‘no particular good,’ insisting upon moral and ideological neutrality as the non-negotiable foundation of political order, marginalizing and even excluding all other possible orderings with respect to the state and sub-state social and political institutions concerned with other possible particular goods. For MacIntyre, all social and political orders inevitably entail a particular view of the ordering of social and political goods, the liberal order no less than others that are more explicit in advancing the good. The liberal ordering to secure the autonomy and liberty of individuals to order social and political goods as they choose, without any supra-individual political interference, presupposes a particular conception of the good and its institutional embodiment. Since state neutrality is therefore impossible, and harmful too in its pretence, then, MacIntyre reasons, the political challenge is to neutralize the state as far as is possible by limiting its size and scope, investing it with politically minimal tasks, such as providing the material, non-moral institutional goods that enable the craft communities of virtuous acknowledged dependence to do the real political work. (Kozinski 2012).

MacIntyre’s Practically Liberal Politics
Despite the disagreements between the dominant positions in contemporary political philosophy, MacIntyre sees them as significantly agreed on one thing - they all support the political order established by the liberal state. No matter whatever else may separate conservatives, liberals, radicals, democrats and socialists, for MacIntyre they are all liberals when it comes to the fundamentals of political order. MacIntyre’s rejection of the modern state is almost total, with only a grudging recognition of its inevitability remaining. That attitude is not conducive to the creation of an authentic politics. For MacIntyre, the nation-state is incapable of grounding a morally based politics through the embodiment of a substantive conception of the good and therefore cannot serve as a possible locus for genuine political activity. MacIntyre goes further, arguing that in attempting to embody and articulate the substantive good, the state ends up being the agency, not of the universal good, but of tyranny, force, and fraud. To the extent that sub-state political communities seek to embody their authentic politics on the state-level, they succeed only in perverting that politics:





The total nature of MacIntyre’s rejection of state politics seems clear enough. The problem is that, on closer analysis, MacIntyre’s rationale seems to be so skewed by his concern to expose the duplicitous and contradictory nature of liberalism that it fails to develop the political potentialities contained in his own view. MacIntyre’s rejection of a state-based politics seems motivated by a concern to reject the liberal state. If that is the case, then the path seems open to us to examine the possibility of some form of state as public community as being capable of undertaking a genuine political activity grounded in a substantive conception of the good.

MacIntyre rules out the possibility of authentic political activity based on the state for both quantitative and qualitative reasons. Quantitatively, the great size and scale of the state works to prevent the emergence of a consensus on a particular tradition of rationality and conception of the good; qualitatively, he points to the state’s complexity and the bureaucratic structure. These two reasons are not of a piece and can be clearly distinguished, implying that large size and scale may not be the essential problem. If that is the case, and the problem does indeed lie elsewhere, then the state could conceivably embody genuine political activity in the context of a general consensus established with respect to a particular conception of the good.

The question then is of appropriate size and scope to enable the state to establish a consensus, at a level somewhere beyond the local communities that MacIntyre prescribes. The issue also entails establishing the appropriate structure to constitute and enable genuine political activity beyond problems of complexity. To make these points is to distinguish the state as such, as genuine public community, from its particular incarnation in the form of the modern and liberal nation state. There is some justification for establishing that distinction in Marx’s designation of the abstract modern state. This passage from Marx is significant:

The abstraction of the state as such was not born until the modern world because the abstraction of private life was not created until modern times. The abstraction of the political state is a modern product. 

Marx EW CHDS 1975: 90

I wonder if MacIntyre’s real target is also Marx’s real target, which is what neither of them quite thought it was. ‘When is a state not a state?’ The abstraction of the political state, with all the centralisation and bureaucratisation that that state implies, is ‘a modern product,’ and is not, therefore, the state as such. The state that Marx seeks to abolish is the state as the command centre of the capital system, one of capital’s alienated second order mediations. There is no reason, then, to understand that the state as a political model is something that necessarily entails abstraction and alienation; that criticism applies only the liberal state and the way, in its supposed neutrality, it embodies the errors and defects of modern Enlightenment rationalism – which is not reason as such.

These points vitiate MacIntyre’s thought in one respect, whilst opening up a greater range of possibilities for his central principles in another. Arguably, the conception of substantive good he seeks to embody socially requires a large-scale political community on the model of the state in order to be realized. MacIntyre argues that the state is incapable of sustaining genuine political activity given that it cannot embody a substantive conception of the good. Even as criticism, however, there is an inconsistency in MacIntyre’s view. He criticizes liberal claims to state neutrality by arguing that the state cannot but embody some particular conception of the good, and yet argues that the state is incapable of embodying the substantive good and becomes harmful to the extent it attempts to. That leaves MacIntyre, for all of his ambitions to embody the substantive good, having to accept the permanency of the neutral state, not as an organized hypocrisy – which is what his criticism of liberalism shows it to be – but as an ‘important fiction’:

Even though that neutrality is never real, it is an important fiction, and those of us who recognize its importance as well as its fictional character will agree with liberals in upholding a certain range of civil liberties. . . . For the contemporary state could not adopt a point of view on the human good as its own without to a significant degree distorting, degrading and discrediting that point of view. It would put those values to the service of its own political and economic power and so degrade and discredit them.

Alasdair MacIntyre, "Toleration and the Goods of Conflict," 143

To say the least, that view falls some way short of the promises suggested by MacIntyre’s political philosophy. MacIntyre seems to be arguing two ways at once. He cannot sustain his claim that the state’s ‘neutrality is never real’ if the state really is the amoral structure he claims it to be in saying that it is incapable of embodying a substantive conception of the good.

I make these comments not to reject MacIntyre’s political philosophy, but to extend its possibilities beyond the institutional restrictions of his criticisms of the liberal state. Once we accept the impossibility of the state’s neutrality, then the way is open to shape the state’s non-neutrality in accordance with a substantive conception of the good. The issue is not simple, since the impossibility of the neutrality that liberals claim does not necessarily imply the possibility of the state being able to embody the true conception of the good. Rejecting the possibility of neutrality may merely mean that non-neutrality is established in the form of bad and bogus realizations of the good, precisely what MacIntyre identifies as the potential for tyranny, force and fraud in the state embodiment of the good. But these may not be the only options. In these volumes of work, I have repeatedly argued for Marx’s practical restitution of power alienated to the state and capital to the social body and its embodiment and articulation through self-mediating forms. What does that mean, precisely, though, in terms of political institutions and forms? The view certainly implies a restructuring of power and resources so as to reduce the size, scope, scale and complexity of the institutional-systemic world – abolishing the alien power of state and capital – thus achieving a social control that brings the world within the moral, psychic and organisational reach of individuals in their everyday relations. Power thus becomes more amenable to conscious common influence and articulation. That would involve the creation of forms enabling individuals to assume a collective moral responsibility at appropriate levels of social interchange. Such a structure could certainly involve the ordering of governmental functions at various levels, local, municipal, regional and national. Such a view is eminently reasonable and achievable, is consistent with MacIntyre’s concern to sustain genuine political activity, and is infinitely superior to having to accept leaving the state power to its own amoral, disordered imperatives on account of denying possibilities of directing it to the substantive moral good. 

My speculations here are based upon the critical work of political philosophers Keith Breen, Ronald Beiner, and Thomas Hibbs, whose insightful arguments expose the problematic nature of MacIntyre’s conception of the state.

MacIntyre recognizes that the state is necessary for the existence and the sustaining of the local communities of the common good, but argues against the state itself as being capable of embodying this good. Against this, the likes of Breen, Beiner, and Hibbs argue that the local communities that MacIntyre favours can only survive and thrive if the state too comes to embody and articulate the politics of the common good. These communities of the common good thus require the existence of a political entity acting as the ultimate custodian of the common good. Without such an overarching body, the politics of the virtues of acknowledged dependence cannot be sustained. This role can only be performed by the state. Not the modern liberal state, certainly, but that particular incarnation of the state is not the state as such. 

Breen identifies a confusion in MacIntyre’s position here, the way in which he criticizes the state as non-political and amoral, even irredeemably evil, in one instant, only to recognize it as capable of at least some good political activity in another: 





MacIntyre, then, does recognize that the state can, after all, be the bearer of ethical value in some form, and that recognition puts a question mark against MacIntyre’s sweeping denunciation of the state as such as necessarily evil and corrupting. As Breen comments, ‘Whether states corrupt values is a matter of contingent fact, not theoretical generalization.’ (Breen 2002: 196). Which means that if the state’s moral corruption is only contingent rather than necessary, then its nature could be reformulated beyond its present institutional form. The abolition of the modern liberal state, Marx’s ‘abstraction of the political state,’ is not, therefore, the abolition of the state as such.

Establishing the possibility of a genuinely rational politics through the state is important in respect of another aspect of MacIntyre’s view, in that recovering the legitimacy of the state power may well be the condition of salvaging the communities of common good he prescribes. Considering the state to be irrevocably evil and morally corrupting, a non-political, non-moral and self-serving entity presenting itself as a moral and selfless one, MacIntyre advises members of traditional communities to have as little to do with it as possible. Members of traditionalist communities must ‘Take from the modern state and modern corporations no more than what one really needs.’ (Alasdair MacIntyre, "The Virtues of Practice Against the Efficiency of Institutions" in Laws, Goods, and Virtues: Medieval Resources for Modern Conflicts, 77.) Keith Breen’s insight here is to show how the effect of MacIntyre’s counsel is to bring about the very opposite of what he intends. Instead of a politics of the common good, members of traditionalist communities end up adopting the self-serving, calculative attitudes characteristic of state functionaries: 





The result of such moral schizophrenia, Kozinski comments, can only be a less robust and integral practice of the virtues of acknowledged dependence. (Kozinski 2008). And this points to a fundamental incoherence in MacIntyre’s view of the state: 





If, as MacIntyre acknowledges, the state, in certain instances, can act as a moral agent for the political good, then it cannot be characterized as necessarily evil. In presenting the state as both a necessary evil and as necessarily evil, MacIntyre opens up an incoherence in his prescription, counselling a calculative cunning and withdrawal on the part of members of the communities of the common good he favours, considering this the proper attitude to adopt when dealing with a necessary, irredeemable, evil. In other words, MacIntyre’s politics are ultimately self-defeating. For want of transforming the nature of the state power, retaining it as a necessary evil and yet rejecting participation in it as irredeemably evil, MacIntyre deprives the communities he favours of the overarching political structure they need in order to survive and thrive, inviting their eventual corruption through the continued existence of an untransformed state and the inevitable influence it exerts over everything within its political purview. Against such a position, it makes far more sense to uproot the particular form of the state, identified as a corrupting force, and replace it with a transformed state as the locus for a rational politics of the common good. MacIntyre has restricted the scope of his politics of the common good to smaller scale non- and sub-state social entities, ruling out anything on a larger scale on a priori grounds. MacIntyre, however, has not given any adequate reason for thinking that those grounds are true. 

Breen identifies a form of hypocrisy in MacIntyre’s thought on the state in this respect, the product of his opposition to the modern state on account of dominant liberal form. However, as pernicious as we may (or may not) consider its effects to be, this dominance is actually consistent with liberalism’s socially transformative goals, whether we agree with them or not. MacIntyre’s fundamental opposition to liberal politics has led him to conflate their incarnation in the liberal state with state politics as such. The connection between liberal politics and the state may be a historical one, but there is no adequate reason to think that it is a necessary one. And since that is the case, then it is possible to envisage a state politics of the virtues of acknowledged dependence. Indeed, closer analysis reveals that MacIntyre’s political ideal requires the state in establishing and sustaining a politics of virtue.

Beyond an Unpolitical Politics

Let me begin with Keith Breen’s critique of MacIntyre, which argues that MacIntyre requires a totalising political ethics if his vision of virtuous communities of practice is to be effective in the world.

Politics, Breen argues, must transcend the dysfunctional competition of individual wills that it has become in modern society, with charismatic elites jostling for domination of a public whose vitality has been desiccated by state capitalism and its bureaucratic machine. Breen examines the responses of Arendt, Habermas, and MacIntyre to Weber’s bleak rationalization thesis, each seeing in their distinctive ways to resuscitate the political through an ethics of inter-subjectivity based on rational discourse (Habermas), joint political action (Arendt) and shared practices (MacIntyre). Arendt, Habermas and MacIntyre are the thinkers who have presented the most substantial political-ethical challenge to the rationalization of the modern world, but each falls short of redeeming their promises of freedom, equality and solidarity: Habermas by separating system and lifeworld, Arendt by extricating the question of social justice from the political realm, MacIntyre by insulating pre-modern values from large-scale modern organisation. Each shares a bifurcation of political space into fallen and salvable realms, depoliticising a key element of our collective existence and thereby limiting the possibility of wholesale social change. Against this, Breen argues that the goal of human flourishing can only be achieved through a political ethics that is holistic, pervading all aspects of social and public life. Means and ends, formal and informal practices, economic and political institutions must all be subject to this commitment to the common good. But, Breen argues, the political nature of this commitment implies a rejection of Habermas’s moral proceduralism and MacIntyre’s substantive univeralism. There are no presuppositions of consensus or guarantees of teleological harmony: the political realm is, as Arendt so lucidly observed, fragile, contingent, unpredictable and frail. And yet, as Arendt neglected, political ethics must not be divorced from conflict and dissensus, instrumental reasoning and strategic action, compromise and even violence. It is a totalising political ethics that is required. (Wilkinson 2012). I believe that such a totalising political ethics requires also the social embodiment of the one and true substantive good, beyond notions of contingency.

MacIntyre's rejection of the possibility of a state politics of the common good could be justified on prudential rather than necessary grounds. In theory, a more extended area for genuine moral political activity is better than a less extended one. The problem lies in the practice. Whilst we could argue for the possibility of a substantive politics in ideal terms, the experience of state politics in history cautions against it. Although the state may not be necessarily amoral and apolitical, it does have the capacity to corrupt nascent communities of virtue too small and too fragmented to preserve their moral and cultural resources against outside encroachment. That argument, however, is deeply flawed. Just because communities withdraw from participation in the state does not mean that that state and its corrupting influence goes away. If the state power is overweening and possesses the capacity to corrupt, then it will inevitably come to exercise a pernicious influence on all that lies within its compass, whether people and communities choose to participate or not. Further, if the state really is a non-moral and non-political institution, then there is a need to be clear in explaining how it comes to serve as a force of corruption with respect to communities and the good. Marx locates the forces for depoliticisation and demoralisation in the wider processes of the capital system as an alienated system of production, emptying civil society of its moral and political significance, fracturing it into a sphere of universal antagonism and egoism composed of self-seeking, self-maximising individuals. Liberals present the rational and moral autonomous subject as the key figure, necessitating the neutrality of the state sphere with respect to the good. It is here that the capacity for the state to corrupt originates, specifically in charging the non-moral and non-political state with the responsibility for articulating the universality and commonality that human beings, as social beings, need, but which is denied in a diremptive civil society.

That problem of frustration and ideal projection needs to be addressed rather than evaded. (Thomas 1994). To settle for much less than is possible with respect to the greater scope for genuine political activity does not guarantee safety against the possibilities of political corruption, and instead threatens the loss of the attainment of political good at every level. If the state power in its present form is so huge and corrupting, then there is no possibility of evading it, ultimately. MacIntyre is so concerned to ensure that communities of virtue avoid being drawn into the political machinations of the state, becoming complicit in the state’s corruption, that he deprives them of political significance. In doing so, however, he renders them vulnerable to the very state political machinations he seeks to avoid. The problem is, in being rendered non-political, these communities also lose the capacity to be moral, becoming in turn part of the depoliticisation and demoralisation of the wider terrain. If the state is indeed as powerful as MacIntyre indicates, and if this political power has such a potential for corruption, then it has the capacity to corrupt the whole body from the top. To attempt to preserve the moral purpose of communities of virtue by rendering them non-political serves only to render them non-moral in the first instance and, affected by the greater corruption of the state, demoralised in the long run. Rather than render communities of virtue non-political in attempt to evade the corrupting force of the state, it makes much more sense to invest sub-state communities with a degree of political significance, in the very least to be able to defend themselves and their moral commitments, at the most to remoralise and repoliticise state and society as a whole through all its parts, with the end of realizing genuine political activity within a transformed state politics. That would be to actualize a rationally justified politics through the constitution of the state as an authentic political community based on shared deliberation within the context of a substantive conception of the good. This affirms the possibility of a state that is capable of taking form as a site of genuine political activity. In which case, the small-scale political communities that MacIntyre prescribes can come to be re-envisaged as sharing in the political features of the state, exercising the authority of law and administration of justice and undertaking legitimate governmental functions as appropriate in terms of scale and competence. This makes much more sense as the repoliticisation and remoralisation implied by the social embodiment of the good, in contrast to MacIntyre’s unpolitical view that leaves not only the corrupting state power intact, but also the wider forces for depoliticisation and demoralisation in capitalist society. On account of rejecting the political nature of the state, for fear of the corrupting influence of state politics, MacIntyre also rejects investing his virtuous communities with any political features, renders them vulnerable to corrupting influences, and falls far short of the rationally justifiable politics his view favours. And that leaves us questioning how genuinely political and, ultimately, how genuinely moral MacIntyre’s small-scale local communities could ever be. Given the intertwining of politics and ethics in ancient conceptions of virtuous communities, Ronald Beiner’s question with regard to politics applies also to ethics:

The unavoidable question is: What's political about MacIntyre’s ‘politics of local community’? . . . he writes that a community is ‘political’ insofar as ‘it is constituted by a type of practice through which other types of practice are ordered.’ He calls this a polis. But the Greek polis embodied concepts of law, authority, and citizenship—notions seemingly absent from the local communities that MacIntyre is calling political.

Beiner 2000: 477 footnote 22

The absence of a political dimension within MacIntyre’s communities of virtue is debilitating. To be genuine political bodies, these virtuous communities require authority, law, and citizenship. In MacIntyre’s conception, these things remained locked in the attic of the centralised nation state. He makes no mention of the communities he prescribes as possessing rights of citizenship, representative authority, or the framework of effective, enforceable law. The latter in particular is a remarkable and telling omission for a political philosopher who draws so substantially from the Aristotelian and Thomist traditions. Both Aristotle and Aquinas make the law an essential component of any political entity. In MacIntyre’s view, however, and despite his opposition to the state, the state is solely empowered to make and execute law. Moreover, the problem would not be resolved by giving local communities the power to make laws. As Hibbs argues, even with the power to make their own laws, these communities would be eclipsed by the much greater law-making power of the central state:





The solution is to end the competition between communities and state as rival centres of power by creating the one unified political body sharing political power between them at appropriate levels, integrating the above and the below so that there is no false antagonism between ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ conceptions. And that entails a reformation of the state power so as to constitute it as a genuine political community, invested with true ends by which to order the whole, investing civil society at the same time with a political and governmental significance. Such a structure would enable the virtues generated within local communities of the common good to remoralize the whole structure from within.

MacIntyre expects the local communities of virtue he prescribes to order and rank goods and practices for individual community members, but there is no provision in his argument to equip these communities with the political sovereignty they require to enact these orderings in such a way as to ensure their autonomy and self-sufficiency vis the state. As a result, these local communities, denuded of political capacity, are at the behest of a politically omnipotent, corrupting, state. (Thomas Hibbs, "MacIntyre, Aquinas, and Politics," The Review of Politics 66, no. 3 (Summer 2004): 366). 

Further, for want of effective political power, in terms of authority, law, citizenship and sovereignty, these local communities of virtue cannot guarantee the accomplishment of the moral goods that is their very raison d’etre. To effectively order the practices and goods within their dominions with a view to the common good, these communities need to possess a truly political dimension in terms of the power of law and sovereign self-rule. Without that political power, they will be unable to order the ‘practice of practices,’ the very thing that is politics. By default, it will be the untransformed state, as the only law-making and law-enforcing body in existence, that will be doing the ‘ordering’ of goods, practices and communities, since it is the only institution in possession of effective political power. MacIntyre counsels against community involvement in the state on account of its corrupting influence. But it is not possible to avoid that corrupting influence merely by attempting to evade it. The state’s overarching power enables it to ‘order’ the goods, practices, and communities under its dominion in its own way, something that disorders the whole as a result. Communities, no matter how virtuous, cannot escape the general disordering that proceeds from a wrongly constituted state. The problem is that MacIntyre, in cutting communities off from not just the state but from a genuine sense of ‘the political,’ ‘is left with no possible site for overarching political community compatible with the basic condition of modernity—he offers Aristotelianism without a polis.’ (Beiner 2000: 474). And that is no Aristotelianism at all. 

The irony is that the source of the political impotence of MacIntyre’s virtuous communities is the very political impotence that MacIntyre ascribes to the state. To realize his ends with respect to virtue, common good and genuine political activity, MacIntyre needs to come to terms with the state power. Because if the state is not politically impotent after all, and if it does embody a conception of the good, however erroneous or misguided we may take it to be, then this conception will come inevitably to wield an architectonic influence over all the communities, good and practices under its purview, on account of its monopoly of law and force. The solution is to constitute that architectonic properly in accordance with true ends. MacIntyre’s counsel to communities to reject or deal as little as possible with the state, at best adopt a self-serving, utilitarian relationship to it, ensures that the state’s conception of the good, however mistaken, will prevail. The lack of effective political significance will therefore, sooner or later, result in the loss of morality within these communities. 

Even if these local communities of virtue were to come to be invested with political power, there is still no way that they could compete with the state power. The idea that communities could protect themselves from the state’s encroachment and influence through a countervailing political power merely involves communities in a power struggle which, against a much greater rival, they are certain to lose. The only solution is to properly constitute an architectonic political power and influence, and create a true state, one based on the interimbrication of institutions, communities and practices at all levels. MacIntyre’s inability to contemplate such a political architectonic authorized on the state vitiates his entire vision, in that the failure to invest the state with the capacity of genuine political and moral activity comes ultimately and inevitably to threaten the moral capacity of the virtuous communities he prescribes:





In effect, whilst MacIntyre prescribes virtuous communities oriented to the common good, he fails to establish the political and institutional conditions that make these communities viable. By rejecting the possibility of embodying the true conception of the good within the political architectonic of the state, and the dissemination of this substantive good through the state’s political power, MacIntyre deprives these communities of the overarching political community they need in order to survive and thrive. Further, by accepting the indispensability of the existing nation-state, for all of its corrupting influence in terms of tyranny, force and fraud, MacIntyre ensures the political impotence of the very moral communities that possess the potential to transform overarching political community into an ethical agency for the good. The consequence is to render these communities vulnerable to the omnipotent state. The preservation of moral integrity, self-sufficiency, and political autonomy on the part of virtuous communities of the good requires a new political architectonic, transforming the state, and the social roots of the state power, so as to make it a site of genuine political activity.

Jonathan Chaplin draws attention to the deleterious consequences of MacIntyre’s rejection of the possibility of a normative state: 





The situation is far from being unsalvageable. In truth, MacIntyre’s vision of a socially embodied good is well within reach. As Keith Breen argues, there are ‘no theoretical obstacles’ to prevent either MacIntyre or us ‘from recognizing that a prime way to render the state less harmful is to transform it from within.’ (Breen 2002: 198). And that transformation would aim at bringing about a genuine political community so that society is remoralized via the architectonic influence of the true state, the state embodying the true conception of the substantive good. 

As I have argued, in recognizing that the state can after all do some good, MacIntyre effectively relinquishes the sense of the state as necessarily evil. The state’s corrupting influence is therefore contingent and historic. The main problem standing in the way of the transformation of the state power lies in MacIntyre’s primary concern to expose the inherent dishonesty of liberalism, claiming neutrality in support of institutional arrangements that embody a particular view of the liberal society as the good society. Liberalism claims neutrality with respect to any conception of the good so as to ensure the rational and moral autonomy of individuals in choosing the good as they see fit. This is not a neutral position at all, in that it asserts the primacy of personal goods over the common good. Moreover, it sanctions institutional arrangement that externally constrains freedom in practice, even as it asserts it in principle. Claiming to be agnostic on the good, being open to all conceptions and traditions by favouring none, liberal neutrality in practice enables no view of the good but its own to be authoritative in public institutions, law and society. Liberalism’s open society is thus not open at all, tolerating all conceptions, goods and communities so long as they do not become embodied and effective. MacIntyre is therefore keenly concerned to expose liberalism as an ideological project. In this, he succeeds. The problem is, he succeeds so well that he effectively blocks off any common alternative that is authoritative on the state as a genuine political community. It is, however, the constitution of that political architectonic that is key to the realization of aspirations for a socially embodied substantive good that is capable of uniting society as a whole and of ordering communities, goods and practices to their true end. 

MacIntyre establishes the need for a genuine alternative, but there are reasons to doubt whether his view is even that distinct from the liberalism he rejects. In considering that the ability of individuals to choose and live out a conception of the good requires that the good be socially embodied, and in insisting that the individual actively participate in that social embodiment, MacIntyre is committed to the social embodiment of a true conception of the good. However, as Kozinski points out, despite considerable differences in scope and rationale, MacIntyre’s view and the liberal view are identical in their rejection of large-scale social embodiment of conceptions of the good, with respect to both the institution of the state and the culture of wider society. Here is where MacIntyre’s critique of liberalism expresses an internal inconsistency. Liberalism rejects the social embodiment of substantive conceptions of the good for the very reason its view is premised on the rational and moral autonomy of the individual. Whether we consider liberalism to be fundamentally right or mistaken on this, it is internally consistent. MacIntyre’s rejection of large-scale political community is harder to fathom, given that his supra-individual moral commitment with respect to learning and achieving personal and common goods seems clearly to require some such political architectonic. 

MacIntyre seems more concerned with exposing the hypocrisy of liberalism, socially embodying its particular conceptions on a large scale, in flagrant violation of its claims to neutrality, than he is in establishing the political and institutional conditions of his substantive good. Ironically, in his concern to expose liberalism’s hypocrisy, in which he amply succeeds, MacIntyre effectively ends up practising what liberalism only preaches, despite the fact that MacIntyre considers the view to be mistaken. The result is that liberalism succeeds in embodying the substantive good that, in principle, it denies, whilst MacIntyre ends up practising the liberal agnosticism he rejects, failing to embody the true substantive good he makes the end of his politics. He misses the real lesson of the dominance of liberalism – conceptions of the good can be socially embodied on a large-scale, and that such embodiment is a condition of their effectiveness. Liberalism, despite its claims to neutrality, has succeeded in embodying its conception of the good to such an extent as to marginalize, disempower and exclude possibilities for alternative social embodiments, condemning and rejecting these de facto embodiments for the reason they are not consistent with its theoretically individualist and epistemologically skeptical theory – that is, with the liberal conception of the good. This is precisely what lies behind the liberal rejection of Marx’s notions of freedom, community and social control as inimical to individual liberty. When Karl Popper identified Plato, Aristotle, Marx and Hegel as ‘enemies’ of the ‘open society,’ he was demonstrating how liberal neutrality operates, taking a stand on the moral and ontological primacy of the individual to positively suppress all rivals to its very particular view of the good.

Why, MacIntyre needs to answer, having succeeded in socially embodying its conception of the good on the large-scale, would liberals be worried about the accusation he levels against them as being hypocritical? The problem is not philosophical or intellectual, and can only be resolved by an alternative social embodiment. And the liberal view does have the merit of consistency, in that its claim to neutrality is realized in the explicit prescription of the social disembodiment and explicit prohibition of the social embodiment of all particular conceptions of the good – there are only individuals choosing the good as they see fit. Those who argue for the inherently personal nature of the good, as something expressed through the social relationships of individuals, and not in itself social, will not be found arguing that these conceptions actually come to be socially embodied. They may be expressed socially through the normal intercourse of individuals, but they do not need to be socially embodied. 

At this point, attention is more profitably focused not on liberalism, which has established its view very well indeed, whatever we may think of it, but upon those who seek to establish an alternative. Here, MacIntyre falls into a contradiction which serves to identify him with the very liberalism he opposes. The social restriction of conceptions of the good that liberalism insists upon is something that MacIntyre too comes to endorse. The result, arguably, vitiates MacIntyre’s entire attempt to establish a genuine alternative to liberalism. In this respect, liberalism is much more robust and coherent, much less politically timid, utterly unafraid of establishing its vision on the large-scale, whilst affirming the primacy of individuals in pursuit of their personal goods. There is no intrinsic reason for MacIntyre to restrict his aspirations with respect to the social embodiment of conceptions of the good to small-scale communities denuded of political power, and every reason to think that the successful realisation of his vision requires an appropriate large-scale purview and architectonic. It is difficult to see how his visions of virtuous communities oriented to the common good can be realized without the large-scale social embodiment of the good within the culture of wider society and without the architectonic of the political community, something which has traditionally been called the state.

MacIntyre is effectively fighting a battle against liberalism without political weapons, engaging in a unilateral political disarmament that will eventually result in his virtuous communities being stripped of their morals too. To believe, as MacIntyre does, in the possibility of identifying a particular conception of the substantive good, to believe this conception to be true, and to be committed to its social embodiment and its ordering through communities and practices, strongly implies a concern to ensure the widest extent of social embodiment there could possibly be. And that could only involve a political body with an extensive, overarching frame, the political community as a state by any other name, the true state as the embodiment of rational freedom …

It is understandable why liberals would be concerned that a conception of the good be as little socially embodied as possible, being agnostic on the good at best, holding that even if some such good exists, it could only be imperfectly known by individuals, at worst denying that such a good exists at all. The liberal position thus points to either no social embodiment at all or to a plurality and equality of all social embodiments of the good, with no one conception able to gain a dominant position over the others, a kind of mutual self-cancellation that preserves an overall neutrality. 

In contrast to the liberal view, MacIntyre does believe in the existence and the knowability of the one, true conception of the substantive good; he also affirms the necessity of socially embodied traditions of rationality to enable the discovery, learning and achievement of this good. Indeed, MacIntyre explicitly identifies the Thomistic tradition of rationality as the embodiment of this one, true good, and advocates the necessity of individuals participating in the socially embodied practices of this tradition in order to discover and achieve the human good to the full. Having laid out the conditions for the learning and achievement of the good so meticulously, it would seem logical for MacIntyre to seek the widespread social embodiment of the good, establishing the conditions for the flourishing of his small-scale virtuous communities. I have given reasons as to why the fulfilment of this commitment requires not merely that these communities survive and thrive, but that they become more extensive, increasing in number. The fact that this points to an embodiment on a large-scale strongly implies a key role for an overarching political framework. In light of Keith Breen’s strong argument that there is no good reason against the state serving as an ethical agency undertaking genuine political and moral activity, it is possible to envisage a social embodiment of the true conception of the good under the auspices of a transformed state. This recovery of the state as the recovery of a political architectonic is particularly pertinent given the extent to which we can expect small-scale ethical communities to suffer when subject to the domination of the untransformed state. It seems entirely reasonable to think that these virtuous communities would require the support and the ordering of the morally good state, the state as the embodiment of rational freedom. A large-scale social embodiment of a conception of the good seems clearly to imply embodiment in a larger political form, which we may here call the state, in the sense of Marx’s ‘true state.’ A large-scale embodiment of the good implies both a social and a political embodiment, each supporting and buttressing the other, with order and orienting coming from the architectonic influence of the state. 

MacIntyre’s restriction of the state as incapable of embodying the good has the result of establishing the conditions, not of the conception of the good he favours, but of the liberalism he opposes, thereby becoming complicit in the continued domination of liberalism. Catherine Pickstock thus shows how the inadequacy of MacIntyre’s political scope, as with all politics whose ambitions are raised no higher than small-scale practical reasoning within a localised social embodiment, serve only to confine his prescriptions within the liberal social order:





Liberalism rejects the social embodiment of conceptions of the good in order to secure and protect individual autonomy. Its political project implies a pragmatist and contractualist state charged with keeping the civil peace between individuals in pursuit of their own personal goods. The liberal state is thus based on the primacy of right over the good, existing as a neutral sphere concerned with managing the essentially private desires and actions of individuals. To preserve neutrality, the liberal state must be vigilant in preventing the social accumulation of similar thoughts, desires, and actions so that one view comes to prevail over all others, marginalising and excluding them in the process. 

That liberal view is the one that MacIntyre opposes. MacIntyre is committed to the social embodiment of the good and to the communal participation in traditions of rationality that serves to realize the good. But in terms of his political prescriptions, MacIntyre’s view is curiously liberal. Where the liberal view is concerned to secure and protect the moral and rational autonomy of individuals in pursuit of private desires and interests, MacIntyre is concerned to secure and protect the autonomy and self-sufficiency of communities and of communal rationality. Both views reject large-scale social embodiment of conceptions of the good and large-scale communal participation in traditions of rationality. The result is not an alternative to liberalism at all but, in Pickstock’s words, ‘liberalism to a higher order,’ since MacIntyre’s politics, in the concern to prevent the social accumulation of similar desires and actions, effectively endorses the same pragmatist and contractualist state that liberals endorse. The only difference is that liberals endorse such a position to secure and protect individual autonomy, whereas MacIntyre does so to secure and protect communal autonomy. 

The crucial deficiency in MacIntyre’s view, which confines his vision within the liberal political order he seeks to supplant, is that MacIntyre’s state is as denuded of a substantive conception of the good as is the liberal state, meaning that the function of politics in both viewpoints is effectively the same, that of managing the autonomous desires of individuals and communities to guard against social accumulation. Ultimately, MacIntyre is implicated in the attempt to establish and preserve the conditions of a liberal order, given that his politics rules out the political embodiment of the overarching rational telos by which to order the traditions to each other and to the good of the social whole, even though this is the very thing which his ethics demands. 

We can go beyond this institutional restriction on MacIntyre’s part and put the politics and ethics together to produce a social embodiment and communal participation that is buttressed and supported by a transformed state as a site of genuine political and moral activity. Anything short of that, and, as Pickstock argues, the ‘universalism intrinsic to liberalism will tend to reassert itself.’ The problem with MacIntyre’s political programme is that it deprives ‘extra-communal’ social space of tradition constituted rationality, a particular conception of the good, an exclusive belief, a specific telos. (Kozinski 2012). Further, MacIntyre knows very well that this universalism and neutrality is a fiction; he exposes the mask of the liberalism’s self-image in that its neutral management of a substantively empty social space social space serves to cover the domination of its own particular conception of the good over all other communities, and in the name of the open society. Neutrality is just a euphemism for liberalism, the words liberalism and neutrality are interchangeable:





Neutrality, Chaplin says, is just another word for liberalism. MacIntyre unmasks liberalism in this aspect, and yet can still be found endorsing it in key respects. Keith Breen makes a telling criticism in this regard: 





The implication is clear, if MacIntyre is presenting a serious politics concerned with changing the world in a certain direction, then he has to see that this entails embodying his conception of the good within political institutions and social structures. The fact that a certain standpoint or movement succeeds in doing that is not in itself a reason for condemnation, it is whether or not it is the right view and right way in the end. MacIntyre offers his view as the one, true conception of the good, and so should have no compunction in seeing his view being embodied socially and politically on the large scale. In other words, it’s not the embodiment he should object to but the particular view being embodied or not, as the case may be.

MacIntyre is concerned to accuse liberals of contradicting their substantive moral and political commitments, but the more telling point is that MacIntyre himself is in denial of the political implications of his own moral commitments. From MacIntyre’s understanding of rationality as being tradition constituted, it seems to follow that the ultimate telos of MacIntyre’s political theory ought to be the transformation of all social space into a tradition-constituted, communal forum for the shared ethical deliberation about the human good. (Kozinski 2012). The real problem is that MacIntyre pointedly refuses to scale up his common commitments beyond the small-scale local community, denying his vision the extensive social space it requires for fulfilment. The result is that the local communities he prescribes are left as oases of virtue within the depoliticised and demoralised terrain of atomist, egoistic society with its individualistic, ‘traditionless’ irrationality, presided over the abstract fantasies of the untransformed, and therefore essentially irrational, state. The ‘universal’ conception of the good advanced by this state is no more than the individualistic autonomy that threatens to dissolve the particular conceptions of the good socially embodied in the communities it rules: 





A plain contradiction opens up here between a moral project that seeks to embody rational moral activity to the full in society and a political project that consigns a substantial part of social space to the custodianship of an ostensibly non-moral state. The point goes further with respect to ‘rational freedom.’ Marx defined the true state in terms of the extent to which it realized the principle of rational freedom. The state he criticised as a ‘bad state’ is the state which fell short of this embodiment. (Marx and Engels Historische Kritische Gesamtausgabe, Frankfurt, Berlin and Moscow 1927, vol. I, i (i), p. 247). In its abstraction, this state turns freedom into an anarchy, its amorality and arationalism becoming an actual immorality and irrationalism. MacIntyre, rightly, challenges these features of the ‘bad state,’ but errs in rejecting large-scale political activity authorized on the state as political community as such. He expects local communities to embody rational moral activity and order society to a common good from below, but rejects the role of the state or public community in this ordering from above. It makes more sense to see the ordering as a two-way process, but with the architectonic influence of the state as forming the central principle organising, orienting and infusing all parts within the whole.

The extent to which this split between politics and ethics is not a contradiction in MacIntyre’s thought reveals the extent to which MacIntyre’s view remains within liberal modes. Despite his commitment to the social embodiment of substantive conception of the good, through communities of practices, shared deliberation and participation in the forms attaining the good, MacIntyre’s moral theory implicitly accepts ‘interminable moral disagreement’ as a fact of social life, recognizing, with other liberal moral and political philosophers, that the ‘fact of pluralism,’ the absence of moral, philosophical, and theological unity in Western liberal society, is an unchangeable reality of modern life. (Rawls 1993; Maritain 1998 [1951]). The fact that MacIntyre accepts the fact of pluralism but eschews any attempt to establish a morally grounded political order upon it renders his moral project without practical purchase and reach. There is thus an internal restriction which means moral and political activity can never scale up to become extensive, effectively checking social embodiment on a large-scale. And it is this that renders MacIntyre’s project an integral part of the liberal landscape, part of the sociological fact of pluralism and not a coherent alternative to it. In this respect, MacIntyre’s thought is very much of a piece with liberal pluralism. To gain the knowledge that truth has been attained, in the sense of being adequate to some aspect of reality, requires that one’s view of the truth be tested against rival claimants to that truth. MacIntyre expresses this central value of liberal pluralism very clearly:

It may seem to be, but it is not paradoxical, to conclude that the discovery that it is possible for our own particular moral standpoint to be rationally defeated by some rival standpoint is a necessary condition for arriving at a rational vindication of our own point of view. For the strongest indication that any point of view can receive is that is has so far survived encounters with as wide as possible a variety of other and rival standpoints without suffering such defeat.

Alasdair MacIntyre, "Moral Pluralism without Moral Relativism," 1999: 3

Given the extent to which human fallibility, passion, partiality, interestedness, bias, contention, conflict, etc., are ineradicable features of the human condition, a pluralism of different and competing accounts of moral reality is indeed an inevitable aspect of social reality. MacIntyre is not critical of liberalism for accepting the fact of pluralism with respect to the inevitability of human fallibility and moral disagreement, but for the way it exploits this condition to establish and sustain a social order that is so politically and ethically restrictive and anaesthetized as to ensure a mutual self-cancellation between ‘free’ rational individuals that leaves all far short of the true human good. 

Interestingly, in rejecting his Marxist past, philosopher Leszek Kolakowski came to place the accent on the rational and autonomous subject. He developed an interest in religion and the spiritual dimension, but denied absolute certainty with respect to the good and the transcendent: ‘I do not believe that human culture can ever reach a perfect synthesis of its diversified and incompatible components,’ he argued. ‘Its very richness is supported by this very incompatibility of its ingredients. And it is the conflict of values, rather than their harmony, that keeps our culture alive.’ That’s a statement of liberal pluralism, which seems so reasonable that many would be inclined to ask what the problem is.

The problem is the loss of a shared good and the possibility of each and all coming to participate in a common life that is mutually enhancing. Further, it leaves individuals, in this neutralisation of the substantive good, ever vulnerable to the corrupting influences of the forces for demoralisation and depoliticisation governing the world. In an organised political and social life that is agnostic on the good, individuals are free to pursue the good as they see fit, that is, in personal rather than public terms. By denying individuals a unified, socially embodied and authoritative tradition of substantive moral rationality, individuals are incapable of learning and achieving the true good, a neutral public sphere serving to neutralize social space in a mutual moral cancellation. It may not be the worst possible moral consequence, but it falls far short of the best, and operates as a constant check against the embodiment of a moral viewpoint by which to order existence. Crucially, individuals are deprived of the shared participation in the communities and practices which develop embedded traditions of rationality and enable individuals as tradition-dependent rational-social animals to learn and know the truth and achieve the good. 

The problem is that MacIntyre’s own view, despite making all these points clearly and forthrightly, also serves to deprive individuals of these traditions of rationality by depriving his communities of political power. Through this deficiency in politics, traditions of rationality and communities of practice lack the capacity to resist the influence and encroachment from the irrational, anarchic, tradition-destroying state. Instead of infusing all social space, not merely local communities of virtue, with tradition-constituted rationality, the reverse happens, with social space coming to be neutralized and demoralized through the political architectonic of the irrational state. In rejecting participation in that state, whilst leaving it untransformed and in place, local communities find their space for growth constantly under pressure. MacIntyre’s position defaults to the very liberal pluralism he seeks to counter with an alternative. Entrenching and extending that alternative requires that local communities scale up to a larger-scale social embodiment, and that requires an ordering that is possible only through the political architectonic of the state. In arguing that the state as such – and not merely the abstraction of the modern liberal state – is incapable of sustaining genuine moral and political activity, the moral project defaults to liberal pluralism. There is no alternative to a genuine balancing of unity and plurality, establishing a central and cohering ordering principle that runs both ways – top-down and bottom-up - throughout the whole, organising and orienting the parts to the true good – and that points to the state as the realisation of rational freedom, the true state, the state transformed beyond its present restrictive, protective, irrational, anarchic form.

Neil Levy demonstrates the extent to which MacIntyre’s endorsement of inter-traditional pluralism effectively amounts to an endorsement of intra-traditional pluralism:

In order to refute relativism, MacIntyre finds himself importing more and more of the pluralism of modern culture into his account of the rational tradition, until it is no longer clear which is the more riven by conflict. The very pluralism which, MacIntyre believes, threatens to undermine the rationality of our moral judgments turns out to be a necessary ingredient of the supposedly unified traditions MacIntyre wished to vindicate.

Levy, "Stepping into the Present," 472

For all of his commitment to the social embodiment of the one, true conception of the substantive good, MacIntyre, in embracing pluralism this way, is effectively drawn into the very relativism he is concerned to check. There are other ways of embedding and expressing pluralism, ensuring that the parts cohere within a whole that is ordered by a central principle that is disseminated through the architectonic of the true state. That view, I would argue, is precisely what MacIntyre requires in order to make good his claims. By refusing to engage seriously and effectively in large-scale politics, MacIntyre hobbles his moral project, drawing it back into the demoralized liberal terrain he is attempting to leave.

MacIntyre’s position on pluralism and on knowing the truth is question begging in a way that cuts against the direction of his thought, threatening to unravel his moral project. If, as MacIntyre acknowledges, a state of conflictive pluralism between traditions is necessary to generate the epistemological controversies that enable traditions to discover whether their claims to truth can be justified against rival claims in relation to reality, then there is no reason not to accept that a state of conflictive pluralist within traditions is also necessary to enable individuals to discover whether their claims to truth with respect to the goods they desire, the practices they participate in, and the authorities they obey are also adequate to truth and reality. And if that is the case, then the liberal, plural and relativist condition is itself the one and only true good, the demoralized and depoliticized condition of subjectivist value, with social life as no more than a congeries of pursuers and possessors, competing claims, rival goods, and subjective preferences, desires, opinions. And MacIntyre knows this not to be the case at all. And yet, for want of an appropriately and effectively political structuring principle and capacity, he is drawn into the very terrain he is seeking to counteract. J. B. Schneewind points out that MacIntyre’s requirement that individuals come to constantly question their given social identities, even within their own tradition is, to all intents and purposes, indistinguishable from the socially skeptical individualist liberalism that the communities that MacIntyre prescribes are supposed to transcend:

MacIntyre envisages communities whose key feature is that their members will not have any deep doubts about their socially given identities and therefore will not have to make decisions about them. . . . By rejecting fixed inherited social identities and the bad faith involved in treating the cultural as the natural, MacIntyre has incorporated into his ethic two closely related principles of that liberal modern morality he so detests. I do not think his communities, if they were to exist in a world as crowded and communicative as ours, could resist the dialectical consequences of having MacIntyre’s theory as their own self-understanding.

Schneewind, "Virtue, Narrative, and Community," 1982: 663

For these reasons, MacIntyre’s moral project is implausible as an alternative to liberalism. It falls short not on account of its vision of a society ordered to the human good, but for want of the structural capacity and institutional means enabling communities of practice and traditions of rationality to scale up to the whole. 

MacIntyre rejects the liberal, individualist, relativist, sceptical, tradition-independent view of rationality in favour of the necessity of obedience to and dependence upon authoritative substantive conceptions, texts, practices, and institutions; obedience to and dependence upon these authorities is never unconditional and unthinking but is subject to constant internal and external rational evaluation and criticism, on the part of adherents of a tradition as well as members of other traditions. That in itself doesn’t necessarily mean that the substantive commitment to the good dissolves into liberalism, individualism and relativism. It all depends on the nature of the ‘reason’ involved in evaluation and criticism. The ‘reason’ that MacIntyre adheres to is a tradition-constituted rather than tradition-independent rationality, since the capacity to engage in rational evaluation and criticism is dependent upon a continual obedience to the authorities subject to examination and scrutiny. That serves to distinguish MacIntyre from liberalism, but brings him closer to Enlightenment rationalism in relation to the constitution and justification of and obedience to authority. MacIntyre stands firmly in the Enlightenment tradition here in holding that authority is ultimately and always subject to reason. As Terry Pinkard argues: ‘The “authority of tradition” is itself subject to assessment by reason, even if the capacities for good reason are not capacities that can be exercised outside of some appeal to such authority.’ (Pinkard in Murphy 2003: 194).

Some see a tension in MacIntyre’s concept of tradition-constituted rationality here. As Levy comments:

In order for a tradition to be able justifiably to hold sway over the entire field, it is necessary that it does not hold sway over the entire field. In order for a tradition to establish its superiority over its rivals, it is necessary for it to enter into dialogue with them, and be transformed by them. In order for a tradition to progress, it needs the arguments thrown at it by, and the alien perspectives of, rivals. . . . In order for us to be able to conclude that a unified culture with a widely agreed upon social and cosmological order is necessary for rational enquiry, it is necessary for the social field to be riven by deep and fundamental divisions.

Levy, "Stepping into the Present," 482

That seems to describe the plural terrain of today, dominated by a liberalism that continually reinforces its domination by checking itself against rival traditions, drawing their best insights into itself, marginalising and suppressing its other claims, strengthening and rejuvenating itself in the process. 

There may well be a tension in MacIntyre’s thought here, but a tension is not the same thing as a contradiction, and MacIntyre’s view that tradition-constituted rationality and the authority of that rationality be held rationally accountable seems eminently reasonable, and compatible with his moral project rather than inevitably dissolving into liberal pluralism and relativism. Stated generally, the position holds that whilst traditions are required for rationality, these traditions are maintained under constant rational surveillance to guard against signs of irrationality and unwarranted, illegitimate authority. While a tradition may claim to be exclusively true, it requires the existence of other traditions, even though these may be considered false in comparison, in order to constantly check the validity of its truth claims against reality, ensuring that reason is indeed rational in being able to withstand critical scrutiny and argumentation. The tension lies between identifying unified agreement as the greatest internal good of a tradition whilst acknowledging the importance of conflictive pluralism. The question is how important. If we go so far as to recognize conflictive pluralism as an internal good in itself, we may well return to the liberal terrain the moral project is supposed to transcend. This is where Leszek Kolakowski seemed to end up after abandoning Marxism. ‘I do not believe that human culture can ever reach a perfect synthesis of its diversified and incompatible components,’ he claimed. ‘Its very richness is supported by this very incompatibility of its ingredients. And it is the conflict of values, rather than their harmony, that keeps our culture alive.’ Except that this culture is reaching an impasse characterised by a mutual self-cancellation. And its diversity actually proceeds on the basis of the uniformity of the liberal worldview. I admire Kolakowski, and have cited many of his arguments in this piece. I think Kolakowski’s coming to terms with religion takes us in the right direction. But I think his affirmation of conflict pluralism, for fear of dogmatic division and tyranny arising from claims to a unified substantive good, places us firmly within a liberalism that is imploding within, provoking all manner of fundamentalisms, collectivisms and reactions if we fail to address its demoralized and depoliticized terrain positively and rationally. The liberal society is parasitic on certain moral and cultural forms and understandings as well as upon a functioning economic system that broadly satisfies the needs of the many. These conditions are narrowing all the time.

I think it is possible to embrace that tension in MacIntyre’s thought with respect to the good, conflict and pluralism as a strength rather than a weakness, incorporating the critical dimension of Enlightenment rationalism without thereby dissolving tradition-constituted rationality, rendering communities of virtue merely one plural interest group among many others. But this is possible only by overcoming the political deficiency at the heart of MacIntyre’s thought. 

MacIntyre’s principal target is not so much Enlightenment rationalism as Enlightenment liberalism, the identification of the Enlightenment with liberal forms, institutions and values. There is another Enlightenment, one that is radical and critical, as well as a counter-current that sought to value and revalue traditions, customs, mores, habits. I’m thinking of Rousseau here, whom Tocqueville, the man of intermediary associations and ‘habits of the heart,’ claimed to have read every day. Like Kant, like Marx, MacIntyre seeks a reason that is rational about itself. MacIntyre expresses an explicit concern is with the ‘interminable moral disagreement’ of modern liberal society, generating a ‘pluralism which threatens to submerge us all.’ The close analysis of MacIntyre’s view above, however, reveals that, far from being the central threats to the good, ‘moral disagreement’ and pluralism may actually play a key role in the discovery and attainment of the good. MacIntyre’s critical concern is only with a certain kind of moral disagreement and pluralism, the interminable kind whose contention and interplay is cut off from the ordering principle of the true good. The conflictive and pluralistic character of social life is not the problem, and neither is the critical scrutiny of reason, it is the individualist locus and hence subjectivist character of these things that ensure the ‘interminable’ nature of social and moral conflict and intercourse. The challenge, then, is to shift the locus of conflict, pluralism and rationality from individuals qua discrete, rational, autonomous individuals to individuals qua members of traditions of rationality and virtuous communities; that is, from individuals organized externally, irrationally and non-teleologically by the institutional and systemic force of the abstract state and capital to individuals organized internally, rationally and teleologically by participation in the practices of genuine moral communities. Effecting this shift serves to establish conflict and pluralism as healthy means involved in the discovery of truth, reason would take rational form, and society and the individuals composing it would be ordered to the human good. Such a view is compatible with MacIntyre’s requirement for a ‘unified culture with a widely agreed upon social and cosmological order,’ in that such unity is constituted through a wide agreement, a view which underscores the extent to which MacIntyre’s conception of a tradition-constituted rationality contains an inherent normative pluralism. 

The conclusion we draw here depends upon where we place the emphasis. To insist on plurality and heterogeneity as ends in themselves will serve to unravel the holistic frame of MacIntyre’s moral project. It all depends on how unity and plurality are constituted and how the parts are related within the whole and in accordance with what principle. MacIntyre’s conception of tradition-constituted rationality could take perfect form in a non-pluralistic and tradition-homogenous culture and order. A tradition-homogenous community on the large-scale would preclude the level of conflictive pluralism which is necessary for the small-scale, tradition-homogenous communities within to develop rationally, but a similar stunting would be caused by the small-scale tradition-homogenous communities themselves. (Kozinski 2012). As Levy puts the point:

The unified practice, rooted in a small, relatively homogenous community—the practices that it remains, officially, MacIntyre's task to defend and promote— turn out on his own arguments to be inhospitable environments for the development of those resources that would allow practices to flourish, to develop, to justify themselves rationally, and so to be worthy of their hegemony.





Haldane considers the line of enquiry that MacIntyre opens up to invite contemplation of the divine as the logical next step, and completion of MacIntyre’s ambitions. Reviewing MacIntyre’s Ethics in the Conflicts of Modernity: An Essay on Desire, Practical Reasoning, and Narrative, Haldane draws this conclusion:





That recognition lies at the heart of this volume. Having examined this question of rational freedom for the best part of a quarter of a century, having taken in a wide range of political, ethical and philosophical sources, I cannot avoid drawing the same conclusion – to make good its emancipatory claims, ‘rational freedom’ needs to be properly constituted in terms of transcendent norms, truths and values as against praxis-based or existentialist projections of truth and meaning, sophism, relativism and conventionalism in politics and culture. Hence my concern to challenge any materialism or naturalism, whether expressed by Hobbes or Nietzsche or other such amoralists. The conclusions drawn in this final volume may be controversial, and certainly require much more substantial supporting argumentation, but they have been earned by hard thinking on my part.

MacIntyre does not theologize the case for an authentic political community. Maritain gives reasons as to why, maybe, he should:





Maritain’s view points to the superiority of a theologically informed commitment to the public good over a theologically uninformed one. Such a joint philosophical and theological enquiry could overcome the diremption of the modern terrain, restoring unity in the things that belong together to begin to address the moral, social and political problems of a modern pluralism that has fractured the common good, rendering it unavailable in other than abstract terms.

David Gallagher presents the case for a morally united political order:





Gallagher’s argument here is for a religiously united order. David Schindler develops the idea further:





Kozinski argues that the Thomist tradition that MacIntyre favours serves as an example to establish the point. ‘Not only did there exist at this time in Europe a multitude of small-scale tradition-homogenous Thomistic communities, but also a large-scale homogenously Catholic community unifying the smaller ones. Notwithstanding the considerable strife within and between these communities, MacIntyre would be the first to admit that there was none of the "interminable moral disagreement" and "pluralism which threatens to submerge us all" now found in postmedieval society. Moreover, the political theology of the Thomist tradition certainly does not endorse moral or political pluralism by any means.’ (Kozinski). 

Kozinski’s claims here are contentious, and are certainly overstated. The fact is that there was moral and theological disputation and disagreement between various schools that must have seemed ‘interminable’ at the time. Dante’s work, far from being an idealized assertion of medieval unity, is driven from first to last by a concern with the pernicious effects of the division and dissension in the world in which he lived. There is nothing to be gained and much to be lost by eschewing the pluralism and heterogeneity of the modern world for a romanticized or nostalgic view of the past. 

That criticism also applies to MacIntyre. He celebrates the city-states of ancient Greece as virtuous communities which united its members in accordance with a single view of the good – that which was the proper telos of human beings. The problem is that the conflict and dissension that afflicts the modern age were very much present in both ancient Greece and in medieval Christendom. The wars of the Greek city-states are notorious. These states were also divided within. In the period of a century, the Athenian city-state went from the laws of Solon to the tyranny of Peisistratus to the dictatorship of Hippias to the democracy of Cleisthenes to the oligarchy of the Four Hundred to the Thirty Tyrants to the democracy of Thrasybulus all in about a century. If we choose the democratic order as the one we favour, then the periods of democracy were as rife with hostile factions and unresolved issues as any period in modern America or Europe. The same point applies with respect to medieval Christendom, Dante’s chief concern being the contention and rivalry breaking out in the city states of Italy, as well as between the emerging nation states of Europe. The image of a Christendom united by a universal church is betrayed by the reality of social and political division. 

All of which begs the question that if the virtue tradition organising communities within the conception of the one, true good couldn’t work then, how could we expect it to work now? The idea that each and all were happily united around the an objective good ordering activities to the proper end of man is contradicted by the facts of division and the way in which disagreement as to what that proper end was in actuality was as rife then as it is now. MacIntyre’s argument in After Virtue that the good life for human beings is spent in pursuit of the good life possesses a happy circularity that doesn’t have to discuss the problems of identifying the specific features of this objective good. In which case, the moderns attempting to secure legitimate and democratic political authority and order, reconciling reason and freedom, is certainly not to be repudiated as a failure on account of its context of social diremption. The potential for a better ordering lies within the (post)modern terrain, however much it draws upon past traditions. I repeat what I wrote all those years ago when first analysing this question – Rousseau, Kant, Hegel and Marx take the high road of modernity to give us a modern polis democracy, integrating the happiness of the ancients with the freedom of the moderns. I just now see this as needing to be firmly grounded in the explicit recognition of transcendent standards, something more than historicism, and something more than self-legislating reason and self-creating labour.

There is also the troubling question as to why MacIntyre would reason as a Thomist natural law theorist only to advance an Aristotelian conception of morality, without an explicit theological standpoint. Not only does that miss the key dimension of Aquinas’ thought, it doesn’t do justice to the cosmological dimension in Aristotle’s thought either. MacIntyre ends up with a quasi-scientific ethical naturalism that is not at all the ethics of Aristotle or Aquinas. I refer people here to the work of David McPherson (2017 2012).

MacIntyre’s view bears comparison to that of Edward Feser, in that both argue that the philosophical tradition of ancient Greece and the medieval age was healthier and more unified than the modern moral tradition, and that the moderns are so confused and incoherent that they don’t even realize their moral predicament, merely make a virtue of a vice and call it a liberal pluralism in which everyone is free to say as they like and no one can silence another. Both write well on teleology, and both became Catholic as a result of their examination of the problematic nature of morality in the modern world. Feser’s work is formidable (Feser 2017 2014 2008). A substantial body of thought is being established which is taking us away from liberal relativism, conventionalism, sophism and scepticism, back to transcendent standards and back to metaphysics. I’d mention the books of Roger Trigg in this context, too (2011 1988 2005 2015 1998). I give these themes the extensive treatment they deserve elsewhere. Here, I can do no more than signpost the direction my conclusions are taking.

Which brings me back to Kozinski, whose key point, outside of his nostalgic idealisation of the past, remains valid, affirming the traditional Catholic political ideal in terms of a large-scale morally and religiously unified state under the moral and spiritual authority of the Catholic Church, that is, Christendom. Peter Kwasniewski thus expresses the Catholic Church's political ideal of the confessional state:





The upshot of these conclusions is that the Thomist tradition that MacIntyre draws upon recommends a social order conducive for the flourishing of human rationality that is significantly different to the one MacIntyre advances. Pinkard writes: 





When subjected to close critical analysis, MacIntyre’s moral project is actually closer to the liberalism and modernity he purportedly rejects than it is to the Thomism and even the Aristotelianism he supports. In many quarters, that is its strength, although it does mean that he pulls his punches. Although MacIntyre’s criticism of liberalism is weighty, attracting many for that reason, he refuses to land a knock-out punch. MacIntyre refuses to theologize his project, giving us a Thomism without God. He also refuses to engage in large-scale political activity and ordering, giving us an Aristotelianism without the polis. The result is that any tensions here will be resolved on the side of dominant liberal conceptions within the prevailing modern condition. 

If, as is frequently claimed, Alasdair MacIntyre is the most sophisticated and incisive critic of liberalism in contemporary moral and political philosophy, then liberalism is safe from external challenge. Any threat to liberalism comes from within, as it implodes as a result of its own internal antinomies. Whilst MacIntyre’s thought points beyond liberalism, he fails to supply the institutional means and structural capacities that would enable his vision to be brought to fruition. Indeed, revelation of the extent to which MacIntyre shares the key values and positions of liberalism indicates the very large extent to which his thought is confined within the liberal political order rather than presenting a coherent alternative to it. Like liberalism, albeit for different reasons, MacIntyre’s political prescription endorses and his moral theory requires a social order in which no particular conception of the good comes to prevail on a large-scale level. MacIntyre is against large-scale social embodiment of the good and is against making the good authoritative on the state. Like liberalism, he precludes the possibility of genuine political and moral activity on the part of the state. Like liberalism, he acknowledges the state as a necessary evil, and like liberalism, he leaves the anarchy and irrationality of the state in place. Like liberalism, MacIntyre restricts the state’s activity to tradition-neutral, pragmatic management of inter-traditional and inter-individual moral conflict respectively. And like liberalism, MacIntyre recommends a neutral state presiding over a morally conflictive social order, a conflict he considers necessary in discovering the good. 

For all of MacIntyre’s Aristotelianism and Thomism – not to mention any remnants of Marxism he has retained – his view defaults to liberalism in practice. And the reason is not hard to find – MacIntyre pulls his punches, drawing his ethics and politics short of the large-scale, denying his virtuous communities of the effectiveness and comprehensiveness they need to survive, thrive, multiply and flourish. Instead of a broadening out, there is a narrowing in and, ultimately, an internal dissolution, subject to the corrupting influences of external forces.

This leads to some truly disquieting observations. MacIntyre is far from being a philosophical lightweight. The struggle that MacIntyre has in developing a coherent alternative to liberalism cannot be attributed to a deficiency in philosophical knowledge, sophistication and rigor on his part. Marx would be the first to point out here that the problem isn’t philosophical at all, and to the extent that we think it is, we remain confined with the interminable disagreement over the interpretation of the world. Some think that MacIntyre suffers from a deficiency in theology, and that his Aristotelianism needs to be supplemented by a thoroughgoing Thomism. At present, MacIntyre’s Aquinas is a curiously Aristotelian and materialist figure. Many, drawn to MacIntyre’s Thomism, insist that MacIntyre needs to theologize his moral project in order to fulfil its full promise. From the presumption that the Thomist tradition is the true tradition of the good, holding that the ideal political order can only be described coherently and persuasively with all the resources of this tradition, including the theological dimension that MacIntyre leaves out, but which is crucial to the entire system, critics demand that MacIntyre ‘put some theology into his philosophical arsenal’ (Kozinski). This is a demand for a theologically informed alternative designed to overcome the tensions and inconsistencies that ensure MacIntyre’s moral project falls far short of its potential. At this point, we reach the limits of philosophy, with many calling on the help of theology in order to go any further:





MacIntyre draws attention to the insufficiency of a purely secular, purely philosophical understanding of the moral life of man: 





[that’s the argument I make in my Aquinas]

Many live in hope that MacIntyre may go the whole hog and develop a Thomist conception of the political order, indicating too how such an order could be implemented. That is a distinctly theological task, one that many, such as John Haldane, hopes that MacIntyre undertakes. His thought points in that direction.

It is interesting to consider why MacIntyre refuses to theologize his political project, not least because he does recognize that the ultimate reason for the superior power of Thomistic philosophy lies in its theological underpinnings: 

What they have too rarely asked is how far the philosophical strengths of Thomism in secular debate with rival moral philosophers may not derive from the extent to which it succeeds in articulating in secular form what were origially distinctively theological, distinctively Christian preoccupations.

Alasdair MacIntyre, ‘What has Christianity to say to the Moral Philosopher,’ 1998: 23

Such views imply the integration of philosophy and theology. I hesitate to go too far down this road, not least on account of being publicly abused by someone who described me as an ‘arrogant Catholic scholar’ for posting the piece I have written on Aquinas (humbly pointing out the deficiencies I detect in the work as I did so). (Critchley 2013). 

More seriously, I have been concerned to guard against ideal prescriptions of public order. If the rational conception and tradition of freedom is true, and true in the sense of conforming with human nature as it is expressed in history, and if the ideal of an ethico-rational political order can only be descibed coherently and cogently from within this body of thought, then the task is not to prescribe a model of the ideal political order – the ideals and principles of that tradition can be established clearly enough – but to furnish the means by which the ideal can be translated into the real. Prescription is the wrong approach. The challenge is to see the extent to which the ideal is contained within the real, with a focus on practices within communities serving to liberate the ideal as socially and historically immanent potential. In Aquinas, Morality and Modernity, I set out the case for Aquinas’ implicit philosophy in terms which fit the view I have been developing in these volumes, to the effect that the realization of the ethico-rational public community is not a matter of prescribing ideals in advance, in accordance with a priori principles of rationality, but of identifying potentials within existing lines of development.

In Aquinas, Morality and Modernity (2013) I wrote about the extent to which Aquinas’ perennial philosophy is also the implicit philosophy. This is the idea that knowledge, and certainly the desire to know, is in some way shared by all, if only in an unreflective sense. The challenge is to activate this desire and create reflective practices that bring human beings to knowledge of the good. In activating the desire to know and organising it within communities of practice and traditions of rationality, the implicit philosophy possessed by each and all is rendered explicit. With respect to Aquinas, this takes us beyond philosophy, beyond an earthly flourishing or Eudaimonia to beatitude. 

Antonio Gramsci presents his version of the implicit philosophy in terms of an emphasis on practical activity:

Accepting Croce's definition of religion as a conception of the world which has become a norm of life … it follows that the majority of mankind are philosophers in so far as they engage in practical activity and in practical activity (or in their guiding lines of conduct) there is implicitly contained a conception of the world, a philosophy. The history of philosophy as it is generally understood, that is as the history of philosophers' philosophies, is the history of attempts made and ideological initiatives undertaken by a specific class of people to change, correct or perfect the conceptions of the world that exist in any particular age and thus to change the norms of conduct that go with them; in other words, to change practical activity as a whole. 

Gramsci SP 1971: 345

MacIntyre’s real deficiency is not in philosophy, and arguably he does need to address the theological implications and conditions of his moral project. But his deficiency might not be in theology, either. 

On closer analysis, the problem that MacIntyre is addressing – the failure of moral theories since the Enlightenment to objectively ground themselves – actually predates the Enlightenment. There has been a struggle over this objective grounding of morality throughout human history, suggesting that the whole approach is flawed and incites controversies and debates that cannot be resolved, causing more trouble than they are worth in the process. Recognizing this point allows us to put aside the question of objective truth and reality as ‘scholastic’ so as to see what politics and ethics can really do together in a practical sense. MacIntyre can thus be read as arguing that whilst we may not be able to objectively ground one moral tradition, we can ensure that we are all operating within the same moral tradition, one constituted practically and rationally, enabling us to communicate with each other with the same moral language. Hence MacIntyre’s refusal to theologize his moral project makes complete practical sense, however inconsistent or deficient that makes his position look to those who adhere to the Thomist system. I speculate as to what theologizing MacIntyre’s project may look like. In the meantime, I agree with his emphasis on communities of practice and traditions of rationality and believe that his emphasis here is important, steering us clear of scholastic questions with respect to the objective good and its grounding.

Seeing what a unified politics and ethics can do practically, however, would still, however, involve indicating how MacIntyre could constitute his practices in such a way as to initiate and entrench widespread substantial social transformation. That would be my view, drawing on MacIntyre’s Marxist background. The search for objective foundations in ethics might well be chimerical. If we are still struggling to identify true foundations now, after countless centuries engaged in that very search, then maybe we have to admit that we never actually had them in the past, because they don’t exist. But we survived all the same. Certain moral behaviours and practices and communities, in working well enough over a period of time, can be designated successful in terms of enabling human beings to attain their ends and find meaning. That encourages the view that such social activity is well founded. But this is to put things the wrong way round, so that the idea that communities succeed and thrive through the possession of a strong ethical foundation is a rationalization of well-constituted practices and communities. The question of objective truth and reality, in the end, may well be as ‘scholastic’ as Marx insisted – and the nature of truth and reality, from first and last instance, is something we discover only through practice in communities and traditions shared with others. Part of a successful practice is the story we tell ourselves that what we do is right because it is sanctioned by a knowledge of objective truth and morality. But it’s the practices that do all the heavy lifting.

If the anti-foundationalists are right, then human beings have done without a foundation for ethics for a few million years, even though part of that successful social and cultural evolution may well involve the pretence that we do indeed have foundations for what we do. We cannot, therefore, do without an invented God, although we need to understand that such a God only ‘works’ in practice if we neither realize nor admit to ourselves or others that it is a human invention. 

The debates go on, and will not be resolved, because they cannot be resolved rationally. Ethics carries on all the same, as it always has done, as a practice. If we ever do find an objective foundation for ethics that is supplied with unassailable philosophical proofs, then fine and dandy. But if Leibniz and Kant between them couldn’t find it, then no one will. In the meantime, we are better applying our moral and intellectual resources and psychic energies to a practical approach, and constituting communities and traditions in such a way as to gradually improve things, with minimal contention over objective grounding. That means giving up on establishing elaborate theories over the ontological questions of reality and being. I wouldn’t go so far as to say that theorizing about ethics has been utterly useless, but I will go so far as to say that the practical relations that individuals establish with each other, reasoning through the questions and concerns of everyday life, have been far more useful than G.E. Moore’s Principia Ethica. The folk knowledge and folk wisdom born of an everyday practice has a way of discerning, embodying and disseminating truths that the theoretical approach does not. It makes more sense, then, to work out how ethics has worked so well so far in history, despite contention over the lack of clarity and agreement over objective foundations. This is not just an empirical question, but a phenomenological one, one that resolves the issue on the level of interpersonal relations – rational freedom as a relational freedom constituting and constituted by the interactive unity of each and all. And that is not a question of an a priori rationality.

Taking a practical approach takes us from ‘what is good?’ to ‘what good is it?’ What is the point of ethics? What is ethics for, what do we want it to do. And that takes us to the question of what we need to do in order to be ethical. This is how most people reason and act when it comes to ethics, even if, from a philosophical standpoint, such questioning is crude and simplistic. The problem is, being so much more complicated and sophisticated, philosophy can’t deliver a straight answer to these questions in terms of an objective ethical foundationalism. Try it, see how difficult it is to state the position, then wait for the myriad objections launched from other philosophical standpoints. And then consider that human beings in the meantime are getting on being ethical and doing ethics in their practical lives. The question of ‘how ethical human beings ought to be’ is a key question of everyday living. Failure to answer that question accounts for much that goes wrong in everyday life. But that failure, in large part, is not a theoretical failure, or a lack of clarity over right and good, but a failure within the practical relations between people in their everyday lives.

MacIntyre has identified the core problem as lying in the fragmentation of the modern moral landscape, and he gives the reasons for that fragmentation. They are the reasons that Marx’s gives in his examination of civil society as a sphere of universal egoism and antagonism. For Marx, though, the problem is not primarily a moral one, neither in cause nor in solution, but one of specific social relations. MacIntyre seeks a moral solution, arguing that if, in the context of fragmentation, we are lacking objective foundations for morality, then ‘we might as well make sure we’re all operating inside the same moral tradition so we can talk to each other.’ Will it happen? Calls to act for the common good are many. What is lacking is the structural, relational and organisational enabling individuals to come together to act for the common good when they act for themselves. The social identity connecting the individual good and the social good, the short-range and the long-range, does not exist. MacIntyre here emphasises virtuous communities of practice and tradition-constituted rationality, something that would indeed give us – or enough of us – a shared moral language. There is, then, a practice there that enables individuals to transcend egoism and start to operate communally within a fragmented moral landscape. Is it enough without a transformation of wider social relations and without a transformation of the overarching political sphere? I argue not. But it is in the right direction. In Marx’s terms, MacIntyre needs to move from a moral practice to a social practice, or better still integrate the two.

Counting in favour of the virtue approach is precisely its practical bent, emphasising that ethics is something that people do, indeed that all people do if they are normal, functioning, healthy human beings. Virtue ethics may not resolve the profound ontological questions of the good, being and reality – no more than any moral theory ever has or ever could – but it is an eminently practical approach which aids individuals using the morality they already have. Virtue ethics appeals in affirming the grand truths of the hedgehog in theory whilst allowing us to be very foxish in practice; that is, it works with the notion of an objective foundation or an overarching truth as an assumption but, instead of engaging in endless philosophical argumentation over ontological questions gets on with an ethical practice. That may not make for the most elegant philosophy, but it does have the merit of putting into practice the most elaborate and sophisticated systems of natural law in which everything is argued from first principles to provide answers to every question. Virtue ethics recognizes that life is messy and that ethical decision is context-dependent, and that is its strength. The identification and knowledge of the one and true good will remain a matter of some philosophical sophistication, and will be all the more question begging for that. Against that grand theory, virtue ethics is a collection of heuristics rather than a systematic presentation of rules. If the question of objective truth and reality is indeed a ‘practical question,’ as Marx said, then virtue ethics is the most practical ethics we have, emphasising learning and discovery by doing, employing a practical method to solve problems. And it does all this whilst affirming the identity and possibility of an overarching good. The great psychological insight of virtue ethics is the recognition that human beings are better motivated by identity and character than by rules and calculations of consequences, and that the springs of action are activated by inner motives much more than external imperatives and commands. In that sense, it is perfectly understandable as to why MacIntyre refuses to theologize his moral project. He recognizes that human beings in the round tend to learn more about how to behave and act well through an everyday practice in relation to others than through philosophical theorizing and theological learning. That may not satisfy the scholars among us, but it makes much more sense if the true and the good cannot just be given to individuals, but must be discovered and learned, and in the process achieved by them, through their practice in community with others.

MacIntyre’s main criticism of Enlightenment rationalism is that it expresses the view that an elegant and clear moral theory could be produced which could encapsulate the shared ethical discourse of the whole community. That attempt at moral clarity failed, and will continue to fail in conditions of social diremption. Rather than establish a set of abstract principles based upon a conception of the objective good, and then issuing orders and imperatives to individuals to ‘act thus,’ virtue ethics works from within, pointing to the character of the agent, practices, goals and narratives, things that individuals already comprehend (even if they cannot explain them, in abstract terms), which are already available and within reach, and which a community can agree on as virtuous, and then, by force and inspiration of practical example, says: ‘be like this.’ (I refer people to my Being at One, 2016, where I make the case for virtue ethics at length). 

Interest in the concept of eudaimonia and ancient ethical theory in general enjoyed a revival in the mid-twentieth century. The primary stimulus here was Elizabeth Anscombe’s article Modern Moral Philosophy (1958), which held that duty-based conceptions of morality are conceptually incoherent on account of being based on the idea of a ‘law without a lawgiver.’ Muflax summarizes G.E.M. Anscombe’s argument in Modern Moral Philosophy as ‘stop theorizing until we have solved psychology kthx.’ A system of morality based on the Ten Commandments presumes the existence of someone who made those rules. Without the lawgiver, the law is groundless. Anscombe thus recommends a return to the eudaimonistic ethical theories of the ancients, in particular Aristotle, for the way that these ground morality in the interests and well-being of human beings as moral agents who can act without the need of appeal to a lawgiver.

Anscombe’s principal charge in Modern Moral Philosophy is that secular approaches to moral theory (Utilitarianism, Kantian Ethics, and Social Contract theories) are all without foundation. ‘They use concepts such as “morally ought,” “morally obligated,” “morally right,” and so forth that are legalistic and require a legislator as the source of moral authority.’ Whereas ‘in the past, God occupied that role,’ now, since Nietzsche’s ‘death of God,’ these theories ‘are lacking the proper foundation for meaningful employment of those concepts.’

Anscombe’s argument here exposes the emptiness of modern moral theories in proposing laws in the absence of a legislator. Rather than trying to keep breathing life into a moribund legislative structure, it makes more sense to develop an alternative ethics that is based on psychology, virtues as qualities of successful living, the facts of human nature, all oriented within an account of the good for human beings based on this approach. The major error of modern moral philosophers is to attempt to develop an account of what is ‘morally right or morally wrong’ that is lacking in any content outside of the legislative arena provided by God. Remove God, and the whole legislative structure is bereft of meaning. Anscombe thus concludes: ‘It would be most reasonable to drop it. It has no reasonable sense outside a law conception of ethics; they are not going to maintain such a conception; and you can do ethics without it, as is shown by the example of Aristotle. It would be great improvement if, instead of “morally wrong,” one always named a genus such as “untruthful,”, “unchaste,” “unjust”’ (Anscombe 1958: 8–9).

Anscombe thus argues for an alternative that is modelled on Aristotle’s account, an alternative that is based on ‘thick’ concepts such as ‘just’ rather than ‘thin’ concepts such as ‘morally wrong’ which, shorn of their metaphysical grounding, lack content.

There is another way of reading Anscombe here. The fact that these secular approaches of utilitarianism, deontology and contract theory continue to survive, despite the revelation that they are foundationless and therefore empty, only serve to suggest that, for a dead man, God remains remarkably alive and remarkably influential. 

Have the courage to use your own reason, reads Kant’s Motto of Enlightenment. How much courage is required to recognize fact and logic if it is true, as Aristotle wrote in the Metaphysics, all men desire to know? I’d say it takes little courage to recognize fact and logic when right and wrong are demonstrated clearly and simply as a matter of a rational method comprehensible to all. The only courage required here comes in respect of various dominant authorities to which individuals will be subject in their social existence. Such was Kant’s point, if one refers back to the full passage in What is Enlightenment? What does Kant’s Sapere Aude mean? Dare to know, dare to use your own understanding, dare to be wise! Stated thus, it refers to much more than knowledge limited to fact and logic, much more than a logical positivism. Kant, we should remember, made room for faith, his final position suggesting an idea of God so closely identified with moral duty as to be rationally immanent rather than a transcendent conception. The key text here is the Critique of Pure Reason where, in the preface to the second edition, Kant wrote: ‘I have therefore found it necessary to deny knowledge, in order to make room for faith’ (Critique, B). Kant was critical of demonstrative arguments with respect to the existence of God, seeking to curtail metaphysical speculation whilst denying all theoretical knowledge of a theological sort. He was sceptical of a religion divorced from rational morality, but affirmed a moral argument establishing religious belief as rational, to suspicions regarding religion divorced from morality. Kant was never a skeptic, and the need to respond to Hume’s challenge, particularly with respect to defending scientific knowledge, drove his great critiques. But, in limiting knowledge to objects of possible experience, he came to consider ideas of metaphysics (including theology) as matters of rational faith. Kant well understood that the mind raised questions of life, meaning and significance that it could not answer in terms of rational knowledge. 

It takes little courage to recognize simple facts and logical truths. It takes real courage to have faith with respect to the anarchic surplus that lies outside of fact and logic and cannot be named and framed. If it takes courage to dare to use your own reason, it takes even more courage to have faith in an age when everything must meet the requirements of reason – but it is the right way in the end. Religion is our bedrock truth and reality, the world of an eternal and experiential truth that is lived beyond reason. 

Edward Feser has a rather impressive book out, Five Proofs of the Existence of God. If you believe in God, you will be impressed by those proofs. If you don’t, you will raise the standard philosophical objections, and the debate will take its familiar course. For my part, I don’t think anyone was ever converted to God by philosophical proof, although they may be of some use to those who want to defend faith and belief rationally, or be reassured that reason is indeed on their side, even if they don’t quite know how. Rather than get involved in arguments over proofs concerning the existence of God, I think it is much more profitable to presume that, since we have these moral laws, and since people do act and do argue as if these laws are indeed true – in politics as in life, people argue in terms of right and wrong, and refer to interested behaviour as not quite moral – there is a legislator and a meaningful legislative structure, a moral grammar embedded in life. 

That points to a covenantal morality and politics, as against the individualism implicit in the contractarian modern view. If we want to establish a democratic community of ends, we need something more than our own reasons, interests, and power, we need a bond of mutuality that is founded on a covenant of love, an unconditional love that is beyond requirements of proof. Jonathan Sacks states the view well:

Something fundamental is happening here, the answer to the key question of social life. How can there be a stable relationship between two free individuals? How can one person's freedom respect that of another while endowing the bond between them with permanence so that it becomes the basis of trust? To this the Bible gives an answer astonishing in its originality and vast in its implications. Relationships lie not in power but in the bond of mutuality made possible by language. A relationship that depends on dominance—physical, economic or political—is not one between free agents. If I have power over you, my will prevails at the expense of yours. You are a means to my end. This fails the biblical test of treating each person as an image of God. It also fails to redeem solitude, for if I regard you as an extension of me, not a person in your own right, I am still alone.








That view not only incorporates difference, it accents it, emphasising particularity against any abstract impositions of the universal:





Now, since that is so, we can ask what would morality without need of proof of divine sanction look like. That would give us something like a concern with practices, dialogue, agency, a context, a tradition, a social focus. That, in my view, is a virtue ethics which enables individuals practically to learn and to achieve the good. Virtue ethics is the practical ethics that individuals use in the normal course of events with respect to questions of everyday life. Whilst arguments with respect to deontological maxims and utilitarian calculations can be philosophically impressive, they can reduce ethics to being the plaything of those engaged in politicking, in lawyering, and in ideological warfare, those who are interested in a power play between human beings in some way, seeking to get their way against the opposition of others. In the practical world of everyday life, however, all but the sociopathic engages in moral deliberation which involves moral judgment and decision, based on a question of a much different moral order – not what must I do, but what kind of person must I be. The emphasis, in other words, is on the character of the agent rather than the rightness of the act. The two, of course, may go together. But when it comes to the moral judgments and decisions of everyday practical life, with respect to the things that matter personally to them, individuals respect and respond to character and virtue much more than they do to deontological maxims and utilitarian calculations and scales. And if there is objective good in the world, and there is indeed a God after all, then it is in and through dialogue, participation in shared deliberation, communities of practice, traditions, narrativity, interrelation, and the phenomenology of practical experience that individuals are brought to a knowledge and understanding of that objective ultimacy, as a truth that is both cognitive and affective, not just passively given but intimately known from the inside. 





The most important thing, then, is to provide the overarching framework and internal infrastructure enabling the expression of the practical morality contained within the parts in their relation to the whole. The most glaring deficiency in MacIntyre’s thought is neither philosophical nor theological but political, with respect to the incapacity of MacIntyre’s virtuous communities to extend to a greater scale and scope, leaving them denuded of power, subject to external forces and influences, and unable to effectively articulate their vision. It’s at this point that MacIntyre’s thought reduces to the similarities that it shares with liberalism he seeks to supplant. To do better requires an extension in scale and scope, a broadening and deepening that is achieved through a reconfigured sense of the political so as to establish a key place for the architectonic of a transformed state. Marx designated some such thing as the ‘true state,’ the state as the embodiment of rational freedom, the state that in the full and complete realisation of rational freedom abolishes itself … When is a state not a state?

Conclusion
To conclude, I attempt briefly to outline the contours of what a ‘rational’ political prescription might look like and how it could be obtained. The first thing to emphasize is that any ‘prescription’ here is not written outside of the means and processes delivering the rational society. Establishing right and wrong is the easy part, which is why so many can be found repeating the simple truth. Theoretical reason alone decides nothing in the world of practical reason, and cannot hope to be effective in motivating action and change by dictating truths from the outside. Such truths need to ‘take’ in the motivational economy of human action. There is a need to bridge the relation between theoretical reason (our knowledge of the world, linked to our technological know-how capable of acting on the world) and practical reason (ethics and politics, of which economics is a branch). The failure to build a bridge here leads to an ineffectiveness in practice, politics as the mere repetition of truth statements that fall on deaf ears in the absence of appropriate mechanisms of (co)responsiveness and responsibility. Truths need to be addressed to the inner motives of action, things nurtured and developed within virtuous communities of practice.

I have argued for a political community that counts as good in being conducive to the end of human flourishing. Such an end requires individual and communal participation in communities and practices that serve to further the free and full development of individuals. In the end, my revolutionary argument restates the basic truths of a traditional conservatism. Communities of practice foster a small-scale practical reasoning, social proximity and identities grounded in warm and affective bonds. We can marshal all the reason, science, facts and figures we like to prove our obligations to abstract and non-existent others, but the appeal will fail without recognition that the human species is a familial species. No one stated the argument better than Edmund Burke, who argued that human life is a pact between past, present and future generations. Society is not a contract between discrete, distinct, self-interested individuals, but a partnership between social beings:

Society is indeed a contract. It is a partnership . . . not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born.

Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790)

Be clear to establish the conditions of that partnership, foster the virtuous behaviours, enable small-scale practical reasoning, and let it grow. This is what we have lost, and what we need to reconstitute, from the base upwards and from the top-down together. Is that a revolutionary socialist argument or a conservative one? Here is Marx in the Communist Manifesto:

All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses his real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind.

Marx MCP Rev1848 1973: 71

These ‘real conditions’ are not conditions that Burke would have appreciated, the atomism of the ‘nexus of callous cash payment’ being the social basis of the contract tradition that Burke despised. Social atomism below and political centralisation above proceed hand in hand, removing us further and further away from the solid structures of human proximity. The implication of this passage is that Marx is disapproving of the rationalistic desolidarisation and profanation of the capital system, as much as he attempts to force people to confront its ugly reality with sober senses. The ties that bind need to be reconstituted to resolidify social existence from the base upwards. So, too, is the need to know individuals in their uniqueness. Overcoming alienation is key to restoring a sense of the sacred, reclaiming the holy, the intrinsic worth of all things, from their annexation by money. And that proceeds from the recognition of the base of alienation in individual self-alienation. The strongest ties are created through close social proximity at the interpersonal level, by the exercise of personal moral effort and the determination to assume responsibility for one’s actions. That fosters an internal peace at the community level that proceeds to expand outwards. The harmony we seek at the global level prevails to the extent that individuals are at peace with themselves, exercising self-control in conscious awareness of their responsibilities. So the healthy exercise of the social power reclaimed from alien forms of mediation is also a repersonalisation that proceeds from and goes back to the individual, infused by the guiding principle of individual responsibilities that are exercised in reciprocal relation with others, as against the possession of rights as claims that the individual has against society. It is surely significant that I can find anarchist and social ecologist John Clark stating this principle so well in relation to Martin Buber in a book of articles gathered under the title of Reinventing Anarchy Today:

The anarchist 'commune' is a community of people attempting to create relationships and institutions based on an organic, ecological, cooperative view of existence. The relationship between local communalism and global communalism is expressed well in the work of Martin Buber, who argues that unless the inhumane, bureaucratic, objectifying relationships created by the state, capitalism, and high technology are replaced by personalistic, cooperative relationships arising in the primary communal group, it cannot be hoped that people will have a deep concern for humanity as a whole... this . . is a call for communitarian praxis. As Buber states it, 'an organic commonweal that .. will never build itself up out of individuals but only out of small and even smaller communities: a nation is a community to the degree that it is a community of communities.

Clark in Ehrlich ed 1996: 94

And that ‘community of communities’ is Aristotle’s polis if nothing else. Here, I tie all the key themes up to define not any known ‘ism’ but a new society. If individuals are rightly ordered in accordance with true ends, then order both ascends and descends through the levels of the social order until harmony between parts and whole is achieved. The ordering proceeds both from above and below, top-down and bottom up. Which makes the point that all this small-scale activity can only sum to the ‘global’ scale required within the comprehensive architectonic of political order enabling individuals to engage in effective action via collective means and mechanism of common control. Assuming responsibility has both personal and communal dimensions and exists always as a co-responsibility, a power that is exercised with others. Hence the key aim of rational freedom is to enable individuals to join together and govern themselves consciously (rationally) through an internal moral and social constraint they supply themselves vis the collective forces unleashed by their activities, as against being subject in their separation to the uncontrolled force of their activities as an external collective constraint. If we are in search of an ‘all-encompassing system of rule,’ we need look no further than the capital system, the most all-encompassing system known in history. To rule out attempts on the part of human beings to institute a rational system of rule as totalitarianism is the epitome of liberal folly.

There is no crude division between ‘above’ and ‘below’ or ‘theory’ and ‘practice’ in this transition. The question is not one of ‘small’ scale as against ‘large’ scale but of appropriate scale, with power residing at its most appropriate level of competence and effective representation. The scope of political community depends upon appropriateness in this sense, sometimes making it necessary to scale up as well as scale down. The danger of MacIntyre’s position is that it rejects on dogmatic grounds any political community of a size greater than the small-scale communities he favours. In rejecting the large-scale, impersonal, instrumental nation-state, MacIntyre would seem to rule out all possibilities of a normative state-politics, regardless of scale. That is unnecessarily restrictive, and cuts us off from a genuinely universal state as ethical agency. Worse, in launching his criticisms, MacIntyre accepts the indispensability of the state in certain of its functions. That renders his political theory incoherent. There is no reason why an authentic political community should not exist on a large-scale, attainable by and fit for individuals as active, informed, continually engaged citizens. 

These local communities of virtue, oriented to the common good, need to scale up so that that good is socially embodied on a larger scale. Failure to do that effectively involves these communities in a guerrilla fight against the corrupting force of a much greater power. It may sound libertarian and radical to affirm the freedom of the individual from the ‘shackles’ of state authority. But human beings are not free on account of being autonomous or self-sufficient; they are social beings requiring a public life in order to individuate themselves in relation to each other. No man is an island, and all individuals – unless they are gods or beasts – will be subject to ‘shackles’ of some kind. ‘You're gonna have to serve somebody,’ sang Bob Dylan. Or, subject to the tyranny of abstraction, something. ‘Serve yourself,’ John Lennon replied, restating the egoism that is the prime condition of self-alienation. There is no personal moral effort here in such libertarianism, merely the ego as a prison. 

The fact is that without personal moral effort and the training in accordance with standards of right and wrong, good and bad, instilling the right habits and dispositions to equip individuals with the will and capacity to take individual responsibility for their actions and their consequences, then all the social action in the world will amount to naught but an aggregation of petty narcissisms closed in on itself, unable to expand outwards to the greater good. And that is about the formation of character, not merely the information of mind. Knowledge and know-how give us the ability to act, they do not create the will to act.

And here I am prepared to make an explicitly conservative statement. It takes effort to become good at being human. For all of the assertions of a natural goodness, and evil as the privation of the good, human beings are more than capable of acting against their true natures, and have proven more than willing to do so. Rejecting morality as repressive and releasing human beings from inhibitions is permissive of evil as much as it is of a natural goodness. To remove the training in standards of right and wrong, good and bad in expectation of the natural growth of goodness is the profoundest naivety, depriving society of its capacity to order itself internally and making it well-nigh inevitable for it to reimpose order externally in the form of police, law and punitive sanctions. And here I will make a statement against liberalism. Liberalism, grounded in an ontology of the discrete individual, has fractured the moral life into a series of subjective desires, likes and preferences. In such conditions, morality and forms of the common life are repudiated as infringements upon individual liberty. The traditional training in the good, through which individuals had the right character formed so as to be prepared to take personal responsibility for their actions and consequences, has been disregarded along with the idea that there is such a thing as the one true and substantive good. Instead, there are only a number of goods, which the individual is free to choose for himself or herself. The result is an agnosticism on the good as something that is common to all, and a check against teaching the virtues that are appropriate to such a good. Human actions are no longer ordered to their true ends. As a result, society gradually loses the ability to supply itself with an internal self-control and self-constraint, it loses the ability to police its own behaviour in accordance with shared standards. In consequences, society as a whole comes to be subject to behaviours which are detrimental to the good of its members. In preventing society from being able to supply an internal moral self-ordering from within, through character formation and the cultivation of the virtues, society comes to be compelled to defend itself by imposing external sanctions upon transgressing individuals, insofar as law and order as central to public life remains a serious concern among policy- and law-makers. Issues that ought to be self-policing through an internal self-constraint have, through a libertarian repudiation of morality, authority and community, become matters of external policing and punitive sanction. The result of such external constraint will not be the modification and change of behaviour required for the good life, merely the regulation and curtailment of the worst behaviours in prevailing conditions. The harsh and punitive regime we end up with is an inevitable result of the failure to equip society with appropriate training in personal moral responsibility in the first place.

The question is not one of being for or against constraint, but of establishing the kind of constraint that is legitimate and illegitimate. The problems which constrain human social life externally are supra-individual collective forces requiring an appropriately and effectively collective constraint for their remedy. To be effective in establishing the common good, virtuous communities need to scale up to a level appropriate to the collective forces that govern social life, and that implies the establishment of a true state authority through the constitution of a conscious of self-constraint. 

Presuming the cogency of the ethico-rational ideal, how could we envisage the socially and morally divided – liberals say ‘plural’ – societies of today come to achieve the unity in moral truth that such a political community would require?

The answer to the question can only come through practice, in the development and implementation of the appropriate institutions and social forms. At the same time, the ‘rational’ themes developed throughout in relation to Aristotle, Hegel and Marx offer the best resources for answering the question intellectually. (I pay more attention to Plato’s well-tempered order in Dante’s Sweet Symphony of Paradise, and have chosen not to repeat the points I make there here). As I have argued, the concept of ‘rational freedom’ posits the incarnation of transcendent norms in the social and historical process, and these establish a strong basis for a communal modus vivendi, a justifiable rational politics that is suitable for a modern pluralism whilst integrating plural identities within the good of the community as a whole. These transcendent norms with respect to reason – involving notions of objective truth, reality, authority - would exist socially and institutionally as provisional norms, subject to constant shared deliberation. They would, however, be norms that would be consciously, purposely, culturally, and politically ordered in a teleological manner through the myriad formative structures of society within and including the institutional structure of the public community – we can call it a state at this late stage if we like – ordering human activities to the purpose of developing the appropriate social, institutional, and cultural conditions of and fostering the virtues for the communal attainment and consensual establishment of the true good for human beings. (237-238). This approach fosters communities of diverse practices sustained by the properly ordered public community and articulated by the dialogically skilled representatives of these communities, as against the autonomous individuals of the old liberalism and the value free pragmatists of the new liberalism. These representatives would serve as the principal mediators in a communal and political search for a rational form of reason undertaken on the part of all citizens.

In contradistinction to the neutral and non-foundationalist character of the liberal public sphere, as exemplified by a Rawlsian ‘reasonableness,’ the norms upon which this rationally justified political community is based would be endorsed as the true, moral, and universal values that inhere in a teleologically conceived and constituted human nature. These norms would serve as the substantive grounding required for public order established in conditions of citizen interaction, discourse and deliberation. These values, then, are worked out consensually between citizen members of the political community, as opposed to being imposed upon them via the overarching legal-institutional apparatus of the abstract modern state. The authority of these norms would not be entirely dependent upon and informed by the consensus formed through shared deliberation, but would draw upon and be evaluated in accordance with the transcendent norms which serve to make truth and value more than conventional and relative to time and place. However, before such norms could be advanced, developed and established to become publicly authoritative, the domination of the prevailing liberalism over society in all of its false and abstract dualisms and separations and contradictions needs to be openly recognized and rejected by increasing numbers, so that the hold of its values is weakened and it can no longer continue to exert its influence as a background assumption. At present, it is still far too easy for proposals to reconstitute the common good, and establish the good in politics, to be rejected as abstract and as potentially oppressive of individual liberty, plural identity and difference. Marx’s systematic and powerful critique of the ontology of liberalism is immensely helpful to this end.

I have made a point of emphasizing that Marx is a profound critic of liberalism but not, thereby, illiberal. Phrasing the argument that way is born of a sensitivity to liberal critics who discern a totalitarian implication in Marxism. Not so, I argue, flagging up the extent to which Marx’s communist individuality is in part motivated by a concern to make the liberal value of autonomy a social reality, not merely an ontological priority. But this idea that Marx is concerned to realize liberal values risks underestimating the radical nature of Marx’s critique and the way he explicitly uproots the central liberal category of the autonomous subject, and the myriad separations and abstractions and flagrant contradictions that are attendant upon it. Liberalism commands a better reputation than it is entitled to. Marx had its measure, as did Rousseau before him. 

Thaddeus J. Kozinski doesn’t pull his punches, arguing that the ‘reality of the present tyrannical hegemony of the tradition of liberalism over society would need to be recognized by the populous. Only when the tradition of liberalism loses its undeserved and destructive social and political authority among the citizenry could a truly deserving and salutary, publicly authoritative tradition develop and eventually supplant it wholesale, one now informed by and embodying MacIntyre’s theory of tradition-constituted rationality and the tradition-transcendent norms required for tradition-comparative inquiry.’ (Kozinski 2012). 

The fact that his ideal is defined in terms of a religious unity, however, would confirm liberal scepticism towards notions of the good.

Such a morally constituted public community could obtain the rational and voluntary assent of a socially and morally divided population as a result of being constituted by shared deliberation and commonly practiced norms so that truths come to be seen and held in common. This holds out the prospect of achieving a unity of perspectives based upon a shared normative concern with the free and full development of each and all. 

Whilst there are various streams contributing to the tradition of rational freedom, a common thread uniting them all is the aspiration to truth. As rational beings, human beings are united by the desire and courage to know; as social beings, human beings are united by the need for others in order to be themselves; as natural beings, human beings are united by a common concern with flourishing - all of which points to the key question of political philosophy: how human beings can come to live well together. That’s the truth of the democratic state and constitution that Marx wrote of.

There are often significant differences between the variants of rational freedom I have drawn upon in these pieces, but they all of them share an important attribute in common. The various moral and political philosophers I have draw upon express a normative commitment to an ideal political community that embodies and articulates freedom as the unity of each and all and happiness as the free and full development or flourishing of all. Indeed, a political philosopher prescribing a morally based justifiable political order should be seeking not merely the statement of the well-tempered order, in the manner of Plato – on which I shall write at length in the near future - but negotiating the bridge that connects contemplation to action to translate the vision into reality. That is where my emphasis has fallen in these volumes. It follows the key insight of Rousseau’s general will, the idea that, in this democratic age, the truth cannot just be given, it has to be willed on the part of the people, absorbed, known and lived from within. Hence my title: ‘socialism from within.’

‘Tell me,’ the poet Mary Oliver asks each of us, ‘what is it you plan to do with your one wild and precious life?’ And to think that there are people who ask me for a strategy or a system that may save us. That’s not how salvation is achieved. And it is salvation with which we are concerned, no mere emancipation. Are we doomed? People are asking in light of climate change. Physically, we are always doomed. ‘Who’s winning at life?’ is the inane question being asked on BBC Radio 2 at the weekend. Physically, life ends in inevitable defeat. Wisdom, not to mention peace on earth, comes when we stop trying to ‘win’ the game of life in this way. Asking whether we are doomed is typical of an age absorbed in the physical flesh, pandering to the ego, and enclosed in egoistic need. The real question we should be asking is whether we are damned. And what it takes to be saved. Are you sanctified? Religion is acceptance of the inevitable defeat of physical life through acceptance of the reality of another order of being entirely, the ‘order of the sacred’ in which all our inadequacies are made good. Do you believe this to be true? We have no evidence that it is true. But we just have no evidence for any future states of being. On ne sais jamais. Earlier, I referred to the work of Stuart Kauffman, for whom complete knowledge is impossible, meaning that we must live into mystery, embrace the future with faith and courage, and act as if we knew. Of course, in doing so, we are co-creating the future, generating knowledge as we go. We can never truly know how to answer such a question since more knowledge — the knowledge that we do not yet have—could always be used to justify putting off plans indefinitely, or changing them, or not having them at all. You want a system or strategy? I say get in tune. Ask yourself of any plan: does it sing, does it dance? If it doesn’t, change your plan. If it does, then sing, then dance. The plan is built into the design. And if you didn’t know that, then no wonder you are asking all the wrong questions. 

As I write these closing words I’m listening to Perry Como, ‘the best of times is now …’

The best of times is now
What's left of Summer
But a faded rose?
The best of times is now
As for tomorrow, well, who knows?
Who knows? Who knows?

So hold this moment fast
And live and love
As hard as you know how
And make this moment last
Because the best of times is now
Is now, is now

Now, not some forgotten yesterday
Now, tomorrow is too far away

So hold this moment fast
And live and love
As hard as you know how
And make this moment last
Because the best of times is now
Is now, is now

‘But the truth? We will discover it after we die.’ (Francoise Hardy 2018). In the meantime … we can live as if we knew, even though we don’t and cannot.

These are the values for the healing of spirit and community in history.

What is now proved was once only imagined.
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